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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis aims to examine the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the 
banking sector in Thailand (mainly the bank lending channel, firm balance sheet channel and 
the interest rate channel) and also to investigate the effect of financial development on these 
channels. We first examine the bank lending channel by introducing a micro data based study 
(bank panel-level data) and using panel data estimation (fix effect, 2SLS, and GMM 
estimation). The results show a negative effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans. We 
find that the higher the bank size, liquidity and capitalization, the weaker the effect of the 
policy interest rate via the bank lending channel. The second chapter investigates the firm 
balance sheet channel by examining the effect of firms’ financial condition on their 
investment and using GMM estimation. We find the significant effect of firms’ balance sheet 
condition on the firms’ investment and also find that the less financial constraint of firms, the 
weaker the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance sheet channel than the more 
financially constrained ones. The third chapter examines the interest rate channel by focusing 
on interest rate pass-through. Our VECM results show the incomplete pass-through with a 
relatively high degree in the long-run than the short-run. We find that banking sector 
development, capital market development, financial liberalization, financial innovation and 
financial competition cause a weaker effect of the policy interest rate via the bank lending 
channel and the firm balance sheet channel.  However, all of these different aspects of 
financial development (except banking sector development) have a stronger effect on interest 
rate pass-through and consequently strengthen the interest channel.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The topic of monetary policy transmission has been the subject of considerable research and 
is an interesting and controversial issue for policy makers. This is because of its importance in 
explaining the way in which monetary policy passes through to the real economy via different 
channels. There are four main ways which monetary policy affects the economy: (1) the 
interest rate channel, (2) the credit channel, (3) the asset price channel, and (4) the exchange 
rate channel. Figure 1.1 illustrates this monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
Figure 1.1:  Main channels of monetary policy transmission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of England (1999) and Mishkin (1999).  
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In the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission, monetary policy (policy interest 
rate) will have an effect on market interest rates and retail interest rates. This will affect the 
cost of capital, investment and consumption spending, and hence influencing on aggregate 
demand and output (Bank of England, 1999; Mishkin, 1999). The credit channel describes the 
way in which monetary policy passes through to the real economy via loan supply. A change 
in the policy interest rate will lead to an effect on loan supply, resulting in a change in the 
investment and consumer spending of firms and households, thus affecting the real economy 
(Mishkin, 1999; Hubbard, 1995). The effect of monetary policy via the credit channel also 
passes through to the balance sheet of firms as a change in policy interest rate will affect their 
cash flow and balance sheet strength (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The change in the 
financial condition of firms will influence on their investment spending, aggregate demand 
and output. Monetary policy can also affect the economy via the asset price channel. This 
channel explains that a change in the policy interest rate can lead to an effect on market 
interest rates as well as the market value or the return of bonds relative to equities. This 
influences on the demand for equities and equity prices. This condition can also lead to a 
change in the market value of firms or the q ratio (the proportion of firms’ market value 
relative to the replacement cost of physical capital), hence affecting investment spending and 
aggregate output (Bank of England, 1999; Mishkin, 1996). A change in stock prices will also 
influence on the financial wealth of households and hence affecting consumer spending, 
which will pass through to a change in aggregate output and inflation (Ireland, 2006). Another 
channel of monetary policy transmission is the exchange rate channel. A change in the policy 
interest rate will also have an influence on the domestic interest rate relative to the foreign 
interest rate, affecting investment returns in foreign countries relative to the returns in the 
domestic country (Arestis and Sawyer, 2002; Mishkin, 1999). This condition causes a change 
 3 
 
in capital outflow and the exchange rate and influences on the net export and aggregate output 
in the economy (Bank of England, 1999). 
 
The channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector and the credit 
view of the transmission have been considered to be an important issue in many studies of 
monetary policy in recent decades. The significance of this study derives from the important 
role of financial intermediaries (the banking sector and financial institutions) in the financial 
market. Banks play an important role in solving the asymmetric information problem by 
reducing agency, transaction and search costs between lenders (banks) and borrowers (firms 
and households) (Hall, 2001; Mishkin, 2013). This is due to the informational economies of 
scale in financial institutions, leading to the low cost of assessment of information on 
borrowers (Heffernan, 1996, 2005; Kashyap and Stein, 1993; Mishkin, 2013). Allen and 
Santomero (2001), Heffernan (1996, 2005), Mishkin (2013) and Hermes and Lensink (1996) 
explain the importance of banks in terms of the risk diversification approach, as banks can 
diversify and reduce risks in financial market transactions. This can be seen in risk 
management techniques, such as the use of options, swaps and other derivatives, the use of 
asset securitisation, and banks’ off-balance sheet approach (mortgage backed securities and 
certificate of deposits) (Mishkin, 2013). Risk diversification also leads to an improvement in 
the saving allocation between economic agents, so financial institutions also play a significant 
role in supporting economic growth (Levine, 1997). 
 
Therefore, the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector are 
considered to be an interesting and significant aspect of the study of this transmission due to 
 4 
 
the important role of the banking sector in the financial market and the economy. Berg et al. 
(2005) state that there are three main channels of monetary policy transmission which will 
pass through to the economy via the banking sector: (1) the interest rate channel, (2) the bank 
lending channel, and (3) the balance sheet channel. These are illustrated in figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2:  Channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Berg et al. (2005). 
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Berg et al. (2005) state that the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission is related 
to the banking sector via the effect of interest rate pass-through. Thus, a change in the policy 
interest rate (monetary policy shock) will pass through to affect the banking sector via the 
money market rates and the commercial bank retail interest rates (retail interest rate). This 
results in a change in bank loan supply and demand and thus affects investment and the 
economy. The credit channel comprises the bank lending and balance sheet channels and they 
also show that the effect of the policy interest rate will pass through to influence bank loans as 
well as bank and firm balance sheets (their net worth and cash flow) respectively. In this way, 
the effect of monetary policy on these three channels also leads to a change in bank loan 
supply and demand and hence affects investment, aggregate demand and economic growth 
(Berg et al., 2005). Overall, the banking sector and bank credits play an important role via 
these three main channels of monetary policy transmission. This is because a change in 
monetary policy through these channels will affect the banking sector and bank credits 
(commercial bank interest rate, bank lending supply and bank lending demand) and hence 
affect investment, aggregate demand and the economy (Berg et al., 2005). Therefore, this 
thesis will focus on the study of these three channels in order to examine the role of monetary 
policy on the banking sector and the economy. This is due to the important role of the banking 
sector in the financial market and economy, as well as the significance of these three main 
channels, which explain the effect of monetary policy through the banks. 
  
The idea of financial development is another important aspect of the study of monetary policy 
transmission. Development in the financial market can be seen in many different aspects, 
including banking sector and capital market development, financial liberalization, financial 
innovation, financial competition and financial deepening (Singh et al., 2008). These 
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developments in the financial market can lead to important influences on the banking sector 
and credit market, as well as affecting the roles which the financial institutions and banking 
sector play in the financial market, economic agents (firms and households), and in the 
economy (Peek and Rosengren, 1995a; Kashyap and Stein, 1993; Walsh and Wilcox, 1995; 
Worms, 2001; Altunbas et al., 2009a; Smant, 2002). Therefore, it is also interesting and 
important to study the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector. This is because of the importance of financial 
development on the banking sector and credit market. Thus, this area of study can give us 
significant insight into the way in which the monetary policy passes through to the economy 
via the banking sector, as well as the impact of the financial development on these channels. 
Study of this issue can also be used as policy implications by policy makers to control the 
economy during the financial development period.  
 
There have been various past and recent studies of the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector. However, studies which take into account the 
effect of financial development on monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector 
are still limited and broadly focus on developed countries, such as the US and European ones. 
This results in a lack of studies focussing on developing countries. Consequently, it is 
interesting to study the effect of financial development by using a case study of a developing 
country. Because of this gap in the research, this thesis will examine the channels of monetary 
policy transmission relating to the banking sector as well as the effect of financial 
development on these channels by using Thailand as a case study of a developing country. 
Thailand was also the country of origin of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which started 
with a highly speculative attack on the Thai baht, leading to a sharp devaluation of the 
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currency, caused by the change from the fixed exchange rate system to the managed float 
system in July 1997 (Bank of Thailand, thereafter BOT, 1997; Supachet, 2005; Nidhiprabha, 
1999). This situation caused a sharp fall in economic growth and investment in the capital 
market as well as mainly affecting the Thai financial sectors, before spreading to other Asian 
countries (BOT, 1997). As Thailand was the country of origin of the Asian financial crisis, 
there are several controversial issues concerning the cause of the crisis. One important cause 
was claimed to have been financial liberalization and the financial development which took 
place before the 1997 period (from 1990 to 1995). A relaxation of financial controls caused 
by financial liberalization and other financial development plans rapidly increased domestic 
and foreign debts, as well as jeopardizing risky investment projects and other less productive 
sectors (real estate and securities) (Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). This caused an asset 
price bubble and a low quality of financial institution and business sector balance sheets, 
leading to a weakness of the financial sector (Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007)1. This 
condition consequently accelerated the financial crisis, when there was a speculative attack 
and collapse of the asset price bubble in the country during 1997. For this reason, it is 
worthwhile to conduct a case study of Thailand in order to explore how financial development 
affects the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector. The 
results from this study will have important policy implications for the government and the 
Bank of Thailand, indicating how monetary policy affects the banking sector and also how 
financial development affects the sector and the economy. Consequently, policy makers can 
enact appropriate monetary policy during the period of financial development to prevent an 
ongoing financial sector and banking sector crisis in the future, as well as achieving the 
economic policy goals of the country (sustainable economic growth rate and price stability). 
                                                          
1
 The details of this will be described in chapter 3. 
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In addition, the financial institutions and economic agents (business sectors and households) 
in Thailand will have a better understanding of the way in which financial development and 
monetary policy shock affect their agents and the banking sector. This results in the benefit of 
being prepared for monetary policy shock and other changes which are a consequence of 
financial sector development. 
 
1.2 Research objectives  
 
The main aims of the thesis are to examine the channels of monetary policy transmission by 
focusing on those channels which relate to the banking sector (bank lending channel, firm 
balance sheet channel and the interest rate channel), as well as investigating the effect of 
financial development on these channels in Thailand. We will therefore divide the research 
objectives into three important areas, representing the study of three significant channels of 
monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector (the bank lending channel, the 
bank balance sheet channel and the interest rate channel). The first area of the study aims to 
explore the bank lending channel and examines the effect of financial development on the 
channel in Thailand. Because of the lack of studies of the bank lending channel from the 
micro data based perspective which take into account a panel data based study as well as the 
effect of different bank characteristics (bank size, capitalization and liquidity) on the bank 
lending channel in developing countries (as discussed in chapters 2 and 4), we will investigate 
the bank lending channel in Thailand by focusing on a micro data based study. We also study 
the effect of financial development by dividing this effect on the bank lending channel into 
five different issues: financial liberalization, financial competition, financial innovation, 
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capital market development and banking sector development. The first area of study is mainly 
discussed in chapter 4 of the thesis.  
 
The second area of the thesis will focus on the second aspect of the channels of monetary 
policy transmission relating to the banking sector, namely the balance sheet channel. As this 
channel can be explored from two aspects, the lenders (bank balance sheet channel) and 
borrowers (firm balance sheet channel), various past studies have largely focussed on the 
lenders' approach, leaving a gap in the study of the borrowers' approach, especially in 
developing countries. Therefore, the second area of this study will examine the firm balance 
sheet channel in Thailand. This is carried out by studying the effect of firms’ financial 
condition on their investment in order to prove the existence of their balance sheet channel. 
We will also investigate the effect of different financial constraints (firm size, leverage, 
dividend payout and cash flow) on firm investment in order to take into account the effect of 
different financial conditions of firms on the firm balance sheet channel. Furthermore, we will 
examine the effect of financial development on the firm balance sheet channel by examining 
the effect of different aspects of this development (as in the first area of study presented 
previously) on this channel. The second area of study is mainly discussed in chapter 5 of the 
thesis. 
 
The third area of study explores another channel of monetary policy transmission relating to 
the banking sector which is the interest rate channel. This part of the study is conducted by 
investigating interest rate pass-through in Thailand in both the short- and long-run, in order to 
obtain an idea of how the monetary policy interest rate affects commercial bank retail interest 
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rates. Furthermore, this area of study examines the effect of different aspects of financial 
development (the same aspects as presented previously) on interest rate pass-through in 
Thailand. This area of study is mainly discussed in chapter 6 of the thesis.  
 
1.3 Research contribution 
 
This thesis makes several main contributions, as summarized below. 
(1) Previous studies of the channels monetary policy transmission relating to the banking 
sector have ignored the effect of financial development on these channels, especially in 
developing countries. This thesis fills this gap, as it not only aims to examine the channels of 
monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector, but also studies the effect of 
financial development on these channels by using the case study of Thailand as a developing 
country.  
 
(2) The effect of different aspects of financial development (financial liberalization, financial 
competition, financial innovation, financial deepening, and banking sector and capital market 
development) on the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector 
will be investigated. The study therefore also fills another gap in past empirical papers, which 
only focus on a few aspects of financial development on monetary policy transmission, such 
as financial liberalization and financial competition.  
 
(3) This thesis is the first study of Thailand which introduces the effect of different aspects of 
financial development on monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector. In 
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addition, it is the first case study of Thailand to introduce different financial development 
indicators to examine the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector. In addition, study of an individual country can 
also control for the different structures of economic and financial backgrounds, which can be 
a problem when investigating multiple countries. 
 
(4) The study investigates the bank lending and the balance sheet channels by using a micro 
data based approach (study of bank and firm panel data).  This also compensates for the lack 
of past empirical papers in this area, which mainly use time series data in their studies, 
especially in developing countries and Thailand.  
 
1.4 Data sample and research methodology 
 
Different methodologies and data sets will be used in this thesis depending on the different 
areas of study mentioned in the research objective section. The first area of study (chapter 4), 
which is the study of the bank lending channel and the effect of financial development on this 
channel in Thailand, will be conducted by making a panel data based study of commercial 
bank level data in Thailand from the period 1978 to 2008.  These data are obtained from the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (thereafter, SET) database and the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets 
(thereafter PACAP) database2. The financial development indicator in Thailand is obtained 
from Beck et al.'s (1999) database, the PACAP database, and the Bank of Thailand database. 
We use three main types of panel data estimations in this study: (1) fixed effect estimation, (2) 
two states least square estimation (2SLS estimation) and (3) dynamic panel data (Generalised 
                                                          
2
 The PACAP database is the database subscription which provided the balance sheet statement data of financial 
and non-financial institutions in countries in the Pacific-Basin market. We use this database for the balance sheet 
data of banks and firms in Thailand listed on the SET from 1978 to 1996. 
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Method of Moments Estimator, thereafter GMM estimation) in order to check for the 
robustness of the results. The econometrics package used in the first area of the study is 
STATA version 12.  
 
The second area of study (chapter 5), which is the study of the firm balance sheet channel and 
the effect of financial development on the channel in Thailand, will be conducted by applying 
the annual non-financial firm balance sheet data from 1978 to 2008. The five different aspects 
of the financial development indicators are also applied in this study in the same period. The 
firm level data comes from the SET and the PACAP database, and the financial development 
indicator is obtained from the same database as in chapter 4. The methodology employed is 
the dynamic panel data approach (GMM estimation) by using both first difference GMM 
estimation and system GMM estimation to compare and confirm the robustness of the results. 
The econometrics package used is STATA version 12.  
 
The final area of study (chapter 6) considers interest rate pass-through and the effect of 
financial development on the pass-through in Thailand. This study is made by using the 
quarterly time series data from the same period, 1978Q1 to 2008Q4, of the commercial bank 
retail interest rates in Thailand (the lending and deposit interest rates), as well as the policy 
interest rate (14 day repurchase market interest rate). The same financial development 
indicators as presented previously are used in this study. The methodology used in this section 
is the Johansen cointegration approach and the econometrics package used is Pcgives version 
13.10. All the data sources in this study were obtained from the Bank of Thailand database. 
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The financial development indicator data were obtained from the Bank of Thailand and Beck 
et al. (1999) databases.  
 
1.5 Organisation of the study 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature survey of both 
the theoretical and empirical issues of the channels of monetary policy transmission relating 
to the banking sector, as well as the effect of financial development on these channels. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the economic conditions, the financial institutions and the financial 
development background of Thailand. The main empirical section will start in chapter 4, 
which examines the bank lending channel in Thailand by mainly focusing on a micro data 
based study of this channel. Subsequently, the different aspects of the financial development 
indicators will be introduced into the study to investigate the effect of different aspects of 
financial development on the bank lending channel. Chapter 5 will examine the firm balance 
sheet channel in Thailand as well as the effect of the five different aspects of financial 
development on the channel. Chapter 6 presents a study of interest rate pass-through in 
Thailand, in addition to the effect of different aspects of financial sector development on the 
pass-through. Chapter 7 comprises the conclusion of the thesis and its limitations and makes 
suggestions for further study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the channels of monetary policy transmission 
related to the banking sector and to investigate the effect of financial development on these 
channels. Therefore, this chapter will review the literature on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission related to the banking sector as well as the impact of financial development on 
these channels. The literature survey will be organised as follows: Section 2.2 will review the 
theoretical concept of the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking 
sector. Section 2.3 will survey the empirical study of these channels. Section 2.4 will explain 
the financial development concept. Section 2.5 will review the literature on the effect of 
financial development on the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking 
sector and section 2.6 draws conclusions and makes suggestions for further research.  
 
2.2 Monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector 
 
This thesis will mainly focus on the study of the channels of monetary policy transmission 
which relate to the banking sector: (1) the interest rate channel, (2) the bank lending channel 
and (3) the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. This section will explore 
the theoretical concept of these three main channels.  
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2.2.1 Interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission 
 
The interest rate channel explains the effect of the policy interest rate, which will pass through 
to the market interest rate, retail interest rates and then affect the real economy (aggregate 
output). Kusmiarso et al. (2002) state that when the central bank uses a contractionary 
monetary policy via an increase in the policy interest rate, it will cause a rise in the short-term 
money market rate and then result in an increase in the short-term retail interest rate. Due to 
price stickiness, the increase in the short-term nominal interest rates will lead to a rise in the 
short-term real interest rates (Mishkin, 1996). In addition, because of the expectations 
hypothesis of the interest rate term structure, a rise in the short-term real interest rate will 
cause an increase in the long-term real interest rate, as the average expectation of future short-
term interest rates is considered as the long-term interest rates (Mishkin, 1996; Kusmiarso et 
al., 2002; Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 2011). Thus, an increase in the real interest rate causes a 
rise in the cost of capital and hence decreases investment spending, aggregate demand and 
aggregate output (Kusmiarso et al, 2002; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007). Berg et al. (2005) and 
Markovic (2005) demonstrate the role of the interest rate channel on financial intermediation 
(the banking sector) and credit supply. This role is explained by interest rate pass-through, as 
an increase in the policy interest rate will affect the banking sector by increasing bank retail 
interest rates (deposit rate and lending rate) (Berg et al., 2005). This causes a reduction in loan 
demand and loan supply and thus decreases investment spending and aggregate demand.  
 
An increase in the real interest rate will also affect consumer spending. This process is 
explained by the income effect and the substitution effect of the interest rate channel. 
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Kusmiarso et al. (2002) point out that an increase in the real interest rate can cause an increase 
in the return on saving as well as a reduction in the future costs of consumption. This results 
in the postponement of consumption and will therefore lower the consumption of non-durable 
goods and aggregate output (the substitution effect) (Kusmiarso et al., 2002). The income 
effect can explain the effect in terms of borrowers and creditors. If the economic agents are 
borrowers, an increase in the real interest rate can also lead to a decrease in consumption 
expenditure due to a reduction in future discounted income and the cash flow of consumers 
(Kusmiarso et al., 2002; Meltzer, 1995). However, if the economic agents are creditors, an 
increase in the real interest rate will cause an increase in their wealth and thus increase 
consumption expenditure (Kusmiarso et al., 2002; Egert and Macdonald, 2006). Therefore, if 
we consider the interest rate channel via the effect of monetary policy on consumption 
expenditure, the effect of the policy instruments through this channel will depend on which 
effects (substitution effect, income effect in term of borrowers, and income effect in term of 
lenders) have more influence on the interest rate channel. 
 
Overall, the effect of monetary policy through the interest rate channel can represented as one 
of the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector, as the effect of 
the policy interest rate (monetary policy shock) will pass through to the banking sector via the 
effect on the money market rates and the commercial bank retail interest rates (retail interest 
rate). This also results in an effect on bank loan demand and supply and thus affects 
investment and the economy. 
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2.2.2 Credit channel of monetary policy transmission 
 
Four assumptions of this channel should be considered in order to study the credit channel 
theory: (1) the bank loan supply has been influenced by the central banks (Ghazali and 
Rahman, 2001; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993); (2) banks are the main source of funds for 
borrowers and firms (Butkiewicz and Ozdogan, 2009; Ghazali and Rahman, 2001); (3) there 
is an imperfect substitution between loans and other sources of funds (such as bonds and other 
securities) (Brissimis and Delis, 2009; Favero et al., 1999; Butkiewicz and Ozdogan, 2009); 
and (4) there is a stickiness in the nominal price which causes an impact of the monetary 
policy on real economic activities via the credit channel (Peek and Rosengren, 1995b; Gupta, 
2004).  
 
The credit channel of monetary policy transmission can be divided into two channels: the 
lending channel (narrow credit channel) (2.2.2.1) and the balance sheet channel (broad credit 
channel) (2.2.2.2). 
 
2.2.2.1 Lending channel (narrow credit channel) 
 
The lending channel explains the impact of monetary policy shock on the economy through 
the effect on both the assets and liability of banks. According to Mishkin (1996), Hubbard 
(1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000), the use of contractionary monetary policy by increasing 
reserve requirements will lead to a decrease in bank reserves and deposits (liability side), 
resulting in a reduction in the quantity of bank loans (asset side). This condition happens as a 
consequence of an imperfect substitution of loans and other sources of funds. Moreover, the 
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central banks also use the policy interest rate as an instrument to conduct monetary policy. 
Mishkin (1996) states that contractionary monetary policy via an increase in the policy 
interest rate (usually the short-term money market interest rate) will lead to a rise in the 
market interest rate and a reduction in the money supply in the economy, thereby causing a 
reduction in bank loans. This leads to a decrease in the investment and consumer spending of 
household and firms due to the major dependence of borrowers and firms on bank funding, 
hence lowering aggregate demand and aggregate output (Mishkin, 1996; Ireland, 2006; 
Chakravarty, 1971; Haan, 2001).  
 
2.2.2.2 Balance sheet channel (broad credit channel) 
 
Monetary policy shock will affect the economy via the effect of loan supply in the bank 
lending channel. However, the external finance premium and the financial position of lenders 
and borrowers (their net worth and cash flow) are crucially focused on the effect of monetary 
policy shock through the balance sheet channel (Agung et al., 2002b; Engler and Macdonald, 
2006). In this case, contractionary monetary policy (an increase in the policy interest rate) will 
result in a reduction in the net cash flows in the balance sheet of firms (Mishkin, 1996; De 
Oliveira and Ramos, 2008). This causes a decrease in firms’ collateral value and thus lowers 
net worth and weakens the balance sheet condition (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Wesche, 
2000; Kim, 1999; De Oliveira, 2006; Ireland, 2008; Mies and Tapia, 2003).  
 
A weak firm balance sheet will result in the higher possibility of moral hazard and an adverse 
selection problem between banks and firms, as well as an increase in the monitoring and 
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screening cost of lenders (Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Wesche, 2000; Mishkin, 2007; Loayza 
and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). This is due to the lower net worth, and a deterioration in firms’ 
balance sheets will probably lead to the higher possibility of firms investing in risky 
investment projects, raising their default risk and thus increasing credit rationing (Simatele, 
2004; De Oliveira, 2006; Agung, et al., 2002b). This situation creates the risk premium 
charged by lenders or banks to prevent the asymmetric information problem.  
 
Consequently, an increase in the policy interest rate will weakens firms’ balance sheet 
condition and increases the risk premium of banks, causing a higher increase in firms’ 
external funding cost compared with internal funding cost and thus raising the external 
finance premium of firms (the wedge between the external funding cost and internal funding 
cost of firms) (Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002b; Ciccarelli et al., 2009; Cecchetti, 
1995,1999; Peek and Rosengren, 1995b; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke et al.,1996). 
This condition will be followed by a drop in the loan demand of firms (their bank borrowing), 
hence reducing their investment spending, which will pass through to a reduction in 
aggregated demand, output, and inflation in the economy (Go mez-Gonza lez and Grosz, 2007; 
Ogawa, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2009).  
 
The graphical model shown in figure 2.1 explains the effect of monetary policy shock on the 
balance sheet channel via the external finance premium. This model is found in many studies, 
such as Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a), Hall (2001), Gertler and Rose (1996), Agung et al. 
(2002b), Hubbard (1998), and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995). 
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Figure 2.1: Graphical explanation of the effect of monetary policy shock on the balance sheet channel via 
the external finance premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a).  
In figure 2.1, D is the curve for demand for funds and S is the curve for the supply of funds by 
firms. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) explain that when there is perfect information in the 
credit market, there is the borrowers’ internal fund (F), the borrowers’ external fund (I 0 -F), 
and the internal funding cost (r 0 ), which is the combination of the risk free interest rate (r
f ) 
and the risk adjustment cost (  ). The equilibrium point in this case is at point A, which is the 
intersection between the flat supply of funds curve (r 0 A) and demand for funds (D 0 ). In 
reality, the financial market is considered as a market with imperfect information, which 
causes lenders to charge the premium for external funding for borrowers (BC), hence 
resulting in an upward slope in the supply of funds curve (S 0 ) from the beginning point of J 
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the equilibrium from A (in the case of perfect information) to B and a drop in the investment 
level from I 0 to I1. The higher the firms’ borrowing, the greater the external finance premium, 
thereby representing the upward slope of the supply of funds curve (Agung et al., 2002b; Peek 
and Rosengren, 1995b; Agung, 1999). In addition, the higher the risk free rate (r f ), the 
greater the external finance premium. This is due to a reduction in the borrowers’ collateral 
discount value caused by a rise in the risk free rate, thereby leading to a rise in the external 
finance premium to protect the moral hazard problem (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a). 
Therefore, we can write the external finance premium function as  
  =  (r f , I-F)                  (2.1) 
where firms’ borrowing (I-F) and the risk free rate (r f ) have a positive effect on the external 
finance premium ( ).  
According to Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) and Agung et al. (2002b), the function of the total 
cost of funds can be written as  
                 r = r 0 + (r
f , I-F)    (2.2) 
A contractionary monetary policy will cause a rise in the risk free rate (r f ) according to the 
broad credit channel, thus leading to a rise in the total cost of funds (r) equal to 
ff rr
r




 0  
(Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a). This condition causes a decrease in the supply of funds, 
shown by the upward shift in the supply of funds curve from S 0 to S1, which reflects the 
change in the risk free rate. Additionally, the contractionary monetary policy will cause a drop 
in the net worth and collateral value of borrowers as well as a higher possibility of moral 
harzard and adverse selection problem.This leads to a rise in the external finance premium of 
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firms and thus causes a change in the supply of funds curve from S1 to S2 (Gertler and Rose, 
1996; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995). Therefore, this causes a total effect, represented by an 
upward shift in the supply of funds curve from S 0 to S 2  (with a steeper curve in S 2 ). This 
leads to a rise in firms' external funding premium from BC to EH and a reduction in the 
investment level of firms from I 1  to I 2 .  
 
We already stated previously that a decrease in firms’ net worth and a rise in the external 
finance premium will eventually have an effect on the economy (a reduction in firms’ 
investment and output). Bernanke et al. (1996), Bernanke (2007), Lunnemann and Matha 
(2001), Georgopouls and Hejazi (2009), and Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007) state that this 
process is called the financial accelerator effect, as the financial conditions (cash flow, net 
worth and balance sheet status of borrowers, and the external finance premium) have a pro-
cyclical effect on the real economy (firms’ investment).   
 
2.3 Empirical studies of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector 
 
This section will be divided into two main sub-sections: empirical studies of the macro data 
based aspect (2.3.1) and those of the micro data based aspect (2.3.2).  
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2.3.1 Empirical studies of the macro data based aspect of the channels of monetary 
policy transmission relating to the banking sector 
 
The empirical studies of the macro data based aspect mainly use time series data in their 
studies. Walsh and Wilcox (1995) examine the lending channel in the USA by applying the 
VARs technique. Their results show the negative effect of the policy interest rate on the 
industrial production index, aggregate bank loans and CPI, as well as the positive effect of 
bank loans on output variables. Their findings support the theoretical view of the lending 
channel. Using the VARs technique, Kashyap et al. (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Oliner 
and Rudebush (1996b), Romer et al. (1990), Haan (2007), Den Haan et al. (2007), and 
Aslanidi (2007) also found a negative impact of monetary policy shock on bank loans in the 
USA. Other studies of the lending channel in developed countries which also apply aggregate 
data (short-term money market rate, bank loans, GDP and CPI) include those of Küppers 
(2001), Holtemoller (2002), Hulsewig et al. (2005), and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) in 
Germany, Garretsen and Swank (2003) and Kakes (1998) in the Netherlands, Giannone et al. 
(2009) and Barran et al. (1996) in European countries, and Kim (1999) in Korea. Their 
findings are also in line with the theoretical aspect of the lending channel as they mainly 
found the negative effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) investigate both the bank lending and the balance sheet channels 
in the USA and their VARs results show a negative effect of the Fed fund rate on the bank 
balance sheet variables (aggregate commercial bank loans, deposits and securities), hence 
supporting the theoretical view of the credit channel. Similar results are also reported by 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Weber et al. (2009), Cechetti 
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(1995), Carpenter and Demiralp (2009), Kashyap and Stein (1994a), and Sousa (2009) from 
VARs studies of the US balance sheet channel. Bacchetta and Ballabriga (2000) examine the 
bank lending and the balance sheet channels in 14 European countries and find a reduction in 
the bank balance sheet variables (deposits and loans) and output variables (CPI and industrial 
production) after the shock of the short-term interest rate. Macro aspect studies of the balance 
sheet channel in developed countries include those by Gupta (2004) and Chakravarty (1971) 
in India, Smant (2002) in Germany, Ferri and Kang (1999) in Korea, Wesche (2008) in 
Austria, and Dale and Haldane (1995) in the UK. 
 
Angeloni et al. (2002), Bory et al. (2009), and Dale and Haldane (1995) examine the interest 
rate channel in the Euro area, Czech Republic, and UK respectively and their VARs results 
confirm the interest rate channel theory, as they show that the policy interest rate has a 
positive effect on the money market interest rate and a negative effect on GDP and 
investment. Supporting evidence for the interest rate channel is also found in the studies by 
Chong et al. (2006) in Singapore. Several studies in developed countries also examine the 
interest rate channel by investigating interest rate pass-through (Lowe and Rohling, 1992; 
Hansen and Welz, 2011; Liu et al., 2005; Bolt and Labondance, 2011; Belke et al., 2012; 
Toolsema et al., 2002; Mojon, 2000; Karagiannis et al., 2011; De Bondt, 2002; Crespo-
Cuaresma et al., 2006). Their findings also show the positive effect of the policy interest rate 
on retail interest rates and hence support the theoretical aspect of the interest rate channel. 
Aleem (2009) found that the policy interest rate has a positive effect on the money market rate 
and a negative effect on aggregate credit, hence supporting the theoretical view of both the 
bank lending and interest rate channels. Studies using aggregate data to examine both the 
bank lending channel and interest rate channel include studies of the Euro area (Héricourt, 
 25 
 
2006; Weber et al., 2008; Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2003), of Korea (Pobré, 2003), of Poland 
(Lyziak et al., 2008) and of Singapore (Weber et al., 2009).  
 
In a study of developing countries, Gupta (2003) shows the negative response of the aggregate 
credit and output variables on the shock of the monetary policy instrument in Brazil and 
Turkey. Agung (1998) uses the SVARs method and his results confirm the theory of the 
balance sheet and lending channels in Indonesia, as the bank balance sheet variables 
(aggregate bank loans, deposits and securities) and macroeconomic variables (real GDP and 
GDP deflator) have a negative response to a shock of the short-term money market interest 
rate. Other studies in developing countries which also support the theoretical view of the 
credit channel include those by Raghavan and Silvapulle (2012) and Kassim and Abdul-
Manap (2008) in Malaysia; Gupta (2004) in Pakistan; Sheng and Wu (2009) in China; Islam 
and Rajan (2009) in India; Younus (2005) in Bangladesh,; Zulverdi et al. (2006) in Indonesia; 
Krstevska (2008) in Macedonia; Jayaraman and Choong (2008) in Fiji; Alam and Waheed 
(2006) in Pakistan; Robinson and Robinson (1997) in Jamaica; and Boughrara (2009) in 
Morocco and Tunisia.  
 
Raghavan and Silvapulle (2012) and Fung (2002) study monetary policy transmission in 
Malaysia and East Asian countries during the pre-and post-financial crisis periods and they 
conclude that there is a stronger effect of the policy interest rate on the output variables during 
the post-crisis period. Kuijs (2002), Mohanty (2012), Samkharadze (2008), and Carrasquilla 
et al. (2008) found a significant effect of policy interest rate shock on aggregate output and 
prices in the Slovak Republic, India, Georgia, and Columbia respectively. This confirms the 
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existence of the interest rate channel. Study of the interest rate channel can be made by 
examining interest rate pass-through; this can be widely seen in several evidence studies in 
developing countries (Fomum, 2011; Amarasekara, 2005; Acheampong, 2005; Chirlesan and 
Aposstoaie, 2012; Bogoev and Petrevski, 2012; Kusmiarso et al., 2002; Aydin, 2010; Tai et 
al., 2012; Scholnick, 1996). Uanguta and Ikhide (2002) support the theoretical view of the 
lending and interest rate channels in Namibia, as there is a significant negative effect of the 
repo rate on aggregate bank credit, CPI and private investment, as well as an effect of the 
policy rate on the short-term lending rate and output variables. Supporting evidence for the 
bank lending and interest rate channel can be found in Afandi (2005), Bhattacharyya and 
Sensarma (2008), and Butkiewicz and Ozdogan (2009) in their case studies of Indonesia, 
India, and Turkey respectively. They found a significant effect of policy interest rate on 
aggregate credit, output and money market interest rates. Studies of developing countries 
concerning both the interest rate and credit channels can be seen in Hung and Pfau (2008) in 
Vietnam, Pobré (2003) in the Philippines, and Aslanidi (2007) in Georgia.  
 
For the studies in Thailand, Atchariyachanvanich (2004) examines the lending channel in the 
ASIA-5 countries (including Thailand) and the results from the VAR technique mainly 
indicate a negative effect of the short-term interest rate on the aggregate bank lending rate and 
output variables, thus confirming the lending channel theory. Kubo (2008) studies the credit 
channel in Thailand and his SVARs results indicate a negative response of the credit and real 
economic variables (CPI, PPI and the industrial production index) on the monetary policy 
instrument, supporting the lending channel theory. Similar results from Thailand are obtained 
by Jayaraman and Choong (2008). Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003), Sriphayakand and 
Vongsinsirikul (2007) and Subhanij (2000) examine the Thai lending and interest rate 
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channels and their outcomes also confirm the theoretical aspect of the lending channel, as they 
found a negative effect of the policy rate on GDP, CPI and bank loans. Their Engle-Granger 2 
step procedure also shows a positive degree of pass-through of policy interest rate on bank 
retail rates, supporting the interest rate channel theory. Charoenseang and Manakit (2007) and 
Pobre (2003) focus on the study of the bank lending and interest rate channels in Thailand and 
their VECM results show a negative effect of the policy rate on commercial bank loans, as 
well as the long-run pass-through of the policy rate on the bank lending rate.  
 
2.3.2 Empirical studies of the micro aspect of the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector 
 
The empirical studies of the macro aspect presented previously only employ aggregate time 
series data (aggregate bank balance sheet variables and aggregate macroeconomic variables) 
to examine monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector. Many researches point 
out that there is an identification problem associated with the use of aggregate data (the study 
of the macro aspect) due to the lack of distinction between the effect of monetary policy 
shock on the supply side (bank loan supply) and on the demand side (the demand for loans 
from firms and households), which is called the supply-versus-demand puzzle (Wibowo, 
2005; Chatelain et al., 2001; Agung et al., 2002a; Gupta, 2004; Kakes, 1998). This problem is 
frequently found in studies of the lending and the balance sheet channels. Garretsen and 
Swank (2003), Hosono (2006), Altunbas et al. (2009b) and Hernando and Martinex-Pagés 
(2001) state that the credit channel should be examined in micro data based study by using 
panel level data (bank and firm panel level data) in order to distinguish between the supply 
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and demand effect of bank loans. The characteristics of lenders and borrowers (bank and firm 
size, liquidity and capitalization) are also used in micro data based study in order to control 
for the banks’ and firms’ heterogeneity. Therefore, this section will review the empirical 
literature on the micro data based aspect of monetary policy transmission relating to the 
banking sector.  
 
By applying bank characteristics such as size, liquidity and capitalization, Kishan and Opiela 
(2000) and Altunbas et al. (2002) found a weaker effect of the policy interest rate on bank 
loans via the bank lending channel in highly capitalized and large banks, compared with the 
low-capitalized and small ones, in the USA, and the Euro area respectively. They conclude 
that the larger the bank size and capitalization, the weaker the effect of policy interest rate via 
the bank lending channel. The studies of the lending channel in European countries by Favero 
et al. (1999) and Ehrmann et al. (2001) conclude that there is a weaker effect of policy 
interest rate on bank loans in large and highly liquid banks. In addition, the studies of 
European countries by Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Haan (2001) and Altunbas et al. 
(2009b) found a weakening of the bank lending channel in large, highly liquid and well 
capitalized banks. Other studies of developed countries which apply the bank characteristic 
variable include Hosono (2006) in Japan; Topi and Vilmunen (2001) in Finland; Pruteanu-
Podpiera (2007) in Czech Republic; Loupias et al. (2002) in France; and Farinha and 
Marques (2001) in Portugal. Studies of developing countries include that of Agung et al. 
(2002a), who found that poor bank capitalization results in a greater effect of the policy rate 
on bank loans in Indonesia. De Oliveira and Ramos (2008) conclude that there is a weaker 
effect of policy interest rate via the bank lending channel in large and highly liquid banks in 
Brazil. Sichei (2005) and Alfaro et al. (2003) investigate both the bank lending and balance 
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sheet channels in South Africa and show that higher bank size and capitalization can lead to a 
weaker effect of the policy rate on bank loans and securities. In a study of Thailand, 
Piyavongpinyo (2002) found that monetary policy will have less effect on large banks than 
small ones.  
 
For the study of firm characteristics, studies of developed countries by Oliner and Rudebusch 
(1996a) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) in the USA; Gaiotti and Generale (2001) in 
Italy; Wesche (2000) and Valderrama (2001) in Austria; Yamashiro and Uesugi (2006) and 
Kuwayama (1997) in Japan; and Butzen et al. (2001) in Belgium, investigate the firm balance 
sheet channel and show that large firms can access other sources of funds more easily than 
small ones. This results in a less dependence of firms on their internal finance and a weaker 
effect of the policy interest rate through the firm balance channel in large firms. Guariglia 
(1999) shows that the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance sheet channel in the UK 
will be considerably higher in high leverage ratio firms than low leverage ones due to the 
more dependence of high leverage firms on the internal finance. Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007) show that there is a weaker 
balance sheet channel in high dividend firms than low dividend ones in the USA and UK 
respectively. For developing countries, the studies by Carrasquilla (1998) in Columbia, 
Héricourt and Poncet (2007) in China, and Yalcin et al. (2004) in Turkey show that large 
firms can access external funding sources more than small ones and thus there is a weaker 
effect of policy interest rate via the firm balance sheet channel in the large firms. Agung 
(1999) found that monetary policy shock has less effect on large firms with high leverage and 
high dividend payout ratios in Indonesia and thus these firm characteristics will weaken the 
firm balance sheet channel. The same results are also found in the studies by Agung et al. 
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(2002b) in Indonesia and Ber et al. (2002) in Israel. Rungsomboon (2005) shows that large 
and highly liquid firms will have less dependence on their internal finance as these firms can 
obtain other external source of funds. Thus, policy shock in Thailand will weaken the firm 
balance sheet channel in the large and highly liquid firms than the small and low liquid ones. 
 
Overall, most of the empirical studies of monetary policy transmission related to the banking 
sector have focused on macro data based studies. This leaves a gap in micro data based study 
in relation to the panel level data and the characteristic data of banks and firms. In addition, 
this micro data based aspect is mainly focused on developed countries, leaving a lack of 
studies of developing countries, especially of Thailand (Rungsomboon, 2005; Piyavongpinyo, 
2002). Therefore, it would be interesting to study the micro aspects of the lending and 
balance sheet channels in Thailand as a case of a developing country. Moreover, the micro 
data based study of developing countries (including studies of Thailand) mainly focus on the 
size characteristic of firms and banks and do not consider other characteristics (for example, 
the capitalization and liquidity of banks, and the dividend payout ratio and leverage of firms). 
It would therefore be of interest if studies of the micro aspects in the future include different 
types of characteristic variables.  
 
2.4 The financial development concept 
 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to study the effect of financial development on 
monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector. Thus, it is necessary to discuss 
the different perspectives of financial development on which this research focuses. Demirguc-
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Kunt and Levine (2008) state that financial development is the condition in which there is 
development in financial intermediaries, markets, instruments and sectors. This condition will 
lead to an improvement in risk management, trading and allocation of capitals; a reduction in 
information costs; better savings and investments mobilization; and efficiency in the exchange 
of goods and services (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine ,2008). Sen (2010) states that financial 
development is also shown by financial sector efficiency (better mobilization and productive 
use of resources), a development in financial intermediaries, and financial deepening. Singh et 
al. (2008) explain that financial development is the process of financial market development, 
which comprises financial liberalization, deepening, innovation, competition, and structural 
change in the financial system. Therefore, based on these definitions of financial 
development, our discussion will be divided into five main perspectives: financial 
liberalization (2.4.1), financial competition (2.4.2), financial deepening (2.4.3), financial 
innovation (2.4.4) and other structural change (2.4.5).  
 
2.4.1 Financial liberalization 
 
According to Ranciere (2013) and Ucer (1997), financial liberalization involves the process of 
financial sector and market deregulation. The process of financial liberalization which is 
commonly mentioned is interest rate deregulation. Interest rate liberalization includes the 
relaxation of bank lending, deposit rates and other financial interest rate control, and is 
usually referred to as the abandonment of the interest rate ceiling (Jbili et al., 1997; Ucer, 
1997). The liberalization of capital accounts is also involved in the financial liberalization 
process and this is manifested by the deregulation of domestic and foreign capital control, 
deregulation of restrictions on capital inflows-outflows, relaxation of the restrictions on 
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financial institutions’ offshore borrowing and a reduction in transaction taxes (Arestis and 
Caner, 2004; Johnston, 1998). Other financial liberalization processes are mainly shown by 
the removal of banking portfolio restrictions, the deregulation of stock market trading 
restrictions, bank and financial institution privatization, the relaxation of monetary and credit 
control and foreign exchange control liberalization (Baswir, 2013; Arestis and Caner, 2004; 
Ucer, 1997; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003).  
 
2.4.2 Financial competition 
 
Financial competition refers to the competition in financial markets and financial institutions, 
which leads to an increase in the number of financial institutions, a rise in the range of 
financial market instruments, and greater opportunity for consumers to access a variety of 
providers, financial services and financial products (International Monetary Fund, 2005). 
According to Beck et al. (1999), The World Bank (2010) and The International Monetary 
Fund (2005), financial competition also refers to the market structure, the efficiency of the 
financial market and the performance of the financial system. A higher level of financial 
competition can lead to higher efficiency in the financial market and hence results in a higher 
degree of financial development. This is because the greater extent of financial competition 
will lead to a lower cost of providing financial products and services, hence increasing the 
efficiency of the financial market and financial sector development (International Monetary 
Fund, 2005). Johnston and Pazarbasioglu (1995) and Singh et al. (2008) state that financial 
competition is also caused by the financial liberalization processes, such as deregulation of 
geographic and product restrictions and relaxation of the barriers to the entry of financial 
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institutions. This therefore shows that financial competition will represent one of the 
components of financial development.  
 
2.4.3 Financial deepening 
 
Financial deepening is the condition when there is an increase in the quantity, quality and 
range of specialized and organized financial market products and investment, and also an 
increase in financial intermediary activities, functions and specialization (Fritz, 2013; Shaw, 
1973). Financial deepening can refer to financial disintermediation, as borrowers and 
investors have more opportunity to invest in other funding sources, such as capital markets 
(equity and bond markets, unit trusts and mutual funds), instead of mainly depending on the 
banking sector as the main financial intermediary (Singh et al., 2008). In other words, 
development in the capital markets and other types of capital market instruments (bonds, 
securities, equities and mutual funds) can also be referred to as financial deepening. Goyal et 
al. (2011) state that financial deepening also refers to greater opportunity for financial sectors 
to access the financial market, a high level of financial market liquidity and a greater range of 
the assets with the purpose of hedging or diversification. According to King and Levine 
(1993a), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Goyal et al. (2011), financial deepening means the 
situation where a broad range of financing and risk management instruments are allowed for 
investment and are widely chosen by investors. Overall, financial deepening will result in the 
development of financial markets and institutions in the economy, hence showing financial 
development.  
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2.4.4 Financial innovation 
 
Financial innovation involves situations where new financial instruments, financial services, 
financial technology and regulations are introduced and developed in markets and financial 
sectors (Kogar, 1995; Mishkin, 2013). Llewellyn (1992) defines the meaning of financial 
innovation as when (1) new financial instruments, techniques and markets are created and (2) 
the separate characteristics and the risks of individual instruments are unbundled and 
reassembled into different combinations. Financial innovation can be classified into four 
categories, namely (1) risk-transferring innovations (which aim to diversify the risk of 
particular instruments), (2) liquidity-enhancing innovations (with the aim of increasing the 
liquidity of the financial market and instruments, such as the securitization of financial 
assets), (3) credit-generating innovations (which aim to create a rise in credit volume and an 
increase in credit market assessment), and (4) equity-generating innovations (aiming to 
increase the role of equity characteristics in financial assets, such as the debt-equity swap 
technique) (Llewellyn, 1992). The example of financial innovation includes the securitization 
of financial market instruments (mortgage-backed securities and certificates of deposit), the 
introduction of banking off-balance sheet business, the creation of secondary market trading 
(interest rate, currency swap and over-the-counter market), new market proliferation, new 
capital market product issuing (financial futures and derivatives), and new technologies in 
financial market trading and payment (ATMs, credit cards, electronic money) (Llewellyn, 
1992; Singh et al., 2008; Allen and Santomero, 1999).  
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2.4.5 Other structural change 
 
The financial development process also includes the situation in which there is a structural 
change in the financial markets and sectors. Singh et al. (2008) point out that this situation 
involves monetary policy operating framework reform as well as legal and institutional 
structure changes which create financial development in the country. Beck and Levine (2003) 
show that changes in the legal system also encourage financial development due to 
deregulation policies and legal changes which aim to improve the financial system. In 
practice, structural change in many countries will be different depending on the economy, 
government, financial conditions and the reasons why those countries are improving their 
financial development.   
 
2.5 Literature concerning the effect of financial development on the channels of 
monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector 
 
We are now reviews the literature involving the effect of financial development on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector. This section will 
discuss the literature on the effect of financial development on the financial sectors, with the 
associated implications for the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the 
banking sector (2.5.1), and the empirical studies of the effect of financial development on 
these channels (2.5.2).  
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2.5.1 The effect of financial development on the financial sectors and the implications for 
the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector 
 
Caprio (1996) highlights that financial development can cause changes in the portfolio choice 
of banks and he explains this by introducing the bank portfolio choice model shown in figure 
2.2. In this model, banks have to trade off between the expected return on loans (r) and the 
loan risk (loan return standard deviation: ).This is indicated by the loan frontier (LF), which 
is a concave curve due to the assumption that banks are risk averse. This means that when the 
expected return on loans increases, banks will accept a higher risk than a rise in the expected 
return due to a higher possibility of default (Caprio, 1996). This results in a downward 
sloping LF curve from point A. The capital market line (CML) illustrates the overall 
combination of riskless assets (treasury bills) and risky loans in an efficient portfolio (Mittra 
and Gassen, 1981). This combination is chosen by banks and will be illustrated by an efficient 
investment portfolio curve (EP) (Caprio, 1996). 
Figure 2.2: Model of the portfolio choice of banks 
 
 
 
 
Source: Caprio (1996). 
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Figure 2.2 shows that 
fr is the risk-less interest rate (treasury bill interest rate), Ar is the risky 
interest rate (interest rate of risky loans), and point B is the point which shows the chosen 
portfolio of banks holding riskless assets and risky loans (Caprio, 1996). 
Figure 2.3: Model of the portfolio choice of banks when there is an abolition of the interest rate ceiling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Caprio (1996). 
Figure 2.3 shows the portfolio choice model when there is an interest rate ceiling at cr  with 
the CML 0 . The portfolio choice of banks will be indicated at point D, with the intersection of 
the EP 0 line and CML 0  line (banks will not choose a portfolio in the area to the right of point 
C, as the same return will give them higher risk) (Caprio, 1996).  
 
Caprio (1996) uses this model to explain the effect of financial liberalization on banks' 
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portfolio choice of banks from point D to point E and raising the loan supply compared with 
the pre-banking liberalization period (Caprio, 1996).  
 
This model has implications for the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the 
banking sector, especially for the bank lending and balance sheet channels. In this portfolio 
choice model, financial liberalization (interest rate ceiling abolition) will cause an increase in 
the loan supply of banks (Caprio, 1996). Thus, this development will dampen the effect of the 
policy interest rate on bank lending and the balance sheet condition of banks compared with 
the pre-liberalization period. Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) also explain that deposit interest 
rate abolition will cause a rise in the deposit interest rate, thus increasing bank deposits. The 
increase in bank deposits will cause a substitution effect of the effect of policy interest rate on 
bank loans, lowering the effect of policy rate on the loans and thus weakening the bank 
lending channel.   
 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that interest rate abolition can lead to a strengthening of the 
credit channel. This is because the change in bank loan supply also depends on banking 
behaviour towards the risk environment (Capiro, 1996). If banks are more risk averse, an 
increase in the lending rate will lead to a decrease in the loan supply due to the rise in risky 
borrowers, raising moral hazard and the adverse selection problem of banks and increasing 
the external finance premium of banks and borrowers (Caprio, 1996). This condition lowers 
the bank loan supply compared to the period before banking deregulation. Hence, during the 
financial liberalization period the effect of the policy interest rate through the bank lending 
and balance sheet channels will be considerably higher compared to the pre-financial 
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liberalization period, thus strengthening the effect of monetary policy shock via the credit 
channel. 
 
Guinigundo (2008), Johnston and Pazarbasioglu (1995) and Simatele (2004) point out that 
financial market liberalization will also involve the relaxation of financial institution and 
market restrictions (removal of banking portfolio restrictions, extension of banking sector 
business and deregulation of stock market trading restrictions). This condition affects the 
increase in financial institution business (issuing securities and investing in capital markets). 
It also causes a rise in the opportunities for banks and firms to obtain more sources of 
funding, hence strengthening their balance sheet condition (Sodsrichai, 1993; Caprio, 1996). 
This consequently leads to a weaker effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans and firms' 
net worth, weakening the lending and balance sheet channels. Hanson (1996) and Singh et al. 
(2008) point out that capital account and capital control liberalization will lead to a rise in the 
opportunities for banks and firms to access international funding sources and to invest in the 
capital market. This will dampen the effect of the policy interest rate on bank lending and the 
balance sheet channel, thus weakening the credit channel. However, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) argue that capital account liberalization can lead to an increase in foreign 
exchange and credit risk. This is because capital liberalization can result in the movement of 
foreign capital flow in the domestic economy and a rise in the capital funding of banks in 
terms of foreign currency. Therefore, the higher risk (exchange rate risk and credit risk) 
associated with capital account liberalization will lead to a reduction in the ability of banks to 
issue loans to borrowers and a decrease in equity investment, thus strengthening the effect of 
the policy rate through the bank lending and balance sheet channels. 
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Singh et al. (2008) and Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) state that interest rate deregulation 
(abolition of the interest rate ceiling) and financial liberalization will result in an increase in 
the degree of transmission of the policy interest rate on the bank retail rate, causing a 
strengthening of the interest rate channel. This is because when there is an abolition of the 
interest rate ceiling, banks will have the possibility to adjust the rates which are not now fixed 
at the ceiling and hence the pass-through of policy interest rate to retail interest rates will be 
greater (Singh et al., 2008). This causes an increase in interest rate pass-through and hence 
strengthens the interest rate channel. Other deregulation policies can be seen during a 
financial liberalization period in a country (deregulation of capital control, foreign exchange 
control relaxation and a relaxation of foreign transaction control). These policies can cause an 
increase in capital inflows, a higher volume of foreign exchange transaction, a rise in 
international lending, and more financial openness in the country (Singh et al., 2008; Fomum, 
2011; Bangura, 2011; Kazaziova, 2010). Fomum (2011) states that more openness in the 
financial market will cause an increase in alternative sources of investment for bank 
customers. This leads to more competitive retail interest rates and thus increases the extent of 
interest rate pass-through and leads to a stronger interest rate channel.  
 
Hanson (1996) mentions that financial competition will result in a rise in financial efficiency, 
and an increase in financial institutions’ branches and networking, thus leading to a better 
portfolio selection for banks and borrowers. Northcott (2004), Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1995) state that an increase in market power in banking will 
encourage relationship lending and cause a rise in bank efficiency and stability, with an 
increase in firms’ credit. Claessens (2009) highlights that financial competition in the 
financial sector will result in financial intermediation efficiency, an improvement in financial 
 41 
 
product innovation and a higher degree of assessment of financial services. The issue of the 
effect of financial competition on the financial market and financial sectors has an implication 
for monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector. A rise in the degree of 
financial competition will encourage an increase in the range of financial market instruments 
and greater opportunities for consumers to access a variety of providers, financial services and 
financial products (International Monetary Fund, 2005). This situation also weakens the effect 
of monetary policy through the lending and balance sheet channels, as banks and firms can 
outweigh the effect of the policy interest rate by using other funding sources. Moreover, 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and Fomum (2011) point out that a more competitive 
environment will lead to a higher degree of interest rate pass-through than a less competitive 
one. This is because in the more competitive environment, profit-maximizing banks will tend 
to reduce interest margins and this situation results in a reduction in interest rate stickiness 
and an increase in the size of pass-through (Bredin et al., 2001; Horváth et al, 2004) This 
situation results in a stronger effect of the transmission of the policy interest rate to the retail 
interest rate and the economy, thus strengthening the interest rate channel.  
 
Gertler and Rose (1996) state that an increase in financial efficiency and intermediation 
caused by financial development will lead to a reduction in the external finance premium 
faced by borrowers and firms, increasing bank loans as well as firms’ net worth and 
borrowing. In addition, the development in financial intermediation also results in an 
improvement in financial market liquidity and portfolio diversification and a reduction in 
financial costs and idiosyncratic risk (Gertler and Rose, 1996). This condition can increase 
bank loans, capital and firms’ net worth, and reduce the external finance premium faced by 
firms. Therefore, financial development will dampen the effect of the policy rate on bank 
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loans and firms’ net worth, weakening the bank lending and firm balance sheet channels. The 
World Bank (1990) shows that the development of financial intermediaries will cause a 
reduction in borrowing and lending transaction costs. This will decrease the bank spread (the 
wedge between borrowers’ costs and lenders’ returns), thus increasing the credit supply. This 
explanation is illustrated in figure 2.4 . 
Figure 2.4: Credit supply and demand curve 
    
 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank (1990). 
 
Figure 2.4 shows a graph of credit supply (S) and credit demand (D). r is the borrowing cost 
(lending rate) and i is the lending return (deposit rate).  Supposing there is no transaction cost, 
the borrowing cost will be equal to the lending return and X is the credit supply (The World 
Bank, 1990). In practice, there is a transaction cost in the financial market and this brings the 
credit supply curve to the S 0 line, where the transaction cost equals the distance between r 0
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to S 1  , causing a decrease in the transaction cost from r 0 i 1  to r 1 i 0  , and a rise in the credit 
supply from   X 0 to X 1 . Therefore, the development of financial intermediaries will lead to a 
reduction in the interest rate spread of banks, thus raising credit supply and lowering the 
external finance premium faced by firms. This will dampen the effect of the policy interest 
rate on bank loans and the balance sheet of firms, meaning a weaker effect on the bank 
lending and balance sheet channels (Singh et al., 2008; Jbili et al., 1997). However, financial 
development in terms of a rise in financial intermediation activities and functions such as an 
extension of the scope of banking business and a rise in the degree of financial intermediation 
can lead to a weakening of the interest rate channel. This is because greater financial 
intermediation can increase the influence of banks on borrowers and firms, causing a lower 
elasticity of demand for loans and deposits and thus leading to a lower degree of pass-through 
(Horváth et al., 2006). 
 
Gertler and Rose (1996) and Goyal et al. (2011) also point out that capital market 
development (financial deepening) will encourage investors to invest in the capital market and 
to obtain other funding sources. This increases financial market liquidity as well as firms’ 
external funds. Thus, capital market development will lower the effect of the policy interest 
rate on the lending and balance sheet channels, as borrowers and banks can compensate for 
the change in loans by investment in other funding source (equities, bonds and other 
securities) (Singh et al., 2008; Thornton, 1994; Tan and Goh, 2007; Disyatat and 
Vongsinsirikul, 2003). Therefore, this weakens the effect of the lending and balance sheet 
channels.  Horváth et al. (2006), Sellon (2002) and Singh et al. (2008) also highlight the fact 
that a rise in the degree of capital market development, financial deepening and efficiency 
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will consequently cause a quick adjustment of the retail interest rate to prevent bank 
customers from investing in other funding sources (higher elasticity of the demand for 
deposits and loans from bank customers), thus resulting in a greater and faster effect of the 
policy interest rate on bank retail rates and a strengthening of the interest rate channel.  
 
Llewellyn (1992) points out that financial innovation is seen largely in the development of 
bank and capital market sectors in terms of the introduction of new financial instruments and 
techniques (securitization of financial market instruments, introduction of banking off-balance 
sheet business, an increase in secondary market trading, and the introduction of new capital 
market products and new technologies in financial market trading and payment). This leads to 
an improvement in the risk diversification of banks and firms, causing a rise in financial 
market liquidity and a rise in credit supply. Financial innovation can have an effect on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector. The securitisation 
technique introduced by financial market innovation will lead to a lower impact of monetary 
policy on the bank lending channel, as the effect of monetary policy shock on bank loan 
supply can be subsituted by these new instruments (Ghazali and Rahman, 2001; Mishra and 
Pradhan, 2008; Van den Heuvel, 2002; Singh et al., 2008). This therefore leads to an increase 
in bank liquidity, thereby lowering the impact of the policy interest rate on loan supply and 
weakening the bank lending channel (Altunbas et al., 2009b). Moreover, Mishra and Pradhan 
(2008), Altunbas et al. (2009b) and Singh et al. (2008) also point out that many securitisation 
and derivative instruments, as well as other securitisation techniques introduced by financial 
innovation, can lead to a reduction in liquidity risk, credit risk and the risk of the asymmetric 
information problem faced by banks. This results in a higher net worth of firms and a 
lowering of the external finance premium, and consequently a weaker effect on the balance 
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sheet channel (Gertler and Rose, 1996). Singh et al. (2008) and Gropp et al. (2007) highlight 
that the wider sources of finance for investors and savers brought about by the innovation of 
financial market instruments will increase the demand elasticity of deposits and loans when 
the policy interest rate changes, as investors have many choices for investment. This leads to a 
greater degree of interest rate pass-through due to the higher elasticity of demand for loans 
and deposits and therefore to a strengthening of the interest rate channel.  
 
2.5.2 Empirical studies of the effect of financial development on the channel of monetary 
policy transmission related to the banking sector 
 
Empirical studies of the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission related to the banking sector can be divided into two aspects: (1) the macro and 
(2) the micro data based aspects, as presented previously in section 2.3.  
 
Several studies have been conducted on the the macro data based aspect of the impact of 
financial sector development on the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the 
banking sector. 
 
Ghazali and Rahman (2001) used the VARs technique and found a weaker effect of the 
lending channel in Malaysia during the post-financial market development period as there 
was an insignificant effect of the monetary policy instrument (money supply (M1) and 
aggregate reserve) on aggregate bank lending after financial market development. However, 
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Simatele (2004) indicates a stronger impact of the lending channel compared with the pre-
development period in Zambia due to the relatively high effect of the policy interest rate on 
aggregate commercial bank lending and real GDP and CPI in the post-development period. 
By studying the effect of financial development on both the bank lending and balance sheet 
channels, Wibowo (2005) shows a weaker effect of these channels in the period of 
institutional development in Indonesia, as there is a significant positive effect of the policy 
interest rate on the bank balance sheet variables during this period compared with the pre-
development period. In Thailand, Klinhowhan (1999) finds a weaker effect of the lending 
channel after the liberalization period, as the VAR outcome shows a positive response of the 
aggregate credit and private investment index on the shock of the monetary policy instrument. 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Sirivedhin (1997), who also found a weaker effect of the 
policy interest rate on the lending channel after the financial liberalization period in Thailand. 
 
In a study of the interest rate channel and interest rate pass-through, Weber et al. (2009) 
conclude that the establishment of the EMU, which encourages financial development in the 
EU countries in terms of financial innovation and banking sector development, will have a 
stronger effect on the interest rate channel due to the higher response of output to the shock of 
monetary policy during the pre-EMU period. Tan and Goh (2007) found that financial 
disintermediation in Malaysia can lead to a stronger effect of the policy interest rate on the 
interest rate channel. This is because the VARs estimation shows a greater negative effect of 
the inter-bank rate (the policy instrument) on aggregate bank loans, GDP and the external 
finance premium during the post-financial disintermediation period than in the pre-financial 
period. Singh et al. (2008) found a positive correlation between interest rate pass-through and 
financial development, including capital market development (measured by the capital market 
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securities to GDP ratio), financial competition (Panzar-Rosse H statistic) and banking sector 
development (private bank credit to GDP ratio), in developed and developing countries 
(including Thailand). This result confirms the notion that financial development can lead to 
strengthening of the interest rate channel. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2006), Sander and 
Kleimeier (2005, 2006), Gudmundsson (2008) and SØrensen and Werner (2006) found that 
financial competition causes greater interest rate pass-through in European countries, thus 
confirming that financial competition will have a stronger effect on monetary policy through 
this channel. Other studies of developed countries also conclude that financial development 
has a stronger effect on the interest rate channel (Mojon, 2000; De Bondt, 2005, De Bondt et 
al., 2005; Chong, 2010). In studies of developing countries, Mies and Tapia (2003) found a 
stronger effect of monetary policy shock on output and inflation when including the capital 
market development indicator (stock market capitalization to GDP ratio) in the VAR model, 
thus supporting the evidence of a stronger interest rate channel caused by financial 
development. Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) and Aziakpono et al. (2010) found a higher 
degree of interest rate pass-through after financial deregulation in South Africa, thus 
supporting the notion that financial liberalization will lead to a stronger interest rate channel. 
Dickinson and Liu (2007) examine both the interest rate and lending channels in China and 
found that monetary policy shock had a weaker effect on the bank lending channel and a 
stronger one on the interest rate channel after the structural changes in the financial sector in 
China. 
 
For the study of the micro data based aspect of the effect of financial development on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector, Li (2009) considers 
the bank lending channel in ten Asian and ten Latin America countries by using the banking 
 48 
 
sector competition indicator (Panzar-Rosse H statistic (PRH)) and concentration indicator 
(the three largest banks' share of total assets). His results from the panel data estimation 
indicate that bank competition can weaken the bank lending channel as this indicator will 
dampen the effect of policy interest rate on bank loans. Other studies have also found that 
financial competition will lead to a weakening effect on the lending channel (Brissimiss and 
Delis, 2009; Gunji et al., 2009). Altunbas et al. (2009b) investigate the effect of financial 
innovation (securitization) on the bank lending channel in 12 Euro area countries and their 
GMM estimation shows that securitization (measured by the bank securitization to total asset 
ratio) can cause less impact of monetary policy shock on bank loans, hence dampening the 
bank lending channel.   
 
Amongst borrower side studies, Gallego and Loayza (2000) employ GMM estimation and 
examine the firm balance sheet channel by using firm balance sheet data in their study (firms’ 
investment to capital ratio and firms’ cash flow). They conclude that banking sector 
development (bank assets to GDP ratio) and capital market development (stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio) will weaken firms’ balance sheet channel in Chile as these 
developments will make them less dependent on their internal funds (a reduction in the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and investment-leverage ratio sensitivity). Gelos and Werner 
(2002) estimate the balance sheet channel by using firm balance sheet data (firms’ investment 
to capital ratio, firms’ cash flow and firms’ leverage ratio) in Mexico. The results from the 
OLS and GMM estimations show that financial liberalization will weaken the balance sheet 
channel as it causes the firms to be less dependent on their internal funding. Harris et al. 
(1994) and Koo and Shin (2004) show that financial liberalization can have a weakening 
effect on the balance sheet channel of firms in Indonesia and Korea respectively. The same 
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result can be seen in Arbeláex and Echavarria (2002) in Columbia, Hermes and Lensink 
(1996) in Chile, Bhaduri (2005) in India and Jaramillo et al. (1993) in Ecuador.  
 
To sum up, both the theoretical and empirical studies of the effect of financial development 
on the financial sectors and on the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the 
banking sector mainly find that financial development will weaken the credit channel (bank 
lending and balance sheet channels) and strengthen the interest rate channel. However, some 
empirical studies found different results, in that the effect of financial development can lead 
to a stronger effect on the credit channel. This different result can be explained by the fact 
that studies in different countries are based on different financial sector structures and 
economic environments.  
 
There are few micro data based empirical studies of the effect of financial development on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector, especially of the 
lending and firm balance sheet channels. In addition, studies of this aspect, particularly of the 
interest rate and bank lending channels, mainly focus on developed countries, leaving a gap in 
the studies of developing ones. There is no empirical study of the effect of financial 
development from the micro data based aspect which uses Thailand as a case study. In 
addition, many studies of this aspect mainly focus on the effect of financial liberalization on 
the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector. This shows the 
lack of studies on various aspects of financial development, such as financial innovation and 
financial deepening.  
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Therefore, future studies of the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the 
banking sector should be focused on the micro data based aspect. In addition, the effect of 
financial development on these channels should concentrate on the effect of different aspects 
of financial development (financial liberalization, financial competition, banking 
development, capital market development and financial innovation). Therefore, it is 
interesting to study this issue by introducing a case study of a developing country such as 
Thailand.  
 
2.6 Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
 
This chapter reviews both theoretical and empirical aspects of monetary policy transmission 
related to the banking sector, the financial development concept, and the effect of financial 
development on the financial sector and on the channels of monetary policy transmission 
related to the banking sector. The conclusion and suggestions for further research are 
summarised below. 
 
(1) Studies of the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking sector, 
particularly the credit channel, mainly focus on macro data (time series data), leaving an 
opportunity for micro data based study. Therefore, it is important that future research on the 
credit channel of monetary policy transmission (lending and balance sheet channels), should 
investigate the micro data based aspect. There is also a gap in the studies of the micro data 
based aspect of the credit channel, especially in developing countries, as many studies focus 
on the US and Europe. Only a few studies of Thailand introduce the micro data based aspect, 
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so future research should also fill this gap by making a case study of Thailand as an example 
of a developing country. This individual country study can reduce the bias in results caused 
by different economic structures and financial backgrounds, which can happen when making 
multi-country studies. In addition, the micro data based studies of developing countries 
(including those of Thailand) mainly focus on the size characteristic of firms and banks, 
ignoring other characteristics (the capitalization and liquidity of banks, the dividend payout 
ratio of firms, and leverage of firms). Therefore, study of the micro aspects in the future 
should include different types of characteristic variables.  
 
Concerning the gaps in past studies, this thesis will attempt to fill these by conducting a micro 
data based study of both the bank lending channel (chapter 4) and firm balance sheet channel 
(chapter 5) and by using the case study of Thailand. In addition, different characteristic 
variables will be included for the study of the bank lending channel (the size, capitalization 
and liquidity of banks) and the firm balance sheet channel (firm size, cash flow, leverage and 
dividend payout ratio). In addition, we also study interest rate pass-through in Thailand 
(chapter 6) to obtain the full effect of monetary policy via the banking sector.  
 
(2) There is a lack of studies which introduce the effect of financial development on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector in developing 
countries, particularly in relation to the interest rate channel (interest rate pass-through) and 
the bank lending channel. In addition, there are few studies of this issue from the micro data 
based aspect, especially of the credit channel. There has been no empirical study of the effect 
of financial development on the micro data based aspect by using Thailand as a case study.  
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Therefore, in order to fill the gap in the past literature, this thesis will not only investigate the 
channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector, but will also examine 
the effect of financial development on these channels. We will also use a case study of 
Thailand and investigate the effect of financial development on the micro data based aspect of 
the lending channel (chapter 4) and balance sheet channel (chapter 5). The effect of financial 
development on interest rate pass-through in Thailand is also investigated in chapter 6 to fill 
the gap in the study of this area in relation to a developing country.  
 
(3) Many studies of the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary 
policy transmission relating to the banking sector mainly focus on just a few aspects of 
financial development, such as financial liberalization or financial competition. This shows 
there is a lack of studies of the various aspects of financial development, such as banking 
sector development, capital market development, financial innovation and financial 
deepening.  
 
Therefore, this thesis will fill this gap by using the effect of different aspects of financial 
development (financial liberalization, financial competition, banking development, capital 
market development and financial innovation) on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission related to the banking sector in Thailand.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As we will focus on a case study of Thailand, it is therefore important to review the economic 
background, institutional and financial market structure, and financial development 
background of the country. This chapter comprises three main parts: (1) an overview of the 
economic conditions; (2) the financial market and institutional background; and (3) financial 
development.  
 
3.2 Overview of economic conditions in Thailand 
 
Economic growth in Thailand decreased from 6.9% in 1978 to about 2.5% in 2008 (IMF, 
2009; Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 2009a). Real GDP in 
the country increased from 39 billion USD in 1978 to 547 billion USD at the end of 2008 and 
GDP per capita showed a steady increase from 883 USD in 1978 to 8,239 USD in 2008 (IMF, 
1999, 2009). Despite the increase in real GDP in the country, the economic growth rate still 
showed a relative decrease compared with growth in 1978. This was possibly due to the effect 
of the financial crisis on the country in 1997, which mainly affected the financial sector and 
the economy and therefore prevented a further increase in economic growth in Thailand 
compared with the previous 30 years. As seen in table 3.1, this growth was relatively low 
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compared with other developing Asian countries and also comparatively low compared with 
the average of 5.17% among the overall Asain developing countries in 2008. Real GDP in the 
country was also relatively low compared with the average of developing Asian countries, at 
560 billion USD. However, GDP per capita in Thailand was comparatively high relative to 
the average of the developing Asian group, at 5,797 USD, which is still low compared with 
Malaysia.  
Table 3.1: The Thai economy compared with other developing Asian countries in 2008 
Country 
Real GDP growth 
(percent) 
Real GDP                 
(Billion USD) 
Real GDP per capita 
(USD) 
China 9.01 7,926.50 5,970.29 
India 7.34 3,297.84 2,797.91 
Indonesia 6.06 909.73 3,980.00 
Malaysia 4.63 384.39 14,081.50 
Pakistan 2.04 422.39 2,624.04 
Philippines 3.83 317.96 3,515.98 
Thailand 2.59 547.06 8,239.17 
Vietnam 6.13 240.75 2,793.76 
Average of developing 
Asian countries 5.17 560.64 5,797.64 
Source: IMF (1999). 
 
We will explain Thai economic conditions by grouping them into three different periods 
(from 1978 to 1989; 1990 to 1996; and 1997 to 2008). The period from 1978 to 1989 is a 
period of strong economic performance, characterized by a gradual rise in the real GDP 
growth rate from around 6.9% in 1978 to a peak of about 12% in 1988 (see figure 3.1). The 
Thai National Economic and Social Development Plan in this period principally aimed to 
decentralize development to the regional areas, thus the steady increase in economic growth 
in this period mainly comes from a rise in domestic expenditure, especially an increase in the 
gross capital formation in the country (from around 26% of real GDP to about 34% in 1989) 
(see figure 3.2) (BOT, 1980). This was due to an increase in the number of investment 
projects (the natural gas pipeline project and the railway line project) in order to develop the 
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country’s infrastructure (BOT, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1989). In addition, the introduction of 
several investment promotion policies (for example, the corporate and business income tax 
reduction policy) and a rise in manufacturing industries during this period are considered to 
be factors supporting the strong economic performance (BOT, 1983, 1987, 1989). Figure 3.3 
shows that the manufacturing sector presents a gradual expansion in this period, from around 
22% of real GDP in 1978 to 26% in 1989, compared with other industrial sectors. At the same 
time, the trade balance showed a deficit due to an increase in investment projects, which led 
to high imports of capital goods, especially machinery and parts (BOT, 1989).  
 
Figure 3.1: Real GDP growth rate at 1988 constant prices from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
 
 
 
 
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8P
er
ce
n
t
Year
Real GDP growth rate
 56 
 
Figure 3.2: Private consumption expenditure, gross capital formation, and government consumption 
expenditure as a percentage of real GDP from 1978 to 2008
3
 
 
 
Source:  Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2009a).
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Main industries as a percentage of real GDP from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source:  Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2009a). 
 
 
                                                          
3
 According to the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (2009b), the definitions of 
these components are as follows: private consumption expenditure is the goods and services consumption value 
of households and non-profit institutions serving households. Gross capital formation is the public and private 
sectors’ expenditure on production, including gross fixed capital formation and change in inventories. 
Government consumption expenditure is the administration and provision of public services spending.   Import 
and export are the value of international transactions of goods and services.  
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From 1990 to 1996, there was a reduction in the economic growth rate from 10% in 1990 to 
5.8% in 1996 (see figure 3.1). This was due to the delay in construction projects in the second 
half of the previous period (1985-1989), a decrease in agricultural product prices and outputs 
resulting from negative weather conditions, the impact of the Persian Gulf crisis, and the 
political problems in 1991 (BOT, 1991, 1992a). This condition is shown in figure 3.3. There 
was a gradual decrease in agricultural production (from 13.5% to 7.6% of real GDP), in 
wholesale and retail trade industries (from around 17% to 16% of real GDP), and in the 
service sector (from around 11% to 7.5% of real GDP) from 1990 to 1996. Private 
consumption expenditure also shows a gradual decrease, from about 57% to 54% of real GDP 
during this period (see figure 3.2).  
 
Although there was a reduction in economic growth, the average growth rate of real GDP was 
still at a high level, with an average of around 7.9%. This is because there were some positive 
factors during the second half of the period, leading to a slight rise in economic growth, from 
7.7% in 1993 to 8.1% in 1995 (see figure 3.1). This was the result of an increase in 
government expenditure on some of the ongoing government projects in rural areas and the 
industrial liberalization policy in 1993, which stimulated the level of Thai industrial 
competitiveness and technological development (BOT, 1993, 1994a). This condition is shown 
by a rise in gross capital formation, from 40.8 % of real GDP in 1993 to 43.2% in 1996 (see 
figure 3.2). Also, the financial liberalization which took place in the country during 1990 also 
led to a growth in the banking and real estate sectors (from 5.5 % of real GDP in 1993 to 
7.7% in 1996) (see figure 3.2), thus causing a rise in economic growth, especially in the 
second half of the period. The details of the financial development in Thailand will be 
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discussed in the following section. Therefore, the economy in this period can be considered as 
the period of medium economic growth or the financial liberalization period.  
 
Thai economic conditions between 1997 and 2008 are considered to represent a post-financial 
crisis period. This is because the financial crisis which occurred in 1997 caused a sharp fall in 
the real GDP growth rate, especially in 1997 and 1998 (from -1.3% to -11.7%). Sussangkarn 
and Vichyanond (2007) and BOT (1997) state that one of the main factors that accelerated the 
crisis was a relaxation of financial controls caused by the financial liberalization initiated in 
1990 (the relaxation of control of financial institutions, capital accounts and foreign exchange 
rates, and the relaxation of fund mobilisation). This led to a gradual increase in short-term 
foreign capital inflow from 1990 to 1996, shown by a dramatic increase in equity investment 
(from 1,689 to 4,518 million USD) and also a rise in foreign direct investment in the country 
(from 1,780 million USD in 1990 to 5,142 in 1995) (see figure 3.4). According to BOT 
(1997), financial deregulation in the country also caused a gradual rise in domestic and 
foreign debts, as well as a rapid increase in investment, particularly in risky investment 
projects and other less productive sectors (real estate and securities). This was shown by a 
gradual rise in real estate industries as a percentage of real GDP from 3.7% of real GDP in 
1990 to 7.7% in 1996 (see figure 3.3). Sussangkarn and Vichyanond (2007) point out that 
there was also a rise in bank loans during this period, which were particularly used to invest in 
risky investment projects and less productive sectors (for example, real estate). This situation 
caused an increase in the default risk of banks and led to the weakness of the financial 
institutions (Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). Therefore, these conditions resulted in an 
asset price bubble, a maturity mismatch problem and the low quality of financial institution 
and business sector balance sheets (Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). This resulted in the 
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weakness of the financial sectors and was consequently one of the factors which caused the 
financial crisis in the country. 
Figure 3.4: Inflow of foreign equity and debt securities investment, and foreign direct investment in 
Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
 
Another major cause of the crisis was the speculative attack on the Baht from the end of 1996, 
resulting in a substantial decrease in Thai foreign exchange reserves in order to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate (BOT, 1997).  Consequently, Thailand had to announce a change in the 
exchange rate system, from the basket system pegged to the US dollar to the managed float 
system in July 1997
4
 (Warr, 1999; Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). This led to the sharp 
depreciation of the Baht from 25 Baht/US dollar in 1996 to 45 Baht/US dollar in 1998 (see 
figure 3.5).  
                                                          
4
 BOT had to change the monetary policy regime from the fixed exchange rate regime to the monetary targeting 
one (BOT adjusted the policy interest rate to achieve a controlled level of domestic money supply, M2, instead 
of controlling the exchange rate, which had been done previously) (BOT, 2010c). As a result of the problems in 
the monetary target regime (the unstable relationship between money supply and output growth, as well as the 
credibility and transparency problem of the monetary targeting caused by decision making not published to the 
public), the inflation targeting regime has been in force from 23 May 2000 until now (BOT, 2010c).  
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Figure 3.5: Baht/dollar exchange rate in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
 
As there was an asset price bubble as well as a rise in real estate investment and short-term 
debt in the Thai economy between 1990 and 1996, the huge increase in the exchange rate led 
to a substantial loss for many business sectors and financial institutions, especially those 
lending and investing in foreign currencies, resulting in a high default rate and a liquidity 
problem for financial institutions (BOT, 1997). This caused the closure of many institutions 
(58 finance company operations were suspended) and a relatively high non-performing loan 
problem, leading to sluggish economic conditions (BOT, 1997). This was shown by a 
reduction in the production of almost all industrial sectors (see figure 3.3), a fall in domestic 
expenditure (see figure 3.2), tight liquidity conditions in the financial market, and a reduction 
in investor and consumer confidence (BOT, 1997, 1998a).  
 
After the crisis period, there was a recovery in the Thai economy, as shown by an increase in 
the real GDP growth rate, from 4.2% in 1999 to 6.6% in 2003 (see figure 3.1). This was due 
to the IMF rescue plans and the economic support policies from the government; for example, 
the industrial restructuring plan at the end of 1998, the agricultural promotion plan in 1998-
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2002, and corporate debt restructuring in 2003 (BOT, 1998a, 1999, 2002a, 2004). The trade 
balance in Thailand also showed a huge surplus from 1997 to 2008 as a result of the 
devaluation of the baht (see figure 3.1). The economic growth rate showed a slight reduction, 
with a decrease in the real GDP growth rate from 5.2% in 2004 to 2.5 % in 2008 (see figure 
3.1). This was mainly due to the uncertain political situation in the country throughout this 
period as well as the decrease in the export caused by the global economic down turn in 2008, 
causing a further reduction in consumer and investor confidence and consequently a lowering 
of the growth rate of investment expenditure (from around 22.13% to 22% of real GDP) and 
private consumption expenditure (from around 54.20% to 52% of real GDP) (BOT, 2006a, 
2008a).   
 
 
On an international level, the balance of payments during the period of strong economic 
performance (1978-1989) showed an improvement, with an increase from -2.7% of GDP in 
1980 to reach its peak at 5.5% in 1989 (see figure 3.6), thus strengthening economic growth 
in the country. The reason for this was mainly the increase in the capital and financial account 
balance, which saw an increase in the surplus from 3.1% in 1978 to 7.8% in 1989 (see figure 
3.7), caused in particular by a rise in foreign direct investment in many government projects 
and portfolio investment (BOT, 1989). Nevertheless, the current account balances showed a 
deficit throughout the period, with an improvement from -5.7% to -2.3% of GDP from 1980 
to 1989 (see figure 3.7). The deficit in the current account was the result of the protectionist 
policies, especially from 1983 to 1985, of the industrialized trading partners, and of a rise in 
the import of petroleum products and capital goods for the government’s development 
projects (BOT, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989). 
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Figure 3.6: Balance of payments in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
Figure 3.7: The current account balance and capital and financial account balance as a percentage of 
GDP from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
During the period from 1990 to 1996, the balance of payments continued to show a surplus, 
with an average of 3.3% of GDP (see figure 3.6). This was mainly caused by a dramatic 
3.12% increase in the capital and financial surplus from 1990 to 1996 (see figure 3.7) 
resulting from the financial development plans introduced during this period. These led to 
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higher levels of foreign capital inflow, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, as 
shown in figure 3.4 (BOT, 1990, 1991, 1992a).  
 
During the period from 1997 to 2008, the financial crisis in 1997 led to a substantial balance 
of payments deficit in 1997 of about -6.3% of GDP, compared with a surplus in the previous 
year (see figure 3.5). The main reason for this was the large deficit in the capital and financial 
account balance, shown by a rise in the deficit from -3.4% of GDP in 1997 to the highest level 
of -8.9% in 1998 (see figure 3.6). The deficit continued throughout this period until 2003. 
This mainly resulted from the huge private capital outflow and the decrease in foreign 
investor confidence (BOT, 1997, 2001). However, the current account balance showed the 
opposite movement, from a deficit of -2.9% in 1997 to a surplus of 7.0% of GDP in 2000 (see 
figure 3.7). This was due to the depreciation of the baht, which increased the competitiveness 
of export goods relative to other trading partners, and a relative decrease in imports caused by 
the economic downturn (BOT, 1997, 1998a).  
 
After the crisis (1998-2008), numerous government bailout plans led to an increase in foreign 
direct investment and foreign capital inflows into the stock market, as well as a reduction in 
capital outflow (BOT, 2001, 2002a, 2006a). As shown in figure 3.4, there were improvements 
in foreign direct investment and foreign equity inflow from 2003 to 2008. This was because 
of the decrease in the external debt repayment of financial institutions and IMF loans (BOT, 
1998a, 2001, 2002a, 2006a). As a result, there was an improvement in the capital and 
financial account from 2004 to 2008, with an average surplus of 4% of GDP (see figure 3.7), 
thus leading to a recovery of the balance of payments from 1.2% in 1998 to the highest level 
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of 8.9% in 2008 (see figure 3.6).  Despite the slowdown of the current account balances from 
4% of GDP in 2001 to -3.2% in 2005 and from 7.9% in 2007 to 3.6% in 2008. (see figure 
3.7), which was mainly caused by a rise in imports following the government economic 
recovery plans, a decrease in the demand for export casued by the political turmoil from 2004 
to2008 and tunami in 2005, and the reduction in the export caused by the global economic 
downturn in 2008; the current account balance still showed a surplus, with an average of 4.8% 
of GDP from 2006 to 2008. This was a consequence of the expansion of the value of exports 
caused by the recovery in the economies of trading partners (BOT,2006a, 2007).  
 
The period from 1978 to 1989 saw high liquidity in banking and the financial market. This 
was due to the introduction of monetary policy measures, particularly between 1983 and 
1986, in order to stimulate the Thai economy (BOT, 1983, 1985, 1986). This policy led to the 
downward adjustment of the lending and deposit interest rates, especially in 1983, 1984 and 
1986. As a result, retail interest rates in Thailand experienced a downward trend, particularly 
between 1980 and 1988, with a 4.5%, 3%, and 2.3% reduction of the loan interest rate (MLR), 
time deposit interest rate and saving deposit interest rate respectively (see figure 3.8). The 
higher liquidity condition also led to an increase in commercial bank credits, from 22% to 
24%, and in commercial bank deposits, from 13% to 22%, between 1980 and 1989 (see figure 
3.9), thus stimulating economic growth in the country. The expansion of bank credits and 
deposits also resulted from the government credit policy, which supported many investment 
projects in the regional areas, and the strong economic performance throughout this period. 
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Figure 3.8: The major interest rates in the financial market, comprising Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), 
1 year time deposit interest rate, and saving deposit interest rate, from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
 
Despite the increase in both the loans and deposits of commercial banks, there was a slight 
decrease in the growth rate of commercial bank loans (a 6% reduction) and deposits (a 7% 
reduction), especially from 1983 to 1986 (see figure 3.9), mainly due to the commercial 
banks’ credit controls on imports and low quality customers, as well as the downward trends 
in the deposit interest rates (BOT, 1984, 1985, 1986). 
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Figure 3.9: The growth rate of commercial bank loans and aggregate commercial bank deposits from 1978 
to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008b). 
 
The capital market conditions in this period showed an increase on the Index of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (hereafter, the SET index
5
), from 182.38 in 1978 to 200.21 in 1989 (see 
figure 3.10). This was due to an increase in the share and debenture public offerings and an 
introduction of new types of securities in 1988 caused by the capital market development 
policies, the high liquidity condition resulting from the downward trend of loan interest rates, 
an improvement in the performance of the listed companies which invested in the securities 
market, and a rise in investor confidence due to the strong economic conditions throughout 
the period (BOT, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987).   
 
                                                          
5
 According to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) (2010a), the movement in the price of the SET common 
stocks is defined as the SET index and this is calculated by the percentage of the ratio of current market value 
and base market value of stocks.   
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Figure 3.10 The SET index from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: DataStream (2010).  
 
From 1990 to 1996, the financial liberalization policies introduced at the beginning of the 
period led to a relatively high liquidity condition in the financial market compared with the 
previous period. This is shown by a 3%, 6.26% and 3.9% decrease in the MLR, time deposit 
interest rate and saving deposit interest rate respectively from 1990 to 1993 (see figure 3.8) 
(BOT, 1992a, 1993). There was a slowdown in the rise in volume of loans and deposits, 
particularly during the first half of this period. This is shown by 6.9% and 8.53% reductions 
in the growth rate of commercial bank loans and deposits respectively (see figure 3.9), caused 
by the economic downturn in this period, commercial banks’ cautious lending policy and the 
relative decrease in the deposit interest rate (BOT, 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1993 1994a). 
Nevertheless, there was an increase in bank loans and deposits throughout the second half of 
the period (1994-1996) due to the introduction of the Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities (BIBF) in 1993, which allowed the mobilization of foreign funds to the domestic 
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financial market, and the liberalization of the regulations for regional bank branches  (BOT, 
1993, 1994a). This led to a relatively high volume of loans and deposits in the country. 
 
The capital market in this period presents a better condition compared with the previous 
period, as shown by the dramatic increase in the SET index, from 855.97 in 1990 to 1,292.61 
in 1996 (see figure 3.10). This mainly resulted from the introduction of the financial 
development plans in 1990, a rise in the economic growth rate during the second half of the 
period, and the strong performance of the listed companies (BOT, 1990, 1994a).  
 
In the period from 1997 to 2008, the financial crisis in 1997 led to low liquidity in the 
financial market. This is shown by a gradual increase in the loan and deposit interest rates 
from 1994 to 1998 (figure 3.8) (from 10.9% to 15.6%, 7.4% to 8.7% and 4.6% to 5% for the 
MLR, 1 year deposit and saving deposit rates respectively), as well as a sharp fall in loans and 
deposits (see figure 3.9) (22% and 7.15% decreases in the growth rate of loans and deposits 
respectively from 1997 to 2001). Furthermore, there was a tight liquidity condition in the 
capital market, with a sharp fall in the SET index, from 661.29 in 1997 to the lowest point of 
300.63 in 2001 (see figure 3.10).  The major reasons for the sluggish performance of the 
financial market at the beginning of this period were the liquidity problem in the financial 
insitutions, a decrease in the creditworthiness of borrowers caused by non-performing loan 
problems, the slowdown of investor confidence, and the ongoing Asian currency crisis (BOT, 
1997, 1998a, 1999). 
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The recovery of the financial market began in 2002, with an increase in bank loans and 
deposits (an 8.4 % increase in loans from 2002 to 2008 and a 4.2% increase in deposits from 
2002 to 2006). This was mainly a result of the Thai economic recovery stimulated by the 
numerous IMF and BOT financial recovery measures, which led to an improvement in 
financial institutions’ portfolios and confidence and consequently improved the liquidity 
condition in the financial market (BOT, 1997, 1998a, 2002a, 2006a; Chotigeat and Lin, 2001; 
Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2007; Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). However, the 
slowdown in the rise in deposits, particularly from 2007 to 2008, was due to the effect of the 
reduction in deposit rates and the rise in alternative saving options (bonds and other 
securities) (BOT, 2006a, 2007, 2008a). Furthermore, many financial crisis bailout plans after 
the crisis period and a rise in investor confidence played important roles in the recovery of the 
stock market, shown by an increase in the stock price index from 371.42 in 2001 to 832.45 in 
2008 (see figure 3.10).  
 
Overall, although there were some downward trends in the Thai economy, particularly in 
1997, which prevented further increases in economic growth in Thailand compared with 
1978, it can be concluded that the Thai macroeconomic and capital market condition 
continued to improve and show a good performance after the crisis to the end of 2008. This 
was due to many financial and economic recovery plans after the crisis period which aimed to 
improve economic conditions in the country.  
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3.3 Financial market and institutional background in Thailand 
 
This section will be divided into two main sub-sections: (1) the institutional sector in Thailand 
and (2) the financial market in the country. 
3.3.1 The institutional sector in Thailand  
 
Institutions in Thailand can be divided into two main categories: financial and non-financial.  
3.3.1.1 Financial institutions  
 
Financial institutions can also be divided into two sections: banking and non-banking. 
(1) Banking financial institutions 
Banking financial institutions in Thailand perform banking business and consist of 
commercial banks and specialized financial institutions (hereafter, SFIs). Figure 3.11 shows 
that banking financial institutions constitute the main proportion of Thai financial institutions, 
with total assets making up 78% of overall financial institution assets. They mainly comprise 
commercial banks, which also have the highest proportion of the total assets of financial 
institutions (58%, as shown in figure 3.11). The fund mobilization of commercial banks 
mainly derives from deposits, as well as domestic and foreign loans, while the use of funds 
comes from securities transactions and lending (Skully, 1984; Yananda et al., 1992). Another 
group of banking financial institutions are the SFIs established by the government, which 
have their own specialized businesses and legal system (Dasree, 1985). The SFIs consist of 
(1) the Government Saving Bank (GSB), established in 1947, whose main business is as a 
saving institution, using saving deposits, time deposits and premium saving certificates as the 
main sources of funds, and using government and enterprise securities, and individual loans 
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as the use of funds (BOT, 1987; Yananda et al., 1992); (2) the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), established in 1966, whose main business purpose is 
lending to farmers and agricultural cooperatives, and obtaining funds from commercial bank 
deposits (BOT, 1987; Lee and Jao, 1982); (3) the Government Housing Bank (GHB), 
established in 1953, which plays a major role in housing and real estate lending for low and 
middle income groups, with a high proportion of funds from deposits, foreign and domestic 
lending, and bond issuing (Yananda et al., 1992); (4) the Export and Import Bank of Thailand 
(Exim Bank), established in 1993,  whose main business is to support lending to import and 
export investors, obtaining funds from securities transactions (BOT, 1994b); (5) the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand (SME Bank), established in 2002,  aimed 
to support lending to small and medium Thai businesses (long-term and short-term loans by 
using promissory notes) (Loungpitak, 2005); and (6) the Islamic bank, established in 2002, 
which performs banking business in parallel with the Islamic religion for Muslims 
(Loungpitak, 2005). Figure 3.11 shows that the SFIs have 20% of the total assets of all 
financial institutions.  
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of the assets of Thai financial institutions from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: BOT (2008c, 2010d). 
(2) Non-banking financial institutions 
Non-banking financial institutions comprise finance and securities companies, insurance 
companies, cooperatives and other sectors (mutual funds, pension funds and pawn shops). 
Their main sources of funds for the finance and securities companies are promissory note 
issuing and commercial bank borrowing, with securities investment and commercial lending 
as the main uses of these funds (Yananda et al., 1992; Skully, 1984). The financial companies 
can also perform both finance business and securities business
6
. As seen in figure 3.11, the 
total assets of these companies are 10% of overall financial institution assets. The credit 
foncier companies’7 main business is in mortgage and securities lending, as well as property 
purchase services (BOT, 1987; Yananda et al., 1992). This is the smallest sector in the field, 
with 0.1% of the total assets of all financial institutions. The cooperatives sector includes 
                                                          
6
 Securities brokerage, dealership, underwriting and investment management are known as securities business; 
on the other hand, consumer and housing finance, commercial finance and development finance are examples of 
financial business (Lee and Jao, 1982; BOT, 1987).  
7
 Since 2006, the credit foncier companies have not been operating (BOT, 2008c).  
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agricultural and savings cooperatives, with 6.8% of overall assets. The agricultural 
cooperatives lend to farmers and agricultural businesses and obtain funds from BAAC and 
members’ capital accounts (BOT, 1987; Skully, 1984). The saving cooperatives lend to salary 
earners and members and they obtain funds from the members’ paid up share capital (BOT, 
1987; Skully, 1984). 2.6% of other non-banking financial institutions are insurance companies 
and another 2.5% are pawn shops, mutual funds and pension funds.  
3.3.1.2 Non-financial institutions 
 
Non-financial institutions in Thailand are the industrial companies listed on the SET 
(excluding all the financial institutions listed previously). These are categorised into different 
industrial sectors: (1) agricultural and food industry companies; (2) consumer production 
companies; (3) industrial production companies; (4) property and construction companies; (5) 
resources companies; (6) service companies; and (7) technology companies.  
 
Overall, the average assets of the non-financial institutions from 1978 to 2008 account for 
around 60% of the total assets of the institutional sector, while for financial institutions it is 
around 40% (SET, 2010e). 
 
A summary of the institutional sector in Thailand can be seen in figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12: Structure of the institutional sector in Thailand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Settrade dot com (2010). 
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3.3.2 Financial market in Thailand 
 
The financial market in Thailand includes three major markets: the money market, foreign 
exchange market and capital market.  
3.3.2.1   Money market  
 
The money market aims to perform short-term transactions (maturity within one year) and 
BOT itself is considered as an important participant in this market (BOT, 2010a). The 
important instruments traded on the money market include interbank market transactions (call 
and overnight transactions), government bond repurchase market transactions, treasury bill 
transactions, BOT bond market transactions, and other short-term trading instruments 
(commercial papers) (BOT, 2010a; Vichyanond, 1994). There is also a small amount of 
secondary market trading in treasury bills, certificates of deposits (hereafter CDs), commercial 
bills and government bond repurchase transactions (Skully, 1984).  
 
3.3.2.2   Foreign exchange market 
 
The foreign exchange market mainly carries out foreign market transactions (spot transactions, 
forward market transactions, foreign exchange derivatives and foreign exchange swaps) (BOT, 
2010a). Trading is performed by using the OTC (over-the-counter market), with commercial 
banks and the Exchange Equalisation Fund as the major trading institutions (BOT, 2010a; 
Vichyanond, 1994).  
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3.3.2.3   Capital market  
 
The capital market in Thailand is the market for long-term transactions (with maturity of more 
than one year) and is divided into the primary and secondary markets (BOT, 1994b). The 
primary market is for newly issued securities and initial public offering, while the secondary 
market deals with transactions of securities already issued in the primary market (SET, 2010b). 
The secondary market began trading on 30 April 1975 (SET, 2010b). The major roles of SET 
are as a listed securities trading centre, securities trading facilitation, clearing house activities, 
securities depository, securities register and securities listing (SET, 2010b).  
 
There are four major SET groups: (1) the equity market; (2) the bond market; (3) the derivative 
market; and (4) the Thailand Securities Depository Company Limited (TSD).   
 
(1) Equity market  
The main equity market coverage is listed as companies’ securities trading, including ordinary 
shares, preferred shares, warrants, unit trusts and Non-Voting Depository Receipt (NVDR) and 
Depository Receipt (DR) trading (SET, 2010a). There is one main index on the SET called the 
SET Index, which is the main composite index of the SET, and all common stock trading price 
movement is shown by this index (SET, 2010a). It comprises the index of all the companies 
listed on the SET, including financial institutions and non-financial ones. Another five indices 
on the SET are (1) the SET 50 Index and SET 100 Index (established in August 1995 and April 
2005 respectively), which represent the top 50 and top 100 listed company stock prices 
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respectively
8
; (2) the MAI Index (established in June 1999), which supports investors and 
innovative business in a wide range of alternative investments and new rising fund 
opportunities; (3) the FTSE SET Index, which is a SET and FTSE group collaborative index 
for measuring capital market performance
9
; (4) the FTSE/ASEAN Index (established in 
September 2005), which is the index that represents the cooperation between the SET and 
other ASEAN stock exchange markets (Bursa Malaysia, Jakarta Stock Exchange, the 
Philippine Stock Exchange and the Singapore Stock Exchange), comprising the FTSE/ASEAN 
Index (the benchmark index) and the FTSE/ASEAN 40 Index (the tradable index)
10
; and (5) 
the Total Return Index, which reports the performance indicators (dividends, capital gain/loss 
and right offering) of the SET, SET 50, SET 100 and MAI markets (SET, 2010a). 
 
(2) Bond market  
Bond market transactions can be performed in both primary (transactions through retail and 
institutional investors) and secondary (transactions through the OTC market and the Bond 
Electronic Exchange (BEX) markets) markets (BOT, 2010b)
11
. The bond trading products can 
be divided into corporate securities, which are corporation bonds, and government securities 
(treasury bills, debt restructuring bills, government bonds, government saving bonds, BOT 
bonds and state-owned enterprise bonds) (BOT, 2010a).  
                                                          
8
 The criteria for dividing the top 50 and top 100 listed companies on the SET are the level of market 
capitalization and liquidity, as well as the compliance of the minor shareholders’ share distribution (SET, 2010a)  
9
 This index also provides information about the major capital segments as it can categorize the index by 
different market capitalization (FTSE SET Large Cap Index, FTSE SET Mid Cap Index, FTSE SET Small Cap 
Index, FTSE SET All-Share Index, FTSE SET Mid Small Cap Index and FTSE SET Fledging Index) (SET, 
2010a). 
10
 The benchmark index has more than 0.5 per cent of its turnover relative to the tradable shares, while for the 
tradable index it is more than 20 percent of its turnover (SET, 2010a).  
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(3) Derivative market  
This market operates in derivative trading and aims to support the hedging and risk 
management (equity risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk and price risk) of the derivative 
instruments (future and option contracts) (BOT, 2010a). Derivative trading is operated by the 
Thailand Future Exchange (TFEX), which was set up on 17 May 2004 and deals with 
electronic trading for the derivative market (BOT, 2010a). Six instruments trade on this 
market: SET 50 Index futures (set up on 28 April 2006), the SET 50 Index option (set up on 
29 October 2007), stock futures (set up on 24 November 2008), 5 year government bond 
futures (set up on 18 October 2010), 50 Baht gold futures (set up on 2 February 2009) and 10 
Baht gold futures (set up on 2 August 2010) (Thailand Future Exchange, 2010).  
 
(4) Thailand Securities Depository Company Limited (TSD) 
TSD, which was established on 16 November 1994, plays a major role as the SET’s 
subsidiary for the post-trade service of securities (securities depository service for stocks and 
bonds, securities clearing and settlement service, securities and fund registration service, and 
broker operation service) (SET, 2010d).  
 
In addition to the four main groups on the SET, there are also other securities trading groups 
elsewhere on the SET, including mutual funds and property funds. A summary of the 
structure of the financial market in Thailand is shown in figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13: Structure of the financial market in Thailand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Financial development in Thailand 
 
Having considered the structure of the financial system in Thailand, it is now important to 
explore financial development in the country. Since the establishment of the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand (SET), which began trading in April 1975, the financial market has shown 
continual development (SET, 2010c). During the period from 1978 to 1989, there was 
development in the financial institution and the capital market sector, as well as financial 
innovation, exemplified by the issuing of new financial instruments and new markets, and 
financial technologies. In April 1979, the repurchase market was established and in May 1979 
there was authorization for commercial banks and finance companies to operate government 
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bond repurchase transactions in order to improve money market liquidity for the bonds (BOT, 
1992b). In December 1979, the Foreign Exchange Offices were opened to increase bank 
services and to support commercial bank foreign exchange systems, and telephone inter-bank 
transfers introduced to support liquidity in the banking system (BOT, 1979, 1992b). In 
January 1982, there was the establishment of the Bond Exchange Programme for the 
transaction of government bonds of different maturities and yields to develop the secondary 
market. During 1983, commercial banks extended their business, as they were allowed to 
transact public bonds to support development in the money and capital markets (BOT, 1983). 
Innovation in the financial security of commercial banks was shown in March 1984 by the 
introduction of transferable deposit certificates, with the purpose of mobilizing short-term 
deposits (BOT, 1984). Moreover, both financial and non-financial institutions were allowed 
by SET to make public offerings of shares and debentures in order to increase liquidity and 
trading on the exchange (BOT, 1984). There was also a relaxation of bank branch opening 
restrictions, as banks were given permission to open branches in districts without 
representation (Vichyanond, 1994). New financial instrument innovation was continued by 
the introduction of the BIBORS (interest rate set for interbank loans and deposits) in 1985, 
which was used for the government bond repurchase market, treasury bills and transaction of 
commercial papers (BOT, 1985). Development in financial technology and the banking 
system continued, as shown by the introduction of the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication)
12
, central credit centres and a computerized check 
                                                          
12
 According to SWIFT (2013), it is a cooperative whose members comprise financial institutions and 
corporations in different countries. Its business includes financial data and information exchange between 
financial institutions, as well as the provision of related services (SWIFT, 2013). SWIFT aims to support the 
reduction of operational risk, low cost financial transactions, and efficiency in the operation of financial 
institutions.  
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clearing system for the development of commercial bank data exchange between countries 
and for the transfer of international funds (Vichyanond, 1994). A further development in 
October 1987 was when commercial banks were allowed to carry out leasing activities, to 
provide mergers and acquisitions consulting services and to recommend clients to life 
insurance companies (BOT, 1987). Between 1987 and 1988, both SET and BOT continued to 
support the development of new securities by issuing ADRs (American Depository Receipts) 
in April 1987, as well as allowing both non-financial and financial institutions to increase the 
share and debenture public offerings in February 1988 in order to develop the capital market 
(SET, 2010e). In June 1989, BOT began its plan for financial liberalization in 1990, which 
started with the deregulation of interest rate ceilings, and it decided to abolish the long-term 
deposit interest rate ceiling (BOT, 1989).  
 
Overall, financial development from 1978 to 1989 showed a continual increase. As seen in 
figure 3.14, the depository bank assets to total financial assets ratio (from 88% to 98%), the 
private credit by deposit money bank to GDP ratio (from 37% to 72%), the stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio (from 5% to 23 %), the stock market value traded to GDP ratio 
(from 8% to 10%) and the private debt securities to GDP ratio (from 4% to 8%) all showed a 
gradual increase. This shows the increase in the size of the banking sector and its issue of 
credit, a rise in the size of the capital market and trading activities, and the innovation of 
financial market instruments throughout the period. This was due to the development of the 
banking sector (the extension of banking business), as well as the introduction of new 
financial market instruments to support capital market trading. Financial deepening (M2 to 
GDP ratio) also showed a steady rise, from around 20% to 61%, as a result of the 
development of capital market instruments and the rise in banking services. The banking 
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concentration ratio in this period shows a slight drop, from around 64% to 60%. This was due 
to higher competition in the banking sector caused by the extension of banking business seen 
during this period.  
Figure3.14:  Financial development indicators in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
 
Source: Beck et al. (1999). 
During the period from 1990 to 1996, institutional sector and financial market development, 
as well as financial innovation, continued to show positive trends. From 1990 to 1992, BOT 
announced an official financial reform plan, which mainly aimed to introduce financial 
system liberalization, as well as to support the development of financial instruments and 
services (Hataiseree, 1995). During this period, the full policies on financial liberalization 
were announced, exemplified by the abolition of deposit interest rate ceilings, including the 
abandonment of the ceilings on short-term time deposit interest rates (in March 1990), saving 
deposit interest rates (in January 1992), and lending interest rates (in June 1992) (Hataiseree, 
1995; Sodsrichai, 1993). Foreign exchange liberalization was introduced in May 1990, 
including the abolition of international current account transaction payment and transfer 
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restrictions, the authorization of commercial banks to make trade transaction payments, 
foreign loan repayment and capital remittance repayments, and an increase in the limits on the 
amount of foreign currency Thai travellers could purchase (Yananda et al., 1992; Sodsrichai, 
1993). The second round of foreign exchange control relaxation was introduced in April 1991 
and April 1992, including the abolition of foreign currency purchase limits
13
 for travelling, 
lending, and portfolio investment; and a relaxation in the regulations on exporters for foreign 
transactions (BOT, 1991, 1992; Hataiseree, 1995). The overseas transfer of foreign currency 
deposits was now allowed, non-resident baht accounts could be used for exporters' payments 
and Thai nationals were now able to open foreign currency accounts (BOT, 1991; Sodsrichai, 
1993; Hataiseree, 1995). A third round of foreign exchange control liberalization was 
introduced in January 1994, which allowed the transfer of foreign currency abroad and the 
lending of foreign currency to non-residents, as well as relaxation of the regulations on 
opening foreign currency accounts (Hataiseree, 1995; Vichyanond, 1994).  
 
The financial liberalization policies introduced in 1990 were also extended to the institutional 
and financial market sectors. In May 1990, commercial banks were allowed to extend their 
business as authorisation was given for them to approve foreign loans and funds remittance of 
customers abroad (BOT, 1990). There was a reduction in the restrictions on the opening of 
new branches and on net foreign liability restrictions, and also on the foreign asset 
requirement of commercial banks in November 1990 (Sodsrichai, 1993). In addition, in 
August 1990, the minimum denomination requirements of promissory notes for finance 
companies, as well as the restrictions on the capital funds they could invest in securities, were 
                                                          
13
 The limitation of this foreign currency purchase appeared in some cases. Details of this can be found in BOT 
(1991).  
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abolished. There were further relaxations in the requirements for the opening of new bank 
branches in this year (Alba et al., 1999; BOT, 1990) and the establishment of provincial 
security trading offices in order to spread trading throughout the country (BOT, 1990). In 
1992, financial institution business and the financial market continued to develop. 
Commercial banks were authorized to hold state enterprise bonds and debt instruments in 
May 1991 (BOT, 1992). In June 1991, financial portfolio management control was relaxed so 
that other securities could be used as the reserve requirement of commercial banks (liquidity 
ratio basis) instead of solely government securities (reserve requirement ratio basis) (BOT, 
1992b). Commercial banks and finance and securities companies were allowed to operate as 
government and state enterprise debt instrument sales agents and financial advisors in March 
1992 (BOT, 1992b). In addition, in October 1992, negotiable certificates of deposits 
(hereafter, CDs) issued by commercial banks and securities companies were introduced. 
There was also an extension of the provision for banks and finance companies to jointly 
establish mutual funds business in June 1992 (BOT, 1991, 1992b; Sodsrichai, 1993; 
Vichyanond, 1994).  
 
From 1993 to 1995, BOT continued the process of financial liberalization in the country by 
issuing the second financial reform plan (BOT, 1992b). New deregulation policies for 
financial institutions and the market were introduced in this period to extend the development 
of banking and financial market business. In March 1993, Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities
14
 (hereafter, BIBF) was established. This institution is an offshore banking unit 
facilitating commercial banks’ international lending and deposit services, foreign currency 
                                                          
14
 Liberalization in this case included authorisation for commercial banks to operate the BIBF licence, which 
means that they could perform foreign exchange transactions and in foreign currencies (BOT, 1993). BOT also 
allowed the expansion of BIBF branches into rural area lending in May 1994 (Vichyanond, 1994).  
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transactions and financial information provision (BOT, 1993). It aims to increase banking 
system competition and bank domestic and foreign lending, reduce the cost of foreign funds 
borrowing, and increase transactions in the foreign exchange market (BOT, 1993). Other 
institutions were also established in this period, including the first Thai credit rating agency 
(Thai Rating and Information Services: TRIS), which aims to facilitate and increase the 
efficiency of the capital market (July 1993); the EXIM bank, which was to support the 
financial business of the trade sector (September 1993), and a bond dealers’ club in 1994 to 
promote liquidity in debt instruments (Vichyanond, 1994; SET, 2010e). The liberalization 
policies introduced in this period included the abolition of the government securities 
requirement for the opening of commercial bank branches in May 1993; the relaxation of 
commercial banks’ business investment requirements in September 1994; the separation of 
financial company and securities company business in August 1994; the relaxation of the 
limits of company equity held by banks and of equity investment in May 1994; the 
introduction of higher maturity (1 and 2 year) bonds traded on the financial market in March 
1996 and authorization for finance companies to carry out foreign exchange operations in 
April 1996 (Sodsrichai, 1993; Alba et al, 1999; BOT, 1995, 1996, 1998b; Vichyanond, 1994; 
Hataiseree, 1995). 
 
Innovations in the financial system continued to develop in this period (1990-1996). New 
financial technologies and systems included a payment system development in February 
1991, with the aim of developing electronic transfer payments; the introduction of SET 
electronic securities trading (Automated System for the SET: ASSET) in April 1991; the 
development of an electronic small value transfer system (ATM pools) in 1993; the 
introduction of the Bank of Thailand Automated High-value Transfer Network (BATHNET), 
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the electronic information report system (Price Reporting System: PRS) and the Electronic 
Listed Company Information Disclosure (ELCID) in 1995, which intended to facilitate real-
time information for investors (BOT, 1991; BOT, 2002b; SET, 2010e).  
 
Overall, the financial liberalization policies introduced in 1990 (the relaxation of interest 
rates, capital accounts, exchange rates and financial institution control), the extension of 
financial institution business, and the establishment of new institutions and financial 
technologies to develop financial market transactions contributed to the increase in the size of 
the banking sector and capital market, the innovation of financial market instruments, and 
financial deepening throughout this period (1990 to 1996). Figure 3.14 shows that the 
depository bank assets to total financial assets ratio, the private credit to GDP ratio, the stock 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, the stock market value traded to GDP ratio, the private 
debt securities to GDP ratio, and the M2 to GDP ratio showed a gradual increase from 1990 to 
1996, therefore indicating that the development of the banking sector and the capital market, 
financial innovation and financial deepening continued to increase in this period. The banking 
concentration ratio showed a slight decrease, from around 59% to 53% from 1990 to 1996. 
This resulted from the higher competition in the financial institution sector due to the 
expanded services offered by financial institutions and from the relaxation of many financial 
institution controls. The abolition of the interest rate ceiling, the relaxation of exchange rate 
and capital account control, and the establishment of new institutions to support foreign 
currency and capital market transactions also led to an increase in the growth of credit and 
deposits, capital inflow, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment and the capital and 
financial account balances during this period, as explained in section 3.2.  
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Although a crisis occurred in 1997, development in Thailand continued to take place in both 
financial institutions and the financial market between 1997 and 2008. As the crisis affected 
the Thai economy, major development from 1997 to 2008 was introduced to help the financial 
sector, which had problems during the crisis, and to prevent ongoing financial crisis in the 
future. In August 1998, the financial sector restructuring plan was introduced (BOT, 1998b). 
This plan included collateral transfer fee and tax exemption and the introduction of a deposit 
insurance agency to solve the liquidity problem of financial institutions (Santiprabhob, 2003). 
There recapitalization policy was introduced from August 1998 to May 1999, which included 
the nationalization and merger of financial institutions from around May and August 1998 to 
2002
15
(Santiprabhob, 2003). Additionally, there was an injection of public funds to support 
financial institutions and the privatization of commercial banks from 1999 to 2000
16
 
(Santiprabhob, 2003). New institutions were established for the purpose of debt restructuring 
as well as improving the liquidity condition of financial institutions and markets. These 
included the Property Loan Management Organisation (PLMO) in 1997, which carries out 
property loan management business (the purchase of impaired property loans, the 
securitization of property loans, and the operation of property mutual funds) in order to solve 
the default debt problem and to support the property business; the Secondary Mortgage 
Corporation (SMC) in 1997, which operates as a liquidity support institution for mortgage 
loans; the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) in October 1997, which manages 
and controls recapitalization plans for finance companies which have closed down; the Thai 
Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) in June 2001, which manages the assets of financial 
                                                          
15
 In May 1998, five financial companies merged with the Krung Thai Thanakit Finance Company (KTT) 
(Santiprabhob, 2003). In August 1998, Union Bank (UB) merged with seven other finance companies to form an 
enlarged KTT (this merger became the Bank Thai (BT)), the Laem Thong Bank (LTB) merged with Radhanasin 
Bank (RB), and Nakronthon Bank (NTB) with Standard Charter Bank (Santiprabhob, 2003). The mergers can be 
seen in April 2002 with the assets and liabilities transfer from Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) to Siam City 
Bank (SCIB) (BOT, 2002).  
16
 RB, NTB, SCIB, and BMB were privatized during this period, with between 51% and 75% of their assets sold 
to strategic partners (Santiprabhob, 2003).  
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institutions in order to increase liquidity in the financial market; and the Credit Bureau in 
September 2002, which provides credit information to financial institution members during 
the loan approval process (BOT, 2002b; Santiprabhob, 2003; Charoenseang  and Manakit, 
2002). BOT also permitted the adjustment of the securities transaction commission in October 
2000 in order to help increase the number of securities transactions (BOT, 2000). 
Furthermore, during 2000, BOT also gave permission for private repurchase transactions in 
listed companies, allowed the specialized financial institutions and others to extend 
agricultural, retail customer and long-term credit, and authorized securities companies to carry 
out some of the commercial bank business (for example, foreign exchange transaction 
business) (BOT, 2000, 2002b).  
 
Innovation in technology and development of the payment system continued in this period. 
This was shown by the establishment of a Set-Trade dot com Public Company Limited and 
the Thai-NDVR Public Company Limited for the promotion of securities trading via the 
internet and for information support in January 2000 (SET, 2010e). Internet trading of 
securities was established in January 2000 and off-hour trading in May 2000 to facilitate 
transactions on the capital market (BOT, 2002b). Furthermore, there was the introduction of 
online retail funds transfer (ORFT) for ATM interbank transfer payments in June 2000 (SET, 
2010e). In December 2001, BATHNET phase II was developed to support government 
securities transfer payments and Electronic Retail Funds Transfer (SMART) was introduced 
(BOT, 2002b). The International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for development of the 
accounting standards of listed companies was also established in 2006 (BOT, 2002b; SET, 
2010e; Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisation, 2009).  
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In 2003, the financial sector master plan phase I was introduced by BOT, covering the period 
from 2003 to 2008, in order to strengthen the Thai financial sectors, support an increase in the 
scope of business of commercial banks, and prevent the risk of financial crisis (BOT, 2006b, 
2009). The Thai capital market master plan phase I (from 2003 to 2005), and phase II (from 
2006 to 2010), were also introduced in order to support the financial master plan framework, 
innovation in the financial system, and competitiveness in the financial institutions 
(Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisation, 2009b). There was further development in 
financial institutions and the financial market, and innovation in the financial system during 
the period from 2003 to 2008. This development mainly comprised the creation of a micro 
finance system development committee in August 2003 to develop the financial sector in 
other provinces (for example, to extend loans and support co-operation to rural areas) 
(Federation of Thai Capital Market Organisation, 2009a). In July 2004, the establishment of 
more commercial banks as subsidiaries of foreign banks was allowed by the Ministry of 
Finance (BOT, 2004). There was also encouragement for SME business to operate retail 
transactions in the bond market and for exchange links between domestic and foreign 
derivative and bond markets from 2006 to 2008 (Federation of Thai Capital Market 
Organisation, 2009; BOT, 2006b). Moreover, from 2003 to 2008, new financial institutions 
were established to support the development of the financial market and institutional sectors. 
This can be seen in the establishment of the Bond Electronic Exchange (BEX) to support 
bond market electronic transactions in November 2003 and the establishment of Thailand 
Derivative Market Public Company Limited, which acted as the centre for derivative 
transactions, in 2004 (SET, 2010e, BOT, 2006b). In May 2004, the Thailand Future Exchange 
market (TFEX) was established for the development of the derivative market and instruments 
transaction (TFEX, 2010). From 2006 to 2008, the development of institutions and the 
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financial market continued. This was shown by the authorization for commercial banks to 
carry out securities short sale transactions and securitization transaction in April 2006; the 
introduction of the SET 50 index for future trading in September 2006; the establishment of 
the SET 50 index for option trading in October 2007; and the establishment of the future 
trading market in November 2008 (TFEX, 2010; SET, 2010e; BOT, 2006b).  
 
Overall, despite the financial crisis of 1997, financial development in Thailand from 1997 to 
2008 continued to show positive trends compared to the previous period.  Figure 3.14 shows 
that although there were downward trends, exemplified by drops in the depository bank assets 
to total financial assets ratio, the private credit by deposit money bank to GDP ratio, the stock 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, the stock market total value traded to GDP ratio and the 
market and private debt securities to GDP ratio, as well as slow growth in the M2 to GDP 
ratio between 1997 and 2001; the introduction of the financial restructuring plan and the 
financial development throughout this period contributed to the increase in the size of the 
banking sector and the capital market, and innovation of financial market instruments. This 
was shown by the increase of these indicators throughout this period. In addition, although the 
financial concentration ratio shows a positive trend from 1997 to 2001 due to the effect of the 
financial crisis and weak competition in the banking sector, this ratio shows a negative trend 
after 2001 to 2008, from 57% to 50%, showing the higher level of competition in the banking 
sector. 
 
After the introduction of the financial master plan which covered the period from 2003 to 
2008, the BOT announced it would extend this master plan by issuing the financial sector 
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master plan phase II, which aimed to increase financial competition, support financial access 
and financial infrastructure, improve financial institutions’ risk management systems, and 
reduce financial operating costs in the banking system (BOT, 2009). This plan is an on-going 
development plan for financial development in Thailand, covering the period from 2010 to 
2014.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the timeline of financial development in Thailand. 
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Table 3.2: Timeline of financial development in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
 
Year Month Financial development in Thailand 
1979 April 
May 
 
December 
- Establishment of the repurchase market. 
- Authorization for commercial banks and finance companies to make government 
bond repurchase transactions. 
- Opening of Foreign Exchange Offices in commercial banks. 
- Introduction of telephone inter-bank transfers. 
1982 January - Establishment of the Bond Exchange Programme. 
1983  - Commercial banks allowed to make public bond transactions.  
- Relaxation of commercial bank branch opening restriction (authorization for the 
extension of bank branches into districts without branches and the outskirts of cities). 
1984 March - Introduction of transferable deposit certificates.  
 December - Financial and non-financial institutions allowed to make share and debenture public 
offerings. 
1985  - Introduction of BIBORS for the government bond repurchase market, treasury bill 
and commercial paper transactions.  
- Introduction of SWIFT (Society for Worldwide International Funds Transfers), a 
central credit centre and computerized check clearing system. 
1987 April 
October 
- Issuing of ADRs (American Depository Receipts) for the development of the capital 
market and to increase capital.  
- Authorization for commercial banks to carry out leasing activities, mergers and 
acquisitions consulting services, and to make life insurance recommendations.  
1988 February - Authorization for non-financial and financial institutions to increase share and 
debenture public offerings.   
1989  - Abolition of the long-term time deposit interest rate ceiling. 
1990 January 
 
March 
May 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 
 
 
 
- Introduction of the financial reform plan (the full system of financial liberalization in 
the country now began).  
- Abandonment of the short-term time deposit interest rate ceiling. 
- Introduction of foreign exchange liberalization (acceptance of the IMF agreement in 
articles VIII).   
- Abolition of international current account transaction payment and transfer 
restrictions.  
- Authorization for commercial banks to make trade transaction payments, capital 
remittance repayments and foreign loans.  
- Increase in Thai travellers’ level of foreign currency purchases. 
- Authorization for commercial banks to make foreign loan approvals and approvals  
for overseas customers'  remittances of funds. 
- Abolition of the promissory note minimum denomination requirement for finance 
companies. 
- Abolition of restrictions on companies’ capital funds invested in securities. 
- Establishment of provincial area security trading offices. 
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Table 3.1 (cont’d): Timeline of financial development in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
Year Month Financial development in Thailand 
1990 September 
November 
- Relaxation of bank branch opening restrictions (1.5 per cent reduction in 
government bond requirements for bank branch opening). 
- Reduction in bank branch opening, foreign asset requirements, and net foreign 
liability position restrictions (a 6.5 per cent reduction in government bond 
requirements for bank branch opening and a 5 per cent increase in the net 
foreign liability position of commercial banks). 
1991 February 
April 
 
 
 
May 
-  Development of electronic transfer payments. 
- Introduction of a second round of foreign exchange control relaxation. 
- Abolition of foreign currency purchase limits (purchase of foreign currency for 
travelling, lending and direct and portfolio investment). 
- Introduction of SET’s electronic securities trading (ASSET). 
- Authorization for commercial banks to hold state enterprise bonds and debt 
instruments. 
1992 January 
February 
 
March 
 
 
April 
 
 
 
 
 
June 
 
 
October 
- Abandonment of the saving deposit interest rate ceiling. 
- Relaxation of bank branch opening restrictions (a 1.5 per cent reduction in 
government bond requirements for the opening of bank branches). 
- Authorization for commercial banks and finance and securities companies to 
operate as government and state enterprise debt instrument sales agents, 
financial advisors and as an information service. 
- Relaxation of exporter regulations on foreign transactions (non-resident baht 
accounts could now be used for exporter payments). 
- Transfer of overseas debt payments for foreign currency deposits now allowed. 
- Fund withdrawals for overseas payments freely approved for commercial 
banks. 
- Abandonment of the lending interest rate ceiling. 
- Relaxation of financial portfolio management control. 
- Extension of provision for banks and finance companies to jointly establish 
mutual funds. 
- Introduction of CDs. 
 
1993  
 
 
March 
May 
- Establishment of the second financial reform plan, with the aim of continuing to 
develop financial liberalization policies and the banking and financial markets. 
-  Establishment of the BIBF. 
- Abolition of all commercial bank opening requirements regarding the holding of 
government securities.  
- Introduction of an electronic small value transfer system (ATM pools). 
1994 January 
 
 
July 
September 
-Third round of foreign exchange control relaxation to support the flow of foreign 
exchange transferred abroad and non-resident foreign exchange lending. 
- Relaxation of the regulations on the opening of foreign currency accounts. 
- Establishment of the Thai Rating and Information Service (TRIS). 
- Establishment of the Export and Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM bank). 
- Establishment of a bond dealers’club. 
- Relaxation of the limits on company equity held by banks and equity 
investment. 
1995  - Introduction of the Bank of Thailand Automated High-value Transfer Network 
(BATHNET), the Electronic Information Report System (PRS), and Electronic 
Listed Company Information Disclosure (ELCID).  
1996 March 
April 
- Introduction of higher maturity bonds (1 and 2 year bonds). 
- Authorization for finance companies to carry out foreign exchange operations. 
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Table 3.1 (cont’d): Timeline of financial development in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
Year Month Financial development in Thailand 
1997  
 
 
 
- Establishment of the Property Loan Management Organisation (PLMO), the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA), and the Secondary Mortgage 
Corporation (SMC) for debt restructuring purposes and for improving 
liquidity conditions in the financial market and institutions. 
1998 May 
August 
- Merger of five finance companies with the Krung Thai Thanakit Finance 
Company (KTT).  
- Introduction of the financial sector restructuring plan. 
- Collateral transfer fees and tax exemption. 
- Introduction of the deposit insurance agency.  
- Increase in the investment limits and holding time period of foreclosed 
properties in order to facilitate debt-equity swaps. 
- Introduction of the recapitalization policy. 
- Merger of the Union Bank and seven other finance companies with KTT. 
- Merger of Laem Thong Bank (LTB) with Radhanasin Bank (RB). 
- Merger of Nakronthon Bank (NTB) with Standard Charter Bank. 
1999  - Injection of public funds to support financial institutions. 
- Privatisation of RB, NTB, SCIB and BMB until 2000. 
2000 January 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 
June 
- Authorization for private repurchase transactions in listed companies. 
- Authorization for specialized and other financial institutions to extend 
agricultural, retail customer and long-term credit. 
- Authorization for securities companies to carry out foreign exchange 
transaction business. 
- Establishment of the Thai-NDVR public company limited and set-trade dot 
com public company limited. 
- Commencement of internet trading in the capital market. 
- Introduction of off-hour trading.  
- Introduction of on-line retail funds transfer (ORFT) for interbank ATM 
transfer payments.  
- Authorization for the establishment of the securities transaction 
commission. 
2001 June 
December 
- Establishment of the Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC). 
- Introduction of BATHNET phase II.  
- Improvements in the government bond payment system.   
2002 April 
 
September 
- Merger of Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) with Siam City Bank 
(SCIB). 
- Establishment of the Credit Bureau. 
2003  
 
March 
April 
 
August 
- Establishment of the financial sector master plan phase I (from 2003 to 
2008), and the Thai capital market master plan phase I (from 2003 to 2005), 
and phase II (from 2006 to 2010). 
- Development of the Credit Bureau. 
- Authorization for commercial banks to make forward bond, bond options 
and default swap transactions. 
- Extension of loans to rural areas and support for cooperation in these areas. 
- Establishment of the Bond Electronic Exchange (BEX).  
2004 May - Establishment of the Thai Future Exchange market (TFEX). 
- Establishment of the Siam DR company for the issuing of depository 
receipts to investors and the Thailand derivative market PLC.  
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Table 3.1 (cont’d): Timeline of financial development in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 
2006 April 
 
 
September 
 
 
 
- Authorization for commercial banks to make private repurchase market 
transactions, securities short sale transactions, and securitization 
transactions.  
- Introduction of SET 50 future index trading.  
- Introduction of the Electronic Retail Fund Transfer (SMART) and 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS).  
- Encouragement for SME business, retail transactions in the bond market, 
exchange linkage between domestic and foreign derivative and bond 
markets from 2006 to 2008. 
 
2007 October - Introduction of SET 50 index option trading. 
2008 November - Introduction of stock future trading. 
2010  - Announcement of the financial master plan phase II (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE LENDING CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION: 
EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND USING BANK LEVEL DATA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The lending channel is one important issue of monetary policy transmission relating to the 
banking sector. We already described in chapter 2 that a micro data based study is considered 
to be the suitable way for the examination of this channel. Agung et al. (2002a), Wibowo 
(2005), Garretsen and Swank (2003), Gupta (2004) and Pruteanu-Popiera (2007) point out 
that the use of aggregate time series data in the model cannot distinguish whether the effect of 
monetary policy shock on loans comes from the supply side (the change in the bank loan 
supply generally presented in the lending channel) or the demand side (the change in the 
demand for loans explained by the interest rate channel), thus giving rise to the identification 
problem.  
 
Many studies of the lending channel mainly use bank-level panel data (micro data based 
studies) which account for the bank characteristic variables (size, capitalization, and liquidity) 
to circumvent the above problem (Hosono, 2006; Li, 2009; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). As the 
different bank characteristics will have different effects on the loan supply, the use of these 
characteristic variables will control for the cross sectional differences in the effects of 
monetary policy on loan supply (Li, 2009; Agung et al., 2002a; Hernando and Martinez-
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Pages, 2001). Thus, this shows that these characteristic variables are the indicators 
representing the supply side effect of monetary policy shock (bank characteristic variables 
mainly affect banks’ loan supply) (Alfaro et al., 2003; Agung et al., 2002a; Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000; Li, 2009; Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001). Another advantage of bank-level 
panel data is that the bank characteristic variables can control for the lenders’ heterogeneity as 
well as the difference in bank balance sheet strength (Li, 2009; Garretsen and Swank, 2003). 
Therefore, the micro data based approach, by introducing the bank characteristic variables, 
becomes the appropriate way to study the lending channel. This type of study has been 
applied in many bank lending channel studies (Kashyap and Stein, 1994a, 2000; Ehrmann and 
Worms, 2004; Peek and Rosengren, 1995b; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Agung, 1998; 
Agung et al., 2002a; Horváth et al., 2006; Gambacorta, 2001; Ehrmann et al., 2001). 
 
The studies of the effect of financial sector development on the lending channel, such as Li 
(2009), Altunbas et al. (2009b), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Aysun and Hepp (2011) 
indicate only the effect of financial competition and financial innovation on the lending 
channel. However, they ignore other financial development issues (financial deepening and 
financial liberalization).  
 
Furthermore, most of the micro data based studies have been carried out in countries with 
developed economies, such as the US (Kashyap and Stein, 1993, 1994a, 2000; Kishan and 
Opiela, 2000; Gunji et al., 2009; Adams and Amel, 2005); the Euro area (Altunbas et al., 
2002; Ehrmann et al., 2001; Chatelain et al., 2003a; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Favero et 
al., 1999); Germany (Worm, 2001); Japan (Hosono, 2006); France (Loupias et al., 2002) and 
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Italy (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2001), while relatively few papers have 
discussed developing countries, such as Indonesia (Agung et al., 2002a), South Africa (Sichei, 
2005), Brazil (De Oliveira and Ramos, 2008), Colombia (Go mez-Gonza lez and Grosz, 2007) 
and Chile (Fernandez, 2004; Alfaro et al., 2003). There is a lack of studies of this issue in 
Thailand; it appears that only Piyavongpinyo (2002) introduces this approach for the bank 
panel level data study of the lending channel. However, he still does not investigate the effect 
of financial development on the lending channel.  
 
This chapter will make the following contributions concerning the gap found in the past 
literature: (1) it will examine a micro data based study by using bank-level panel data and 
introducing bank characteristic variables in order to circumvent the problem of using 
aggregate time series data in the bank lending channel; (2) other studies only focus on the 
effect of financial competition and financial innovation on the lending channel, so this chapter 
will expand this issue by also introducing the effects of financial liberalization, banking sector 
development and capital market development on the channel in order to investigate the effect 
of different areas of financial development on it, and (3) this chapter will also shed light on 
the study of the effect of financial development on the lending channel in order to fill the gap 
in previous empirical studies in Thailand, which do not focus on the effect of financial 
development on the bank lending channel. This individual country study can also control for 
the different structures of economic and financial backgrounds, which is generally the case 
when conducting multi-country studies.  
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The main objectives of this chapter are as follows: (1) to examine the lending channel from 
the micro data based perspective, with the aim of analyzing the effect of different bank 
characteristics, which include bank characteristic variables (size, capitalization, liquidity and 
ownership structure) on the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, and (2) to 
investigate the effect of financial development (financial liberalization, financial competition, 
financial innovation, banking sector development, and capital market development) on the 
lending channel in Thailand, particularly at the micro based level. The study will examine this 
effect by using financial development indicators in the model to represent the effect of 
financial sector development. 
 
Our results indicate the existence of the bank lending channel in Thailand in the period from 
1978 to 2008 as we found a negative effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans. The 
results show that the higher the size, capitalization and liquidity characteristics of banks, the 
weaker the effect of monetary policy via the bank lending channels. This is due to the greater 
opportunity for these banks to obtain external sources of funding and they will therefore face 
a lower effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans  The results of the effect of financial 
development indicate the significant effect of financial development indicators on bank loans 
in Thailand. The results show that banking sector development, banking competition, capital 
market development, financial innovation and financial liberalization have weakened the bank 
lending channel. This is because financial sector development can lead to development in 
both the size and activities of the banking sector and capital market, and development of new 
financial market instruments. This condition leads to wider opportunities for banks to access 
the financial market, as well as a higher level of financial market liquidity and capital, thus 
leading to a lower effect of monetary policy on bank loans. 
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The remainder of this chapter will be developed as follows: section 4.2 will present a 
theoretical literature review concerning the effect of bank characteristics on the lending 
channel, as well as the empirical literature related to the micro aspect study, including micro 
based study of the lending channel and the effect of financial development on the lending 
channel. Section 4.3 will discuss the data and methodology (data description, model 
specification and the methodology applied in this study). The empirical results and analysis 
will be presented in section 4.4, and finally the conclusion and suggestions for further 
research will be discussed in section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Literature review  
 
4.2.1 Effect of bank characteristics on the lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission 
 
Bank characteristics can be considered as size, capitalization and liquidity. According to 
Kashyap and Stein (1994a, 2000) and Kakes (1998), a rise in the policy interest rate will be 
followed by a lower decline in large bank lending than in that of small banks. This is because 
large banks have greater opportunities to raise external funds than small ones. Furthermore, 
there is a lower level of asymmetric information problems in large banks relative to small 
ones (Kashyap and Stein, 1994a, 2000). This is due to their higher reputation, better risk 
diversification behaviour, and the higher liquid funds (Li, 2009; Bank of Korea, 1998; Favero 
et al., 1999; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Sichei, 2005). This will reduce the external funding 
costs or securities issuing costs of large banks and thus incresing the opportunity for external 
funding (access to capital markets and commercial paper markets, and also the issuing of 
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foreign bonds and other securities) (Ehrmann et al., 2001; Garretsen and Swank, 2003; Agung 
et al., 2002a; Loupias et al., 2001; Haan, 2001; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009). Therefore, 
when there is a monetary policy shock, large banks will show a lower sensitivity of their bank 
loans to the change in the policy interest rate than small banks, thus leading to the weakening 
of the lending channel. 
 
For the capitalization characteristic of banks, monetary policy shock will have a lower effect 
on the loans of better capitalized banks than those of poorly capitalized ones (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995b; Wu et al., 2007; Altunbas, 2009; Benkovskis, 2008). This is because the 
highly capitalized banks have a lower credit risk, as well as high creditworthiness 
(Piyavongpinyo, 2002; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007; Chavan and Vaidya, 2003; Brissimiss and 
Delis, 2009; Haan, 2001; Loupias et al., 2001). Consequently, the more highly capitalized 
banks will find external funding from the financial markets more easily and thus their loans 
will show a lower response to the monetary policy shock than the less capitalized ones 
(Worms, 2001; Engler et al., 2007; Hosono, 2006; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). In other 
words, the higher the bank capitalization, the lower the effect of monetary policy shock on 
bank loans and the weakening of the lending channel.  
 
For the liquidity characteristic, the higher a bank’s liquidity, the lower the effect of monetary 
policy shock on its loans. This is due to the high proportion of cash, liquid assets and 
securities of the more liquid banks compared with the less liquid ones (Favero et al., 1999; 
Schmitz, 2004). As a result, when the policy interest rate increases, the more liquid banks will 
have greater opportunities to offset the decrease in bank loans with their liquid assets and 
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securities (Haan, 2001; Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001; Loupias et al., 2002; Ghosh, 
2006; Brissimis and Delis, 2009). Therefore, the higher the banks’ liquidity, the lower the 
effect of monetary policy shock on their loans and the weakening of the lending channel.  
 
Therefore, concerning the previous theoretical review, higher size, capitalization and liquidity 
of banks are expected to weaken the effect of monetary policy shock on bank loans. 
 
4.2.2 Studies of the micro data based aspect of the lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission 
This section will discuss two aspects of the empirical micro data based studies: (1) studies of 
the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission, and (2) studies of the effect of 
financial sector development on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission.  
4.2.2.1 Studies of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission 
 
Kishan and Opiela (2000) consider the lending channel in the US and their dynamic panel 
data results indicate a higher negative effect of the policy interest rate on the loans of small 
and undercapitalized banks, compared with those of large and well capitalized ones. This 
result supports the theoretical concept explained previously, as the smaller the bank size and 
capitalization, the higher the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans. Instead of 
dividing banks into different groups, Engler et al. (2007) apply a bank characteristic variable 
to their model and use the GMM technique in a case study of Austria. They indicate the 
positive effect of the interaction of policy rate and capital characteristic of banks on bank 
loans, which means that the higher the capitalization of banks, the lower the effect of the 
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interest rate on their loans. Similar results are also shown by Peek and Rosengren (1995b) in 
their study of the US. By using the GMM technique, they report that both the size and 
capitalization characteristics of banks will lead to a weakened effect on the bank lending 
channel.  
 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) apply the GMM estimation to study the bank lending 
channel in Italy and they introduce the liquidity chracteristic into their model. They show a 
positive effect of the interaction term between money market interest rates and capitalization, 
as well as the liquidity characteristic, on bank loans. Consequently, this confirms that the 
higher the capitalization and liquidity of banks, the weaker the lending channel. A similar 
result is also reported by Topi and Vilmunen (2001), Ashcraft (2001), Gambacorta (2001), 
Haan (2001) in their bank lending channel studies of Finland, the US, Italy, and the 
Netherlands respectively.  
 
Amongst studies of developing countries, Piyavongpinyo (2002) examines the lending 
channel in Thailand. Her panel data results confirm that the larger the bank, the weaker the 
effect of the policy interest rate via the lending channel. De Oliveira and Ramos (2008) and 
Sichei (2005) study the lending channel in Brazil and in Africa using GMM estimation and 
introducing the size and liquidity characteristics of banks in their studies. They conclude that 
the higher the size and liquidity characteristics of banks, the weaker the effect of the policy 
rate on bank loans and thus the weaker the effect of the policy interest rate through the 
lending channel. Similarly, Go mez-Gonza lez and Grosz (2007), using GMM on data from 
Argentina and Colombia, found that the higher the liquidity and capital of banks, the weaker 
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the effect of the policy interest rate via the lending channel. Similar results are also reported 
by Brooks (2007), Aktas and Onur-tas (2007), Agung et al. (2002a), Gunji and Yuan (2010), 
Golodniuk (2006), and Wu et al. (2007) in their bank lending channel studies of Turkey, 
Indonesia, China, Ukraine, and various developing countries respectively. By introducing all 
of the bank characteristic variables (size, liquidity and capitalization) into the model, Ghosh 
(2006) and Karim et al. (2010), Alfaro et al. (2003), Lang and Krznar (2004), Fernandez 
(2004) and Boughrara and Ghazouani (2008) examine the lending channel in India, Malaysia, 
Croatia, Chile, and  MENA countries (Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia) respectively. Their 
results prove that an increase in bank size, capital and liquidity will weaken the bank lending 
channel.  
 
The empirical studies presented previously have reported results in line with the theoretical 
expectation that a higher bank size, capital and liquidity will lead to a weaker effect of the 
policy interest rate via the bank lending channel. However, some empirical studies obtain 
results which contradict the theoretical prediction. Loupias et al. (2002), Jimborean (2009), 
and Hernando and Martinez-Page s (2001) used the GMM technique and found that a higher 
bank size leads to a higher effect of monetary policy on bank loans in their lending channel 
studies of French, Euro area country, and Spanish banks respectively. They explain that this 
unexpected result comes from the higher liquidity and capital in small banks, which will 
dampen the effect of monetary policy on bank loans. The same result is also reported by 
Chatelain et al. (2003a) in a lending channel study of France, Germany, Italy and Spain and 
by Worms (2001) in Germany, Favero et al. (1999) in European countries, Pruteanu-Podpiera 
(2007) in Czech Republic and Çavuşoğlu (2002) in Turkey. Altunbas et al. (2002) and 
Farinha and Marques (2001), who investigate panel data in 11 EMU countries and Portugal, 
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also argue that there is no clear explanation for the effect of bank size on bank loans; 
nevertheless, the capital characteristic of banks still supports the theoretical explanation.  
 
Some studies also report an unexpected result for other bank characteristic variables. The 
GMM study in Central and Eastern European countries by Matousek and Sarantis (2009) 
found the insignificance of the capital characteristic in most countries (Hungary, the Baltic 
States and Slovenia), while the size and liquidity characteristics of banks show a significant 
positive effect on bank loans. They explain that this probably comes from the high proportion 
of capital in banks, which causes the independence of this characteristic from monetary policy 
shock. Similarly, Ehrmann et al. (2001), Hosono (2006), and Benkovskis (2008) not only 
found this insignificant effect of capital but also of the liquidity characteristic on bank loans in 
the Euro area countries, Japan and Latvia respectively. 
 
4.2.2.2 The effect of financial sector development on the lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission 
 
We can see previously that the few studies of the lending channel are concerned with the 
effect of financial development on the lending channel. Li (2009) examines this effect in Asia 
and Latin America countries. The results from his GLS and fixed effect estimation identify a 
positive effect of the interaction term of the competition indicator (the Panzar-Rosse H 
statistic) and policy interest rate on bank loans, showing that financial competition leads to a 
weakening of the bank lending channel. He explains that this is because a more competitive 
market will lead to a greater opportunity for customers to access a variety of funding sources, 
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thus weakening the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans. This supports the 
theoretical literature discussed in chapter 2. His bank characteristic studies also report that the 
loans of small, undercapitalized and low liquid banks have a stronger reaction to an increase 
in the policy rate than the loans of large, highly capitalized and highly liquid banks. Gunji et 
al. (2009) and Adams and Amel (2005) support the findings that bank competition has a 
positive effect on bank loans by using  a US banking database, thus confirming that financial 
competition will lead to a weakening of the bank lending channel. Similarly, Brissimiss and 
Delis (2009) use GMM on bank level data in the US and 12 EU countries, showing that the 
higher the banking competition, the lower the effect of interest rates on bank loans.  
 
Ferreira (2010) introduces the banking sector development indicators (bank deposits to GDP 
ratio and foreign assets to GDP ratio) as well as the capital market development ones (bonds 
and money market instrument to GDP ratio) into a study of the lending channel in the EU. 
The GMM estimation shows that these indicators weaken the effect of policy interest rate on 
bank loans, concluding that development in the banking sector will have a weaker effect on 
the lending channel.   
 
Among studies on the effect of financial innovation on the lending channel, Altunbas et al. 
(2009b) show that securitization will lead to a rise in bank liquidity and securities holding and 
thus cause a weaker effect of the policy interest rate via the bank lending channel. Moreover, 
they report that all of the bank characteristic variables (size, capital and liquidity) also have a 
positive effect on bank loans. The same result was also found by Aysun and Hepp (2011), 
who show that an increase in securitization activity and the bank characteristics (size, capital 
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and liquidity) will result in a weaker effect of policy interest rate via the lending channel in 
the US.  
 
To sum up, most of the empirical studies of the micro data based aspect of the lending 
channel obtain results which support theoretical expectations. Most studies of developed and 
developing countries find that greater size, capital and liquidity of banks will lead to a weaker 
effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans, and thus weaken the lending channel. 
However, some studies obtain the unexpected result that large banks tend to have a stronger 
effect on the lending channel (Loupias et al., 2002; Jimborean, 2009; Chatelain et al., 2003a; 
Hernando and Martinez-Page s, 2001; Worms, 2001; in Germany; Favero et al., 1999; 
Pruteanu-Podpiera ,2007;  Çavuşoğlu, 2002; Altunbas et al., 2002; Farinha and Marques, 
2001) and also find insignificant results of the effect of bank characteristics on the lending 
channel (Ehrmann et al., 2001; Hosono, 2006; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Benkovskis, 
2008). We can also see that most of the studies of the micro data based have focused on 
developed countries.  
 
For the effect of financial development on the lending channel, the previous empirical studies 
have found that this development will lead to a weaker effect on the lending channel. 
However, the empirical studies of this issue only focus on the effect of financial innovation 
(securitization) and financial competition on the lending channel, leaving a gap in the study of 
other issues of financial development (capital market development, financial liberalization, 
and banking sector development).   
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Therefore, concerning the gaps found in the previous literature, this study will examine the 
bank lending channel by using Thailand as a case study of a developing country and also 
investigate the effect of different aspects of financial development (financial liberalization, 
financial competition, financial innovation and banking and capital market development) on 
the bank lending channel.  
 
4.3 Data and methodology  
 
This section will be divided into three sub-sections: (1) data description, (2) model 
specification and (3) methodology. 
4.3.1 Data description  
 
Banking financial institutions in Thailand are discussed in this study in order to examine the 
lending channel, while non-banking financial institutions (investment banks, finance and 
securities companies, mutual fund and insurance companies, and credit cooperatives), are not 
included in the sample. Compared with the banking financial institutions, these non-banking 
financial institutions’ major business does not significantly depend on the function of taking 
deposits and making bank loans and thus these institutions do not relate to the analysis of the 
lending channel (Schmitz, 2004;  u et al., 2007; Hernando and Martinez-Page s, 2001). 
Because of this, many studies only use a commercial bank sample in their papers (Gomez-
Go nza lez and Grosz, 2007; Sichei, 2005; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007; Fernandez, 2004; Kishan 
and Opiela, 2000). 
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Following the merger treatment by Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2001), Gambacorta et al. 
(2001), Gambacorta (2001), Benkovskis (2008), Fernandez (2004), Kishan and Opiela (2000) 
and Horváth et al. (2006), backward aggregation is applied (treatment of the merged banks as 
a single bank throughout the sample period). This will take the absorbing banks out of the 
sample and maintain only the merged ones.  
 
Before the above treatment, the overall sample is equal to 120, including both banking and 
non-banking financial institutions. After omitting the non-banking financial institutions and 
using the merger treatment for the reason explained previously, the sample was reduced to 22 
banking financial institutions, including 16 commercial banks and 6 specialized financial 
institutions. However, the specialized financial institutions had to be omitted from our sample 
because they have different supervisory regulations compared with commercial banks
17
 
(Altunbas et al., 2009b; Ehrmann et al., 2001; Engler et al., 2007; Gambacorta, 2001). As a 
result, the total bank sample is equal to 16 commercial banks, covering the period from 1978 
to 2008. 
 
                                                          
17
 According to the Thai banking act of legislation 2007, the specialized financial institutions (the Government 
Saving Bank, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, the Government Housing Bank, the 
Export and Import Bank of Thailand, the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Bank of Thailand, and the 
Islamic bank) have been controlled by the Ministry of Finance instead of by the Bank of Thailand (BOT, 2008c). 
This means that policies introduced by the Bank of Thailand (a change in the policy interest rate or a monetary 
policy decision) mainly affect the commercial banks. This means that the specialized financial intuitions’ 
activities (such as issuing loans) are independent from Bank of Thailand policies (Loungpitak, 2005). Therefore, 
in order to study the lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Thailand, the commercial banks are a 
suitable sample to be applied in this case.  
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We use the consolidated balance sheet data
18
 as these data can capture the bank’s financial 
constraints and the informational asymmetries through the subsidiary information 
(Gambacorta, 2001). Therefore, this will improve the data efficiency and deliberately examine 
the effect of monetary policy shock on bank loans. This type of data is also notably applied in 
other studies (Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Haan, 2001; Schmitz, 2004). The sample is an 
unbalanced panel which is used to increase the observations and to investigate the effect of 
financial development which probably relates to the change in the number of financial 
institutions (an increase in banking concentration or the introduction of new financial 
institutions). All of the bank balance sheet data and the bank characteristic data (bank size, 
bank liquidity and bank capitalization) are obtained from the commercial banks’ financial 
statements listed on the PACAP database for Thailand from the period 1978 to 1996, and 
from the SET database for the period 1997 to 2008. The 14 day repurchase market interest 
rate is used as the policy interest rate in Thailand and these data are obtained from the Bank of 
Thailand database
19
.  
 
We use the financial development indicators which are classified by Beck et al. (1999, 2008) 
and Singh et al. (2008). In this case, they will be grouped according to the different sectors of 
financial development as follows: 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Consolidated data means the data which also include the subsidiary banks in the balance sheet data (Ehrmann 
et al., 2001).  If there is no consolidated data available from some banks and periods, the unconsolidated data is 
used instead.  
19
 The Bank of Thailand database is available at the Bank of Thailand website: http://www.bot.or.th/English/ 
Statistics/ContactPerson/Pages/Contact.aspx. If there is no data for the repurchase rate available, we use 
interbank overnight interest rate instead.  
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(1) Banking sector development 
The banking sector development indicator is classified as the development in the size of the 
sector (size measure) and the development in its activity (activity measure). The development 
in the size of the banking sector is measured by the depository banks’ assets to total financial 
assets (FD1). This indicator has been applied in several papers in the financial development 
area (Beck et al., 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Nourzad, 2002; Da Silva, 
2002) in order to present banking sector development, particularly in size. According to Beck 
et al. (2008) and Nourzad (2002), this indicator shows the development of the size of the 
banking sector compared with financial institutions and also represents the financial depth as 
well as the degree of financial intermediation in the banking sector. For the activity measure, 
we use the private credit by depository banks to GDP ratio (FD2). This indicator is used to 
represent the financial intermediary activities provided to customers (the channel by which 
banks provide loans and services to customers) (Beck et al., 1999; Levine et al., 2000). This 
indicator has also been applied in many financial development studies (Beck et al., 1999, 
2008; Levine et al., 2000; Levine and Zervos, 1998).  These banking sector development 
indicators are obtained from the Beck et al. (1999) database
20
.  
 
(2) Financial competition 
We use the three largest bank assets to total bank assets (FD3), which is the bank 
concentration ratio, to represent financial competition. This indicator has been widely applied 
in several researches to represent financial competition in the banking sector, as greater 
                                                          
20
 This database is available via the World Bank website:  http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20696167~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,
00.html  
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banking concentration will lead to a low competitive condition in the sector (Li, 2009; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cull and Effron, 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2009; 
Edirisuriya, 2007; The World Bank, 2010; Beck et al., 1999). We already stated in chapter 2 
that a higher level of financial competition can lead to higher efficiency in the financial 
market in terms of the lower cost of providing financial products and services, thus leading to 
development in the financial market. Some studies also use Panzar and Rosses’s H statistic, 
which is calculated by the banks’ total revenue elasticity with respect to the input prices of 
banks, as a measure of financial competition (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Li, 2009; Bikker 
and Haaf, 2000). However, it has been argued that the use of the H statistic can result in bias, 
as this indicator is valid only in the long-run equilibrium condition, which is difficult to 
achieve (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Shaffer, 1983). Bikker et al. (2007) claim that there is 
misspecification of the calculation of the H statistic. They found that the use the ratio of total 
income to asset as the endogenous variable when calculating the H statistic will lead to an 
overestimation of the competition degree. In addition, Claessens and Laeven (2003) point out 
that this statistic tends to be biased when the bank sample size is very small (below 20 banks). 
Due to the above reasons and the small bank sample size in Thailand, we will use the bank 
concentration ratio to represent the financial competition measure in Thailand. These data are 
calculated from the commercial banks’ balance sheet statement database in Thailand obtained 
from the SET and Beck et al.’s (1999) database.  
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(3) Capital market development  
The capital market development indicator is also classified as development in the size of the 
capital market (size measure) and development in its activity (activity measure). The size 
measure is shown by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (FD4) and the activity 
measure is represented by the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP (FD5). These 
indicators have been widely applied by many papers to capture capital market development as 
they present the value of firms’ listed shares and the value of shares traded in the market. 
They will therefore present the degree of financial deepening and disintermediation which 
shows development in the financial market (Beck et al., 2008; Beck and Rahman, 2006; Von 
Furstenberg and Fratianni, 1996; The World Bank, 2010; Krause and Rioja, 2006; Beck et al., 
1999; De La Torre et al., 2006; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2000; Gallego and Loayza, 
2000). These indicators are obtained from the Beck et al. (1999) database.  
 
(4) Bond market development  
We use the ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations to GDP to measure bond market development. This indicator shows the 
development in size of the bond market and financial depth (Beck et al., 2008; Beck et al., 
1999; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2009; Gallego and Loayza, 2000). According to Singh et al. 
(2008), this measurement also represents financial innovation in the country, as a rise in debt 
securities also shows an increase in the other types of capital market instruments which 
 114 
 
represent innovation in financial instruments and risk diversification techniques. These data 
are obtained from the Beck et al. (1999) database and the Bank of Thailand website
21
.  
 
(5) Financial liberalization  
We already explained in chapter 3 that the period of financial liberalization in Thailand 
mainly covers the period from 1990 to 1995. We use the financial liberalization dummy 
(FD7), which has the value 1 from 1990 to 1995 and 0 otherwise to capture this period. These 
data are obtained from the author’s own calculations.  
 
A summary of the financial development indicators used in this study are presented in table 
4.1 and a summary of all variables used is shown in table 4.2. 
 
The statistics of the observations are also presented in table 4.3, which shows the statistical 
value of bank balance sheet variables, bank characteristic variables and the financial 
development indicators during the period from 1978 to 2008. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The Bank of Thailand database is available at:   http://www.bot.or.th/English/Statistics/ ContactPerson/Pages/ 
Contact.aspx. 
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Table 4.1: Financial development indicators used in this research including their symbols, type of 
development indicators, and the researchers who also applied these indicators to their studies 
Financial 
sector 
Type of 
development 
Financial sector development indicators Symbol Authors 
Banking  Size Depository banks’ asset to total financial 
assets (depository banks’ asset/ depository 
banks’, central banks’, other financial 
institution assets).  
 
FD1 Beck et al., 1999, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998, Nourzad, 2002, Da 
Silva, 2002, Nourzad, 2002, and Beck et al. 
(2008). 
 Activity The ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP  
FD2 Beck et al. (1999, 2008), Levine et al. 
(2000), and Levine and Zervos (1998) 
Banking Competition 
 
  
Three largest bank assets to total asset  
 
 
 
 
FD3 
   
Li (2009), Claessens and Laeven (2005), 
Cull and Effron, (2005), Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009), Edirisuriya( 2007), 
The World Bank (2010), Beck et al.(1999) 
Capital 
market 
Size The ratio of Stock market capitalization to 
GDP  
FD4 Beck et al. (2008), Beck and Rahman 
(2006), Beck et al.(1999), and Andriesz et 
al.(2005) 
 Activity The ratio of Stock market total value 
traded to GDP  
FD5 Beck et al. (2008), The World Bank (2010), 
Beck and Rahman (2006) 
Bond market Size/ 
financial 
innovation 
The ratio of  private domestic debt 
securities issued by financial institutions 
and  corporations to GDP  
FD6 Beck et al. (1999, 2008), Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009), Gallego and Loayza  
(2000), Singh et al. (2008) 
Financial 
market sector 
Liberalization Dummy variable from year 1990 to 1995 FD7 Gelos and Werner (2002), Johnston and 
Pazarbasioglu (1995) 
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Table 4.2:  List of all variables used in this study illustrated by type of variable, name of variable, variable’s symbol, variable’s definition and source of data 
 
 
 
 
Type of  variable Variable Symbol Definition Source of data 
Balance sheet Loan 
L it  
Aggregate bank loans SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database  
 Deposit 
 
D it  
 
Total bank deposits  SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database 
 Securities 
S it  
The sum of government securities and the investment in securities of banks SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database 
Monetary policy 
instrument 
Short-term interest rate 
r t  
14-day repurchase market interest rate Bank of Thailand database 
Banking characteristic Size characteristic 
size it  
The total bank assets to total asset ratio SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database 
 Capital characteristic 
cap it  
Bank capital (cash, bank balances, interbank lending, and securities and investment in 
securities on the commercial banks’ balance sheet) to total asset ratio 
SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database 
 Liquidity 
characteristic liq it  
Total bank equity to total asset ratio SET bank balance sheet and PACAP database 
 
 Dummy variables 
  D1988 Dummy which captures the economic expansion in Thailand in 1988 which equals 1 in 
1988 and 0 otherwise 
Author's own calculation 
  D1997 Dummy which captures the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997 which equals 1 in 1997 
and 0 otherwise 
Author's own calculation 
  D2003 Dummy which captures the economic recovery period in Thailand in 2000 which 
equals 1 in 2003 and 0 otherwise 
Author's own calculation 
Financial development 
indicators 
Banking size 
development 
FD1 Deposit money banks’ asset to total financial assets  Beck et al. (1999) 
 
 Banking activity 
development 
FD2 The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP  Beck et al. (1999) 
 Banking concentration FD3 The ratio of three largest bank assets to total assets  Beck et al. (1999) and SET database  
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Table 4.2 (cont’d): list of all variables used in this study illustrated by type of variable, name of variable, variable’s symbol, variable’s definition and source 
 
Type of  variable Variable Symbol Definition Source 
Financial development 
indicators 
Capital market size 
development 
FD4 The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP Beck et al. (1999) 
 Capital market 
activity development 
FD5 The ratio of Stock market value traded to GDP  Beck et al. (1999) 
 Bond market size 
development/ 
financial innovation 
FD6 The ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations to GDP  
Beck et al. (1999) and Bank of Thailand 
database 
Financial liberalization Financial liberalization  FD7 Liberalization dummy which equal 1 from year 1990 to 1995  and 0 otherwise Author owned calculation 
 118 
 
 
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of all variables used in the estimation and the form they enter in the model 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total bank loan (L)(thousands of Bath) 428 173,839,094 240,507,106 238,030 1,124,272,080 
The change of bank loans (ΔlnL) 428 0.1462 0.2267 -0.8262 1.4811 
Total bank deposit (D) (thousands of Bath) 428 194,614,993 280,248,218 80,376 1,322,287,437 
The change of bank deposits  (ΔlnD) 428 0.1473 0.2185 -0.8791 1.8483 
Total bank securities (S) (thousands of 
Bath) 428 25,067,076 37,428,320 7,561 186,047,996 
The change of  bank securities  (ΔlnS) 428 0.1461 0.3715 -1.7896 2.7295 
Bank size characteristic (size) 428 0.0048 0.5707 -1.4811 1.1421 
Bank liquidity characteristic (liq) 428 0.00095 0.0565 -0.0699 0.4331 
Bank capital characteristic (cap) 428 -0.0047 0.0636 -0.1029 0.5633 
Policy interest rate (r) 496 8.3609 4.8536 1.4 17.25 
The change of the policy interest rate (Δr) 496 -0.2833 3.1187 -11.71 5.89 
Deposit money bank asset to total financial 
asset (FD1) 496 0.9469 0.5133 0.8491 0.9961 
The change of FD1 (ΔFD1) 496 0.0027 0.0128 -0.0204 0.0478 
Private credit by deposit money banks to 
GDP ratio (FD2) 496 0.8399 0.3536 0.3700 1.6596 
The change of FD2 (ΔFD2) 496 0.0136 0.0978 -0.2676 0.1664 
Three largest bank assets to total assets ratio 
(FD3) 496 0.4524 0.2019 0.1767 0.9021 
The change of FD3 (ΔFD3) 496 0.0094 0.1441 -0.3088 0.7195 
Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio 
(FD4) 496 0.3584 0.2839 0.0310 0.9095 
The change of FD4 (ΔFD4) 496 0.0227 0.1149 -0.2572 0.3344 
Stock market value traded to GDP ratio 
(FD5) 496 0.2710 0.2238 0.0031 0.6954 
The change of FD5 (ΔFD5) 496 0.0095 0.1175 -0.2153 0.3402 
Private domestic debt securities to GDP 
ratio (FD6) 496 0.1875 0.1335 0.0398 0.4149 
The change of FD6 (ΔFD6) 496 0.0125 0.0468 -0.0771 0.2032 
Financial liberalization dummy (FD7) 496 0.1935 0.3954 0 1 
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Figure 4.1 is a graph of all the variables listed in table 4.2. From the graph of the balance 
sheet variables (loans, deposits and securities), bank characteristic variables (size, 
capitalization and liquidity) and the financial development indicators, important changes in 
the series took place in some periods. The series illustrate the important change in 1988, 
which saw an increase in loans, deposits and securities. This is because this year saw the 
highest increase in the Thai economic growth rate (the GDP growth rate increased from 5.6% 
in 1978 to its peak in 1988 of 12%) as a result of the rapid expansion of production, 
investment, construction and consumption in the country (BOT, 1988). This strong economic 
performance led to a rise in the bank loan supply, deposits and securities. In addition, there 
was also the introduction of new types of securities (Thai Oil promissory notes, Industrial 
Finance Corporation of Thailand notes, and convertible debentures) as well as an expansion 
policy of new commercial bank branches in regional areas in this period.  Consequently, this 
situation led to an increase in banks’ securities, deposits and loans, as well as FD1 
(development in the size of banks) and FD2 (banking concentration).  
 
As the Thai economy was greatly affected during the financial crisis period of 1997, this 
caused a significant drop in the GDP growth rate and domestic expenditure, and sluggish 
conditions in the financial markets (as explained in chapter 3). This condition was the main 
reason for the drop in bank loans, deposits and securities, as well as the banking characteristic 
variables (size, capitalization and liquidity). There was also a steady decrease in almost all of 
the financial development indicators and an increase in the policy interest rate during this 
period.  
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In addition, there was a rise in bank balance sheet variables, bank characteristic variables and 
the capital market development indicators (FD4 and FD5) during 2003. This was due to the 
recovery of economic conditions in Thailand after the financial crisis, thanks to many 
government bailout plans, such as the financial sector restructuring plan. This recovery led to 
an increase in the bank balance sheet and bank characteristic variables (as explained in 
chapter 3). The introduction of the financial master plans and capital market master plan 
during this period, which encouraged SME businesses to list on the capital market and 
supported retail transactions and trading in the capital market, also led to a rise in the FD4 and 
FD5 during this period.  
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Figure 4.1: The graphs of variables use in this study (bank balance sheet variables, bank characteristic variables, interest rate variable and financial development 
indicators) 
  
  
Note: In this case, we plot the graph according to our model specification form explained in section 4.4.2 in order to specify some important change in our model.  The first difference of 
the log of loan, deposits and securities is Dlog(L), Dlog(D), and Dlog(S) respectively. The first difference of FD1 to FD6 is Dfd1 to Dfd6.  The name of banks enter into equation is as 
follows: ACL (ACL bank PCL.), BAY (Bank of Ayudhya PCL.), BBC(Bangkok Bank of Commerce PCL.), BBL (Bangkok Bank PCL.), CIMBT (CIMBT Thai Bank PCL.), KBANK 
(Kasikornbank PCL.), KK (Kiatnakin Bank PCL.), KTB(Krung Thai Bank PCL.), SCB (Siam Commercial Bank PCL.), SCBT (Standard Charter Bank PCL.), SCIB (Siam City Bank 
PCL.) TBANK (Thanachart Bank PCL.), TISCO (TISCO Bank PCL), TMB(TMB Bank PCL.),UOBR(UOB Radanasin Bank PCL.), UOBT(United Overseas Bank Thai PCL.) 
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  Figure 4.1(cont’d):  The graphs of variables use in this study (bank balance sheet variables, bank characteristic variables, interest rate variable, and 
financial development indicators) 
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Figure 4.1(cont’d): The graphs of variables use in this study (bank balance sheet variables, bank characteristic variables, interest rate variable, and financial 
development indicators) 
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4.3.2 Model specification  
 
The model specification considered in this study can be grouped into two models: (1) the 
baseline model of the lending channel and (2) the model of the effect of financial sector 
development on the bank lending channel. 
 
 (1) Baseline model of the lending channel 
The baseline model is the micro data based model of the bank lending channel. This model 
specification has been used by many papers (Ehrmann et al., 2001; Aktas and Onur-Tas, 
2007; Hosono, 2006; Wu et al., 2007; Altunbas et al., 2009b; Benkovskis, 2008; Topi and 
Vilmunen, 2001; Gambacorta, 2001)
22
: 
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loglogloglog
 
(4.1) 
where   i  is the index representing each individual bank (1,2,3,…). 
  t is the time period (1,2,3,…….t).  
  k is the number of lags. 
 i  is the individual banks' fixed effect. 
                                                          
22
 For the number of lags, we use the second lag of both dependence and independence variables in the model. 
The use of this number of lags has been widely applied in many researches in micro based studies (Horvath et al., 
2006; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Jimborean, 2009; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007; Westerlund, 2003). At first, many 
lags are applied into the model in order to test for its suitability. However, the use of other lag variables (only 
first lag variables as well as the current and first lag variables) shows many insignificant results and also the 
rejection of the test statistic (Sagan test in GMM estimation and Hansen test in 2SLS model). 
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 itL   is the total bank loans (loan supply of banks). 
itD   is the total bank deposits.  
itS   is the total bank securities holdings. 
tr  is the 14 day repurchase market interest rate used as proxy of the monetary policy 
instrument in Thailand. 
tX  is the vector of bank characteristic variables. 
 td  is the dummy variable controlling for particular events that effect the bank loan 
(already analyzed in section 4.3.1, figure 4.1) as follows: 
d1988 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in 1988 and 0 otherwise. 
This dummy is used to control for the rapid expansion of the economy.  
d1997 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in 1997 and 0 otherwise.  
This dummy is used to control for the financial crisis period in Thailand.  
d2003 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in 2003 and 0 otherwise. 
This dummy controls for the period of economic recovery in Thailand. 
it  is the error term. 
Deposits and securities variables (D it  and S it ) are introduced by Golodniuk (2006), Kashyap 
and Stein (1995), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Aktas and Onur-Tas (2007), Altunbas et al. 
(2002) and Westerlund (2003) for the control of loan demand cross-sectional difference 
(funding effect control or the individual banks’ loan demand control). According to Agung et 
 
 
126 
 
al. (2002a) and Kim (1999), the deposits variable represents the bank funds, and thus a rise in 
bank deposits will lead to a rise in bank loans. Hence, this effect highlights the positive effect 
of bank deposits on bank loans ( 2  ˃ 0 in equation 4.1). For the securities variable, 
 esterlund (2003), Kim (1999) and Çavuşoğlu (2002) state that banks will tend to 
compensate for the loss of loans with their securities holding (bonds). Thus, bank securities 
will expect to have a negative effect on loan supply ( 3 < 0). The r t  variable is expected to 
have a negative effect on bank loans ( 4 <0 ) according to the lending channel theory. 
 
The bank characteristic variables (X it ), which comprise size, capitalization and liquidity, 
have been considered in many micro data based studies of the lending channel (Farinha and 
Margues, 2001; Ehrmann et al., 2001; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Schmitz, 2004; 
Benkovskis, 2008; Gambacorta, 2001; Altunbas et al., 2009b). Following the calculation 
technique introduced in these papers, the normalization of the size, capitalization and liquidity 
indicators (calculations shown in (a) to (c)) is applied in order to make the sum of each 
indicator equal zero. This technique leads to the removal of unwanted trends (Horváth, 2006; 
Schmitz, 2004; Gambacorta, 2001; Altunbas et al., 2009b; Haan, 2001). These characteristics 
are defined as follows: 
(a)  Bank size is defined as total bank assets minus the average of total assets in the t 
period: 
 itsize  =  
tN
i it
t
it A
N
A
1
ln
1
ln  
 where itA  is the total bank assets of each bank. 
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  tN is the number of banks in the t period. 
This definition can be seen in many micro data based studies of the lending channel (Li, 2009; 
Jimborean, 2009; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Ehrmann et al., 2001; Gambacorta, 2001; 
Aktas and Onur-Tas, 2007; Chatelain et al., 2003a). We already stated in the literature review 
(section 4.2.1) that the higher the bank size, the higher the reputation, liquidity and external 
funding opportunities. This therefore leads to a greater opportunity for banks to issue loans 
and thus a weaker effect of the policy interest rate on these loans. Hence, the effect of this 
characteristic variable and its interaction with the policy interest rate on bank loans are 
expected to be positive ( 65 , ˃0).    
(b) Bank liquidity is defined as the ratio of bank liquid assets to total assets:  
i tliq =   






t i
it
it
tit
it
A
L
NTA
L 11
 
where itL  is the liquid assets of each bank. Following the definitions of Chatelain et al. 
(2003a), Gambacorta (2001), Aktas and Onur-Tas (2007), Loupias et al. (2002) and 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), this comprises cash, bank balance, interbank lending and 
securities in the commercial banks’ balance sheet.  
     T is the length of time period. 
This characteristic variable and its interaction with the policy interest rate should be positive    
( 65 , ˃0). We already mentioned that the higher the banks’ liquidity, the greater the 
opportunity for them to obtain external funding sources and issue more loans and hence the 
weaker the effect of monetary policy shock on bank loans, with consequent weakening of the 
lending channel.  
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(c) Bank capitalization is defined as the total bank equity to total assets ratio: 
 
itcap   
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


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

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it
it
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it
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where itE  is the total bank equity of each bank in the sample. 
     T is the length of the time period. 
This definition is made by Li (2009), Hosono (2006), Gomez-Gonzalez and Grosz (2007), 
Golodniuk (2006), Brooks (2007), Schmitz (2004) and Wu et al. (2007). As mentioned in 
section 4.2.1, the higher a bank’s capitalization, the greater its creditworthiness and external 
funding opportunities. Hence, this increases the opportunity for banks to issue more loans and 
leads to a weaker effect of monetary policy shock on these loans, and thus the weakening of 
the lending channel. Therefore, this variable, as well as its interaction term, are expected to be 
positive ( 65 , ˃0). 
 
For the dummy variables included in the model, it is expected that the effect of rapid 
expansion in the economy (d1988) and the economic recovery period in Thailand (d2003) will 
have a positive effect on bank loans ( 7 ˃ 0). This is because these dummy variables represent 
the period of the rapid increase in the economic growth rate and the economic recovery in 
Thailand respectively, which are the factors which support the increase in bank loans. On the 
other hand, d1997, which represents the financial crisis period in the country, is expected to 
have a negative relationship with bank loans ( 7 < 0). This result is supported by the situation 
in Thailand after the financial crisis period of 1997, when there was a sharp decline in 
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commercial bank loans (as shown in chapter 3) as a result of the economic downturn, non-
performing loan problems and sluggish conditions in the financial market.  
(2)  Model of the effect of financial sector development on the bank lending channel 
The model specification in this aspect will be similar to the model in section (1); however, it 
will also include the financial development indicators and the interaction term of these 
indictors and the monetary policy instrument. We follow the model specification of Li (2009), 
Brissimis and Delis (2009) and Altunbas et al. (2009b). In this case, each financial 
development indicator will be entered into the model separately in order to study the effect of 
each individual type of financial development indicator on the bank lending channel.  The 
model is presented below: 
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               (4.2) 
  
 
where 
tFD  represents the different financial development indicators as previously 
represented in the data description section as follows:  
tFD1  is the ratio of depository banks’ assets to total financial assets. We explained 
previously that this indicator has been applied to show banking sector development, 
particularly in size, and also represents financial depth as well as the degree of financial 
intermediation in the sector. An increase in this indictor will show an increase in bank size 
compared with other financial institutions, as well as a greater influence of commercial 
banks among depositors and investors (a rise in this indicator shows an increase in bank 
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assets, compared with the total assets of financial institution) (Nourzad, 2002). As already 
explained in chapter 2, section 2.5.1, a rise in financial intermediation will lead to an 
improvement in financial market liquidity and portfolio diversification, an increase in the 
opportunities for external funding, as well as a decrease in financial costs. Thus, this results 
in an increase in bank loan supply. Therefore, a rise in this indicator will indicate a rise in 
the financial intermediation and size of the banking sector, and will have a positive effect 
on bank loans. In addition, the policy interest rate will probably have a weaker effect on 
bank loans due to the greater opportunity for banks to obtain external funding sources, an 
improvement in portfolio diversification and higher financial market liquidity.  For the 
above reasons, the coefficient of this indicator, as well as its interaction term with the 
policy rate, is expected to have a positive effect on bank loans ( 87 ,  ˃0 in equation 4.2). 
 
tFD2  is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, which represents the 
activity of banking sector development.  We already discussed that this indicator is used to 
represent the financial intermediaries’ activities provided to customers; an increase in this 
indicator will show an increase in banking activities in terms of the banking services 
provided to customers, such as loans and saving facilities (Beck et al., 1999; Levine et al., 
2000).  Consequently, an increase in this indicator will have a positive effect on bank loans 
and will also weaken the effect of the policy interest rate on them, as this indicator shows a 
rise in banking activities as well as the loans and services provided to customers. For the 
above reasons, the coefficient of this indicator, as well as its interaction term with the 
policy rate, is expected to have a positive effect on bank loans ( 87 ,  ˃0 in equation 4.2) 
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tFD3 is the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total bank assets. This indicator shows 
the concentration measure of the banking sector and an increase in it represent more 
concentration of the institutional sector and a less competitive environment in the banking 
sector (Li, 2009; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2009; Beck et al., 1999). We explained in 
chapter 2, section 2.5.1 that a more concentrated market with a higher proportion of large 
banks (high market share) will create more monopoly power in the market (low 
competition), making it difficult for other banks to access the financial services and 
products provided as well as other sources of funding. This situation leads to a stronger 
impact of the policy rate on bank loans, hence causing a stronger effect on the lending 
channel. Therefore, the higher the banking concentration (low competition), the lower the 
loan supply and the higher the impact of the policy rate on bank loans. Thus, the coefficient 
of this indicator and its interaction with the policy rate can have a negative effect on bank 
loans  ( 87 , < 0  in equation 4.2).  
 
tFD4 is the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, which represents development in 
terms of the size of the capital market. As described in chapter 2, sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.1, 
development in the size of the capital market also shows an increase in financial deepening, 
which leads to greater opportunities for banks to obtain other funding sources as well as a 
rise in bank capital and liquidity. Hence, an increase in this indicator will result in a 
positive effect on bank loans and a weaker effect of policy interest rates on them. 
Consequently, the coefficient of this indicator and its interaction term should have a 
positive sign in our model ( 87 , ˃ 0 in equation 4.2).  
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tFD5 is the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP, which is used to represent the 
activity measure of capital market development. A rise in this indicator represents an 
increase in activities in the capital market (a rise in stock market trading) as well as an 
increase in liquidity in the capital market (Beck et al., 1999). Similar to FD4, this 
development also leads to greater opportunities for banks to obtain other funding sources 
and an increase in bank capital and liquidity. Therefore, an increase in this indicator will 
result in a positive effect on bank loans and a weaker effect of the policy interest rate on 
them. In this regard, the coefficient of this indicator and its interaction term should have a 
positive sign in our model ( 87 , ˃ 0 in equation 4.2).  
 
tFD6 is the ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and  
corporations to GDP. This indicator is applied to represent bond market development and 
also financial innovation. As explained in chapter 2, sections 2.4.4 and 2.5.1, a rise in this 
indicator shows a greater opportunity for the banking sector to access the financial market, 
a high level of financial market liquidity and capital, and an improvement in the risk 
diversification of banks. Thus, an increase in this indicator will result in a positive effect on 
bank loans and a weaker effect on the lending channel.  Therefore, the coefficient of this 
indicator and its interaction term should have a positive sign ( 87 , ˃ 0 in equation 4.2). 
 
tFD7  is the dummy variable from 1990 to 1995, which has the value of 1 from years 1990 to 
1995 and 0 otherwise. As explained in chapter 3, the financial liberalization period in 
Thailand mainly began between 1990 and 1995, starting with the announcement of the official 
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financial reform plan, which mainly aimed to introduce financial liberalization, up to the 
period of the third round of exchange rate liberalization in 1994 to 1995. Concerning our 
explanation of the effect of financial liberalization on the lending channel in chapter 2 
(section 2.5.1), this can either lead to a positive or negative effect on bank loans, and a weaker 
or stronger effect via the lending channel. This is because financial liberalization which 
involves relaxation of financial institution and market restrictions will cause an increase in 
financial institution business (issuing of securities and investing in capital markets) and also a 
rise in the opportunities for banks to obtain more sources of funding. This will dampen the 
effect of the policy interest rate on bank lending, thus weakening the lending channel. 
However, financial liberalization, such as capital account liberalization and deregulation of 
banking restrictions, can lead to an increase in foreign exchange and credit risk. These risks 
reduce the possibility of banks to issue more loans and invest in the capital market, thus 
reducing their loan supply and strengthening the effect of the policy interest rate via the bank 
lending channel. Therefore, the coefficient of this indicator and its interaction term should 
have either a positive or negative sign ( 87 , < 0 or 87 , ˃ 0 in equation 4.2).  
 
The expected signs of the variables in equations 4.1 and 4.2 are indicated in table 4.4.  
[Insert table 4.4 here]  
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Table 4.4: Summary of the expected signs for the model estimation 
Dependence/ independence 
variable 
Lag L D S r size liq cap r* size r* liq r* cap FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4  FD5 FD6 FD7 
Loan + + - - + + + + + + +  + -  +  + + + /- 
 
Dependence/ independence 
variable 
r*FD1 r*FD2 r*FD3 r*FD4 r*FD5 r*FD6 r*FD7 d1988 d1997 d2003 
Loan + + - + + + +/- + - + 
Note: the (+) sign indicates the positive effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, while the (-) sign shows the negative effect.
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4.3.3 Methodology  
 
We apply panel data estimation for the micro data based study of the bank lending channel. 
Westerlund (2003) and Brooks (2007) point out that the panel data technique can deal with 
the identification problem caused by the supply-versus-demand effect on the lending channel. 
This is because the technique can estimate the model with the bank characteristic variables 
constructed from the bank level data. This will ensure that the effect of monetary policy is 
caused by the supply side effect, thereby confirming the assumption of the homogeneity of 
loan demand across banks. The panel data estimation can also deal with the individual 
heterogeneity of banks as well as the lack of observations in the dataset (Çavuşoğlu, 2002; 
Westerlund, 2003; Topi and Vilmunen, 2001).  
 
We can see in the literature review (section 4.2) that almost all papers apply the panel data 
model, especially the dynamic panel data model, in their studies. In this respect, it is 
necessary to apply the dynamic panel data model which includes the lagged dependence 
variable. This is due to the lock-in effect of banks caused by their close relationship with 
customers (the high cost to customers to change banks) (Golodniuk, 2006; Westerlund, 2003; 
and Aktas and Onur-Tas, 2007). Moreover, Li (2009), Aktas and Onur-Tas (2007) and Sichei 
(2005) state that there is the possibility of a relationship between the bank characteristic and 
the balance sheet variables and consequently the lag of dependence and independence 
variables need to be included to solve the endogeneity problem of the model.  
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The dynamic panel data form is as follows (Baltagi, 2008; Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Judson and Owen, 1999): 
  
itiittiit vxyy    1,      (4.3) 
where  i = 1,...,N      and t = 1,…,T 
 ity  is the endogenous variable. 
   is a scalar (1 x 1) with 1  
 itx  is the time-varying exogenous vector  11 K  
    is the parameter vector. 
 itiit vu   when i  is the fixed effect with IID(0,
2
 ) and itv is the random 
disturbance with IID(0, 2
v ). 
  
In order to select a suitable method to estimate the dynamic panel data model, it is now 
important to discuss some possible techniques. When estimating the dynamic panel data, 
many researchers report explicit bias when using the OLS estimator as a result of the 
endogeneity problem caused by the correlation between the lagged dependence variable           
(
1, tiy ) and the error term ( itv ) (Worms, 2001; Benkovskis, 2008; Sichei, 2005; Çavuşoğlu, 
2002; Baltagi, 2008; Bond, 2002).  
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For the fixed effect estimation, the Within estimator can transform equation 4.3 into the form 
below by subtracting equation 4.3 with the mean value of ,,1,, itii tyy   and itv (Judson and 
Owen, 1999): 
  )()()( 1,1, itititittitiitit vvxxyyyy       (4.4) 
From equation 4.4, although the unobservable individual specific effect ( i ) is taken out of 
equation 4.3, it is still a correlation between 
1,1,   titi yy and i ti t
vv   , thus causing bias when 
using the fixed effect estimation with the dynamic panel model (Baltagi, 2008). This 
correlation is caused by the correlation between 
1

T
yit  and itv  as well as between 
1
1,

 
T
v ti
and 
1, tiy (where )......(1
1
1,11,1,1,  

 Tiititititi yyy
T
yyy and
))......(
1
1
1,2 iTtiiititit vvv
T
vvv 

  (Bond, 2002; Hsio, 2003; Roodman, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, bias is still found in the fixed effect estimation and even in the 
random effect.   
 
This bias can be reduced when the time period (T) is large compared to the observation 
number (N) (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, as our data have large T and small N properties
23
, 
fixed effect estimation is considered to be a suitable technique in our case. However, Judson 
and Owen (1999) and Baltagi (2008) still argue that bias can be found even for T = 30 (the 
Monte Carlo experiments report that there is still approximately 20% bias in the true value of 
the coefficient in the fixed effect estimator).
 
                                                          
23 Our study considers data from 1978 to 2008 in Thailand (T = 31) with a total of 16 commercial banks (N=16). 
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Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest the use of 2SLS estimation (Two-Stage Least Squares 
estimation) to solve the above problem by first differencing equation 4.3 and adding the 
instrumental variables into the model to deal with the endogeneity problem. In this case, 
equation 4.3 can be written as follows: 
)()()( 1,1,2,1,1,   tiittiittititiit vvxxyyyy         (4.5) 
where t= 2,…, T 
In equation 4.5, the individual effect ( i ) is omitted from the model. The instrumental variable 
is the variable which is uncorrelated with the transformed error term ( itv  ), but correlated 
with the transformed lagged variables ( 1,  tiy ) (Baum, 2009; Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006). 
From equation 4.5, Hsiao (2003) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982) state that the instrumental 
variable of  1,  tiy  are considered as 2, tiy  or  3,2,   titi yy  
 
By adding this instrumental variable in the above model, the estimation of the coefficient of 
the lag of dependence variables ( ) and independence variables (  ) obtained from the 
instrumental-variable method is presented below (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982): 
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Or  
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Nevertheless, Bond (2002) and Baltagi (2008) argue that this method still shows inefficient 
parameter estimation due to the lack of further available moment conditions. Therefore, the 
GMM estimation by Arellano and Bond (1991) is introduced in order to solve these 
problems, as additional moment conditions in the first differenced equations are brought into 
this technique to improve model efficiency (“First-Difference GMM estimation”) (Judson 
and Owen, 1996:5; Çavuşoğlu, 2002). Baltagi (2008) states that if one assumes that itx  are 
strictly exogenous variables
24
   0itit vxE for all t, s = 1,2,…,T), the valid instrument of 
equation 4.5 is defined as ],...,[ 2,1 iTii xxx  . Therefore, the instrument matrix is: 
  ),...,,,,...,( 212,1 iTiitii xxxyydiagW       (4.8) 
In first difference GMM estimation, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Baltagi (2008) state that 
the orthogonality conditions of equation (4.5) are: 
  0)( ,  itsti vyE , for t = 3,…,T and s≥ 2     (4.10) 
    0,  itsti vxE , for t=3,...,T and s≥ 2               (4.11) 
                                                          
24
 If itx is a predetermined variable   0itit vxE for s < t and 0 otherwise), the valid instrument will be 
defined as ],...,,,[ )1(21  siii xxx and therefore the instrument matrix 
)( iW  is
),...,,,,...,( )1(212,1   Tiiitiii xxxyydiagW  
(Baltagi, 2008). In this case, the 1- and 2-step GMM 
estimators are estimated by the same procedure as when itx is an exogenous variable, but we change the 
instrument matrix from W  to iW (Baltagi, 2008).  
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where 
itv  is 1,,  titi vv  
For the above condition, first difference GMM estimation assumes that the dependence and 
independence variables are not correlated with the disturbances term and this thus solves the 
endogeneity problem explained previously (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
When multiplying W in equation 4.5, the equation is rewritten as (Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 
2003): 
vWXWyWyW    )()( 1     (4.12) 
where the X  is the N(T-2)×K matrix of observation on i tx   
     y  is the dependence variables’ vector 1× N(T-2) 
    
'W  is the instruments matrix  

NWW ,...,1  
Equations 4.13 and 4.14 will show the ),(   in the 1- and 2- step GMM estimators 
respectively, as follows (Baltagi, 2008): 
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and for the 2-step estimator: 
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 where  


N
i
iiiiN WvvW
N
V
1
1
 
Nevertheless, Agung (1999), Bond (2002) and Rungsomboon (2005) also state that in the 
first-difference equation of the GMM estimation, there is an instrument bias or a weak 
instrument of the level variables which causes finite sample bias in the model. Concerning 
some drawbacks in the first-difference GMM estimation, the system GMM estimator is 
introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) to solve the above problem.  
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) attempt to improve the efficiency of the GMM estimator by 
applying the additional moment conditions below: 
 0)))((( 1,   ititi vyE                (4.15) 
                                             0)))((( 1,   ititi vxE      (4.16) 
In this case, they add the first difference of the lag of dependence and independence variables 
into the level equation. Thus, the new GMM estimator is calculated by using the additional 
restriction in equations 4.15 and 4.16, and the instrument matrix will change from iW to 
W
as below (Baltagi, 2008): 
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),...,,,,...,,( '2
'
1
'
2,1 iTiitii xxxyyWdiagW  
            (4.17) 
Following these additional moment restrictions, this new GMM estimator is called the system 
GMM estimator as it is the system estimator of (T-2) equations in the first differences and the 
(T-2) equations in levels from t = 3,…,T (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In other words, the 
system GMM estimator allows two kinds of instruments: (1) the lagged of ity and itx in the 
first differenced equation and (2) the lagged first difference of ity and itx in the level equation; 
this technique therefore causes a reduction in the finite sample bias seen in the first 
differenced equation and increases the precision of the parameter estimation (Baltagi, 2008; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; Bond, 2002; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
 
The 2-step system GMM estimator uses the same idea and technique as described above, but 
we change the G matrix in the 2-step first differenced GMM estimator to the G
~
matrix, as 
follows (Blundell and Bond, 1998) : 
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Despite the fact that the first difference GMM and system GMM estimations improve the 
efficiency of the fixed effect and 2SLS estimations by introducing the additional moment 
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conditions into the equations to improve the model, Mileva (2007) and Roodman (2006) 
point out that this technique is suitable for a panel with large N and small T. As our sample is 
larger than the time period, we will apply the fixed effect and 2SLS estimation in our study 
and also apply the first difference GMM estimation as well as the system GMM estimation 
into the model in order to compare and check for the robustness of our results. For the 1- and 
2- step GMM consideration, in spite of the 2-step estimation being more efficient due to a 
higher efficient standard error estimator compared with the 1-step estimation, the 1-step 
GMM estimation is applied in this study. This is because when we estimate the 2-step 
estimation in our studies, the empirical result indicates a drop in many variables in the 
regression due to the small sample size and thus this study will report only on the 1-step 
estimation. 1-step estimation is still preferred by many micro data based studies of the 
lending channel (Farinha and Marques, 2001; Haan, 2001; Ehrmann et al., 2001; Schmitz, 
2004; Topic and Vilmunen, 2001; Engler et al., 2007; Hosono, 2006). All of the 
methodologies used in this chapter are estimated by using STATA 12. 
 
4.4 Empirical results 
 
4.4.1 Panel data unit root test  
 
Baltagi (2008) points out that the large time series property for the panel data will probably 
generate the nonstationarity problem.  Due to the large T panel data set (T= 31 from 1978-
2008), it is important to first check for the non-stationary property of our data by performing 
the panel data unit root test.  According to Maddala and Wu (1999), the panel data model is 
presented below: 
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titiiti yy ,1,,                 (4.21) 
where  i = 1,2,…, N and t = 1,2,…,T. The null and alternative hypotheses of the panel unit 
root test are as follows:  
  0:0 iH    for all  i and 0: iaH  for i = 1,2,…,N 
The rejection of the null hypothesis will show that the panel data series have the stationary 
property (Im et al., 2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999).  
Due to the unbalanced panel data used in this study, the Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type tests 
need to be used to perform the panel data unit root test (Stata, 2011).   
 
(1) Im-Pesaran-Shin test  
Im et al. (2003) and Banerjee (1999) state that the Im-Pesaran-Shin model for the unit root test 
is as follows: 
ti
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where  i = 1,2,…, N and t = 1,2,…,T, ,1)1(),1(),1(
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The null and alternative hypotheses of this type of panel unit root test are as follows:  
    0:0 iH    for all  i      (4.23) 
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iH :1 < 0 for i = 1, 2,…,N, .,...,2,1,0 21 NNNii    (4.24) 
The rejection of the null hypothesis will show that the panel data series have the stationary 
property (Im et al., 2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999; Baltagi, 2008).  
 
(2) Fisher-type test 
Maddala and Wu (1999) argue that the Fisher-type test has some advantages over the Im-
Pesaran-Shin test, as not only is the ADF test performance used, but also the PP test. 
Additionally, the sample size used in the test is not restricted and we can determine each 
sample’s lag length separately (Baltagi, 2008; Maddala and u, 1999).  
The Fisher-type test model is also a heteroskedastic panel, which takes the form below (Choi, 
2001): 
ititit xdy        (4.30) 
where  i = 1,2,…, N and t = 1,2,…,T 
 
                     
  i
i
m
imiiit ttd   ...10  , ittiiit
uxx   )1(  
The null and alternative hypotheses of this type of panel unit root test are as follows:  
   1:0 iH    for all  i       (4.31) 
i
H :1 < 1for i = 1, 2,…,N,     (4.32) 
The rejection of the null hypothesis will show that the panel data series has a stationary 
property. The result of the panel data unit root test is presented in table 4.5. 
  
146 
 
Table 4.5: The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model 
Variable  Im-Pesaran-Shin Fisher 
  ADF PP 
 t-bar t-tile-bar z-t-tilde-bar W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse normal Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
Loan -3.6206*** -2.8561*** -7.3608*** -2.9329*** 57.7907*** -2.9853*** -3.0359*** 3.2238*** 190.1486*** -9.9447*** -13.0163*** 19.7686*** 
Deposit -3.9131*** -3.0041*** -8.1192*** -4.5566*** 125.6141*** -4.5426*** -7.4820*** 11.7018*** 225.0925*** -11.3758*** -15.4951*** 24.1366*** 
Securities -5.1193*** -3.4689*** -10.5004*** -6.6984*** 125.6938*** -7.3879*** -8.3909*** 11.7117*** 403.4923*** -16.5480*** -27.7317*** 46.4365*** 
size -2.9114*** -2.2591*** -4.3022*** -2.2927** 62.6326*** -2.3125** -2.5954*** 3.8291*** 183.8918*** -6.7048*** -10.8374*** 18.9865*** 
cap -2.1968*** -1.9230*** -2.5807*** -2.0936** 62.6326*** -2.3125** -2.5954*** 3.8291*** 71.6098*** -3.5455*** -3.9172*** 4.9512*** 
liq -2.5145*** -2.2104*** -4.0529*** -1.3230** 46.6851** -1.5069** -1.5368* 1.8356** 84.8256*** -4.6227*** -5.3122*** 6.6032*** 
Controlling for cross sectional dependence in the series  
Loan -5.066*** -3.4959*** -10.6386*** -6.5381*** 56.4328*** -3.1991*** -3.1858*** 3.0541*** 391.906*** -16.5438*** -27.1458*** 44.9883*** 
Deposit -4.9366*** -3.4488*** -10.3974*** -8.3064*** 62.4657*** -3.6327*** -3.6807*** 3.8082*** 363.7879*** -15.8395*** -25.1939*** 41.4735*** 
Securities -5.4334*** -3.57*** -11.0183*** -8.2319*** 54.1616*** -2.6392*** -2.8016*** 2.7702*** 473.6761*** -18.2904*** -32.6116*** 55.2095*** 
size -2.4360*** -2.1669*** -3.8303*** -1.7969** 51.3323** --1.7339** -1.8788** 2.4165*** 78.388*** -4.4221*** -4.5895*** 5.7985 
cap -2.3493*** -2.1180*** -3.5796*** -2.5448*** 58.7948*** -2.5257*** -2.7986*** 3.3494*** 67.1891*** -4.0266*** -4.0569*** 4.3986*** 
liq -2.9212*** -2.5232*** -5.6552*** -2.5775*** 56.328*** -2.986*** -3.1547*** 3.041*** 62.1665*** -3.4606*** -3.5176*** 3.7708*** 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and [-] respectively. The AIC information criteria is used to 
determined the lag of ADF test.
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The results from all the test statistics from both the Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-type 
tests show the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit root in the series. This confirms 
that our panel data series, including the bank balance sheet data and bank characteristic 
data, have a stationary property. To control for possible cross sectional dependence in 
the data, the demeaning procedure introduced by Levin et al. (2002) is also applied and 
still confirms the stationary property of the series.  
 
Furthermore, the time series unit root test needs to be applied in this study with regard to 
the time series variables used in the model (policy interest rate and financial 
development indicators). The Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF test) is used in this 
case. From the simple time series model below:  
ttt yy   1   , where t = 1,2,…,T   (4.37) 
the null and alternative hypothesis of the time series unit root test is: 
0:0 H  and :1H < 0  
Thus, the rejection of the null hypothesis shows that the series have no unit root 
(Brooks, 2008). The results from the time series unit root test are shown in table 4.6. 
 
The results show that both the interest rate and financial development indicator variables 
have a stationary series property as the ADF test shows the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the unit root.  
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Table 4.6: The result of time seires unit root test for the series in the model 
 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in 
(-) and [-] respectively. 
 
 
4.4.2 The empirical results of the baseline model 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows the baseline results of the bank lending channel in Thailand. Each 
column represents the four different methods of estimation (fixed effect model, 2SLS, 
first difference GMM and system GMM estimation).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 This series is the dummy variable represent the financial liberalization in Thailand and thus no unit root 
test required in this series.  
Variable (in first difference)  ADF  KPSS 
Policy Interest rate  -5.0950***  0.2701 
FD1  -3.0758**  0.2347 
FD2  -3.2044**  0.2011 
FD3  -4.7046***  0.1111 
FD4  -4.4221***  0.0605 
FD5  -4.2097***  0.0629 
FD6  -5.0961***  0.1891 
  FD725  -  - 
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Table 4.7: The result for the baseline model 
 
 
Dependent variable ( L ) 
 
Fix effect(1) 2SLS (2) 1st difference 
GMM (3) 
System GMM 
(4) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
L      
L1 0.1493* 
(0.0851) 
0.1884** 
(0.0953) 
0.2078*** 
(0.0724) 
0.2250* 
(0.1196) 
L2 -0.0712 
(0.0742) 
-0.1819 
(0.1364) 
-0.0898 
(0.1134) 
-0.0991 
(0.0767) 
D      
L1 0.1473 
(0.1402) 
0.2739** 
(0.1212) 
0.2694** 
(0.1253) 
0.2517** 
(0.1059) 
L2 0.2318* 
(0.1155) 
0.1275 
(0.1229) 
0.2595** 
(0.1064) 
0.2601*** 
(0.0843) 
S      
L1 0.0091 
(0.0304) 
-0.0110 
(0.0350) 
-0.0064 
(0.0358) 
-0.0121 
(0.0378) 
L2 -0.1263** 
(0.0471) 
-0.1127*** 
(0.0362) 
-0.1285*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.1372*** 
(0.0455) 
r      
L1 -0.0129** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0129*** 
(0.0042) 
L2 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0044) 
-0.0049 
(0.0041) 
-0.0047 
(0.0043) 
-0.0064 
(0.0044) 
size     
L1 -0.0760* 
(0.0412) 
-0.0489* 
(0.0283) 
-0.0615* 
(0.0317) 
-0.0535** 
(0.0221) 
L2 -0.0549* 
(0.0279) 
-0.0068 
(0.0286) 
-0.0048 
(0.0345) 
0.0624 
(0.0490) 
cap     
L1 0.2552 
(0.2116) 
0.0938 
(0.2167) 
0.2758 
(0.2121) 
0.2704 
(0.2107) 
L2 
 
-0.4337* 
(0.2265) 
-0.4793* 
(0.2455) 
-0.4425* 
(0.2281) 
-0.4314* 
(0.2261) 
liq     
L1 0.9025** 
(0.4095) 
0.8459* 
(0.4929) 
0.8353*** 
(0.2990) 
0.7512** 
(0.3526) 
L2 -0.2359 
(0.2873) 
-0.4690 
(0.4607) 
-0.2569 
(0.2504) 
-0.1772 
(0.2950) 
 r ×size     
L1 -0.0033 
(0.0062) 
0.0057 
(0.0085) 
0.0043 
(0.0086) 
0.0058 
(0.0071) 
L2 0.0178*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0195** 
(0.0081) 
0.0188* 
(0.0113) 
0.0191*** 
(0.0054) 
 r ×cap     
L1 0.1489** 
(0.0649) 
0.1072* 
(0.0615) 
0.1243** 
(0.0617) 
0.1350** 
(0.0642) 
L2 0.0136 
(0.0588) 
0.0458 
(0.0522) 
-0.0156 
(0.0551) 
-0.0008 
(0.0007) 
 r ×liq     
L1 0.0717* 
(0.0355) 
-0.0143 
(0.1211) 
0.1045* 
(0.0579) 
0.0794* 
(0.0436) 
L2 0.0259 
(0.0350) 
0.1116* 
(0.0588) 
0.0056 
(0.0602) 
0.0095 
(0.0639) 
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Table 4.7: (cont’d) The result for the baseline model.  
 
Note: We use lag1 and lag 2 in the model presented by L1 and L2 respectively. For the instrumental 
variable used in this model in 2SLS, first difference GMM and system GMM estimation, we apply the 
third lag to forth lag of the exogenous variables (deposits, securities, and policy interest rate) as well as the 
bank characteristic variables as suggested by several papers for the instrumental variable used in this 
model (Çavuşoğlu, 2002; Gambacorta, 2001; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2001;  Loupias, 
2001; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Benkovskis, 2008). *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and [-] respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable ( L ) Fix effect(1) 2SLS (2) 1
st 
difference 
GMM (3) 
System 
GMM (4) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
D1988 0.1566*** 
(0.0568) 
0.1938*** 
(0.0564) 
0.1626*** 
(0.0581) 
0.1581*** 
(0.0329) 
D1997 -0.0933* 
(0.0521) 
-0.0844* 
(0.0474) 
-0.0875* 
(0.0498) 
-0.0978* 
(0.0514) 
D2003 0.1194** 
(0.0513) 
0.1215* 
(0.0689) 
0.1542*** 
(0.0493) 
0.1218** 
(0.0505) 
AR(1)   -3.3926*** 
[0.0007] 
-3.4100*** 
[0.0010] 
AR(2)   0.9104 
[0.3626] 
1.0400 
[0.2970] 
Sargan statistic   336.6613 
[0.3736] 
330.9700 
[0.5670] 
Hansen J statistic  11.2540 
[0.4222] 
  
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk. LM statistic)  29.5650*** 
[0.0032] 
  
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic)  13.0730*   
Hausman test 45.15*** 
[0.0056] 
   
F-test for fix effect model 7.63*** 
[0.0000] 
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The fixed effect estimation result (column 1) indicates that all variables in the equations 
have a significant effect on bank loans. Deposits and bank securities have the expected 
positive and negative effects on bank loans respectively. This result is also found by 
several other studies (Altunbas et al., 2002; Çavuşoğlu, 2002;  esterlund, 2003; Kim, 
1999; Farinha and Marques, 2001; Wu et al., 2007; Agung et al., 2002a). The monetary 
policy instrument (r) has a significant negative effect on bank loans, confirming the 
existence of the bank lending channel in Thailand. For the effect of the characteristic 
variables, the bank liquidity characteristic has the expected positive effect on bank loans. 
This finding is in line with the theoretical expectation, which explains that highly liquid 
banks will have more cash, liquid assets and securities, and thus greater opportunities to 
issue more loans than the less liquid banks. Table 4.8 also shows a summary of the 
balance sheet variables of banks, which are divided according to size, capital and 
liquidity. We can see that the highly liquid banks have a higher average bank loan, 
securities, capital to total asset ratio and liquid assets to total assets ratio. This condition 
confirms that the more highly liquid banks will have a higher loan supply than the less 
liquid ones.  
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Table 4.8: summary of balance sheet variables of banks classified by their characteristics (size, capitalization, and liquidity) 
Variable Large banks Small banks Well capitalized banks Low capitalized banks Well liquid banks Low liquid banks 
 (average) 
 number Mean number Mean Number Mean Number Mean Number Mean Number Mean 
Loans (thousands of Baht) 6 312,378,181 10 52,660,061 5 32,310,081 11 231,568,034 9 229,784,816 7 79,119,861 
Deposits (thousands of Baht) 6 350,917,691 10 58,443,914 5 34,011,966 11 260,124,023 9 248,908,760 7 76,777,188 
Securities (thousands of Baht) 6 38,367,171 10 8,404,551 5 8,493,112 11 28,374,084 9 35,021,890 7 8,205,027 
Liquid asset (thousands of Baht) 6 68,905,770 10 10,289,077 5 8,867,608 11 49,306,168 9 45,772,004 7 10,313,294 
Total equity (thousands of Baht) 6 32,054,130 10 6,304,477 5 8,609,494 11 23,088,161 9 22,638,269 7 7,292,573 
Total asset (thousands of Baht) 6 439,014,996 10 78,156,294 5 46,607,480 11 327,170,421 9 312,353,104 7 111,627,229 
Loan to total asset 6 0.7115 10 0.6737 5 0.6932 11 0.7077 9 0.7356 7 0.7088 
Deposits to total asset 6 0.7993 10 0.7477 5 0.7297 11 0.7950 9 0.7968 7 0.6878 
Securities to total asset 6 0.0873 10 0.1075 5 0.1822 11 0.0867 9 0.1121 7 0.073 
Liquid asset to total asset 6 0.1569 10 0.1444 5 0.1902 11 0.1507 9 0.1465 7 0.092 
Capital to total asset 6 0.0730 10 0.0806 5 0.1847 11 0.0705 9 0.0724 7 0.065 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: Regarding the criteria to classify the bank characteristics, banks which have total asset, capital to asset ratio, and liquid asset to total asset ratio more than the average of 
all banks will be classify as large banks, well capitalized bank, and well liquid banks respectively. Banks that have the average amount of total asset, capital to asset ratio 
(total equity to asset ratio), and liquid asset to total asset ratio less than the average of all banks will be considered as the small, low capitalized banks, and low liquid banks.
  
153 
 
In contrast, the size and capital characteristic variables have a significant negative effect on 
bank loans. A similar effect of the size characteristic on bank loans is also found in many 
empirical results from micro based studies of the bank lending channel (Loupias et al., 2002; 
Worms, 2001; Topi and Vilmunen, 2001; Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001).  The reason 
for this is due to the balance sheet structure of banks. If there is better capitalization in small 
banks than large ones, it will cause a negative effect of the size characteristic on bank loans 
(Loupias et al., 2002; Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001; Gambacorta, 2001; Ehrmann, 
2001; Jamborean, 2009). Table 4.8 shows that there is a higher average of the capital to total 
asset ratio and securities to asset ratio in small banks than in large ones (small banks have a 
capital to asset ratio and total securities to total asset ratio which are 0.76% and 2.02% higher 
than large banks respectively). Thus, an increase in the size characteristic of banks can also 
mean a decrease in their capital and securities (large banks have a lower capital ratio). This 
leads to the smaller possibility of banks issuing loans and hence a greater the bank size can 
possibly lead to the lower the bank loans. 
 
The unexpected negative effect of the capital characteristic variable on bank loans can be 
found in some empirical studies (Fernandez, 2004; Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001; 
Loupias et al., 2002).  The reason for this can be explained by table 4.8, as we can see that the 
poorly capitalized banks have considerably higher average loans than the highly capitalized 
ones. This condition can cause a negative relationship between the capital characteristic of 
banks and bank loans.  
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The results for the effect of the interaction term between all the bank characteristic variables 
(size, capitalization and liquidity) and policy interest rate show the expected positive sign. The 
interaction term between the size characteristic and policy interest rate shows a significant 
positive effect on bank loans. This illustrates that monetary policy will lead to a weaker effect 
on bank loans in large banks than small ones and confirms our theoretical prediction in section 
4.2.1 and other empirical studies on this aspect (Ghosh, 2006; Karim et al., 2010; Alfaro et al., 
2003; Go mez-Goza lez and Grosz, 2007; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Kishan and Opiela, 
2000; Engler et al., 2007). Nevertheless, although we find a negative effect of the size 
characteristic variable on bank loans, this result will have little effect when it includes the 
interest rate variable. This is because large banks still have greater opportunities for external 
funding when the policy interest rate rises. This condition is shown by table 4.8, which 
illustrates that large banks also have a relatively high proportion of average bank securities, 
total equity, total liquid assets, and liquidity to total asset ratio compared with small banks 
(80.33%, 85.06%, and 78.09%, of the average total equity, liquid assets and securities of large 
banks are higher than in small banks, and the liquid asset to total asset ratio of large banks is 
1.25% higher than that of small ones). Therefore, although the balance sheet structure of small 
banks in Thailand shows that the size characteristic causes a negative effect on bank loans, the 
relatively high ability of large banks to use external funding sources (a higher proportion of 
liquid assets) is the main factor which compensates for the effect of the policy interest rate on 
bank loans. Thus, a greater bank size will lead to a weaker effect of the policy interest rate via 
the bank lending channel.  
 
The interaction term between the capital characteristic variable and policy interest rate also 
indicates a significant positive effect on bank loans. This result is supported by our 
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expectation as explained in section 4.2.1 and is also found in many empirical studies on this 
issue (Fernandez, 2004; Jimborean, 2009; Westerlund, 2003; Hováth et al., 2006; Alfaro et al., 
2003; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Sichei, 2005; Pruteanu-
Podpiera, 2007).  However, although we obtain an unexpected negative effect of the capital 
characteristic variable on bank loans, this finding has less influence on our result when the 
interest rate is included as the interaction term. This is possibly due to the greater opportunity 
for better capitalized banks to access external funding sources, resulting in a higher proportion 
of capitalization and liquidity compared to poorly capitalized banks. Table 4.8 shows that the 
capital to total asset ratio, the liquidity to asset ratio, and the securities to total asset ratio of 
better capitalized banks are a significant 11.42%, 3.95% and 9.55% higher than those of 
poorly capitalized banks. Therefore, despite the negative effect of the capitalization 
characteristic variable on bank loans, the higher capitalization and liquidity of well capitalized 
banks in Thailand can outweigh this negative relationship when the policy interest rate 
changes. Consequently, an increase in the capitalization characteristic of banks will weaken 
the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans and thus weaken the bank lending channel. 
  
The interaction term of the liquidity characteristic variable and policy interest rate shows a 
positive effect on bank loans, meaning that highly liquid banks will weaken the bank lending 
channel. This is because these banks have relatively higher securities and liquid assets to 
offset the decrease in bank loans when the policy interest rate rises. This is confirmed by our 
theoretical explanation as well as other empirical studies on this aspect (Pruteanu-Podpiera, 
2007; Li, 2009; Farinha and Marques, 2001; Hosono, 2006; Wu et al., 2007; Haan, 2001; 
Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2001; Topi and Vilmunen, 2001; Ehrmann et al., 2001; 
Gambacorta, 2001; Chatelain, et al., 2003a). Table 4.8 also confirms this result, as the capital 
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to total asset ratio, the liquidity to asset ratio, and the securities to total asset ratio of highly 
liquid banks are 0.71%, 5.45% and 3.91% higher than banks with low liquidity.  
 
For the dummy variables, the results indicate the same relationship as expected in section 
4.4.2, as the coefficient of the dummy variables in 1988 and 2003 has a positive effect on bank 
loans, while in 1997 there is a negative effect. This confirms that the rapid expansion of the 
economy and the economic recovery in Thailand had a positive effect on bank loans; however, 
the financial crisis in Thailand had a negative impact. 
 
The specification tests of the fixed effect estimation show that the F test in the fixed effect 
model displays rejection of the null hypothesis that every coefficient is equal to zero. The 
Hausman test also indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of the consistency of the random 
effect estimator, ensuring that the fixed effect model is the appropriate model. 
 
In addition, the robustness results obtained from the other three methods (2SLS, first 
difference GMM and system GMM) shown in columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 4.7 are similar to 
the results obtained from the fixed effect in column 1. The baseline results of these three 
methods also indicate a significant effect of all the variables on bank loans, as well as the 
existence of the bank lending channel in Thailand. The demand effect control variables 
(deposits and securities) still show the expected positive and negative effects on bank loans 
respectively. The size and capital of banks still have a negative effect on bank loans, while the 
liquidity characteristic has a positive effect. It can be concluded that large, better capitalized, 
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and highly liquid banks will weaken the lending channel in Thailand. The consistency tests of 
these three methodologies still show that our model is well specified. The 2SLS method shows 
the validity of our instrument variables, as the Hansen J statistic test indicates the non-
rejection of the null hypothesis of the instrument validity (our instruments used are exogenous 
and they are not correlated with the error term). The under identification test and the weak 
identification test also show a rejection of under and weak identification of our instrument 
variables, thus confirming that the model does not use the redundancy number of instruments. 
The Arellano-Bond second order serial correlation (AR(2)) test and the Sargan test show non-
rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the equation and the null hypothesis of 
validity of the instruments respectively. These consistency tests confirm that our first 
difference and system GMM results have no autocorrelation of the equation and that the 
instruments used in the model are valid.  
 
4.4.3 Empirical results of the effect of financial development on the bank lending 
channel 
 
Table 4.9 presents the fixed effect results (columns 1-7) when including the different financial 
development indicators in the baseline model. The results from columns 1 to 7 indicate the 
existence of the lending channel in Thailand as the interest rate coefficient shows a significant 
negative effect on bank loans. The loan demand control variables (deposits and securities) 
show respectively positive and negative signs, as expected. The results in all models also show 
that large, well capitalized and highly liquid banks will weaken the bank lending channel in 
Thailand. Moreover, the dummy variables controlling for important events still show the 
expected effect on bank loans. 
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Table 4.9: The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (fixed effect 
estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable     
( L ) 
 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
       
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L         
L1 0.1444* 
(0.0774) 
0.1560* 
(0.0932) 
0.1565* 
(0.0908) 
0.1591** 
(0.0617) 
0.1465* 
(0.0824) 
0.1474* 
(0.0696) 
0.0718 
(0.0795) 
L2 -0.0772 
(0.1168) 
-0.1387* 
(0.0719) 
-0.0783 
(0.0755) 
-0.1114 
(0.1192) 
-0.0966 
(0.0746) 
-0.0873 
(0.1208) 
-0.1245* 
(0.0729) 
D         
L1 0.1978* 
(0.1012) 
0.1213 
(0.0847) 
0.2422* 
(0.1145) 
0.0668 
(0.0978) 
0.2945** 
(0.1192) 
0.0825 
(0.1034) 
0.1653 
(0.1298) 
L2 0.1961** 
(0.0869) 
0.1919** 
(0.0800) 
0.2257* 
(0.1192) 
0.1638* 
(0.0842) 
0.2420* 
(0.1144) 
0.1942** 
(0.0884) 
0.2131* 
(0.1188) 
S         
L1 0.0135 
(0.0356) 
0.0082 
(0.0374) 
0.0075 
(0.0418) 
0.0062 
(0.0348) 
-0.0179 
(0.0416) 
0.0199 
(0.0396) 
-0.0026 
(0.0440) 
L2 -0.1488** 
(0.0549) 
-0.1302** 
(0.0472) 
-0.1283** 
(0.0446) 
-0.1436** 
(0.0498) 
-0.1414*** 
(0.0479) 
-0.1392*** 
(0.0444) 
-0.1472*** 
(0.0482) 
r         
L1 -0.0111 
(0.0064) 
0.0016 
(0.0070) 
0.00009 
(0.0057) 
0.0159 
(0.0159) 
0.0024 
(0.0101) 
-0.0074 
(0.0064) 
0.0062 
(0.0072) 
L2 -0.0168*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0159*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0123** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0206* 
(0.0104) 
-0.0141* 
(0.0075) 
-0.0116** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0062* 
(0.0032) 
size        
L1 -0.0650 
(0.0458) 
-0.0703* 
(0.0386) 
-0.1000** 
(0.0472) 
-0.0366** 
(0.0689) 
-0.0701* 
(0.0394) 
-0.0845** 
(0.0384) 
-0.0382 
(0.0318) 
L2 -0.0277 
(0.0491) 
-0.0521 
(0.0396) 
-0.0265 
(0.0518) 
0.0555 
(0.0747) 
-0.0249 
(0.0324) 
-0.0224 
(0.0359) 
-0.0119 
(0.0443) 
cap        
L1 0.5696 
(0.4544) 
0.2137 
(0.2966) 
0.5627 
(0.4148) 
0.2938 
(0.2019) 
0.3109 
(0.2221) 
0.3309 
(0.2127) 
-0.4301 
(0.6404) 
L2 -0.2725 
(0.3276) 
-0.3154 
(0.3293) 
-0.0041 
(0.0332) 
-0.6313*** 
(0.2595) 
-0.4087* 
(0.2350) 
-0.5388** 
(0.2327) 
0.5283 
(0.4513) 
liq        
L1 1.0846** 
(0.4179) 
0.8130* 
(0.4121) 
0.7915* 
(0.4129) 
0.9891** 
(0.3791) 
0.9462** 
(0.4468) 
0.8416* 
(0.4162) 
0.9149** 
(0.4107) 
L2 -0.2262 
(0.3073) 
-0.2423 
(0.3348) 
-0.0296 
(0.3068) 
-0.2666 
(0.3179) 
-0.6787 
(0.4364) 
-0.1056 
(0.3558) 
-0.2454 
(0.2762) 
 r ×size        
L1 -0.0053 
(0.0084) 
0.0032 
(0.0063) 
0.0079 
(0.0068) 
0.0074 
(0.0057) 
0.0014 
(0.0063) 
-0.0020 
(0.0056) 
0.0027 
(0.0064) 
L2 0.0231* 
(0.0117) 
0.0172*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0166*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0206*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0169*** 
(0.0057) 
 r ×cap        
L1 0.0789* 
(0.0449) 
0.1325** 
(0.0625) 
0.1169* 
(0.0668) 
0.1196** 
(0.0606) 
0.1582* 
(0.0790) 
0.1383** 
(0.0656) 
0.1407** 
(0.0648) 
L2 0.0214 
(0.0368) 
0.01298 
(0.0529) 
0.0068 
(0.0563) 
-0.0554 
(0.0563) 
-0.0204 
(0.1013) 
-0.0401 
(0.0612) 
-0.0201 
(0.0609) 
 r ×liq        
L1 0.1326** 
(0.0484) 
0.0403 
(0.0609) 
-0.0238 
(0.0871) 
0.1917 
(0.0825) 
0.0369 
(0.0594) 
0.1229** 
(0.0507) 
0.1231* 
(0.0634) 
L2 -0.0604 
(0.0561) 
0.0932* 
(0.0534) 
0.1120* 
(0.0657) 
0.0734* 
(0.0429) 
0.0949* 
(0.0532) 
-0.0363 
(0.0434) 
0.0121 
(0.0615) 
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Table 4.9 (cont’d): The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (Fixed 
effect estimation) 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and 
[-] respectively.  
 
For the effect of banking sector development (size measure: FD1), the result from model (1) 
shows that the effect of this indicator on bank loans and its interaction term with the policy 
interest rate show the expected positive effect on bank loans. This result is supported by the 
theoretical explanation of Levine et al. (2000), Da Silva (2002), Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 
(2009), Beck et al. (2008) and Nourzad (2002), and the empirical study conducted by Ferreira 
(2010). This means that an increase in the development of the size of the banking sector, 
financial depth and degree of financial intermediation in the banking sector in Thailand will 
cause an improvement in financial market liquidity and portfolio diversification, as well as an 
increase in the opportunities for external funding. Thereby, this leads to a positive effect on 
loan supply and the policy interest rate will have a weaker effect on bank loans as they have 
Dependent 
variable            
( L ) 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD        
L1 1.3359* 
(0.7652) 
0.0861 
(0.0644) 
0.3117 
(0.4248) 
0.1314* 
(0.0702) 
-0.0097 
(0.0853) 
0.1279* 
(0.0621) 
0.0893* 
(0.0475) 
L2 1.1258 
(0.7300) 
0.1062** 
(0.0464) 
-0.1504 
(0.3252) 
0.1113 
(0.0942) 
0.2811* 
(0.1435) 
-0.0022 
(0.0014) 
-0.0378 
(0.0368) 
 r× FD        
L1 0.3634** 
(0.1422) 
0.1204*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.1176* 
(0.0626) 
0.1074** 
(0.0468) 
0.0207 
(0.0396) 
0.0681** 
(0.251) 
0.0238** 
(0.0092) 
L2 0.1241 
(0.1824) 
0.0243 
(0.0290) 
-0.0363 
(0.0293) 
0.0616* 
(0.0311) 
0.0784* 
(0.0373) 
0.0327 
(0.0227) 
0.0026 
(0.0028) 
D1988 0.0929 
(0.0619) 
0.1414* 
(0.0694) 
0.1343** 
(0.0568) 
0.1115** 
(0.0535) 
0.1015* 
(0.0516) 
0.1101* 
(0.0581) 
0.1114** 
(0.0550) 
D1997 -0.0997* 
(0.0571) 
-0.0728 
(0.0539) 
-0.0919** 
(0.0545) 
-0.1352* 
(0.0702) 
-0.1012* 
(0.0518) 
-0.1146** 
(0.0527) 
0.1204* 
(0.0506) 
D2003 0.1119** 
(0.0531) 
0.1408*** 
(0.0492) 
0.1251** 
(0.0515) 
0.1034 
(0.0826) 
0.1344*** 
(0.0505) 
0.0775 
(0.0482) 
0.1368*** 
(0.0494) 
        
Hausman test 78.16*** 
[0.0000] 
76.98*** 
[0.0103] 
51.28*** 
[0.0032] 
65.56*** 
[0.0001] 
64.79*** 
[0.0000] 
62.98*** 
[0.0002] 
61.90*** 
[0.0001] 
F-test  6.56*** 
[0.0000] 
6.81*** 
[0.0000] 
6.18*** 
[0.0000] 
7.82*** 
[0.0000] 
6.79*** 
[0.0000] 
6.69*** 
[0.0000] 
7.09*** 
[0.0000] 
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more opportunity to obtain the external source of funds, which shows that banking size 
development will weaken the lending channel in Thailand.  
 
The result from model (2) in table 4.9 still shows that development in the size of the 
banking sector in terms of an increase in banking activities will lead to a positive effect on 
bank loans. Also, the interaction term between this indicator and the policy interest rate 
shows a significant positive effect on bank loans. These results are in line with our 
expectation, as an increase in banking activities and services, such as loan facilities, will 
encourage an increase in bank loans and thus weaken the effect of the policy interest rate 
on bank loans via the bank lending channel.  
 
The effect of banking concentration on the bank lending channel is shown in model (3) in 
table 4.9. The coefficient of the interaction term between the policy interest rate and the 
banking concentration indicator presents the expected negative sign. This result is 
supported by the theoretical explanation, as well as by several empirical studies (Li, 2009; 
Gunji et al., 2009; Adams and Amel, 2005). This means that the higher the banking 
concentration, the more monopoly power there will be and the greater the difficulty for 
other banks to access alternative sources of funding. Thus, an increase in the policy interest 
rate will have a higher impact on bank loans, and hence have a stronger effect through the 
lending channel. As more banking concentration represents a low competitive environment 
in the banking sector, we can conclude that banking competition will lead to a weakening 
of the bank lending channel.  
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The result in table 4.9 in models (4) and (5) clearly shows a significant positive coefficient 
of the effect of the interaction term between development in the size and policy interest rate 
on bank loans, and the interaction term between the activities of the capital market and the 
policy interest rate on bank loans. Our results are in line with our expectation, as an 
increase in the size and activities of the capital market will show a higher degree of 
financial depth (relatively high efficiency, trading activity and liquidity in the capital 
market). This therefore causes banks to have more opportunity to find other sources of 
funds, thus increasing bank loans, lower the effect of policy interest rate via the bank 
lending channel and thus weakening the bank lending channel.  
 
Model (6) in table 4.9 also shows a significant positive effect of bond market development 
as well as financial innovation on bank loans. This result is in line with our expectation, as 
development of the equity and bond markets will lead to a rise in financial deepening, 
greater opportunities for the banking sector to access the financial market and invest in new 
financial instruments, a high level of financial market liquidity and capital, and a rise in 
assets for hedging and diversification purposes.
 
Consequently, an increase in this indicator 
will result in a weaker effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans through the bank 
lending channel due to more opportunity of banks to obtain more source of fundings, which 
is shown by the positive sign of the interaction term between this indicator and the policy 
interest rate.  This result is similar to other studies on the effect of financial innovation on 
the bank lending channel (Altunbas et al., 2009b; Aysun and Hepp, 2011).  
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Model (7) in table 4.9 shows the expected positive sign of the effect of the financial 
liberalization dummy during the period 1990 to 1995 on bank loans and also the interaction 
term between the policy interest rate and financial liberalization dummy on bank loans. 
This result shows that financial liberalization in Thailand leads to a weaker effect of the 
policy interest rate on bank loans.  This result is in line with our expectation, as financial 
liberalization will tend to increase the bank loan supply in the market. This is supported by 
our portfolio choice model presented in chapter 2, section 2.5.1, as the liberalization 
policies (the relaxation of capital and foreign exchange control and the relaxation of bank 
branch opening requirements) will also cause a rise in capital inflow, deposits and bank 
loans. As explained previously in the overview of macroeconomic conditions in Thailand 
(chapter 3, section 3.1), the relaxation of foreign exchange and capital control (the 
establishment of BIBF in 1993) and other deregulation policies during the period of 
financial liberalization led to an increase in capital and financial surplus. This condition 
also shows the upward trend in both commercial bank loans and deposits from 1990 to 
1996 (figure 3.9, chapter 3). Therefore, the effect of financial liberalization will cause a 
weaker effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans as banks have an opportunity to issue 
more loans and also to access more funding sources (capital and securities). In summary, 
our results in this case confirm that financial liberalization will weaken the bank lending 
channel in Thailand.    
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In addition, the robustness results obtained from the other three methods (2SLS, first 
difference GMM and system GMM in tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 respectively) show similar 
results to the fixed effect estimation. The consistency tests of all of our methodologies still 
show that our model is well specified which is similar to the previous description in section 
4.4.2. Therefore, we can confirm the consistency of our results on the effect of financial sector 
development on the bank lending channel in Thailand.  
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Table 4.10: The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (2SLS 
estimation) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable     
 ( L ) 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L         
L1 -0.2151 
(0.1389) 
-0.2015* 
(0.1219) 
0.1548* 
(0.0931) 
0.1943** 
(0.0980) 
0.1615* 
(0.0953) 
0.1607* 
(0.0952) 
0.1613* 
(0.0886) 
L2 0.1658* 
(0.0972) 
0.1101 
(0.0903) 
-0.1186 
(0.1587) 
-0.0528 
(0.1243) 
-0.2161 
(0.1415) 
-0.2228 
(0.1406) 
-0.1563 
(0.1413) 
D         
L1 0.4217*** 
(0.1165) 
0.2443* 
(0.1414) 
0.2943** 
(0.1480) 
0.3517** 
(0.1380) 
0.2992** 
(0.1231) 
0.2566** 
(0.1213) 
0.2749* 
(0.1517) 
L2 0.4258** 
(0.1698) 
0.2645* 
(0.1440) 
0.2145 
(0.1466) 
0.2402 
(0.1721) 
0.2160* 
(0.1249) 
0.1676 
(0.1293) 
0.3012* 
(0.1562) 
S         
L1 -0.2993 
(0.0456) 
-0.006 
(0.0520) 
-0.0042 
(0.0476) 
-0.0212 
(0.0509) 
-0.0102 
(0.0463) 
-0.0017 
(0.0546) 
-0.0202 
(0.0488) 
L2 -0.1674*** 
(0.0522) 
-0.1355*** 
(0.0528) 
-0.1124** 
(0.0473) 
-0.1370** 
(0.0564) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0468) 
-0.1191** 
(0.0525) 
-0.1588*** 
(0.0505) 
r         
L1 -0.0003 
(0.0088) 
-0.0111 
(0.0083) 
-0.0005 
(0.0062) 
-0.0022 
(0.0074) 
-0.0080* 
(0.0048) 
-0.0106** 
(0.0049) 
0.0054 
(0.0060) 
L2 -0.0239** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0152** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0119*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0156** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0117** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0044 
(0.0044) 
-0.0078** 
(0.0034)  
size        
L1 -0.0505 
(0.0323) 
-0.0468 
(0.0296) 
-0.0480* 
(0.0275) 
-0.0366 
(0.0334) 
-0.0520* 
(0.0297) 
-0.0489* 
(0.0283) 
-0.0497* 
(0.0271) 
L2 0.0029 
(0.0311) 
-0.0027 
(0.0284) 
-0.0152 
(0.0276) 
-0.0141 
(0.0316) 
-0.0159 
(0.0297) 
-0.0068 
(0.0286) 
-0.0176 
(0.0266) 
cap        
L1 0.2768 
(0.2030) 
0.5017 
(0.5120) 
0.3791 
(0.2370) 
0.4162 
(0.4236) 
0.3849 
(0.2351) 
0.2938 
(0.2019) 
0.2461 
(0.3086) 
L2 -0.6842*** 
(0.2288) 
-0.1131 
(0.4732) 
-0.5795** 
(0.2718) 
-0.0141 
(0.0374) 
-0.5341** 
(0.2588) 
-0.6313*** 
(0.2287) 
-0.2937 
(0.3089) 
liq        
L1 0.9544* 
(0.5145) 
0.7556** 
(0.3226) 
0.9759* 
(0.5024) 
0.6491* 
(0.3372) 
0.6415* 
(0.3303) 
0.8222* 
(0.4266) 
0.8616*** 
(0.3221) 
L2 -0.6008 
(0.4587) 
-0.1131 
(0.4732) 
-0.5292 
(0.4821) 
0.0091 
(0.3362) 
-0.0465 
(0.3028) 
-0.4662 
(0.4214) 
-0.2224 
(0.2903) 
 r ×size        
L1 0.0064 
(0.0089) 
0.0074 
(0.0072) 
0.0072 
(0.0084) 
0.0025 
(0.0066) 
0.0019 
(0.0059) 
0.0053 
(0.0085) 
0.0028 
(0.0085) 
L2 0.0188** 
(0.0078) 
0.0167* 
(0.0091) 
0.0183** 
(0.0078) 
0.0172*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0167*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0158* 
(0.0093) 
0.0191** 
(0.0090) 
 r ×cap        
L1 0.1025* 
(0.0620) 
0.1116* 
(0.0593) 
0.1002* 
(0.0574) 
0.1127* 
(0.0619) 
0.1282** 
(0.0599) 
0.0947* 
(0.0571) 
0.0975* 
(0.0588) 
L2 -0.0611 
(0.0611) 
-0.0069 
(0.0585) 
-0.0283 
(0.0570) 
-0.0359 
(0.0571) 
-0.0423 
(0.0566) 
-0.0375 
(0.0552) 
-0.0286 
(0.0586) 
 r ×liq        
L1 -0.0031 
(0.1264) 
-0.0131 
(0.0726) 
-0.0391 
(0.1275) 
0.0452 
(0.0752) 
0.0472 
(0.0623) 
0.0413 
(0.0615) 
0.1097* 
(0.0571) 
L2 0.1458** 
(0.0688) 
0.1039** 
(0.0519) 
0.1393** 
(0.0663) 
0.0719* 
(0.0385) 
0.1293** 
(0.0535) 
0.1153** 
(0.0511) 
0.0297 
(0.0557) 
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Table 4.10 (cont’d): The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel 
(2SLS estimation) 
 
 
 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and 
[-] respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable     
( L ) 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD        
L1 0.5897 
(0.8190) 
0.2347*** 
(0.0908) 
0.1746 
(0.3993) 
0.1989* 
(0.1078) 
0.0129 
(0.0981) 
0.1486** 
(0.0686) 
0.0308 
(0.0556) 
L2 1.3319** 
(0.6654) 
0.2047*** 
(0.0715) 
-0.1849 
(0.3178) 
0.0509 
(0.1254) 
0.1973 
(0.1521) 
0.0801 
(0.0532) 
-0.0873 
(0.0547) 
 r× FD        
L1 -0.0562 
(0.1848) 
0.1370*** 
(0.0303) 
-0.1241** 
.(0.0566) 
0.1016*** 
(0.0346) 
0.0417 
(0.0400) 
0.0571** 
(0.0241) 
0.0256** 
(0.0114) 
L2 0.2965* 
(0.1757) 
0.1066*** 
(0.0227) 
-0.0388 
(0.0354) 
0.0481 
(0.0322) 
0.0753* 
(0.0399) 
0.0554*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0010 
(0.0078) 
D1988 0.1175** 
(0.0501) 
0.1173** 
(0.0494) 
0.0904* 
(0.0481) 
0.0895* 
(0.0506) 
0.1118** 
(0.0451) 
0.1439** 
(0.0684) 
0.1947*** 
(0.0420) 
D1997 -0.1887*** 
(0.0415) 
-0.1569** 
(0.0642) 
-0.1715* 
(0.0916) 
-0.1005* 
(0.0557) 
-0.1889*** 
(0.0558) 
-0.0562 
(0.0606) 
-0.0815 
(0.0759) 
D2003 0.1431** 
(0.0708) 
 
0.1477** 
(0.0662) 
0.1421* 
(0.0731) 
0.0573 
(0.0513) 
0.1394** 
(0.0698) 
0.1439** 
(0.0684) 
0.1591** 
(0.0709) 
Hansen J statistic 8.3400 
[0.6825] 
17.4670 
[0.1788] 
20.8780 
[0.0132] 
11.079 
[0.4367] 
13.8010 
[0.2442] 
16.6320 
[0.1193] 
7.9350 
[0.7191] 
Underidentification 
test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic) 
36.8800*** 
[0.0002] 
33.7850*** 
[0.0022] 
27.2070*** 
[0.0024] 
32.420*** 
[0.0012] 
25.0510** 
[0.0146] 
25.5050** 
[0.0126] 
28.0640*** 
[0.0054] 
Weak identification 
test  
(Cragg-Donald Wald 
F statistic) 
22.3750*** 11.863** 17.311* 24.9330*** 19.509** 19.8840** 24.8980*** 
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Table 4.11: The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (1st 
difference GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable              
( L ) 
 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L         
L1 0.2153** 
(0.0918) 
-0.0008 
(0.0788) 
0.1382* 
(0.0828) 
-0.0401 
(0.0836) 
0.1912* 
(0.0985) 
0.2038* 
(0.1043) 
0.1886** 
(0.0871) 
L2 -0.0588 
(0.0708) 
-0.1541** 
(0.0716) 
-0.0759 
(0.0719) 
-0.1583** 
(0.0713) 
-0.1181 
(0.0747) 
-0.1593* 
(0.0846) 
-0.0859 
(0.0725) 
D         
L1 0.1989 
(0.1381) 
0.1616 
(0.1001) 
0.1082 
(0.0775) 
0.2372** 
(0.0978) 
0.2322* 
(0.1308) 
0.2041* 
(0.1088) 
0.1859 
(0.1242) 
L2 0.1993* 
(0.1125) 
0.2105** 
(0.1057) 
0.2104* 
(0.1121) 
0.2358** 
(0.1021) 
0.2213** 
(0.1109) 
0.2404** 
(0.1101) 
0.2197** 
(0.0990) 
S         
L1 0.0024 
(0.0369) 
0.0132 
(0.0381) 
0.0216 
(0.0378) 
-0.0003 
(0.0366) 
0.0054 
(0.0347) 
0.0056 
(0.0372) 
-0.0070 
(0.0378) 
L2 -0.1250*** 
(0.0437) 
-0.1239*** 
(0.0425) 
-0.1376*** 
(0.0385) 
-0.1400*** 
(0.0378) 
-0.1223*** 
(0.0419) 
-0.1351*** 
(0.0407) 
-0.1399*** 
(0.0380) 
r         
L1 -0.0094* 
(0.0055) 
-0.0382*** 
(0.0136) 
0.0023 
(0.0052) 
0.0055 
(0.0083) 
0.0001 
(0.0075) 
-0.1140 
(0.0082) 
-0.0171*** 
(0.0058) 
L2 -0.0042 
(0.0038) 
-0.0710*** 
(0.0200) 
-0.0104** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0131** 
(0.0055) 
-0.0182*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0302*** 
(0.0108) 
-0.0066* 
(0.0035) 
size        
L1 -0.0741* 
(0.0394) 
-0.0401 
(0.0376) 
-0.0530 
(0.0335) 
-0.4000 
(0.0427) 
-0.0787* 
(0.0445) 
-0.0676* 
(0.0397) 
-0.0643* 
(0.0377) 
L2 -0.0703 
(0.0478) 
-0.0397 
(0.0319) 
-0.0165 
(0.0301) 
-0.0184 
(0.0287) 
-0.0366 
(0.0316) 
-0.0271 
(0.0336) 
-0.0404* 
(0.0244) 
cap        
L1 0.3983 
(0.2413) 
0.2005 
(0.2119) 
0.2067 
(0.2058) 
0.2485 
(0.3448) 
0.3259 
(0.2657) 
0.5665 
(0.3655) 
0.2447 
(0.2990) 
L2 -0.4959* 
(0.2545) 
-0.5146** 
(0.2441) 
-0.4131* 
(0.2325) 
0.0031 
(0.2665) 
-0.43985 
(0.2992) 
-0.1258 
(0.3094) 
-0.2140 
(0.3211) 
liq        
L1 0.7768** 
(0.3635) 
0.7487** 
(0.3700) 
0.7854** 
(0.0364) 
0.6897* 
(0.3541) 
0.6677* 
(0.3620) 
0.7234* 
(0.3754) 
0.9097*** 
(0.3396) 
L2 -0.1597 
(0.2814) 
-0.0375 
(0.3081) 
0.0229 
(0.3143) 
-0.2533 
(0.3297) 
-0.0254 
(0.2987) 
-0.0872 
(0.3051) 
-0.0718 
(0.3046) 
 r ×size        
L1 0.0015 
(0.0061) 
0.0051 
(0.0060) 
0.0185* 
(0.0111) 
0.0058 
(0.0066) 
0.0035 
(0.0067) 
0.0034 
(0.0061) 
0.0039 
(0.0067) 
L2 0.0172*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0172*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0041 
(0.0083) 
0.0169*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0174*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0168*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0177*** 
(0.0055) 
 r ×cap        
L1 0.1412* 
(0.0800) 
0.1485** 
(0.0708) 
0.1152* 
(0.0635) 
0.1116* 
(0.0656) 
0.1181* 
(0.0652) 
0.1454** 
(0.0703) 
0.1384* 
(0.0776) 
L2 -0.0025 
(0.0770) 
0.0351 
(0.0955) 
-0.0375 
(0.0576) 
-0.0169 
(0.0876) 
-0.0041 
(0.0530) 
0.0148 
(0.0871) 
0.0101 
(0.0696) 
 r ×liq        
L1 0.0800 
(0.0583) 
0.0166 
(0.0421) 
0.0282 
(0.0371) 
-0.0030 
(0.0653) 
0.0139 
(0.0664) 
0.0598 
(0.0457) 
0.0088 
(0.0476) 
L2 0.0969* 
(0.0541) 
0.0981*** 
(0.0333) 
0.1001*** 
(0.0370) 
0.0800* 
(0.0454) 
0.0929* 
(0.0536) 
0.1031*** 
(0.0335) 
0.0860*** 
(0.0324) 
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Table 4.11 (cont’d): The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (1st 
difference GMM estimation) 
 
 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and 
[-] respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable             
( L ) 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 
Coef. Coef. 
FD        
L1 1.3282** 
(0.6243) 
-0.1780 
(0.8105) 
0.3736 
(0.3406) 
0.2042*** 
(0.0736) 
0.1261** 
(0.0599) 
-0.1900 
(0.1457) 
0.0865* 
(0.0480) 
L2 0.1651 
(0.5521) 
0.5662 
(0.7952) 
-0.1709 
(0.2263) 
0.0828 
(0.0938) 
-0.0604 
(0.0826) 
0.0830* 
(0.0495) 
-0.0036 
(0.0448) 
 r× FD        
L1 0.4122* 
(0.2347) 
0.0472** 
(0.0187) 
-0.1096* 
(0.0591) 
0.0987** 
(0.0440) 
0.0699** 
(0.0306) 
0.0039 
(0.0164) 
0.0140* 
(0.0078) 
L2 0.0609 
(0.0808) 
0.1191*** 
(0.0361) 
-0.0131 
(0.0269) 
0.0568* 
(0.0310) 
0.0472* 
(0.0251) 
0.0518** 
(0.0221) 
0.1328 
(0.0098) 
D1988 0.1320*** 
(0.0329) 
0.1468* 
(0.0836) 
0.1767*** 
(0.0294) 
0.1132** 
(0.0553) 
0.1536*** 
(0.0281) 
0.1775*** 
(0.0691) 
0.1377*** 
(0.0353) 
D1997 -0.1053* 
(0.0618) 
-0.0511 
(0.0495) 
-0.1438*** 
(0.0451) 
-0.0656 
(0.0517) 
-0.1029** 
(0.0412) 
-0.0878** 
(0.0414) 
-0.0754 
(0.0548) 
D2003 0.1353*** 
(0.0525) 
0.1172** 
(0.0487) 
0.1427* 
(0.0845) 
0.1133** 
(0.0530) 
0.1185** 
(0.0521) 
0.1228** 
(0.0521) 
0.1492* 
(0.0865) 
AR(1) 
 
-3.3542*** 
[0.0008] 
-3.2790*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.2638*** 
[0.0011] 
-3.1401*** 
[0.0017] 
-3.3089*** 
[0.0009] 
-3.2884*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.4397*** 
[0.0006] 
AR(2) 0.1232 
[0.9019] 
0.7982 
[0.4247] 
0.0805 
[0.9358] 
0.5417 
[0.5880] 
0.5155 
[0.6062] 
-0.4414 
[0.6589] 
1.237 
[0.2161] 
Sargan test 337.3477 
[0.3637] 
331.0860 
[0.4573] 
332.0806 
[0.4421] 
334.6085 
[0.4039] 
340.3193 
[0.3220] 
337.1387 
[0.3667] 
326.9208 
[0.5064] 
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Table 4.12: The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel (system 
GMM estimation) 
Dependent 
variable            
( L ) 
 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
L         
L1 0.0619 
(0.0907) 
-0.0102 
(0.0882) 
0.2312*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.0392 
(0.0894) 
0.0319 
(0.0983) 
-0.0057 
(0.0883) 
0.2088* 
(0.0957) 
L2 0.1447* 
(0.0768) 
-0.1699** 
(0.0745) 
0.0605 
(0.0737) 
-0.1672** 
(0.0735) 
0.1306* 
(0.0758) 
-0.1443* 
(0.0741) 
-0.1236 
(0.1120) 
D         
L1 0.3463** 
(0.1421) 
0.2817* 
(0.1409) 
0.1921 
(0.1295) 
0.3195* 
(0.1674) 
0.3693** 
(0.1376) 
0.2658 
(0.1517) 
0.0100 
(0.1194) 
L2 0.2803** 
(0.1059) 
0.2664** 
(0.0968) 
0.2295* 
(0.1156) 
0.2645** 
(0.0974) 
0.2910** 
(0.1063) 
0.2542** 
(0.1048) 
0.2275** 
(0.0972) 
S         
L1 -0.0351 
(0.0469) 
-0.0119 
(0.0502) 
0.0066 
(0.0447) 
-0.0221 
(0.0364) 
-0.0273 
(0.0428) 
-0.0196 
(0.0469) 
0.0389 
(0.0505) 
L2 -0.1399*** 
(0.0471) 
-0.1344** 
(0.0469) 
-0.1291*** 
(0.0427) 
-0.1345*** 
(0.0441) 
-0.1316*** 
(0.0440) 
-0.1454*** 
(0.0440) 
-0.1193*** 
(0.0336) 
r         
L1 -0.0202*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0245* 
(0.0126) 
0.0004 
(0.0061) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0123** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0104 
(0.0095) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0053) 
L2 -0.0118** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0575** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0112** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0084* 
(0.0041) 
-0.0128*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0355*** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0113** 
(0.0046) 
size        
L1 -0.0364* 
(0.0200) 
-0.0259 
(0.0188) 
-0.0451* 
(0.0218) 
-0.0280 
(0.0240) 
-0.0487** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0452* 
(0.0239) 
-0.0419* 
(0.0211) 
L2 -0.0235 
(0.0216) 
-0.0205 
(0.0229) 
-0.0156 
(0.0250) 
-0.0361 
(0.0252) 
-0.0155 
(0.0213) 
-0.0026 
(0.0269) 
-0.0053 
(0.0223) 
cap        
L1 0.2847 
(0.2110) 
0.2741 
(0.2129) 
0.3076 
(0.2147) 
0.3101 
(0.2915) 
0.3027 
(0.2807) 
0.2771 
(0.2596) 
-0.5478 
(0.6650) 
L2 -0.4021* 
(0.2314) 
-0.4400* 
(0.2299) 
-0.4688** 
(0.2315) 
-0.4669 
(0.3408) 
-0.4494 
(0.3193) 
-0.4832* 
(0.2787) 
0.5487 
(0.6661) 
liq        
L1 0.9800* 
(0.4838) 
0.8653* 
(0.4583) 
0.9241** 
(0.4538) 
0.6938* 
(0.3654) 
0.6298* 
(0.3502) 
0.9017* 
(0.4491) 
0.6714*** 
(0.2378) 
L2 -0.6247 
(0.4468) 
-0.4509 
(0.4365) 
-0.4921 
(0.4468) 
-0.2284 
(0.3658) 
-0.1135 
(0.3209) 
-0.4667 
(0.4214) 
-0.2063 
(0.2653) 
 r ×size        
L1 0.0062 
(0.0063) 
0.0063 
(0.0063) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0049 
(0.0061) 
0.0064 
(0.0070) 
0.0060 
(0.0063) 
0.0108* 
(0.0059) 
L2 0.0148** 
(0.0064) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0061 
(0.0065) 
0.0171*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0152*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0154*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0149** 
(0.0061) 
 r ×cap        
L1 0.1446* 
(0.0718) 
0.1431* 
(0.0763) 
0.1381** 
(0.0670) 
0.1135* 
(0.0619) 
0.1399* 
(0.0757 
0.1451* 
(0.0748) 
0.1163** 
(0.0590) 
L2 -0.0363 
(0.0984) 
-0.0040 
(0.1121) 
-0.0388 
(0.0627) 
-0.0514 
(0.0592) 
-0.0243 
(0.0922) 
-0.0284 
(0.1051) 
-0.0247 
(0.0599) 
 r ×liq        
L1 0.0591 
(0.0502) 
0.0254 
(0.0432) 
0.0560 
(0.0393) 
0.0074 
(0.0422) 
0.0287 
(0.0682) 
0.0417 
(0.0482) 
0.0135 
(0.0675) 
 0.0776* 
(0.0398) 
0.0973*** 
(0.0267) 
0.0861** 
(0.0369) 
0.0757** 
(0.0319) 
0.0953** 
(0.0433) 
0.0980*** 
(0.0286) 
0.0930* 
(0.0547) 
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Table 4.12 (cont’d) The result for the effect of financial sector development on bank lending channel  
(system GMM estimation) 
 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. Standard error and p-value  are in (-) and 
[-] respectively.  
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This study aims to examine the bank lending channel in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 from the 
micro data based perspective as well as to investigate the effect of financial sector 
development on this channel. The results obtained from different methods (panel data fixed 
effect estimation, 2SLS, first difference GMM and system GMM estimation) show the 
existence of the bank lending channel in Thailand during the period under consideration as 
there is a significant negative effect of policy interest rate on bank loans.  Our results show 
that the large, well capitalized and highly liquid banks will have a weaker effect of the policy 
interest rate on bank loans and thus a weakening of the bank lending channel. However, we 
found that the size characteristic variables show an unexpected negative effect on bank loans 
Dependent 
variable            
( L ) 
 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD        
L1 1.2379** 
(0.5705) 
-0.2424 
(0.1975) 
-0.2754 
(0.4576) 
0.1366* 
(0.0746) 
-0.0175 
(0.1144) 
-0.1997 
(0.1570) 
0.0360 
(0.0369) 
L2 0.7621 
(0.5464) 
0.0550 
(0.0730) 
0.1143*** 
(0.0353) 
0.1236 
(0.0943) 
0.2575* 
(0.1383) 
0.0808* 
(0.0493) 
0.0332 
(0.0344) 
 r× FD        
L1 0.3995* 
(0.2399) 
0.0214 
(0.0169) 
-0.1186* 
(0.0641) 
0.0784 
(0.0562) 
0.0135 
(0.0294) 
0.0003 
(0.0218) 
0.0178* 
(0.0086) 
L2 0.0361 
(0.1236) 
0.1228** 
(0.0385) 
-0.0041 
(0.0405) 
0.0719** 
(0.0278) 
0.0629* 
(0.0345) 
0.0593** 
(0.0229) 
0.0137 
(0.0103) 
D1988 0.1451** 
(0.0615) 
0.1318*** 
(0.0502) 
0.1504*** 
(0.0376) 
0.1563*** 
(0.0311) 
0.1453*** 
(0.0337) 
0.1924*** 
(0.0391) 
0.1426 
(0.0879) 
D1997 -0.0876** 
(0.0443) 
-0.0485 
(0.0508) 
-0.1286*** 
(0.0466) 
-0.0427 
(0.0751) 
-0.0302 
(0.0606) 
-0.1028** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0604 
(0.0527) 
D2003 0.1049** 
(0.0521) 
0.1253** 
(0.0501) 
0.1428*** 
(0.0534) 
0.0954* 
(0.0566) 
0.1154 
(0.0933) 
0.1348*** 
(0.0495) 
0.1199* 
(0.0586) 
AR(1) 
 
-3.24*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.34*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.26*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.24*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.27*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.32*** 
[0.0010] 
-3.40*** 
[0.0010] 
AR(2) -0.04 
[0.9660] 
0.6600 
[0.5070] 
0.19 
[0.8530] 
1.36 
[0.1740] 
0.67 
[0.5030] 
-0.24 
[0.8080] 
1.04 
[0.2970] 
Sargan test 336.70 
[0.4640] 
334.51 
[0.4970] 
336.04 
[0.4580] 
344.24 
[0.3520] 
336.25 
[0.4700] 
340.82 
[0.4020] 
333.09 
[0.5190] 
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due to the balance sheet structure of banks in Thailand, with small banks having higher capital 
to asset and securities to asset ratios. In addition, the capital characteristic variable shows an 
unexpected negative effect on bank loans, as the poorly capitalized banks have considerably 
higher average loans than the highly capitalized ones. Despite these unexpected findings, this 
result will have little impact when the effect of the policy interest rate variable is included. 
This is because the balance sheet structure of large and high capitalized banks in Thailand 
which still have the relatively high ability to obtain external funding. This will lead to a 
weaker effect of the policy rate on bank loans. In this case, large banks have a relatively high 
proportion of average bank securities, total equity, total liquid assets, and liquidity to total 
asset ratio compared with small banks. There is also the greater opportunity for better 
capitalized banks to access external funding sources, showing by a higher proportion of 
capitalization (capital to asset ratio) and liquidity (liquidity to asset ratio), compared to poorly 
capitalized banks. Therefore, we still conclude that greater bank size, capital and liquidity will 
weaken the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans, and thus weaken the bank lending 
channel in Thailand.  
 
The results of the effect of financial sector development on the bank lending channel indicate 
that banking sector development (both in size and activity), banking competition, capital 
market development (both size and activity), bond market development (financial innovation), 
and financial liberalization have weakened the bank lending channel. The development of the 
size of the banking sector causes a rise in the degree of financial intermediation and an 
increase in the bank size compared with other financial institutions. This leads to an 
improvement in financial market liquidity as well as an increase in the opportunities for 
external funding. In addition, the activities development of the banking sector leads to an 
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increase in the banking activities in terms of the loans and services provided to customers. 
Thus, banking sector development can weaken the effect of the policy interest rate on bank 
loans due to more opportunity of banks to obtain more sources of funding and to issue bank 
loans. Financial competition can lead to higher efficiency in the financial market in terms of 
the lower cost of providing financial products and services, thus leading to development in the 
financial market. We find that financial competition (a lower concentration ratio) will leads to 
a more competitive environment in the banking sector and a lower cost for the banks in the 
market to access other sources of funds. This situation can therefore weaken the effect of the 
policy interest rate via the bank lending channel. Furthermore, capital market development, 
bond market development and financial innovation will result in a greater opportunity for 
banks to obtain other funding sources; such as securities and equity investment, and the 
development of new financial instruments and risk diversification techniques; thus weakening 
the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans and the bank lending channel. In addition, 
financial liberalization in Thailand can cause a weakening effect on the bank lending channel 
due to the deregulation policies (capital account liberalization, the relaxation of financial 
institutions and market restrictions). This leads to a rise in financial institution business and 
more opportunities to obtain additional sources of funding, thus reducing the effect of the 
policy interest rate on bank loans. 
 
Our empirical studies raise important issue for policy makers in Thailand. The results show 
the positive effect of financial development on bank loan supply. Thus, we found that 
financial development can be used in order to increase the loan supply and stimulate 
economic growth in the country. However, policy makers should be aware that if they do not 
carefully control financial development in the country, it will probably lead to a rise in the 
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default risk of banks and a weaker balance sheet condition. This weak condition of banks may 
mean they experience increased non-performing loan problems in the future. For the effect of 
financial sector development on the bank lending channel, our findings indicate that financial 
development indicators show a weaker effect via the bank lending channel. Therefore, policy 
makers should consider the effect of financial development when controlling and regulating 
monetary policy and before issuing new financial development policy as these can cause a 
weakening effect via the bank lending channel and make it difficult for them to control the 
economy through this channel. However, the effects of financial development can also pass 
through to the economy via other channels of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, an 
adequate supervisory system and appropriate risk management techniques in the banking and 
financial sectors are also needed when carrying out financial development in the future 
(Sussangkarn and Vichyanond, 2007). Moreover, policy makers should examine financial and 
economic conditions before introducing financial development plans. In this case, reasonably 
stable macroeconomic condition is required, with stable conditions in the financial market, 
and the banking and capital market sectors should be well supervised and well versed in 
financial skills (Caprio et al., 1993).   
 
This study uses data on the total loan supply of banks to study the bank lending channel in 
Thailand. Thus, further studies can be extended by examining the effect of monetary policy 
and financial development on the bank lending channel in terms of the effect on bank loans in 
specific sectors (for example, corporate and household sectors). However, data on these kinds 
of bank loans to specific sectors are not available in Thailand (bank balance sheet data in 
Thailand only report the data of total loans in each bank). Therefore, in the future, studies on 
this issue should be done in relevant case studies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE BALANCE SHEET CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION: 
EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND USING FIRM LEVEL DATA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The study of the bank lending channel in chapter 4 uses a micro-data based study (bank panel 
data study) to solve the identification problem caused by the macro-data based studies (the 
use of aggregate time series data). Therefore, it is important to explore another aspect of the 
micro-data based approach to the credit channel by focusing on the balance sheet channel of 
monetary policy transmission and using panel firm level data. 
 
Wesche (2000), De Oliveira and Ramos (2008) and Ashcraft and Campello (2005) point out 
that a firm level data study can represent the effect of monetary policy shock on the demand 
side (borrower side), thus solving the identification problem caused by a macro based study. 
Chatelain et al. (2002,2003b), Butzen et al. (2001), Jiménez et al. (2009) and Gaiotti and 
Generale (2001) also state that the drawback of using aggregate time series data is that it 
cannot control for cross-sectional dimensions and firm specific effects. Therefore, a micro 
data based study of the credit channel by using firm panel data is considered as a more 
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suitable approach for studying the balance sheet channel. This aspect will be focused on and 
considered in this chapter in the study of the firm balance sheet channel of monetary policy 
transmission.  
. 
The financial market in reality is considered as a market with imperfect information. 
Therefore, there is a wedge between the external and internal funding costs of firms (external 
finance premium) caused by the asymmetric information in the financial market (Valverde 
and Del Paso, 2009; Fazzari et al., 1987; Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Valderrama, 2001). In this 
case, lenders will charge borrowers (firms) a risk premium to cover their monitoring and 
screening costs, as well as the risk possibly created by the borrowers (Kadapakkam et al., 
1998; Wesche, 2000). As explained in chapter 2, the balance sheet channel describes that a 
rise in the policy interest rate will lead to a decrease in the firms’ cash flow and net worth, 
thus weakening their balance sheet condition (Mishkin 1996; Wesche, 2000). A weaker 
balance sheet condition will pass through to a rise in the external finance premium and thus 
reduce their investment and output (Valderrama, 2001; Valverde and Del Paso, 2009; 
Wesche, 2000). From the balance sheet channel theory, it can be seen that firms’ investment 
will depend on their balance sheet condition. Agung (1999) states that when there is a 
contractionary monetary policy (a rise in the policy interest rate), firms with more financial 
constraint (ones with a weaker balance sheet condition) will have a greater reduction in their 
investment due to the high external finance premium, compared with ones with low financial 
constraint (firms with a stronger balance sheet condition). Therefore, the study of the effect of 
the firms’ balance sheet condition on their investment can also prove and support the theory 
of the firm balance sheet channel (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007; Agung, 1999; Butzen et 
al., 2001; Lunnemann and Matha, 2001; Bryson, 2009). In this aspect, the study can also shed 
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light on the effect of firms’ financial structure (internal finance/ external finance) on their 
investment decisions. As a result, the study of the firm balance sheet channel in this chapter 
will be investigated and refered by the study of the effect of firms’ financial condition on their 
investment. Study of this issue can therefore support the theory of the firm balance sheet 
channel. The effect of the balance sheet condition/financial constraint of firms (cash flow, 
size, leverage and dividend payout ratio) on their investment has been widely investigated in 
many studies (Chatelain et al., 2002, 2003b; Bond et al., 1997, Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001; 
Hoshi et al, 1991; Oliner and Rudebush, 1996; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Gaiotti and 
Generale, 2001; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1989; Gilchrist and 
Zakrajek, 1995; Kuwayama, 1997; Butzen et al., 2001).   
 
Furthermore, it is not only the balance sheet condition of firms itself that has an effect on their 
investment, but also financial development. This is because development in the financial 
market will make firms less dependent on their internal finance as they can have alternative 
sources of funding (Galindo et al., 2007). This condition can lead to a weaker effect of the 
firm balance sheet condition on firms’ investment, thus weakening the firm balance sheet 
channel. Therefore, the study of the effect of financial development on firms’ financial 
condition and investment has become an interesting issue in recent studies (Leaven, 2003; 
Galindo et al., 2007; Koo and Shin, 2004; Love, 2003; Harrison et al., 2002; Islam and 
Mozumdar., 2002). Nevertheless, study of this aspect is quite limited and many papers only 
focus on the effect of financial liberalization (Gelos and Werner, 2002; Koo and Shin, 2004; 
Schiantarelli et al., 1992; Arbeláex and Echavarria, 2002; Bhaduri, 2005; Hermes and 
Lensink, 1996; Harris et al., 1994) and rarely consider other aspects of financial sector 
development, such as banking and capital market development, financial competition and 
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financial innovation (Love, 2003; Laeven, 2003; Gallego and Loayza, 2000; Harrison et al., 
2002). Therefore, this gap in the studies introduces the interesting issue of examination of the 
effect of different aspects of financial development on the study of the firm balance sheet 
channel. 
 
The studies of this aspect of the firm balance sheet channel and those of the effect of financial 
development only investigate the effect of firms’ cash flow and  size on their investment 
(Chatelain et al., 2002, 2003b; Kalckreuth, 2001; Chatelain and Tiomo ,2001; Hsiao and 
Tahmiscioglu , 1997; Hall et al., 1998;  Hoshi et al. ,1991;  Lunnemann and Matha , 2001;  
Kuwayama , 1997;  Bougheas et al., 2006;  Butzen et al., 2001 ; Galindo et al., 2007; Love, 
2003; Bond et al., 1997). However, few papers introduce the effect of other factors 
determining firms’ financial constraint, such as their leverage and dividend payout ratios 
(Agung et al., 2002b; Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007; Harris et al., 1994; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Bhaduri, 2005; Kaplan and Zingles, 1997). Therefore, it is interesting to 
introduce the effect of other factors determining firms’ financial constraint (leverage ratio and 
dividend payout ratio) on their investment to capture the whole effect of the balance sheet 
constraint on their investment.   
 
In addition, most of the research only focuses on case studies of developed countries, 
especially the US and European countries (Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001; Guariglia, 1999; 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Bond et al, 1997; Oliner and 
Rudebush, 1996; Agca and Mozumdar, 2008; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995). However, 
studies rarely focus on the case of developing countries (Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; 
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Agung et al., 2002b; Gallego and Loayza, 2000; Bhaduri, 2005; Hermes and Lensink, 1996). 
In addition, concerning the study of Thailand, a past empirical paper by Rungsomboon (2005) 
did not focus on the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel. 
Therefore, it is interesting to study the firm balance sheet channel as well as the effect of 
financial development on this channel by introducing Thailand as a case study of a developing 
country.  
 
Consequently, due to the limits found in past papers, this chapter makes several main 
contributions. First, it will examine not only the firm balance sheet channel itself but also 
investigate the effect of different aspects of financial development (banking and capital 
market development, financial competition, financial innovation and financial liberalization) 
on this channel. This will fill the gap in past empirical studies, which only focus on the micro 
data based aspect of the firm balance sheet channel and only consider the effect of a few 
financial development aspects (for example, financial liberalization) on this channel. Second, 
this study will introduce the effect of other factors determining firms’ financial constraint 
(their leverage and dividend payout ratios) on their investment in order to fill the gap in the 
past literature, which only focuses on the effect of firms’ cash flow and size on their 
investment. Third, this study will fill a further gap in the past empirical literature, which 
mainly focuses on developed countries, by examining the firm balance sheet channel as well 
as the effect of financial development on this channel by using Thailand as a case study of a 
developing country. Finally, this is the first case study of Thailand which also investigates the 
effect of financial development on the firm balance sheet channel. 
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The main aims of this study are (1) to examine the firm balance sheet channel in Thailand by 
investigating the effect of firms’ financial condition on their investment; (2) to investigate the 
effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel in the country; and 
(3) to study the effect of the different financial constraints (small/large firms and high/low 
dividend payout firms) on firms’ investment. Our results support the theory of the firm 
balance sheet channel as we found an effect of the firm balance sheet condition (firms’ cash 
flow and leverage) on their investment. In this case, a stronger firm balance sheet condition 
(higher cash flow and lower leverage ratio) will have a significant positive effect on firms’ 
investment. When dividing firms according to their different financial constraints (size and 
dividend payout), the results show that the lower the financial constraint of firms, the less 
sensitive their cash flow and leverage will be to investment and thus the greater their 
opportunity to obtain external source of funds. This shows that the balance sheet condition 
(cash flow and leverage of firms) of the less financially constrained firms (large and high 
dividend ones) has less effect on their investment and thus means a weaker firm balance sheet 
channel, compared with the more financially constrained firms. Regarding the effect of 
financial sector development, our findings show that banking development, financial 
competition, capital market development, financial innovation and financial liberalization in 
Thailand lead to a lower effect of the firm balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) on 
firms’ investment and hence weaken the firm balance sheet channel. This is because financial 
development can lead to a greater opportunity for firms to obtain bank loans and other sources 
of funds, reducing the dependence of their investment on internal finance and their balance 
sheet condition.  We also found that this effect is more significant in the more constrained 
firms than the less constrained ones.  
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The remainder of the chapter is developed as follows. Section 5.2 will present the literature 
review of this study. Section 5.3 will discuss the data and methodology of this chapter, 
comprising the data description, model specification and the methodology employed. The 
empirical analysis will be presented in section 5.4, followed by the conclusion and 
suggestions for further research in section 5.5.  
 
5.2 Literature review  
 
5.2.1 Firms’ financial constraint and investment and the firm balance sheet channel of 
monetary policy transmission 
The financial market in reality is an imperfect information market and there is consequently a 
wedge between the external and internal funding costs of firms (external finance premium). 
This is caused by the asymmetric information problem as well as the transaction costs 
between lenders and borrowers (Koo and Shin, 2004; Fazzari et al., 1987; Leaven, 2003). The 
higher the financial constraint of firms, the higher the external finance premium, which 
therefore has an effect on investment decisions (Agca and Mozumdar, 2008; Hericourt and 
Poncet, 2007; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Kaplan and Zingales, 1995). As a result, firms’ 
financial condition will have an effect on their investment (Butzen et al., 2001; Lunnemann 
and Matha, 2001; Bryson, 2009).  
 
Therefore, if there is an effect of firms’ balance sheet condition on their investment, it can 
prove and support the idea of the balance sheet channel of firms (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 
2007; Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002b). This is due to the effect of the policy interest rate, 
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which will pass through to firms’ investment via the effect of the external finance premium 
explained previously (Agung, 1999). Hence, as the financial condition of firms has an 
influence on their external finance premium, it also has an effect on their investment and 
therefore shows the existence of the firm balance sheet channel.  
 
There are many factors which affect the financial condition of firms (size, leverage, dividend 
payout, and cash flow). The cash flow of firms also presents their balance sheet condition as it 
shows their creditworthiness and thus has an effect on their investment spending. 
Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007), Agung (1999), Agung et al. (2002b), Bernanke et al. 
(1996), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) state that a higher cash flow of firms represents 
larger firms’ creditworthiness, hence increasing liquidity. A higher cash flow of firms also 
shows a higher level of internal funds, which will consequently increase the viability of 
investment projects (Butzen et al., 2001; Gelos and Werner, 2002). Therefore, this condition 
raises firms’ investment as well as lowering the effect of monetary policy shock on their 
investment. To sum up, the higher the cash flow of firms, the lower the external finance 
premium and thus the weaker the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance sheet 
channel.  
 
Another factor which determines the balance sheet condition of firms is their leverage (debt to 
capital ratio). In contrast to firms’ cash flow, an increase in their leverage shows that firms 
will be more dependent on external funds and this causes the higher possibility of a rise in 
agency cost and default risk (Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002; Angelopoulou and Gibson, 
2007). This leads to a rise in the risky behaviour of firms and the moral hazard problem 
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caused by a higher value of their risky debt (Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995; Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007; Harris et al, 1994). This situation results 
in a higher level of external finance premium charged by lenders and increases the external 
funding cost of firms. This therefore leads to a lower level of investment as well as the 
strength of the effect of monetary policy shock on firms’ investment behaviour (Gomez-
Gonzalez and Grosz, 2007; Agung et al., 2002).  Therefore, the higher the firms’ leverage, the 
stronger the effect of the policy interest rate via the firm balance sheet channel. 
 
The size of firms can determine their financial condition (Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007; 
Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Leaven, 2003). Agung (1999), 
Hubbard (1995), Gelos and Werner (2002), Kadapakkam et al. (1998), and Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996a) state that monetary policy shock will have less effect on large firms than 
small ones. This is due to the higher net worth, capital strength and liquidity condition of 
large firms (Kim, 1999; Valverde and Del Paso, 2009; Black and Rosen, 2007; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). Large firms also have a better reputation 
than small ones due to their relatively stronger balance sheet condition (Hall, 2001; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; Kuwayama, 1997). This leads to the lowering of information and 
transaction costs as well as the lowering of the default risk of large firms (Hall, 2001; Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994; Kadapakkam et al, 1998; Arellano et al., 2009). These conditions 
also lead to the higher possibility for large firms to access external funding sources 
(commercial papers, bonds, public debt and equity funding) instead of mostly depending on 
internal funding sources, as in the case in small firms (Valverde and Del Paso, 2009; Wesche, 
2000; Gupta, 2003; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Agung, 1999; Yalcin et al., 2003). Therefore, 
large firms will face a lower external finance premium compared with small firms, reducing 
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the dependence of their investment on internal finance, as well as reducing the effect of 
monetary policy shock on their loans and investments (Georgopoulos and Hejazi, 2009; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; De Oliveira, 2006; Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Gelos and Werner, 2002; 
Cooley and Quadrini, 2006). Thus, this leads to a weaker effect of monetary policy through 
the firm balance sheet channel. 
 
Another factor determining the financial constraint of firms is their dividend payout ratio . 
Lünnemann and Math  (2001), Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007) and Agung (2000) indicate 
that a higher dividend payout ratio presents less financial constraint for firms. This implies 
that firms with a higher dividend payout ratio will have a relatively lower external finance 
premium than those with a lower dividend payout ratio. Therefore, firms with a high dividend 
payout ratio will have a less dependence on their internal finance and thus be less affected by 
monetary policy. To sum up, the higher the dividend payout ratio of firms, the lower their 
financial constraint and thus the weaker the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance 
sheet channel.  
 
In conclusion, the lower the financial constraint of firms, the lower the dependence of firms’ 
investments on internal finance and the lower their external finance premium. Consequently, 
this condition weakens the effect of the policy interest rate on the firm balance sheet channel. 
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5.2.2 Empirical studies of the firm balance sheet channel and the effect of financial 
sector development on the channel  
 
Several papers examine the effect of firms’ financial condition on their investment. Studies of 
developed countries include Chatelain et al. (2002, 2003b), who apply the GMM technique 
and whose results show the significant positive effect of firms’ cash flow on investment in 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain. This result supports the balance sheet channel theory as the 
balance sheet condition of firms has an effect on their investment. It also confirms the 
theoretical explanation, as the higher the firms’ cash flow, the higher their investment. Shin 
and Park (1999) used the GMM technique and found a positive effect of firms’ cash flow on 
investment in Korea. Hoshi et al. (1991) also found that the higher the cash flow of firms in 
Japan, the higher the investment spending. These results therefore support the firm balance 
sheet channel theory and confirm the theoretical expectation that the higher the internal 
finance of firms, the higher their investment. Similar results are also reported by studies in 
other developed countries, such as Bond et al. (1997) in Belgium, France, Germany, and the 
UK; Kalckreuth (2001) in Germany; Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) in France;  Blundell et al. 
(1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994a, 1994b) in the UK; Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997), 
Chirinko (1997), Chirinko and Schaller (1995), and Agca and Mozumbar (2008) in the US, 
and Harrison et al. (2002) and Kadapakkam et al. (1998) in groups of developed countries. 
 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) divide US firms according to their size and show from their 
pool OLS results that firms’ cash flow has a positive effect on their investment and that this 
effect is shown only in small firms, with an insignificant effect on large ones. They conclude 
that the higher the financial constraint of firms (smaller firm size), the higher their 
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dependence on internal finance (cash flow) and thus, small firms will show a higher 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow than large ones.  Similarly, Gaiotti and Generale (2002) 
use GMM estimation and found that there is a positive effect of cash flow on the investment 
spending of firms in Italy and that this effect is larger in small firms than large ones. They 
explain that the investment of firms with higher financial constraint (small firms) will show 
greater sensitivity to cash flow than the less financially constrained ones (large firms) due to 
the greater dependence of the financially constrained firms on internal funding sources. This 
therefore confirms our theoretical expectation that the lower the financial constraint of firms 
(large firms), the weaker the firm balance sheet channel. The same results are also found in 
firm level studies by Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) in Luxemburg; Kuwayama (1997) in 
Japan; Bougheas et al. (2006) in the UK; Bryson (2009) in Jamaica; Wesche (2000) in 
Austria; and Butzen et al. (2001) in Belgium. Amongst studies of developing countries, 
Rungsomboon (2005) shows that small firms in Thailand have higher investment to cash flow 
sensitivity than large ones. This therefore shows that the lower the financial constraint of 
firms (higher firm size), the lower their dependence on internal funding sources, which 
consequently causes low investment to cash flow sensitivity. The results from these studies 
also support the balance sheet channel theory, as the lower the constraint of firms (large 
firms), the less they will depend on their internal fianance and thus they will face lower 
external finance premiums, which will reduce the effect of monetary policy shock via their 
balance sheet channel. 
 
However, some studies obtain an unexpected result with regard to the theoretical view. 
Valderrama (2001) used the GMM technique in Austria and found that investment to cash 
flow sensitivity is greater in large firms than small ones. Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989) 
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also found an unexpected result in their financial constraint study of firms in the UK, as the 
cash flow effect on investment is greater in the group of large companies than small ones. 
They explain that this unexpected case is probably due to the lower proportion of cash flow in 
large firms (the higher net worth of small firms compared to large ones), thus causing the 
higher dependence of the large firms’investment on their balance sheet condition.  
 
Guariglia (1999) introduces the leverage ratio of firms as another factor determining their 
balance sheet condition. She found from her GMM study that a higher effect of the liquidity 
condition (firms’ cash flow) on the investment of high leverage ratio firms in the UK 
compared to low leverage ratio ones. This result supports the theoretical expectation, as the 
higher leverage ratio will show the greater financial constraint of firms, causing the greater 
dependence of these firms on internal funds. This causes a higher sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow in the more highly leveraged firms. This result supports the firm balance sheet 
channel theory, as the higher the financial constraint of firms (high leverage ratio), the more 
they will depend on their internal funds, thus strengthening the effect of monetary policy 
shock via the firm balance sheet channel. The same result is also found by Gilchrist and 
Zakrajsek (1995) in their study of the firm balance sheet channel in the US. Amongst case 
studies of developing countries, Agung et al. (2002b) apply OLS and GMM methods and 
found a positive effect of cash flow and a negative effect of the leverage ratio on the 
investment level of firms in Indonesia and that this effect is higher in small firms. Their 
findings also support the theoretical expectation that the lower the financial constraint of firms 
(greater firm size), the lower the sensitivity of investment to cash flow and to leverage. This 
result also supports the firm balance sheet channel theory, that the lower the financial 
constraint of firms, the lower their dependence on internal source of funds and hence the 
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weakening the firm balance sheet channel. A similar result is also found by Gallego and 
Loayza (2000) in a case study of Chile and Héricourt and Poncet (2007) in China. 
 
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Van Ees and Garretsen (1994) introduce the dividend payout ratio of 
firms to represent their balance sheet constraint. They found a positive effect of firms’ cash 
flow on their investment in the US and Netherlands respectively, with this effect greater in 
low dividend payout firms. This confirms that the greater the financial constraint of firms 
(low dividend payout firms), the greater the dependence of their investment on their internal 
finance and thus the stronger the effect of monetary policy on the firm balance sheet channel. 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use GMM analysis and found a higher positive effect of 
cash flow on investment in small and low dividend payout firms than large and high dividend 
ones. This result confirms that the higher the financial constraint of firms (small firms and 
low dividend payout firms), the higher the sensitivity of their investment to cash flow, and 
thus the stronger the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance sheet channel. A similar 
result is also reported by Agca and Mozumdar (2008) in their study of the US. Angelopoulou 
and Gibson (2007) apply the GMM technique and found a positive effect of cash flow on firm 
investment and that this effect is stronger in small, high leverage and low dividend payout 
firms. However, a result contradictory to the theoretical prediction is found by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), who report that US firms’ investment to cash flow sensitivity is greater in 
less financially constrained firms (high dividend firms) than in more financially constrained 
ones. In studies of developing countries, Agung (1999) uses the GMM technique and shows 
that the cash flow of small, high leverage and low dividend payout firms has a greater effect 
on their investment. This result shows that the higher the financial constraint of firms, the 
higher the investment to cash flow sensitivity. Hence, this result supports the firm balance 
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sheet channel theory, that the higher the financial constraint of firms, the stronger the effect of 
monetary policy shock on the firm balance sheet channel. The same result is also found in Ber 
et al. (2002) in their firm balance sheet channel study of Israel. 
 
To sum up, the numerous empirical studies of the firm balance sheet channel presented 
previously support the theory of the firm balance sheet channel as they found a significant 
effect of firms’ balance sheet condition (firms’ cash flow and leverage) on their investment. In 
addition, they found that the lower the financial constraint of firms (large size and dividend 
payout ratio), the lower the dependence of their investment on internal finance. Consequently, 
this condition will weaken the effect of the policy interest rate via the firm balance sheet 
channel. Also, most studies mainly focus on developed countries, leaving a gap in relation to 
the study of developing countries, especially on the effect of firms’ dividend payout ratio and 
leverage on their investment. This gap is also found in past studies of Thailand (see 
Rungsomboon, 2005). 
 
Some micro based studies of firms not only discuss the firm balance sheet channel in general, 
but also examine the effect of financial development on this channel. Gelos and Werner 
(2002) divide firms according to their size and show from both OLS and GMM results that 
investment to cash flow sensitivity decreased during the post-financial liberalization period in 
Mexico and that this sensitivity is relatively larger in small firms than large ones. Laeven 
(2003) conducted a case study of 13 developing countries (including Thailand) and indicates 
from the GMM results that the effect of cash flow or the liquidity condition of small firms on 
investment is weaker during the post-financial liberalization period. The same result is also 
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reported by Koo and Shin (2004) in their panel data studies of the impact of financial reform 
and liberalization on Korean firm level data. Therefore, these findings support the theoretical 
aspect described in chapter 2, section 2.5.1, that financial liberalization in a country, which 
involves the relaxation of financial institution and market restrictions, will increase the 
opportunities of firms to obtain additional external funding sources. This leads to less 
dependence on their internal finance (cash flow) and hence this will weaken the firm balance 
sheet channel. Love (2003) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) use the GMM technique and 
found that bank and capital market development will lead to a weaker effect of cash flow on 
firms’ investment and that this effect is greater in small firms than large ones. This result 
confirms the theoretical expectation explained in chapter 2, section 2.5.1, that financial 
development will lead to lower financial constraint of firms, leading to a greater opportunity 
for them to obtain external finance, thus weakening the firm balance sheet channel.  
 
Arbeláez and Echavarria (2002) introduce the leverage of firms as another firm balance sheet 
condition and employ OLS and GMM estimation in a study of Colombia. They conclude that 
financial sector development (financial liberalization dummy and the development of 
financial sector size and activity) will lead to a lower positive effect of firms’ cash flow and a 
lower negative effect of leverage on investment spending, hence confirming that financial 
development will weaken the firm balance sheet channel due to the greater dependence of 
firms’ investment on their external sources of funds. Harris et al. (1994) employ OLS and 
GMM estimation and their results from Indonesia confirm that the cash flow and leverage of 
firms will lead to positive and negative effects respectively on their investment spending, and 
that these effects are relatively large for small firms compared to large ones. Moreover, these 
effects during the financial liberalization period are weaker than in the pre-liberalization 
  
189 
 
period. This result supports the idea that financial liberalization will lead to less dependence 
of firms on their internal finance and hence can weaken the effect of monetary policy shock 
on the firm balance sheet channel.  
 
However, some papers do not find significant evidence to support the fact that financial 
development can reduce firms' financial constraint and weaken the firm balance sheet 
channel. Hermes and Lensink (1996) apply the GMM technique in Chile and show that the 
effect of cash flow on firm investment does not represent a significant change between pre- 
and post- reform periods in both small and large firm groups. Jaramillo et al. (1993) argue that 
there is no difference in the effect of the financial condition on investment in the pre- and 
post- liberalization period in Ecuadorian firms. They explain that this unexpected outcome is 
possibly due to the short period of observation. Bhaduri (2005) also found that the investment 
to cash flow and investment to leverage sensitivity is higher after the financial liberalization 
period. He explains that this conflicting result is possibly due to the unsuccessful government 
financial reform plan related to resource allocation in the country. 
 
Most empirical studies of the effect of financial development on the firm balance sheet 
channel have found that financial development will lead to less dependence of firms’ 
investment on their balance sheet condition (a lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
and to leverage). This effect is mainly evident in the more constrained firms (small and low 
dividend payout ones). Therefore, financial development can help the financially constrained 
firms to have more opportunities to obtain additional external funding and thus lead to less 
dependence of these firms on their internal funds.  
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Moreover, we can see that past empirical studies have focused on the firm balance sheet 
channel; however, few have examined the effect of financial development on the firm balance 
sheet channel. Most studies also only focus on the effect of financial liberalization on the firm 
balance sheet channel, ignoring the other effects of financial development (banking and 
capital market development, financial innovation and financial competition). Therefore, our 
study will fill this gap by not only examining the firm balance sheet channel but also the 
effect of different aspects of financial development on it.   
 
5.3 Data and methodology 
 
This section is divided into three parts: (1) model specification, (2) data and (3) methodology. 
5.3.1 Data description 
 
The sample data in this study include a total of 361 non-financial firms excluding financial 
companies (banks, finance and securities companies, and insurance companies) as well as 
companies which are under rehabilitation. The sample comprises unbalanced panel data in 
order to prevent the survival bias problem (Rungsomboon, 2005; Butzen et al., 2001; Prasad 
and Ghosh, 2005). Consolidated data26 are used as the firms’ balance sheet data in order to 
capture their branch and subsidiary information (Bond et al., 1997). Firm data are obtained 
from the PACAP database for Thailand from the period 1978 to 1996, and from the financial 
statements of non-financial companies listed on the SET (Stock Exchange of Thailand) for the 
period 1997 to 2008. 
                                                          
26
 If there are no consolidated data available, the unconsolidated data are applied instead. 
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We apply the same financial development indicators previously used in chapter 4. These 
comprise:  
(1) Banking sector development indicators. These include the size measure (the ratio of 
depository bank assets to total financial assets, FD1) and the activity measure (the 
private credit by depository banks to GDP ratio, FD2). 
(2) The financial concentration indicator (the three largest banks’ assets to total bank 
assets, FD3).  
(3) Capital market development indicators. These include the size measure (stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio, FD4) and the activity measure (stock market total value 
traded to GDP ratio, FD5). 
(4)  The bond market development indicator (the ratio of private domestic debt securities 
issued by financial institutions and corporations to GDP). This measurement also 
represents financial innovation.  
(5)  The financial liberalization indicator (dummy covering the period from 1990 to 
1995). 
 
The listed of all variables used in this study is listed in table 5.1. The summary statistics of the 
variables applied in the model are also presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3. These statistics are 
shown in both the full sample presented in table 5.2 and the sample divided according to the 
firms’ financial constraint presented in table 5.3 (small/large firms and low dividend payout/ 
high dividend payout firms). 
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Table5.1: List of all variables used in this study illustrated by type of variable, name of variable, symbol of variable, definition of variable and source 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of variable Variable Symbol Definition Source 
Balance sheet Loan to capital ratio 
     
I/K
 
The ratio of firms’ investment (I) to the cost of capital (K) PACAP database and SET bank balance sheet  
 Sale to capital ratio 
 
 S/K 
 
The first difference of the ratio of firms’ total net sale (S) to the cost of capital (K) PACAP database and SET bank balance sheet 
 Cash flow to capital 
ratio 
C/K
 
The ratio of firms’ cash flow (C) to the cost of capital (K) PACAP database and SET bank balance sheet 
     
 Total borrowing to 
capital ratio  
D/K
 
The ratio of firms’ debt (D) to capital ratio (K) PACAP database and SET bank balance sheet 
  D1988 Dummy which captures the substantial economic expansion in 1988 which equals 1 in 
1988 and 0 otherwise 
Author's own calculation 
 Dummy variables D1997 Dummy which captures the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997 which equals 1 in 1997 
and 0 otherwise 
Author's own calculation 
  D2003  Dummy which captures the economic recovery period. This takes the value 1 in 2003 
and 0 otherwise. 
Author's own calculation 
Financial development 
indicators 
Banking size 
development 
FD1 Deposit money banks’ assets to total financial assets  Beck et al. (1999) 
     
 Banking activity 
development 
FD2 The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP  Beck et al. (1999) 
 Banking concentration FD3 The ratio of three largest bank assets to total assets  Beck et al. (1999) and SETdatabase  
 Capital market size 
development 
FD4 The ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP Beck et al. (1999) 
 Capital market 
activity 
development 
FD5 The ratio of stock market value traded to GDP  Beck et al. (1999) 
Bond market 
development 
Bond market size 
development/ 
financial innovation 
FD6 The ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations to GDP  
Beck et al. (1999) and Bank of Thailand 
website 
Financial liberalization Financial liberalization  FD7 Liberalization dummy which equals 1 from year 1990 to 2005 and 0 otherwise Author’s own calculation 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of all variables from 1978 to 2008 (total sample, N=361) 
  
Note:  all of the value presented in table 5.2 is the average value of the variables 
 
Table5.3: Summary statistics of all variables from 1978 to 2008 (sub-sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
Time period/ Variable I/K  S/K C/K D/K 
   
FD1 
 
FD2 
 
FD3 
 
FD4 
 
FD5 
 
FD6 
 
FD7 
 
1978-2008 0.24901 0.11258 0.26117 1.37310 
 
0.94698 
 
0.84004 
 
0.57419 
 
0.35849 
 
0.27109 
 
0.18751 
 
0.19354 
 
 
1978-1983 0.24355 0.05182 0.15746 1.47411 
 
0.86187 
 
0.40731 
 
0.66084 
 
0.04044 
 
0.02953 
 
0.04761 
 
0 
 
 
1984-1989 0.42229 0.11470 0.17795 1.26052 
 
0.92203 
 
0.56527 
 
0.60265 
 
0.09577 
 
0.06998 
 
0.05671 
 
0 
 
 
1990-1995 0.47219 0.17590 0.29303 0.69365 
 
0.98709 
 
0.97000 
 
0.57108 
 
0.58324 
 
0.46847 
 
0.88740 
 
1 
 
 
1996-2001 0.23501 0.03383 0.19101 1.86289 
 
0.97847 
 
1.36449 
 
0.54925 
 
0.39571 
 
0.23941 
 
0.22225 
 
0 
 
 
2002-2008 0.26699 0.17561 0.32942 1.67850 
 
0.98014 
 
1.03817 
 
0.49959 
 
0.63174 
 
0.50850 
 
0.38196 
 
0 
 
Variable Obs Large firms 
 
Obs Small firms
 
 
Obs 
High dividend 
payout firms 
 
Obs 
low dividend 
payout firms 
 
I/K 74 0.2513 
 
287 0.2499 
 
118 0.2564 
 
243 0.2497  
ΔS/K 74 0.1080 
 
287 0.0929 
 
118 
 
0.1379 
 
243 0.0966  
 
C/K 74 0.2715 
 
287 0.2282 
 
118 0.2929 
 
243 0.2435 
 
 
D/K 74 1.1525 
 
287 1.5347 
 
118 1.0071 
 
243 1.6767 
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The summary statistics in table 5.2 show that the average of the data used in the model 
presents some important changes during the period from 1978 to 2008. From 1984 to 1995, 
there was an increase in the investment ratio, sale to capital ratio, and cash flow to capital 
ratio of firms, and other financial development indicators from 1978. This was mainly caused 
by a rapid expansion in production and investment in the country in 1988, which saw the 
highest increase in the Thai economic growth rate, as previously explained in chapter 3 (the 
GDP growth rate reached its peak in 1988 at 13.28 %) (BOT, 1988). During this year, there 
was also the introduction of a new type of securities and a significant expansion of new bank 
branches in regional areas, which led to a rise in the financial development indicators. The 
firms’ balance sheet variables (investment, sales and cash flow to capital ratio) and financial 
development indicators show a reduction again from 1996 to 2001, mainly due to the effect of 
the financial crisis during 1997 and 1998, which caused sluggish conditions in both the 
financial and investment markets. There was an increase in the financial constraint of firms, 
shown by a steady increase in their leverage ratio in this period compared with the previous 
one. After this period, investment, cash flow, the sales to capital ratio, as well as the financial 
development indicators, show a gradual increase. This was a result of the economic recovery 
from 2003, especially in the manufacturing and construction sectors, which was due to the 
financial and industrial restructuring plan and many policies for the recovery of the economy, 
as explained in chapter 3 (BOT, 2003).  
 
The sample, which is divided according to firms’ balance sheet constraint, is shown in table 
5.3. We can see that small firms and low dividend payout ones have a relatively low value of 
investment ratio, sales ratio, and cash flow ratio, as well as a relatively large value of 
leverage, compared with large and low dividend payout firms. This condition also supports 
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our theoretical view that firms with high financial constraint (small firms and low dividend 
payout firms) will present a weak balance sheet condition and a higher agency cost and 
default risk possibility than those with low constraint.  
 
5.3.2 Model specification 
 
The model specification considered in this study can be grouped into two parts: (1) the 
baseline model and (2) the model of the effect of financial sector development on the firm 
balance sheet channel.  
(1) Baseline Model  
We described previously in the literature review section that we can study the broad credit 
channel of firms by examining the effect of their balance sheet condition on their investment 
spending. Many previous empirical papers use the Tobin q model of investment to study the 
effect of firm balance sheet condition on investment (Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; 
Hoshi et al., 1991; Fazzari et al., 1987, Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; Blundell et al., 1992; 
Agca and Mozumdar, 2008; Koo and Shin, 2004). However, there are some problems in using 
the Tobin q model for investment. This is because the marginal q, which is the correct value 
used in the Tobin q model, is very difficult to measure in practice and thus the average q (the 
ratio of firms’ market value to replacement of capital) is used instead. Using average q creates 
a measurement problem, as it is only the correct measurement for marginal q when there is 
perfect competition in the product market of firms, fixed capital homogeneity, and a non-
relationship between firms’ financial structure and investment decisions (Hayashi, 1982; 
Chirinko, 1997; Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; Agca and Mozumdar, 2008; Hubbard, 
1998). These assumptions are quite strong and thus average q will not be a suitable proxy for 
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marginal q. Moreover, when the capital market is inefficient (volatility in stock prices), firms’ 
fundamental value is not represented by the stock prices and this therefore causes a wrong 
measurement of Tobin q (Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; Bhaduri, 2005). Due to the 
inaccuracy of measuring the q value in the Tobin q model, the Euler equation for investment 
has been used in past papers (Agung, 1999; Love, 2003; Leaven, 2003; Harrison et al., 2002; 
Bond and Meghir, 1994; Héricourt and Poncet, 2007). Nevertheless, some arguments have 
been raised over a misspecification problem of this equation. Oliner et al. (1995) study the 
performance of the Euler equation by estimating the Euler equation model compared with 
other traditional models (q model and accelerator model). They conclude that the Euler 
equation is missspecified as a result of an inability to forecast investment spending, as well as 
a poor forecast performance compared with other models. This misspecification problem of 
the Euler model is also stated in other literature (Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung et al., 2002). 
Therefore, the sale accelerator model is suggested by other papers for the study of the 
investment model and balance sheet channel of firms to circumvent the problems found in 
both the Tobin q model and Euler equation (Agung et al., 2002; Rungsomboon, 2005; Harris 
et al., 1994; Bhaduri, 2005; Arbela ez and Echavarria, 2002). In addition, the empirical 
forecast performance study by Oliner et al. (1995) supports the notion that this model has a 
better performance than the previous two models27. For the above reasons, the sales 
accelerator model will be used in this study. Our model specification is based on the model 
specification in Agung et al. (2002b), Bhaduri (2005) and Arbeláez and Echavarria (2002). 
The model is presented as follows28: 
                                                          
27
 The mean square error of the sales accelerator model is lower compared with the q model and Euler equation 
(Oliner et al. 1995). 
28
 As suggested by Agung (1999) and Agung et al. (2002b), we apply the second to third lags of the exogenous 
variable (ΔS/K, C/K, and B/K) as well as the lag dependence variable as the instrumental variable. 
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           (5.1) 
where  i is the number of individual firms (1,2,3,…N) 
 t is the time period (1,2,3,…T) 
 i  is the individual firms’ specific effect 
 
K
I
 is the firms’ investment to capital ratio, which is the ratio of firms’ investment (I) 
and the capital stock (K). According to Rungsomboon (2005), Agung (1999), Agung et al. 
(2002b), Bhaduri (2005) and Van Ees and Garretsen (1994), investment (I) is calculated by 
the formula below: 
tttt DEPKKI  1  
where K is the capital stock (fixed assets: property, plant and equipment) and DEP is the 
depreciation.  
 
K
S
 is the change in firms’ total net sales to capital ratio. 
 
K
C
 is the firms’ cash flow to capital ratio. The firm cash flow is the combination of the 
firms’ after tax profit and depreciation (Agung et al., 2002b; Gallego and Loayza, 2000; 
Angelopoulou and Gibson, 2007; Butzen et al., 2001; Kalckreuth, 2001; Chatelain and 
Tiomo, 2001).  
 
K
D
 is the firms’ debt to capital ratio.  
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 td  is the dummy variable which presents the particular events that effect the firms’ 
investment (already described in section 5.4.1): 
d1988 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in year 1988 and 0 
otherwise.  This dummy is used to control for the rapid expansion in the economy which has 
an effect on the firms’ investment. 
d1997 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in year 1997 and 0 
otherwise. This dummy is applied to control for the financial crisis in Thailand, which caused 
sluggish conditions in both the financial and investment markets and impacted on the 
investment of firms. 
d2003 is the dummy variable which has a value equal to 1 in year 2003 and 0 
otherwise. This dummy reflects the economic recovery period, especially in the 
manufacturing sector and construction, which led to an improvement in firm performance and 
investment.  
ti ,  is the error term. 
In equation 5.5, the coefficient of the lag variable of (
K
I
) is expected to be positive   ( 1 ˃ 0). 
This is because the lag level of the endogenous variable should move in a similar way to the 
endogenous variable (Agung et al., 2002b; Butzen et al., 2001; Kalckreuth, 2001; Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1996a). The coefficient of the change in the net sales to capital ratio (
K
S
) is 
added to the model to represent the accelerator effect in the sales accelerator-type model of 
investment function (Bhaduri, 2005; Agung et al., 2002b; Ber et al., 2002). This variable is 
also expected to have a positive sign ( 2 ˃ 0); this is because higher output or sales by firms 
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will directly lead to an increase in their investment spending (Agung, 1999; Ber et al., 2002; 
Arbeláez and Echavarria, 2002; Bond et al., 1997). The ratio of cash flow to capital stock        
(
K
C
) is used to represent the firm balance sheet condition as it presents the liquidity of firms 
(Rungsomboon, 2005). We stated previously in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 that a higher cash 
flow of firms will lead to more internal funding and thus increase investment spending. 
Therefore, the coefficient of this variable is expected to have a positive sign ( 3 ˃ 0). For the 
ratio of firms’ debt and capital stock (
K
D
), this is applied to represent the firm balance sheet 
condition and it also presents the leverage of firms (Agung et al., 2002b; Harris et al., 1994; 
Arellano et al., 2009; Guariglia, 1999; Agung, 1999; Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001). We already 
discussed in the literature review in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 that a higher leverage ratio of 
firms will show a higher financial constraint and thus lower the level of investment. This is 
because a rise in firms’ leverage will increase the agency cost and the moral hazard problem 
and thus lead to a higher external finance premium for firms. Therefore, this situation causes a 
decrease in firm investment and as a result the coefficient of this variable is expected to have 
a negative sign ( 4 < 0).       
     
For the dummy variables, it is expected that the coefficient of d1988 and d2003 will have a 
positive effect on the investment ratio ( 5 ˃ 0).  This is because these dummy variables 
represent the rapid expansion in the economy and the economic recovery in the manufacturing 
sector, which are the factors that support the increase in firms’ investment ratio. However, the 
d1997 dummy, which captures the effect of the financial crisis, is expected to have a negative 
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effect on firms’ investment and thus the coefficient of this dummy should have a negative 
sign ( 5 < 0).      
 
In addition, the theoretical and empirical literatures described in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 show 
that there are other factors which determine firms’ financial constraint and have an effect on 
the firm balance sheet channel (firm size and dividend payout ratio). Therefore, this paper will 
also study the effect of these firms’ financial constraint on the firm balance sheet channel. 
This is achieved by dividing the firms into different sub-samples according to their size (small 
and large firms) and dividend payout ratio (low and high dividend payout firms). Following 
the studies by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Agung (1999), Agung et al. (2002b) and 
Rungsomboon (2005), we use the total assets of firms as the criterion to divide them into 
small firms which have total assets below the mean and large firms which have total assets 
above the mean value. This technique also applies when the firms are divided by low and high 
dividend payout ratio. We already described in the theoretical and empirical discussion in 
sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 that the higher the financial constraint of firms (small firms and low 
dividend payout firms), the higher the dependence of their investment on their financial 
condition (firms’ cash flow and leverage) and hence the firm balance sheet channel will 
become weaker. Therefore, we expect the coefficient of 
K
C
 and 
K
D
 in equation 5.5 to be 
larger in the case of the more constrained firms (small and low dividend ones) than the less 
constrained ones (large and high dividend firms). 
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(2) Model of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel 
Financial development is an important factor which also has an effect on the firm balance 
sheet channel and therefore it is important to study its effect on this channel. To study the 
effect of financial development, we add the interaction term between the firms' balance sheet 
condition (
K
C
and
K
D
) and the financial development indicators, as presented by Leaven 
(2003), Gelos and Werner (2002), Koo and Shin (2004), Arbeláex and Echavarria (2002), 
Harrison et al. (2002) and Bhaduri (2005).  The estimation model for the effect of financial 
development on the firm balance sheet channel is shown below:  
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where  FD
K
C






 is the interaction term between firms’ cash flow to capital ratio and 
financial development indicators. 
 FD
K
D






 is the interaction term between firms’ total debt to capital ratio and 
financial development indicators. 
 
For the interaction term variables, different financial sector development indicators are 
applied to each interaction term and the model in equation 5.2 has to be estimated separately 
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regarding each different financial development indicator. The details of the indicators used in 
this study are presented below. 
 
FD1 is the depository banks’ assets to total financial assets (depository banks’ assets/total 
financial assets). We already discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5.1 and chapter 4, section 4.3.2, 
that an increase in this indicator will show an increase in bank size, a significant role of banks 
among borrowers and firms and a higher degree of financial intermediation. A rise in financial 
intermediation will lead to an improvement in financial market liquidity, an increase in the 
opportunities for external funding, and a decrease in financial costs. Therefore, more 
development in the banking sector will lead to a greater opportunity for firms to obtain bank 
loans as well as a lowering of their external funding cost. Thus, this condition will reduce the 
external finance premium of firms as well as decrease their dependence on internal funds. 
Consequently, this condition will weaken the firm balance sheet channel. For this reason, the 
coefficients of 1FD
K
C






 and 1FD
K
D






 are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0). This is because the higher the level of FD1, the lower the 
dependence of firms' investment on their internal finance (cash flow) and also the lower their 
external funding cost and agency cost, thus raising the debt finance of firms for investment 
(leverage) and weakening the firm balance sheet channel.  
 
FD2 is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP, which represents the 
activity of banking sector development. We already presented in chapter 4 that this 
indicator shows the activities provided to customers by financial intermediaries (banking 
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services provided to customers). Consequently, an increase in this indicator will show the 
development of the banking sector in terms of a rise in banking activities as well as the 
loans and services provided to customers. This development results in a greater opportunity 
for firms to obtain bank loans as well as a lowering of their external funding cost.  Thus, 
this condition will decrease the dependence of firms on internal funds (cash flow). 
Therefore, the coefficients of 2FD
K
C






 and 2FD
K
D






 are expected to be negative and 
positive respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0). This is because the higher the level of FD2, the 
lower the dependence of firms' investment on their internal finance and the lower their 
financial cost, thus the weaker the firm balance sheet channel. 
 
FD3 is the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total bank assets. This indicator shows the 
financial concentration in the banking sector and is widely applied in several papers to 
represent financial competition (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2009; Beck et al., 1999; Li, 2009). A more concentrated market can be presented as a higher 
proportion of large banks in the market, thus resulting in more monopoly power in the market. 
This leads to a difficulty for other banks to access borrowers’ information and other sources 
of funding. For other smaller banks, this condition will possibly mean they need to charge a 
higher risk premium, thus increasing the external finance premium faced by firms and 
strengthening the firm balance sheet channel. As a result, firms will have difficulties in 
obtaining external sources of funds and will depend more on their internal sources. Therefore, 
the coefficients of 3FD
K
C






 and 3FD
K
D






 are expected to be positive and negative 
respectively ( 5 ˃ 0 and 6  < 0). This is because an increase in this indicator can cause a 
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higher dependence of firms’ investment on their internal funding source (cash flow) and also  
higher external financing costs, which increases the effect of firms’ leverage on investment. 
This effect can therefore strengthen the firm balance sheet channel.   
 
FD4 is the stock market capitalization to GDP ratio (listed share value to GDP ratio). This 
indicator is used by several papers to show capital market development, especially size 
development and financial depth (Love, 2003; Harrison et al., 2002; Beck et al., 2008; Gallego 
and Loayza, 2000; Islam and Mozumdar, 2002). We discussed previously in chapters 2 (section 
2.5.1) and 4 (section 4.3.2) that development in the capital market will lead to the higher 
possibility of firms to obtain external funding sources and less dependence on internal funding 
(cash flow). This also results in lower external funding cost and agency cost of firms, thus 
increasing their opportunity to increase the debt for their investments.  Therefore, this indicator 
will weaken the effect of the policy interest rate through the firm balance sheet channel and thus 
the coefficients of 4FD
K
C






 and 4FD
K
D






 are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0).  
 
FD5 is the ratio of stock market total value traded to GDP and is used to represent the activity 
measure of capital market development. We discussed previously in chapter 4 that a rise in this 
indicator represents an increase in activities and liquidity in the capital market. An increase in 
this indicator leads to a rise in financial market liquidity and activities, hence resulting in 
greater opportunities for firms to obtain other funding sources and less dependence on internal 
funding (cash flow). Thus, firms also reduce their external financing cost and have an 
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opportunity to issue more debt to support their investment. An increase in this indicator will 
weaken the effect of the policy interest rate through the firm balance sheet channel. Thus, the 
coefficients of 5FD
K
C






 and 5FD
K
D






 are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0). 
 
FD6 is the ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations to GDP. We already discussed in chapter 4 that this indicator is applied to 
represent bond market development, and particularly to show development in the size of the 
bond market and financial depth. Also, we already explained in chapter 2, (section 2.4.3), that 
the development of equity and the bond market will represent financial deepening and thus 
lead to less dependence of firms on the financial institutional sector and its internal finance 
(cash flow), as well as a lowering of the external funding cost of firms. Thus, an increase in 
this indicator, which shows an increase in the size of the bond market, will weaken the effect 
of the policy interest rate on the firm balance sheet channel.  The coefficients of 6FD
K
C






 
and 6FD
K
D






 are expected to be negative and positive respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0). 
 
In addition, according to Singh et al. (2008), this indicator also shows financial innovation 
in the economy. We already described in chapter 2 (section 2.4.4) that financial innovation 
leads to the development of new financial instruments (CDs, MBS and other derivative 
instruments), giving firms greater opportunity to obtain external funding sources and to be 
less dependent on their internal finance (cash flow). This higher liquidity of firms leads to a 
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weaker effect of the policy rate on their net worth and investment, thus the weaker the 
effect of monetary policy on the firm balance sheet channel. Financial innovation also 
involves the development of new financial instruments and techniques, such as 
securitization techniques, which reduce liquidity and credit risk and the external funding 
cost of firms. Hence, this encourages firms to use debt finance for their investments. In 
light of this explanation, the coefficients 6FD
K
C






 and 6FD
K
D






  should have 
negative and positive signs respectively ( 5 < 0 and 6  ˃ 0).  
 
FD7 is the dummy variable from 1990 to 1995, where the value of 1 is seen in years 1990 to 
1995 and is 0 otherwise. We explained in chapter 3 that the financial liberalization period in 
Thailand began in 1990, and is mainly evidenced by domestic interest rate liberalization (the 
abandonment of the time and saving deposit interest rate ceiling) and relaxation of the foreign 
exchange rate control. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) point out that financial sector liberalization will lead to a decrease in the external 
funding cost of firms, causing a reduction in the asymmetric information problem and firms’ 
external finance premium. This condition will therefore lower the financial constraint of firms 
and reduce the dependence of their investment on internal funds (cash flow), thereby lowering 
the effect of monetary policy on the balance sheet channel (Galindo et al., 2007; Kohsaka and 
Enya, 2007; Arbeláez and Echavarria, 2002). Nevertheless, some studies argue that financial 
liberalization can lead to a strengthening of the firm balance sheet channel, as some financial 
deregulation policies, such as interest rate abolition and capital account liberalization, may 
encourage firms to invest in risky investment projects as well as increasing the credit risk. 
This leads to a high financial premium charged by banks to prevent the moral hazard and 
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adverse selection problem, hence lowering the opportunity for firms to obtain external 
funding sources. This condition causes a higher sensitivity of firms’ investment to their 
internal finance and more cost of debt finance, thus strengthening the firm balance sheet 
channel (Simatele, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Therefore, the coefficients 
of 7FD
K
C






 and 7FD
K
D






 may have either a positive or negative sign    ( 65 , < 0 or 
65 , ˃ 0). 
 
There are other factors which determine firms’ financial constraint and have an effect on the 
firm balance sheet channel (size and dividend payout ratio). Therefore, we will follow the 
technique of Bhaduri (2005), Harris et al. (1994) and Gelos and Werner (2002), who study 
this effect by dividing firms into different sub-samples depending on their financial 
constraint. In this case, we expect that financial development will have a greater effect on the 
more constrained firms (small firms and low dividend payout ones) than the less constrained 
ones (large firms and high dividend payout ones). This is due to the greater dependence of 
investment on the balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) of the more constrained 
firms, and therefore financial development will also affect these firms more (Bhaduri, 2005; 
Love, 2003; Leaven, 2003; Arbeláex and Echavarria, 2002; Islam and Mozumdar, 2007; 
Gelos and Werner, 2002). Moreover, the less financially constrained firms already have 
greater opportunities to obtain external funding sources (easy access to the capital market and 
bank loans) than the more constrained ones, which depend mostly on their internal funds. 
Therefore, the effect of financial development will have a greater effect on the more 
constrained firms, which have relatively difficult access to external sources of funds (Gelos 
and Werner, 2002; Leaven, 2003; Arbela ex and Echavarria, 2002; Bhaduri, 2005). 
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Therefore, the coefficients of
K
C
,
K
D
 , FD
K
C






 and FD
K
D






are expected to be higher in 
the more constrained firms.  
 
Table 5.4 below shows the expected signs of the variables in our model specification from 
equations 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Table 5.4: Summary of the expected signs for the model estimation where the (+) sign indicates the positive effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, while the (-) sign shows the negative effect 
Dependence/ 
independence 
variable 
 
      I/K
 
  
     
 
C/K
 
 
D/K
 
 
(C/K)*FD1 
 
(D/K)*FD1 
 
(C/K)*FD2 
 
(D/K)*FD2 
 
(C/K)*FD3 
 
(D/K)*FD3 
I/K
 
+ + + -              - + - + + - 
 
 
Dependence/ 
independence 
variable 
 
(C/K)*FD4 
 
(D/K)*FD4 
 
(C/K)*FD5 
 
(D/K)*FD5 
 
(C/K)*FD6 
 
(D/K)*FD6 
 
(C/K)*FD7 
 
(D/K)*FD7 
I/K
 
- + - + - + +/- +/- 
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5.3.3 Methodology  
 
We already mentioned in section 5.2.3 that many papers have applied the dynamic panel data 
technique (GMM estimation) in their model (Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002b; Kalckreuth, 
2001; Love, 2003; Chatelain and Tiomo, 2001; Valderrama, 2001; Chatelain et al, 2003b; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; Harris et al., 1994; Gelos and Werner, 2002; Bond et al., 1997; Aga and 
Mozumdar, 2008). Chatelain and Tiomo (2001), Agung (1999) and Harris et al. (1994) state 
that there is the possibility of correlation between dependence, lagged dependence and 
independence variables in the investment model, and correlation between the independence 
and the error terms. Thus, this leads to the problem of endogeneity in the model. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, section, 4.3.3, the OLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent due to the 
endogeneity problem caused by the correlation between the lagged dependence variable and 
the error terms in the model (Lünnemann and Mathä, 2001; Baltagi, 2008). In addition, when 
using fixed effects by applying the within transformation for the elimination of the firm-
specific effect, there is still bias as there is a correlation between the transformed lag 
dependence variable and the transformed disturbance term (as explained in chapter 4, section 
4.3.3, equation 4.4). Baltagi (2008) points out that this bias in the fixed effect estimation can 
be reduced when the time period (T) is larger than the observation number (N). However, the 
number of observations in the sample considered in this chapter is greater than the time period 
(N = 410 and T = 31), thus this bias will still be found when applying the fixed effect 
estimation.  As shown in chapter 4, when using 2SLS estimation to solve the endogeneity 
problem by adding the instrumental variables in the model, there are still some drawbacks as 
this method continues to show inefficient parameter estimation. This is due to the lack of 
further available moment conditions (Baltagi, 2008). 
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Therefore, the first difference GMM estimation by Arellano and Bond (1991) is considered as 
the suitable method in this study as the additional moment conditions in the first differenced 
equations are brought into this technique to improve model efficiency. This technique uses the 
first differenced equation for the elimination of firm specific effects and uses the lag value of 
variables as the instruments to solve the endogenity problem (Bond et al., 1997; Agung, 1999; 
Gaiotti and Generale, 2001). Furthermore, Mileva (2007) and Roodman (2006) point out that 
this technique is suitable for a panel with large N and small T, which is similar to our panel 
sample. The detail and function forms which describe the first difference GMM estimation are 
already stated in chapter 4, section 4.3.3. In this case, the two-step first difference GMM 
estimator is used in our studies as this technique produces a higher efficient standard error 
estimator compared with one-step estimation (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2006; Gelos and 
Werner, 2002; Agung, 1999). Many papers which analyse the firm balance sheet channel by 
studying the investment equation of firms also widely apply this technique (Butzen et al., 
2001; Kalckreuth, 2001; Valderrama, 2001; Chatelain et al., 2002, 2003b; Rungsomboon, 
2005; Valverde and Del Paso, 2009; Gelos and Werner, 2002). Nevertheless, the two-step 
estimation also has some problems as there is a relatively large asymptotic t-ratio caused by 
relatively small asymptotic standard errors (Bond, 2002; Çavuşoğlu, 2002; Benkovskis, 
2008). Therefore, we follow the technique suggested by Rungsomboon (2005) by using 
 indmeijer’s (2000) technique of the two-step covariance matrix’s finite sample correction in 
order to create robust standard errors. 
 
Nevertheless, the first-difference GMM estimation may have instrument bias or a weak 
instrument for the level variables, thus causing finite sample bias and a poor precision 
problem (Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999; Bond, 
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2002). Therefore, the system GMM estimator is applied by Blundell and Bond (1995, 1998) 
to solve the above problem. This is because this technique introduces the additional moments 
by using two kinds of instruments: (1) the lagged of dependence variable in the first 
differenced equation and (2) the lagged first difference of the dependence variable in the level 
equation. This technique therefore causes a reduction in the finite sample bias seen in the first 
differenced equation and increases the precision of the parameter estimation (Baltagi, 2008; 
Rungsomboon, 2005; Agung, 1999; Bond, 2002; Blundell and Bond, 1995, 1998). The detail 
and function form of the system-GMM estimation is already explained in chapter 4, section 
4.3.3. Therefore, this study also uses two-step system GMM estimation in order to check for 
the robustness of our results, besides two-step first differenced GMM estimation. 
 
5.4 Empirical results 
 
5.4.1 Panel data unit root test 
 
Baltagi (2008) states that a large time series used in panels will probably generate 
nonstationarity.  Due to the large T panel data set (T= 31 from 1978-2008), it is important to 
first check for the non-stationary property of our data by performing the panel data unit root 
tests.  Due to the unbalanced panel data used in this study, the Im-Pesaran-Shin and Fisher-
type tests have to be used to perform the panel data unit root test for the unbalanced panel data 
set (Stata, 2011). The model specifications of these tests have already been discussed in 
chapter 4, section 4.4.1.  
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The results from all the test statistics from both the Im-Pesaran-Shin29 and Fisher-type tests 
show the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit root in the panel data series. This confirms 
that our panel data series has a stationary property. The demeaning procedure introduced by 
Levin et al. (2002) is also applied to control for possible cross sectional dependence in the data 
and still confirms the stationary property of the series.  
 
The result of the panel data unit root test is presented in Appendix A, table A5.1 (total sample 
result) and table A5.2 (sub-sample result). 
 
5.4.2 Empirical results of the baseline model  
 
Table 5.5 shows the results from the first difference GMM estimation of the baseline model 
explained in section 5.3.2. For the total sample result (column 1), all variables in the equation 
show the significant and expected sign. The coefficient of the lag of investment to capital ratio 
presents a significant positive sign, which is supported by the theoretical expectation described 
previously (Agung et al., 2002b; Kalckreuth, 2001; Oliner and Rudebush, 1996a). The 
coefficient of sales to capital ratio of firms also shows a positive sign, which is in line with our 
expectation that the higher the sales of firms, the greater their investment spending. This result 
is also in line with other empirical studies (Gaiotti and Generale, 2001; Chatlain and Tiomo, 
2001; Hall et al., 1998; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Héricourt and Poncet, 2007; Hermes and 
Lensink, 1996; Leaven, 2003). The firm balance sheet variables (cash flow and leverage ratio) 
indicate the significant expected positive and negative effect on firms’ investment 
                                                          
29
 In the Im-Prasaran-Shin test, our result shows only the W-t-bar test, as the t-bar, t-tile-bar and z-tilde-bar tests 
cannot calculate when the number of samples is below 10. As we use the unbalanced panel data of firms, it may 
be the case that there are some firms which have fewer than 10 samples. 
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respectively. These results confirm the theoretical expectation, as higher firm liquidity (cash 
flow) shows an increase in firms’ creditworthiness, thus increasing external funding source 
possibilities and investment spending. On the other hand, higher firm leverage will show the 
risky behaviour of firms (higher agency costs and default risk), raising the external finance 
premium and lowering investment. These results are also supported by past empirical papers 
(Agung, 1999; Agung et al., 2002b; Hoshi et al, 1991; Rungsomboon, 2005; Fazzari et al., 
1987; Shin and Park, 1999; Ber et al., 2002; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a; Bond et al., 1987; 
Chirinko and Schaller, 1995).  
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Table5.5: the result for the baseline model (first difference GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. (-) is the standard error.
Dependent variable (I/K) Total sample (1) Large firms (2) Small firms (3) High dividend 
firms (4) 
Low dividend firms 
(5) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.0489*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0730*** 
(0.0192) 
0.0427*** 
(0.0089) 
0.0612* 
(0.0362) 
0.0376* 
(0.0192) 
    1t  
0.0515*** 
(0.1113) 
0.0228** 
(0.0094) 
0.0641*** 
(0.0174) 
0.0289* 
(0.0160) 
0.0113* 
(0.0058) 
C/K 1t  
0.2218* 
(0.1212) 
0.2106** 
(0.0917) 
0.3426* 
(0.1945) 
  0.1708* 
(0.1027) 
0.3413** 
(0.1439) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
0.0020 
(0.0121) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0250 
(0.0226) 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0020) 
D1988 0.3360*** 
(0.1210) 
0.2903 
(1.3588) 
0.3603*** 
(0.1073) 
0.5279 
(0.6780) 
0.2679** 
(0.1055) 
D1997 -0.2484** 
(0.1228) 
0.1219 
(0.1656) 
-0.3385*** 
(0.1199) 
-0.1158 
(0.1499) 
-0.3202* 
(0.1737) 
D2003 0.3886** 
(0.1689) 
0.1293 
(0.1797) 
0.0953** 
(0.0375) 
0.2338* 
(0.1352) 
0.2146** 
(0.1055) 
      
AR(1) -4.10*** -2.51** -1.40 -2.49** -1.67* 
AR(2) -0.91 1.50 -1.20 -0.44 -0.86 
Hansen test 415.50 315.60 438.38 301.30 282.60 
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For the sub-sample study, table 5.5 is divided into another four columns showing small and 
large firms, and high and low dividend payout firms. For the size sub-sample results (columns 
2 and 3), we find that small firms’ balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) has more 
effect on their investment, compared with large firms. The coefficient of the lagged 
investment and sales accelerator variable also indicates a significant positive sign in both 
small and large firms, supporting our theoretical expectation. For the balance sheet condition 
variables (cash flow and leverage ratio of firms), the cash flow ratio in both small and large 
firms shows a significant positive effect on their investment, with a relatively higher effect in 
small firms than in larger ones (the coefficient of the cash flow to capital ratio of small firms 
is 13% higher than that of large firms). This result explains the fact that small firms have more 
financial constraint (a lower reputation and net worth) than large ones. The summary statistic 
in table 5.3 also confirms this finding, as small firms have a relatively low level of cash flow 
and a higher leverage ratio than large firms (large firms have a 10.81% higher cash flow and a 
38.22% lower leverage ratio compared with small firms). Also, as large firms have more 
reputation and higher creditworthiness than small firms, this condition will prevent small firms 
from obtaining external funding. Therefore, small firms’ investment will depend more on their 
internal finance (cash flow). This result is also reported by extensive empirical literature for 
this sub-sample study (Agung, 1999; Kalckreuth, 2001; Shin and Park, 1999; Rungsomboon, 
2005; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a; Gaiotti and Generale, 2001; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 
1995; Wesche, 2000; Butzen et al., 2001). On the other hand, the coefficient of leverage ratio 
shows a significant negative sign in small firms, while showing an insignificant positive sign 
in large ones. This is in line with the theoretical expectation, since small firms have a lower 
reputation and net worth, and higher external funding costs. Thus, they will have a higher 
possibility of default risk than large firms. Therefore, an increase in the leverage ratio of small 
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firms will have a greater negative effect on investment spending compared with large ones. 
Our result shows that the leverage ratio of large firms has an insignificant positive effect on 
their investment. This may be the case since large firms have a greater reputation and net 
worth and a lower default risk than small ones (shown in table 5.3). This condition results in 
lower external funding costs for large firms. Therefore, these firms can raise investment 
spending even when there is a rise in the leverage ratio, resulting in a positive effect of the 
leverage ratio on the investment ratio. An insignificant result of the leverage ratio in large 
firms can be seen and supported by some empirical studies (Hermes and Lensink, 1996; 
Agung et al., 2002b; Bhaduri, 2005). This result explains why large firms tend to face less 
impact from financial constraint (firm leverage), as not only is there a lower effect of leverage 
on their investment, but additionally this does not have a significant effect on the investment 
(Bhaduri, 2005; Agung et al., 2002b).  
 
When the sample is divided into high and low dividend ratio firms (columns 4 and 5), the 
result also supports the theoretical expectation. The coefficient of investment and sales to 
capital ratio also supports the theoretical expectation, with a significant positive sign in both 
cases. For the balance sheet condition effect, we find that the balance sheet condition of low 
dividend firms has more effect on their investment than for high dividend payout firms. The 
cash flow in both high and low dividend payout firms shows a significant positive effect on 
investment, with a relatively higher effect on firms with low dividend. This result reflects the 
theoretical predictions, since low dividend payout firms have more financial constraint than 
high dividend ones. The summary statistics in table 5.3 also confirm this result, as the high 
dividend payout firms have a 5.3% higher cash flow and 67% lower leverage ratio than low 
dividend ones. This condition in the low dividend firms prevents them from obtaining more 
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external funding and thus their investment will depend more on their internal finance. A 
similar result is also obtained by other empirical studies, such as Fazzari et al. (1987), Van Ees 
and Garretsen (1994), and Angelopoulou and Gibson (2007). On the other hand, the 
coefficient of leverage ratio shows a significant negative sign in low dividend firms, while 
showing an insignificant negative sign in high dividend payout ones. This is in line with the 
theoretical expectation, since low dividend firms have lower external funding costs and 
financial constraint than high dividend ones. Thus, they will have a high possibility of default 
risk and a higher agency cost than high dividend firms. Therefore, an increase in the leverage 
ratio of low dividend payout firms will have a greater negative effect on investment spending 
compared with large firms. The insignificance of the effect of leverage on investment of the 
high dividend firms may be the case, since high dividend payout firms have a better financial 
condition and a lower default risk than small firms (shown in table 5.3). Thus, high dividend 
firms tend to face less impact from financial constraint (firm leverage) as not only is there a 
lower effect of leverage on the investment of large firms, but additionally this effect does not 
have a significant effect on investment (Bhaduri, 2005; Agung et al., 2002b).  
 
The effects of the dummy variables are displayed in table 5.5 (columns 1-5). It is shown that 
the coefficient of dummy variable in the periods 1988 and 2003 has a positive effect on firms’ 
investment, while the coefficient of the dummy in period 1997 presents a negative effect. This 
finding is in line with expectations. However, the insignificant effect of some of these dummy 
variables can be found in the large and high dividend firms. This is probably due to the 
strengthening of the balance sheet condition of these less financially constrained firms (large  
and high dividend ones), which can offset the effect of these particular events on their balance 
sheet condition, compared with the highly financially constrained ones.  
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Furthermore, our baseline result in table 5.5 also confirms and supports the theory of the firm 
balance sheet channel, as we find a significant dependence between the firms’ financial 
condition (cash flow and leverage) on their investment. We found that the effect of financial 
condition on investment is higher in the more constrained firms (small and low dividend ones) 
compared with the less constrained ones (large and high dividend firms). The higher the 
financial constraint of firms (small and low dividend ones), the lower their creditworthiness 
and possibilities for them to obtain external funds, and the higher their dependence on internal 
finance (cash flow) for investment. Therefore, we can conclude that the firm balance sheet 
channel will become weaker in the less constrained firms. This is because when the policy 
interest rate increases, it will have an effect on the external finance premium and consequently 
on investment. This condition will lower the effect of the policy interest rate on the investment 
of these firms and hence weaken the firm balance sheet channel. 
 
The specification test of the first difference GMM estimation of the baseline model, Arellano-
Bond’s second order serial correlation (AR(2)) test and the Hansen test of the instrument 
validity show a non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrection in the equation as 
well as the validity of the instruments respectively. Therefore, these tests confirm that our 
results have no residual correlation and that the instruments used in the model are valid ones. 
 
Table 5.6 shows the result from the baseline model with the system GMM estimation in order 
to check for the robustness of our findings. The baseline result of the total sample and sub-
sample cases is similar to that shown and explained previously in table 5.5. We also confirm 
from this robustness result that the investment of the more constrained firms (small and low 
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dividend ones) has greater dependence on their internal finance than the less constrained ones 
(large and high dividend firms). The statistical result (AR(2) and Hansen test) also confirms 
that there is no residual correlation and the instruments used in the model are valid. Therefore, 
this finding shows the robustness of our results.  
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Table5.6: The result for the baseline model (system GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable (I/K) Total sample (1) Large firms (2) Small firms (3) High dividend firms 
(4) 
Low dividend firms 
(5) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.0503** 
(0.0212) 
0.0802*** 
(0.0300) 
0.0138** 
(0.0050) 
0.0162* 
(0.0089) 
0.04262** 
(0.0200) 
    1t  
0.0442*** 
(0.0143) 
0.0198** 
(0.0098) 
0.0866* 
(0.0450) 
0.0319* 
(0.0165) 
0.0323*** 
(0.0090) 
C/K 1t  
0.2342** 
(0.1083) 
-0.2977 
(0.2285) 
0.1783*** 
(0.0567) 
0.2756 
(0.9246) 
0.1168* 
(0.0617) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0147** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0028 
(0.0662) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0185 
(0.0174) 
-0.0059*** 
(0.0015) 
D1988 0.2381** 
(0.0984) 
0.0254 
(0.2233) 
0.2847*** 
(0.0445) 
0.2639** 
(0.1103) 
0.2939** 
(0.1438) 
D1997 -0.4884*** 
(0.0824) 
-0.2300 
(0.9359) 
-0.3385*** 
(0.1199) 
0.2952** 
(0.1433) 
-0.4125* 
(0.2029) 
D2003 0.3742** 
(0.1534) 
0.5310** 
(0.2059) 
0.1009*** 
(0.0336) 
0.2534 
(0.1551) 
0.2108** 
(0.1058) 
AR(1) -4.02*** -2.45** -1.30 -2.54** -1.71* 
AR(2) -0.92 1.52 -1.02 -0.08 -0.73 
Hansen test 465.28 217.23 449.80 320.38 284.16 
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5.4.3 Empirical results of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance 
sheet channel   
 
Table 5.7 shows the first difference GMM result of the total sample when including the 
different financial development indicators in the baseline model to study the effect of financial 
sector development on the firm balance sheet channel. The results from columns 1 to 7 show 
that most of the variables in the equations have a significant effect on firms’ investment. The 
lagged investment ratio and the sales accelerator variable show a significant positive sign, as 
expected. The balance sheet variable of firms (cash flow and leverage ratio) also shows a 
significant positive and negative effect on their investment respectively. These results confirm 
the theoretical expectation, as higher firm liquidity (cash flow) shows an increase in firms’ 
creditworthiness, thus increasing external funding source possibilities and investment 
spending. On the other hand, higher firm leverage will show the risky behaviour of firms 
(higher agency costs and default risk), raising the external finance premium and lowering 
investment. Furthermore, most of the dummy variables controlling for the important events 
continue to show the expected relationship with investment. The coefficient of the dummy 
variable for the period 1988 and 2003 shows an expected positive sign and for the period 1997 
shows the expected negative sign.  
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Table5.7: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (total sample) (first difference GMM estimation) 
Dependent variable (I/K) FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD7(7) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.0658* 
(0.0346) 
0.0678** 
(0.0343) 
0.0605* 
(0.0310) 
0.0605* 
(0.0311) 
0.1119* 
(0.0598) 
0.0145* 
(0.0086) 
0.0292** 
(0.0147) 
    1t  
0.0208** 
(0.0103) 
0.0370** 
(0.0185) 
0.0351*** 
(0.0113) 
0.0307** 
(0.0126) 
0.0314*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0329* 
(0.0176) 
0.0349* 
(0.0107) 
C/K 1t  
-0.0012 
(0.00086) 
0.4188*** 
(0.1269) 
0.0124 
(0.1240) 
-0.8467 
(0.6351) 
0.4894*** 
(0.1581) 
0.3892*** 
(0.0828) 
0.9052*** 
(0.1359) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0633 
(0.1136) 
-0.0048* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0067 
(0.0044) 
-0.0182** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0026 
(0.0068) 
-0.0431* 
(0.0241) 
-0.1437** 
(0.0627) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.0336** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0309*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0011** 
(0.00056) 
-0.0317*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0607*** 
(0.0214) 
-0.0679** 
(0.0274) 
0.6691*** 
(0.1917) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0411** 
(0.0189) 
0.0050* 
(0.0026) 
-0.0134* 
(0.0071) 
0.0334* 
(0.0172) 
         0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
-0.0176* 
(0.0104) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0006) 
D1988 0.4540*** 
(0.1353) 
0.40242*** 
(0.1612) 
0.3482* 
(0.2006) 
0.4042** 
(0.1836) 
0.3375* 
(0.1816) 
0.5283*** 
(0.1755) 
0.4625*** 
(0.1624) 
D1997 -0.3157** 
(0.1277) 
-0.3476*** 
(0.1224) 
-0.0684 
(0.2044) 
-0.4120*** 
(0.0589) 
-0.4322*** 
(0.0637) 
0.1702* 
(0.0940) 
-0.1628 
(0.1519) 
D2003 0.4086*** 
(0.1498) 
0.4331*** 
(0.1584) 
0.6638*** 
(0.1339) 
0.3780** 
(0.1599) 
0.2855* 
(0.1539) 
0.3622** 
(0.1737) 
0.2770** 
(0.1313) 
AR(1) -4.23*** -4.27*** -4.36*** -4.32*** -4.02*** -4.34*** -3.61*** 
AR(2) -0.33 -0.31 -0.51 0.06 0.26 -0.68 -0.92 
Hansen test 393.31 390.68 410.97 430.90 376.47 415.66 425.09 
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For the effect of the size measure of the banking sector development indicator (the depository 
bank assets to total financial assets: FD1), the result in the model (column 1) indicates a 
significant negative effect of the interaction term between the cash flow of firms and FD1        
( 1FD
K
C






) on their investment, while the interaction term between the leverage ratio and 
FD1 ( 1FD
K
D






) shows a significant positive effect. This finding is supported by other 
empirical studies of this aspect (Gallego and Loayza, 2000; Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003; 
Arbeláex and Echavarria, 2002) and also by the theoretical expectation presented previously 
in section 5.4.2. This is because banking development will show an increase in bank size, a 
significant role of banks among borrowers and firms and a higher degree of financial 
intermediation. A rise in financial intermediation will lead to an improvement in financial 
market liquidity, an increase in the opportunities for external funding, and a decrease in 
financial costs. This condition will increase the opportunity for firms to obtain bank loans and 
lower their external funding costs. This will reduce the dependence of the firms’ investment 
on their internal funds (cash flow) and also lower the external funding cost and agency cost of 
firms, raising the debt finance of firms for investment (leverage). This condition can also 
weaken the firm balance sheet channel as firms have more opportunity to obtain external 
source of funds.  
 
Similarly, the effect of the activity measure of banking development (the ratio of private credit 
by deposit money banks to GDP: FD2) shown in column 2 shows a significant negative effect 
of the interaction term 2FD
K
C






 on the investment of firms, while the interaction term 
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2FD
K
D






 shows a significant positive effect.  We have already explained that this indicator 
is used to represent the activities of financial intermediaries provided to customers. An 
increase in this indicator will show an increase in banking activities in terms of the banking 
services provided to customers. Consequently, development in the activities of the banking 
sector will increase the opportunity for firms to obtain bank loans and lower their external 
funding costs. This will reduce the dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance 
and hence weaken the firm balance sheet channel.  
 
The effect of financial concentration is shown in column 3. We find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term between the financial concentration indicator (three largest banks’ assets to 
total bank assets: FD3) and cash flow ( 3FD
K
C






) shows the expected positive sign and the 
interaction term of this indicator with the leverage ratio ( 3FD
K
D






) shows a negative sign. 
This confirms the theoretical expectation, as more concentration in the market will cause 
more monopoly power. This leads to a difficulty for other banks to access borrowers’ 
information and other sources of funding, thus leading to higher risk and external finance 
premiums faced by firms. Therefore, firms will have difficulty in accessing external sources 
of funds. This means their investments will depend more on their internal finance (cash flow) 
and less on their external funds (leverage). Also, higher external financing costs for firms will 
increase the effect of leverage on investment. This effect can therefore strengthen the firm 
balance sheet channel.   
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Regarding the effect of the capital market development indicators on both the size and activity 
measures (stock market capitalization to GDP ratio –FD4 - and the ratio of stock market total 
value traded to GDP – FD5), the results in columns 4 and 5 show a similar result, as we find a 
significant negative effect of the interaction term between firms’ cash flow and FD4 and FD5  
( 4FD
K
C






 and 5FD
K
C






) and a significant positive effect of firms’ leveragre ratio and 
FD4 and FD5 ( 4FD
K
D






 and 5FD
K
D






) on firms’ investment. This finding is in line 
with the expectation, as development in the size and activity in the capital market will lead to 
greater possibilities for firms to access external funding sources and less dependence on their 
internal finance (cash flow). This also results in lower external funding and agency costs, thus 
increasing the opportunity for firm to increase debt for their investments.  Therefore, this kind 
of development leads to a weaker effect of the financial condition on the investment of firms 
and hence weakens the firm balance sheet channel. This result is also supported by other 
empirical studies on this area (Agca and Mozumdar, 2008; Hsiao and Tahmicioglu, 1997; 
Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003; Baum et al., 2006; Galindo et al., 2007; Gallego and Loayza, 2000; 
Arbela ex and Echavarria, 2002).  
 
The result in column 6 shows the effect of bond market development and financial innovation 
on firm investment.  e find that the interaction term between firms’ cash flow and leverage 
ratio with the bond market development indicator ( 6FD
K
C






 and 6FD
K
D






) shows a 
significant negative effect on firms’ investment and also a lower negative effect on investment 
respectively (the coefficient of the  is lower compared with the coefficient of 
K
D
.) 6FD
K
D






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This result is in line with the theoretical expectation, as greater development of the equity and 
bond markets will lead to less dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance. This 
indicator also presents financial innovation, which is involved in the development of new 
financial instruments (CDs, MBS and other derivative instruments), giving firms greater 
opportunities to obtain external funding sources and to be less dependent on their internal 
finance (cash flow). Financial innovation also includes the development of new financial 
instruments and techniques (securitization techniques) which reduce liquidity and credit risk 
and the external funding cost of firms. Hence, this encourages firms to use debt finance for 
their investment. Therefore, an increase in this indicator will also lead to a higher opportunity 
for firms to obtain external funding sources and thus weakening the balance sheet channel.  
 
Column 7 shows the result of the effect of financial liberalization (FD7) on the firm balance 
sheet channel. The result indicates that the interaction term between firm cash flow and 
leverage with the financial liberalization dummy ( 7FD
K
C






 and 7FD
K
D






) has a lower 
positive and lower negative effect on firms’ investment, compared with before adding the 
financial liberalization indicator as the interaction term ( 





K
C
 and 





K
D
). This finding is 
supported by the theoretical expectation explained previously, as financial sector liberalization 
in Thailand is mainly evidenced by domestic interest rate liberalization (the abandonment of 
the time and saving deposit interest rate ceilings) and relaxation of foreign exchange rate 
control. This will lead to a decrease in the external funding cost of firms, causing a reduction 
in the asymmetric information problem and firms’ external finance premium (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998) This condition will therefore lower 
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the financial constraint of firms and reduce the dependence of their investment on internal 
funds, as well as increasing their dependence on external finance. This is shown by our 
finding, as the coefficient of 7FD
K
C






 and 7FD
K
D






obtains results in a lower positive 
and lower negative coefficient respectively. We can thereby conclude that financial 
liberalization in Thailand will lead to a weaker effect on the firm balance sheet channel as we 
find less dependence of firms’ investment on their financial condition. 
 
The robustness result is shown in table 5.8 (system GMM estimation) and we reach a similar 
conclusion to that found in the first difference GMM estimation. The consistency test in both 
talbe 5.7 and 5.8 shows that our model is well specified and hence confirms the consistency of 
our results.  
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Table5.8: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (total sample) (system GMM estimation) 
 
Dependent 
variable (I/K) 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) FD6 (6) FD(7) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.070** 
(0.0352) 
0.0790** 
(0.0346) 
0.0234** 
(0.0118) 
0.0513** 
(0.0230) 
0.0617** 
(0.0303) 
0.0178* 
(0.0103) 
0.0635** 
(0.0319) 
    1t  
0.0263** 
(0.0101) 
0.0453** 
(0.0202) 
0.0215* 
(0.0121) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0325*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0292** 
(0.0147) 
0.0318*** 
(0.0107) 
C/K 1t  
-0.0774 
(0.9506) 
0.4894*** 
(0.1581) 
0.4908 
(0.44913) 
0.4463*** 
(0.1228) 
0.5097*** 
(0.1556) 
0.6604** 
(0.2650) 
0.8760*** 
(0.1225) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0322** 
(0.0162) 
-0.0136** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0642 
(0.0625) 
-0.0131* 
(0.0071) 
0.0004 
(0.0018) 
-0.0679** 
(0.0314) 
-0.0450* 
(0.0262) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.0349* 
(0.0211) 
-0.0192* 
(0.0115) 
0.0013** 
(0.00063) 
-0.0148** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0606*** 
(0.0213) 
-0.0238** 
(0.7731) 
0.6374*** 
(0.1675) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0357** 
(0.0178) 
0.0146** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0148** 
(0.0061) 
0.0011** 
(0.0005) 
0.0334* 
(0.0172) 
0.0228* 
(0.0117) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.0012) 
D1988 0.4724*** 
        (0.1426) 
0.5860*** 
(0.1173) 
0.4129*** 
(0.1260) 
0.3924*** 
(0.1258) 
0.4970*** 
(0.1752) 
0.1370 
(0.1988) 
0.4170*** 
(0.3182) 
D1997 -0.3732*** 
(0.0532) 
-0.3497*** 
(0.1236) 
-0.1519 
(0.1596) 
-1.3264 
(0.1748) 
-0.3637*** 
(0.0673) 
-0.1545* 
(0.0911) 
-0.3936*** 
(0.0632) 
D2003 0.5751*** 
(0.2060) 
0.4749*** 
(0.1492) 
0.3819** 
(0.1547) 
0.6284*** 
(0.1343) 
0.4379*** 
(0.1408) 
0.3864** 
(0.1678) 
0.4423*** 
(0.1403) 
AR(1) -4.28*** -4.40*** -3.70*** -3.90*** -4.36*** -4.29*** -4.35*** 
AR(2) 0.01 0.05 -0.69 0.77 0.13 -0.05 0.09 
Hansen test 447.27 431.99 424.32 389.50 435.57 351.09 318.21 
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In the case of the sub-sample estimation, tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the effect of financial 
development on the firm balance sheet channel when the sample is divided according to firm 
size (table 5.9) and dividend payout ratio (table 5.10). The results from columns 1 to 7 in 
tables 5.9 and 5.10 show that most of the variables in the equations have a significant effect on 
firms’ investment. The lagged investment and the sales accelerator variables show a 
significant positive sign, as expected. We also find some negative effects of the lagged 
investment ratio on the investment ratio of firms, particularly small ones. This result is 
supported by Agung (1999) and Butzen et al. (2001). They explain that as small firms have a 
low investment to capital ratio relative to large firms, they will face difficulties in smoothing 
the investment level in the following year and thus the negative relationship between the 
lagged investment ratio and investment ratio in time t can be found in this case. The balance 
sheet variable of firms (cash flow and leverage ratio) also shows a significant effect on firms’ 
investment, supporting the theory of the firm balance sheet channel. The results in both tables 
5.9 and 5.10 show that there is higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow in small and low 
dividend firms than large and high dividend ones. This finding supports our theoretical 
prediction, as the small and low dividend payout firms have more financial constraint than 
large and high dividend ones. The summary statistic in table 5.3 also confirms this finding, as 
small and low dividend firms have a relatively low level of cash flow and a higher leverage 
ratio than large and high dividend ones. As a result, large and high dividend firms will have 
more reputation and higher creditworthiness than small and low dividend firms, and their 
investment will depend more on external funding and less on internal funds. We also find 
some insignificant effects of cash flow on their investment, especially in large and high 
dividend firms. This insignificant effect of the result explains why large and high dividend 
firms’ investment tend to face less impact from cash flow as these less financially constrained 
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firms have more ability to obtain external funding sources and depend less on their internal 
fund. Therefore, their cash flow will have a less significant effect on their investment or even 
an insignificant effect, as found in some of our results. 
 
 hen consider the effect of firms’ leverage ratio on the investment, table 5.9 shows that the 
leverage of firms shows a significant negative effect on small firms’ investment, while 
showing a positive effect on the large firms. The result in table 5.10 shows that there is a 
higher negative effect of the leverage ratio on the investment of the low dividend payout firms 
than the high dividend ones. The insignificant effect of the leverage ratio on investment is also 
found, especially in the large and high dividend firms. These results are in line with the 
theoretical expectation, since small and low dividend firms have a lower reputation and net 
worth, and higher external funding costs. Thus, they will have a higher possibility of default 
risk than large and high dividend firms. As a result, an increase in the leverage ratio of small 
and low dividend firms will have a greater negative effect on investment spending compared 
with large and high dividend ones. Therefore, large firms can raise investment spending even 
when there is a rise in the leverage ratio, resulting in a positive effect of the leverage ratio on 
the investment ratio. Also, the insignificant effect of the result explains why large and high 
dividend firms’ investment tend to face less impact from financial constraint (firm leverage) as 
not only is there a lower effect of leverage on their investment, but additionally this effect 
does not have a significant effect on investment. In other words, these less financially 
constrained firms have more ability to obtain external funding sources to fund their financial 
position and thus their leverage ratio will have a less significant effect on their investment or 
even an insignificant effect, as found in some of our results. This finding is supported by other 
empirical studies (for example, Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996a; Butzen et al., 2001; Harris et 
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al., 1994; Laeven, 2003; Van Ees and Garretsen, 1994; Hermes and Lensink, 1996; Agung and 
Morena, 2002; Bhaduri, 2005).  
 
Most of the dummy variables controlling for important events still show the expected 
relationship of firms’ investment with the positive coefficient of the effect of the rapid 
expansion in the economy (d1988), the economic recovery period in Thailand (d2003), and the 
negative coefficient of the effect of financial crisis (d1997) on investment. In line with the 
baseline result, the insignificant effect of these dummy variables is also found in the large and 
high dividend firms. This is possibly due to the strengthening of the balance sheet condition in 
the less financially constrained firms, which can offset the effect of these particular events on 
their balance sheet condition. 
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Table 5.9: the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (large/small firms) (first difference GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable (I/K) 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2 
 
FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) 
Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.0707** 
(0.0347) 
0.0288** 
(0.0141) 
0.0615* 
(0.0363) 
-0.1517** 
(0.0719) 
0.0650** 
(0.0244) 
0.0612* 
(0.0365) 
0.1638*** 
(0.0738) 
0.1321** 
(0.0419) 
0.0688* 
(0.0379) 
0.0414* 
(0.0239) 
    1t  
0.0168** 
(0.0080) 
0.0340** 
(0.0134) 
0.0884** 
(0.0368) 
0.0736** 
(0.0353) 
0.0340*** 
(0.0116) 
0.0940** 
(0.0134) 
0.0185*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0428*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0168** 
(0.0080) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0125) 
C/K 1t  
0.0864*** 
(0.0254) 
0.7198*** 
(0.1195) 
0.1756* 
(0.1049) 
0.5861*** 
(0.1571) 
0.0393** 
(0.0180) 
0.0719*** 
(0.0126) 
0.1250** 
(0.0518) 
0.3636*** 
(0.1299) 
0.1067* 
(0.0616) 
0.4889*** 
(0.1199) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0134*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.00053** 
(0.00021) 
-0.0599 
(0.0470) 
-0.0084** 
(0.0042) 
0.0283*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.00053** 
(0.00021) 
0.0432** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0017** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0197 
(0.0370) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0003) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.0393** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0470*** 
(0.0154) 
-0.0285*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.1656* 
(0.0956) 
0.0864*** 
(0.0254) 
0.1346*** 
(0.0370) 
0.0033 
(0.5097) 
-0.0321*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0080 
(0.0049) 
-0.0098** 
(0.0049) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0283*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0293*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0121 
(0.0282) 
0.0090* 
(0.004) 
-0.0285*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.1340*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0676** 
(0.0282) 
-0.0044* 
(0.0025) 
-0.0039* 
(0.002) 
0.0077** 
(0.0031) 
D1988 0.1781*** 
(0.0313) 
0.2653*** 
(0.0473) 
0.2043 
(0.2359) 
0.5851*** 
(0.1782) 
0.1192 
(0.1754) 
0.2997*** 
(0.0769) 
0.1540 
(14.406) 
0.3558** 
(0.1597) 
0.3330 
(0.2098) 
0.3007* 
(0.1706) 
D1997 -0.9517 
(2.8480) 
-0.4940*** 
(0.0893) 
-1.2343 
(5.8166) 
-0.3634*** 
(0.1162) 
-0.9517 
(2.8481) 
-0.3826*** 
(0.1171) 
-0.7931 
(6.6199) 
-0.4243*** 
(0.0690) 
-1.9313 
(7.5913) 
-0.4100*** 
(0.0606) 
D2003 0.3260 
(0.2418) 
0.4872*** 
(0.1544) 
0.2354 
(0.2768) 
0.3765*** 
(0.1238) 
0.2852* 
(0.1491) 
0.3748*** 
(0.124) 
0.3640* 
(0.2091) 
0.5271*** 
(0.1532) 
0.5447** 
(0.2189) 
0.3780** 
(0.1599) 
           
AR(1) -2.49*** -3.90*** -2.93*** -3.88*** -2.93*** -3.87*** -2.51** -3.95*** -2.49** -4.33*** 
AR(2) -0.37 -0.96 0.87 -0.65 1.62 -0.65 1.51 -1.12 1.67 -0.65 
Hansen test 255.13 386.46 311.30 376.66 296.11 271.90 257.46 493.97 216.73 306.77 
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Table 5.9(cont’d): the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (large/small firms) (first difference GMM 
estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable (I/K) 
FD6 (6) FD7 (7) 
Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.0365* 
(0.02022) 
-0.0255** 
(0.0111) 
0.0912*** 
(0.0132) 
-0.1175** 
(0.0590) 
    1t  
0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
0.0784** 
(0.0359) 
0.00098* 
(0.00053) 
0.0267* 
(0.0142) 
C/K 1t  
0.05019** 
(0.0211) 
0.4994*** 
(0.1403) 
-0.6274*** 
(0.2182) 
0.8774*** 
(0.1277) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0931 
(0.0916) 
-0.0321* 
(0.0185) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0402** 
(0.0176) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.1177* 
(0.0691) 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.0046 
(0.0542) 
-0.2143** 
(0.1177) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0113* 
(0.0065) 
0.0914* 
(0.0520) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0394** 
(0.0177) 
D1988 0.1238 
(6.9555) 
0.4687** 
(0.1821) 
0.6995 
(14.587) 
0.4064*** 
(0.0208) 
D1997 -0.1681 
(0.2312) 
0.1544* 
(0.0861) 
-0.0136 
(0.2529) 
-0.2229*** 
(0.0094) 
D2003 0.3819 
(0.2343) 
0.2981** 
(0.1399) 
0.1864*** 
(0.0129) 
0.3093* 
(0.1709) 
AR(1) -2.02** -4.00*** -2.35** -3.20*** 
AR(2) 0.11 -0.60 0.70 -2.15 
Hansen test 182.82 283.15 212.99 341.18 
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Table5.10:  the result of the effect of financial development on the firm balance sheet channel (high/low dividend payout  firms) (first difference GMM 
estimation) 
 
 
Dependence 
variable (I/K) 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) 
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.2612*** 
(0.0481) 
0.1038** 
(0.0491) 
0.1224** 
(0.0504) 
0.1166*** 
(0.0410) 
0.2612*** 
(0.0481) 
0.0744* 
(0.0401) 
0.2644*** 
(0.0492) 
0.1171** 
(0.0537) 
0.2801*** 
(0.0796) 
0.1137** 
(0.0543) 
    1t  
0.0280** 
(0.0120) 
0.0299*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0164* 
(0.0098) 
0.0231** 
(0.0107) 
0.0210* 
(0.0120) 
0.0274*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0168*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0292** 
(0.0114) 
0.0221** 
(0.0101) 
0.03042*** 
(0.0082) 
C/K 1t  
-0.0014 
(0.3260) 
0.3902** 
(0.1331) 
0.3781 
(0.6865) 
0.2893* 
(0.0150) 
0.1080 
(0.0822) 
0.4220* 
(0.2551) 
0.0661** 
(0.0331) 
0.7153*** 
(0.2096) 
0.6549* 
(0.3479) 
0.7534*** 
(0.1321) 
D/K 1t  
-0.00036* 
(0.00021) 
-0.0430* 
(0.0238) 
0.0263*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.2889* 
(0.1653) 
-0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-0.0261*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.5713* 
(0.3080) 
 (C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.0184*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.1216*** 
(0.0298) 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0605*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0020 
(0.0023) 
0.0602** 
(0.0341) 
-0.0028* 
(0.0016) 
-0.0820** 
(0.0327) 
-0.0108*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0594*** 
(0.0161) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0891** 
(0.0353) 
0.1217** 
(0.0504) 
-0.0284 
(0.0291) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0344* 
(0.0199) 
-0.0329*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.1010 
(0.0022) 
0.0062* 
(0.0032) 
-0.1350 
(0.4037) 
-0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
D1988 0.1785 
(0.6037) 
0.0583** 
(0.2581) 
0.2544 
(0.2351) 
0.4083* 
(0.2090) 
0.2970* 
(0.1515) 
0.3315*** 
(0.0911) 
0.2448 
(0.1615) 
0.4295** 
(0.1898) 
0.2536 
(0.3495) 
0.3770** 
(0.1740) 
D1997 -0.0763 
(0.2090) 
-0.5343*** 
(0.0829) 
-0.3427** 
(0.1477) 
-0.3023* 
(0.1708) 
-0.1965 
(0.1462) 
-0.2034** 
(0.1036) 
-0.0837 
(0.1992) 
-0.3403* 
(0.1930) 
-0.2976 
(0.3062) 
-0.3108* 
(0.1844) 
D2003 0.1017** 
(0.0475) 
0.7181*** 
(0.1777) 
0.2318 
(0.1453) 
0.4165* 
(0.2417) 
0.0993** 
(0.0474) 
0.4646** 
(0.1839) 
0.1054** 
(0.0481) 
0.7086*** 
(0.1938) 
0.3446** 
(0.1596) 
0.5801*** 
(0.1987) 
AR(1) -2.58*** -3.96*** -2.51** -1.24*** -3.88*** -3.82*** -3.93*** -3.98 -2.51** -3.94*** 
AR(2) 0.35 -0.50 -0.30 -0.65 0.41 -0.03 0.41 0.21 -0.47 0.13 
Hansen test 302.37 331.85 298.39 314.33 310.64 373.60 302.21 318.81 283.55 315.20 
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Table 5.10(cont’d): the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (high/low dividend payout firms) (1st difference GMM 
estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependence 
variable (I/K) 
FD6 (6) FD7 (7) 
High dividend 
firms 
Low dividend  
firms  
High dividend 
firms 
Low dividend  
firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.2284*** 
(0.0645) 
0.1335** 
(0.0610) 
0.2403*** 
(0.0675) 
0.0129* 
(0.0077) 
    1t  
0.0162** 
(0.0075) 
0.0248** 
(0.0114) 
0.0175** 
(0.0076) 
0.0218* 
(0.0124) 
C/K 1t  
0.7041*** 
(0.1417) 
0.7577*** 
(0.1390) 
-0.0087 
(0.0057) 
0.6306*** 
(0.1222) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0034 
(0.0018) 
0.0029 
(0.0086) 
0.0012 
(0.0018) 
-0.0481** 
(0.0197) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.1773*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.2387*** 
(0.0376) 
-0.4513*** 
(0.1353) 
-0.6807*** 
(0.1595) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
-0.2144 
(0.1848) 
0.0187* 
(0.0101) 
-0.1182*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0472** 
(0.0198) 
D1988 0.2049 
(0.1450) 
0.4189* 
(0.2205) 
0.3137* 
(0.1736) 
0.4643* 
(0.2396) 
D1997 -0.4179*** 
(0.0069) 
-0.3281* 
(0.1748) 
-0.0888 
(0.0619) 
-0.5512*** 
(0.0874) 
D2003 0.1538*** 
(0.0349) 
0.4256* 
(0.2368) 
0.1821*** 
(0.0339) 
0.4230* 
(0.2370) 
AR(1) -4.11*** -3.92*** -3.81*** -3.80*** 
AR(2) 0.30 0.03 0.53 -0.29 
Hansen test 334.66 317.64 314.38 354.38 
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We now focus on the interaction term of the financial development indicator with the cash 
flow and leverage ratio. The sub-sample results of small and large firms in table 5.9 and of 
high and low dividend payout firms in table 5.10 shows that the coefficient of the interaction 
term between 





K
C
 and 





K
D
 with FD1 to FD7 shows a similar result to the total sample case 
explained previously. We found that these coefficients are significant higher in small and low 
dividend firms, while showing a lower coefficient in the large and high dividend ones. These 
results are in line with our expectation. This is because greater financial constraint of firms 
(small and low dividend payout ones) leads to greater dependence on their internal funds (see 
table 5.5). Also, the small and low dividend firms have higher agency and external financial 
costs, leading to a higher negative effect of leverage on their investment. Therefore, financial 
sector development is expected to have a greater effect on the more constrained firms (small 
and low dividend payout ones) than the less constrained ones (large and high dividend payout 
ones) due to the greater dependence of investment on the balance sheet condition (cash flow 
and leverage) of the more constrained firms, and therefore financial development will also 
affect these more financially constrained firms to a greater extent. As a result, we can see the 
higher coefficient of FD
K
C






 and FD
K
D






 in the more financially constrained firms 
compared with the less financially constrained ones. Moreover, we also found the 
insignificant effect of financial development on the sensitivity of investment to leverage and 
to cash flow, particularly in large and high dividend payout firms. This can be explained by 
the fact that the large and high dividend firms already have greater opportunities to obtain 
external funding sources and have relatively low external funding and agency costs than the 
small and low dividend ones, which depend mostly on their internal funds. Table 5.3 supports 
this, as the large and high dividend firms have leverage ratios 38.22% and 66.96% 
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respectively lower than the small and low dividend firms. Also, the large and high dividend 
firms have cash flows 4.33% and 4.94% respectively higher than the small and low dividend 
firms. This shows that the less financially constrained firms have a relatively low agency cost 
and default risk, as well as higher balance sheet strength than the more constrained ones. 
Therefore, the effect of financial development will possibly have no affect on these less 
constrained firms, which already can raise investment by obtaining funds from external 
sources and have relatively low agency costs, external cost of funds and low default risk, 
compared with the more constrained ones. Our empirical results are also supported by Love 
(2003), Islam and Mozumdar (2007), Leaven (2003), Bhaduri (2005), Gelos and Werner 
(2002), Harris et al. (1994), and Koo and Shin (2004), and Arbeláez and Echavarria (2002).  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that financial development in Thailand (banking sector 
development, capital market development, financial competition, financial innovation, and 
financial liberalization) will lead to a rise in the opportunities to obtain external finance 
sources, resulting in less dependence of firms’ investment on internal finance (cash flow). 
These developments also lead to a reduction in the external finance cost and agency cost, 
increasing debt finance for investment. The sub-sample results show that the higher the 
financial constraint of firms (small and low dividend payout ones), the more greatly they are 
affected by financial development. This is due to the greater dependence of the investment of 
these firms on their balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage), compared with the large 
and high dividend firms. Therefore, financial development will affect the more financially 
constrained firms more, compared the large and high dividend ones, which have relatively 
easy access to external sources of funds. These results also raise implications for the firm 
balance sheet channel. We found that firms will be less dependent on their internal finance 
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and more dependent on their external funds when there is financial development. Thus, this 
shows that the effect of monetary policy shock will have a lower effect through the firm 
balance sheet channel as firms can obtain external funding sources to offset the effect of 
monetary policy. Consequently, financial development can weaken the firm balance sheet 
channel and this effect is considerably higher in the less financially constrained firms (small 
and low dividend payout ones) than the more financially constrained ones (large and high 
dividend firms).  
 
We also estimate the same model as in tables 5.9 and 5.10 with system GMM estimation to 
check for the robustness of our results. The results in tables 5.11 and 5.12 show a similar 
conclusion to the first difference GMM estimation. The consistency test still shows that our 
model is well specified and hence confirms the consistency of our results.  
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Table 5.11: the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (large/small firms) (system GMM estimation) 
                          
 
 
Dependent 
variable (IK) 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) 
Large 
firms 
Small 
firms  
Large 
firms 
Small 
 firms  
Large  
firms 
Small  
firms  
Large  
firms 
Small  
firms  
Large  
firms 
Small  
firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.1795** 
(0.0789) 
0.0713* 
(0.0385) 
-0.0470* 
(0.0268) 
0.0713* 
(0.0385) 
0.1795** 
(0.0789) 
0.0728** 
(0.0357) 
-0.0560** 
(0.0274) 
0.1508** 
(0.0735) 
0.0721** 
(0.0274) 
0.0621* 
(0.0338) 
    1t  
0.0171** 
(0.0084) 
0.0817** 
(0.0346) 
0.0251* 
(0.0129) 
0.0817** 
(0.0346) 
0.0100** 
(0.0042) 
0.0277*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0132* 
(0.0068) 
0.0269*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0208** 
(0.0088) 
0.0271*** 
(0.0095) 
C/K 1t  
0.3052 
(0.4619) 
0.0077 
(0.0014) 
0.0378 
(0.0522) 
0.0856** 
(0.0339) 
0.3052 
(0.4619) 
0.7891* 
(0.4763) 
0.1529* 
(0.0820) 
0.4781** 
(0.1978) 
0.0721** 
(0.0274) 
0.7226*** 
(0.2543) 
D/K 1t  
0.0071* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0218* 
(0.0113) 
-0.0459 
(0.0419) 
-0.0218* 
(0.0113) 
0.0100** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0196** 
(0.0084) 
0.0324** 
(0.0152) 
-0.0128** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0028 
(0.0085) 
-0.0331*** 
(0.0126) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
0.0763 
(0.0503) 
-0.0150* 
(0.0078) 
-0.0150* 
(0.0078) 
-0.0673** 
(0.0302) 
-0.0637 
(0.9178) 
0.0364*** 
(0.0122) 
-0.1943 
(0.1502) 
-0.0176** 
(0.0083) 
-0.0108 
(0.0399) 
-0.0089** 
(0.0044) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
0.0230* 
(0.0122) 
0.0439 
(0.0321) 
0.0230* 
(0.0122) 
0.0020** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0365** 
(0.0163) 
0.0316* 
(0.0165) 
0.0090* 
(0.0049) 
0.0041** 
(0.0011) 
0.0060* 
(0.0031) 
D1988 0.1819 
(0.1980) 
0.4857*** 
(0.0780) 
0.1327 
(0.2048) 
0.5750*** 
(0.1257) 
0.8242 
(0.6628) 
0.4336** 
(0.1695) 
1.1091 
(0.8183) 
0.3747** 
(0.1466) 
0.2708 
(0.2280) 
0.5678*** 
(0.1548) 
D1997 -0.2968** 
(0.1162) 
-0.3653*** 
(0.0945) 
-0.5972 
(1.8543) 
-0.3653*** 
(0.0945) 
-0.2800** 
(0.1085) 
-0.2744*** 
(0.0680) 
-0.4529 
(8.0321) 
-0.3800*** 
(0.0549) 
-0.4157*** 
(0.1558) 
-0.4100*** 
(0.0606) 
D2003 0.5475* 
(0.2829) 
0.4274*** 
(0.1112) 
0.3946 
(0.2543) 
0.4274*** 
(0.1112) 
0.1769 
(0.1877) 
0.4594*** 
(0.1219) 
0.34021* 
(0.1851) 
0.5445*** 
(0.5190) 
0.2708 
(0.2280) 
0.4651*** 
(0.13716 
AR(1) -2.51** -4.02*** -2.49*** -4.02*** -2.51*** -3.97*** -2.51** -3.71*** -2.64*** -4.31*** 
AR(2) 0.59 -0.29 1.22 -0.29 0.59 -0.34 1.51 0.56 1.70 -0.05 
Hansen test 325.38 427.49 284.61 427.49 325.38 419.88 227.31 371.31 183.47 359.74 
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Table 5.11 (cont’d): the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (large/small firms) (system GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable (I/K) 
FD6 (6) FD7 (7) 
Large firms Small firms  Large firms Small firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.2711* 
(0.0157) 
0.0269* 
(0.0154) 
0.0534*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0968* 
(0.0575) 
    1t  
0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
0.0700** 
(0.0308) 
0.0017* 
(0.0008) 
0.0559* 
(0.0313) 
C/K 1t  
0.0565*** 
(0.0208) 
0.7073*** 
(0.2465) 
-0.5357 
(0.8417) 
0.5393*** 
(0.1290) 
D/K 1t  
0.0089** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0800* 
(0.0444) 
0.0505 
(0.0748) 
-0.0249 
(0.0235) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-0.1820* 
(0.1074) 
-0.2600*** 
(0.2188) 
0.0392** 
(0.0166) 
0.4697*** 
(0.1753) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0882 
(0.2060) 
0.2759* 
(0.0159) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0272*** 
(0.0103) 
D1988 1.5331 
(0.9081) 
0.2615*** 
(0.0859) 
0.3142 
(1.9799) 
0.2751* 
(0.1612) 
D1997 -0.0029 
(0.2427) 
-0.1603* 
(0.0837) 
-0.0937 
(0.2227) 
-0.1749 
(0.1252) 
D2003 0.2376 
(0.2247) 
0.2882** 
(0.1327) 
0.1577*** 
(0.0190) 
0.2313** 
(0.1226) 
AR(1) -2.46** -3.73*** -2.48** -3.49*** 
AR(2) 0.41 0.69 1.11 -1.73 
Hansen test 227.30 325.80 202.96 392.58 
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Table5.12: the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (large/small firms) (system GMM estimation) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable (IK) 
FD1 (1) FD2 (2) FD3 (3) FD4 (4) FD5 (5) 
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.1348** 
(0.0675) 
0.07928* 
(0.0400) 
0.1185*** 
(0.0382) 
0.1173*** 
(0.0410) 
0.1184** 
(0.0588) 
0.0744* 
(0.0400) 
0.3302*** 
(0.0616) 
0.1350** 
(0.0674) 
0.2400*** 
(0.0612) 
0.1467** 
(0.0679) 
    1t  
0.0249*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0265*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0155* 
(0.0090) 
0.0246** 
(0.0112) 
0.1083* 
(0.0099) 
0.0274*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0086** 
(0.0035) 
0.0249*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0285*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0245** 
(0.0118) 
C/K 1t  
0.4250** 
(0.2097) 
0.3704* 
(0.2056) 
0.0019 
(0.0093) 
0.0230** 
(0.0109) 
0.2430 
(0.2379) 
0.4220* 
(0.2550) 
0.1036*** 
(0.0281) 
0.4274** 
(0.2122) 
0.6317** 
(0.2885) 
0.6939*** 
(0.1719) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0162*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0196** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0043 
(0.0033) 
0.1185*** 
(0.0382) 
-0.0785* 
(0.0398) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0067 
(0.0044) 
-0.0116** 
(0.0045) 
-0.5766** 
(0.2667) 
-0.007** 
(0.0036) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
0.0067 
(0.0044) 
-0.0202*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0027 
(0.0681) 
-0.0581*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.0805 
(0.1728) 
0.0312** 
(0.0123) 
-0.4233** 
(0.1692) 
-0.0196*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.0160*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0511*** 
(0.0152) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
0.0106*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0297** 
(0.0130) 
0.0034* 
(0.0018) 
0.0802** 
(0.0359) 
-0.0566*** 
(0.0207) 
-0.2735 
(0.2496) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0093 
(0.0428) 
0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
D1988 0.3096 
(0.3890) 
0.5492*** 
(0.2075) 
0.2527 
(0.2805) 
0.4678*** 
(0.1384) 
0.3218** 
(0.1336) 
0.2970* 
(0.1515) 
0.2972* 
(0.1582) 
0.4764* 
(0.2528) 
0.2893 
(0.2144) 
0.4610** 
(0.1799) 
D1997 -0.1868 
(0.1478) 
-0.5584*** 
(0.0895) 
-0.3685** 
(0.1724) 
-0.2955** 
(0.1381) 
-0.41063 
(0.2634) 
-0.5489*** 
(0.0807) 
0.0260 
(0.0199) 
-0.5589*** 
(0.0865) 
-0.0181 
(0.3475) 
-0.5984*** 
(0.0893) 
D2003 0.6046*** 
(0.1950) 
0.4775** 
(0.2322) 
0.3526** 
(0.14322) 
0.4060* 
(0.2143) 
0.4731** 
(0.1862) 
0.4312* 
(0.2196) 
0.0912** 
(0.0452) 
0.5985*** 
(0.1946) 
0.4095** 
(0.1665) 
0.5326*** 
(0.2020) 
AR(1) -3.78*** -3.93*** -2.57*** -4.27*** -2.27*** -3.82*** -2.58*** -3.78*** -2.56*** -3.85*** 
AR(2) 0.56 0.03 -0.13 -0.86 -0.45 -0.03 0.38 0.56 0.23 0.38 
Hansen test 323.50 373.48 265.28 355.87 265.84 373.60 303.11 323.45 314.38 335.94 
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Table 5.12 (cont’d) : the result of the effect of financial sector development on the firm balance sheet channel (high/low dividend firms) (system GMM estimation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent 
variable (IK) 
FD6 (6) FD7 (7) 
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
High 
dividend 
firms 
Low 
dividend  
firms  
 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
I/K 1t  
0.2117*** 
(0.0647) 
0.1177* 
(0.0578) 
0.2436*** 
(0.0686) 
0.1271* 
(0.0676) 
    1t  
0.0152*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0257* 
(0.0131) 
0.0183** 
(0.0078) 
0.0232** 
(0.0111) 
C/K 1t  
0.4701** 
(0.2380) 
0.7861*** 
(0.1591) 
-0.0081 
(0.0056) 
0.7154*** 
(0.1033) 
D/K 1t  
-0.0120 
(0.0078) 
-0.0558** 
(0.0275) 
0.00024 
(0.0018) 
-0.0799*** 
(0.0298) 
(C/K)*FD 1t  
-1.3717** 
(0.6946) 
-1.5800*** 
(0.513) 
0.6694*** 
(0.1571) 
0.6767*** 
(0.2576) 
(D/K)*FD 1t  
-0.2189*** 
(0.0277) 
0.0187* 
(0.0101) 
-0.1172*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0795*** 
(0.0297) 
D1988 0.1282 
(0.1327) 
0.1435 
(0.2392) 
0.2754** 
(0.1387) 
0.4618* 
(0.2371) 
D1997 -0.1767** 
(0.0824) 
-0.4994*** 
(0.0728) 
-0.1012 
(0.0616) 
-0.1907** 
(0.0831) 
D2003 0.1455*** 
(0.0362) 
0.5801*** 
(0.2086) 
0.1532*** 
(0.0496) 
0.4080* 
(0.2104) 
AR(1) -4.16*** -3.92*** -3.76*** -3.66*** 
AR(2) 0.13 0.30 0.49 -0.87 
Hansen test 303.11 281.89 382.78 324.97 
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
This study examines the firm balance sheet channel and also investigates the effect of financial 
sector development on this channel in Thailand from 1978 to 2008 by using firm panel data. 
The study was conducted by investigating the effect of firms’ financial condition (their cash 
flow and leverage) on their investment in order to prove the existence of the firm balance sheet 
channel. We investigate this by using firm panel data and GMM estimation (first difference-
GMM and system-GMM estimation) and the result from the baseline model confirms the 
existence of the firm balance sheet channel, as a higher cash flow and leverage ratio have a 
significant positive and negative effect on firms’ investment respectively. These results 
confirm the theoretical expectation, as higher firm liquidity (cash flow) shows an increase in 
firms’ creditworthiness and investment spending. On the other hand, higher firm leverage will 
show the risky behaviour of firms (higher agency costs and default risk), raising the external 
finance premium and lowering investment. Our sub-sample result (small/large firms and 
high/low dividend payout firms) still shows the positive effect of firms’ cash flow on 
investment, with a relatively greater effect in small and low dividend payout firms than in 
larger and high dividend ones. This is due to the fact that small and low dividend firms in 
Thailand have more financial constraint (a lower reputation and net worth) than large and high 
dividend ones, thus this condition will prevent them from obtaining external funding. 
Therefore, their investment will depend more on their internal finance (cash flow). On the 
other hand, the leverage ratio shows a significant negative effect in small and low dividend 
payout firms’ investment, while showing a lower insignificant effect in large and high 
dividend ones. This is in line with the theoretical expectation, since small and low dividend 
firms have a lower reputation and net worth, and higher external funding costs. Consequently, 
they will have a higher agency cost and higher possibility of default risk than large and high 
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dividend firms. Therefore, the leverage ratio of small and low dividend firms will have more 
negative effect on investment spending compared with large and high dividend ones. An 
insignificant result of the leverage ratio in large and high dividend firms can explain why these 
firms tend to face less impact from financial constraint (firm leverage), as not only is there a 
lower effect of leverage on their investment, but additionally this effect does not have a 
significant effect on investment. We can see that our results can have an implication for the 
firm balance sheet channel, as monetary policy can cause a weaker effect via the firm balance 
sheet channel, particularly in the less financially constrained firms (large and high dividend 
ones) than the more constrained ones. This is due to their higher reputation and net worth, 
lower external funding costs and lower dependence on their internal finance. Thus, this will 
weaken the effect of the monetary policy compared with the more constrained firms.  
 
For the effect of financial sector development, our findings show similar results, which are in 
line with our prediction that financial development in Thailand (banking sector development, 
capital market development, financial competition, financial innovation, and financial 
liberalization) leads to less dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance and more 
dependence on external funds. Banking sector development (both size and activity measures) 
results in an increase in bank size, a significant role of banks among borrowers and firms, a 
higher degree of financial intermediation and a rise in the activities of financial intermediation 
provided to customers. Therefore, this will lead to an improvement in financial market 
liquidity, an increase in the opportunities for external funding, and a decrease in financial 
costs. This will reduce the dependence of the firms’ investment on their internal funds (cash 
flow) and also lower the external funding cost and agency cost of firms, thus raising their debt 
finance for investment (leverage). We find that financial competition (lower concentration 
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ratio) results in less difficulty for other banks to access borrowers’ information and other 
sources of funding, thus leading to lower risk, lower external finance premiums faced by firms 
and less difficulty in accessing external sources of funds. Therefore, the investments of firms 
will depend less on their internal finance (cash flow). Also, the decrease in external financing 
costs of firms will reduce the effect of leverage on their investment. Our results show that 
capital market development (both size and activity measures) will lead to a weaker effect of 
internal finance (cash flow) on investment and increase the debt finance (leverage) for 
investment. This is because development in the size and activity in the capital market will lead 
to greater possibilities for firms to access external funding sources and less dependence on 
their internal finance (cash flow). This also results in lower external funding cost and agency 
cost for firms, thus increasing their opportunity to increase debt for their investment. Similar 
results are also found for the effect of bond market development and financial innovation on 
firm investment, as greater development of the equity and bond markets will lead to less 
dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance and more dependence on their 
external finance. Financial innovation also includes the development of new financial 
instruments and techniques (securitization techniques), which reduce liquidity and credit risk 
and the external funding cost of firms. Hence, this encourages firms to use debt finance for 
their investments. Financial liberalization in Thailand also lowers the financial constraint of 
firms and reduces the dependence of their investment on internal funds, as well as increasing 
their dependence on external finance. This is because domestic interest rate liberalization (the 
abandonment of the time and saving deposit interest rate ceilings) and relaxation of the foreign 
exchange rate control will lead to a decrease in the external funding cost of firms, causing a 
reduction in the asymmetric information problem and firms’ external finance premium. 
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The effect of financial development on our sub-sample estimation shows that all of these 
aspects of financial development have similar results to the total sample case, as banking 
sector development, capital market development, financial competition, financial innovation, 
and financial liberalization will lead to less dependence of firms’ investment on their internal 
finance and more dependence on external funds. Also, the effect of all these aspects of 
financial development are significant and higher in the small and low dividend firms, while 
showing a lower effect on the large and high dividend firms. This is because more financially 
constrained firms (small and low dividend payout ones) have greater dependence on their 
internal funds and higher agency and external financial costs. This causes greater dependence 
of investment on the balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) of the more constrained 
firms, and therefore financial development will also affect these firms more. Moreover, we 
also found an insignificant effect of financial development on the sensitivity of investment to 
the balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) of firms, especially the less financially 
constrained ones. This can be explained that the large and high dividend firms already have 
greater opportunities to obtain external funding sources and have relatively low external 
funding and agency costs than small and low dividend ones, which depend mostly on their 
internal funds. Therefore, the effect of financial development will possibly have no affect on 
these less constrained firms, which have relatively low agency cost, external cost of funds and 
low default risk, compared with the more constrained ones.  
 
The results of the effect of financial development on the sensitivity of firms’ investment to the 
balance sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) also raise implications for the theory of the 
firm balance sheet channel. We found that firms will be less dependent on their internal 
finance and more on their external funds when there is financial development. Thus, this 
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shows that the effect of monetary policy shock will have a weaker effect through the firm 
balance sheet channel, as firms can obtain external funding sources to offset the effect of the 
monetary policy. Consequently, financial development can weaken the firm balance sheet 
channel and this effect is considerably higher in the less financially constrained firms than the 
more financially constrained ones. 
 
Our study raises some important issues for policy makers in Thailand. Our results show that 
financial development will increase the opportunity for firms to obtain bank loans and lower 
their external funding costs. This will reduce the dependence of the firms’ investment on their 
internal funds (cash flow) and also lower the external funding and agency costs of firms, 
raising their debt finance for investment (leverage). Therefore, financial development in 
Thailand will increase the opportunity for firms to obtain external funding sources and 
possibly leading to an increase in their investment and economic growth. Thus, we found that 
financial development can be used in order to stimulate economic growth in the country. 
However, financial development can probably lead to a rise in the default risk of firms due to 
the higher possibility for them to obtain external funding sources and greater dependence on 
their debt finance (leverage). Our findings also raise implication for the firm balance sheet 
channel, in that financial development can lead to a weaker effect of monetary policy via the 
firm balance sheet channel as firms can outweigh the effect of policy shock by obtaining other 
external sources of funds. Thus, this possibly leads to a difficulty for policy makers to control 
the economy through this channel. Therefore, not only should monetary policy be controlled 
and regulated, but also the suitable level of financial sector development is an important issue 
which should be focused on by policy makers and central banks in order to prevent the 
problem of the default risk of firms, as well as the difficulties for policy makers to control the 
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economy. However, the effects of financial development can also pass through to the economy 
via other channels of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, an adequate supervisory 
system, appropriate risk management techniques in the banking and financial sectors, and 
stable conditions in the financial market and the banking and capital market sectors are also 
needed when carrying out financial development in the future.  
 
Furthermore, we found that financial development can have a stronger effect on the more 
financially constrained firms than the less financially constrained ones. Therefore, policy 
makers should consider the financial condition of firms in the market carefully before issuing 
policies, as the different financial condition of firms can lead to different effects of financial 
development. Firms should also be well prepared, with improved financial conditions and risk 
management, to face upcoming policies and developments.  
 
This study examines the firm balance sheet and the effect of financial development on it in 
both the total sample cases and the sub-sample cases according to the financial constraint of 
firms. Further studies could focus on the effect of financial development on the different 
sectors of firms in order to examine the effect of financial development in more detail 
regarding different industrial sectors.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH AND THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
We have already explained that the interest rate channel is one of the monetary policy 
transmission channels which affect the banking sector. The literature on the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy transmission hypothesises that monetary policy will have an 
effect on the economy due to the policy interest rate, which will pass through to affect the 
money market rate and retail interest rates (Jobst and Kwapil, 2008; Chionis and Leon, 2005; 
Berg et al., 2005). This causes a change in credit supply, firms’ investment spending and the 
real economy. Thus, this idea raises an important issue for the study of interest rate pass-
through, which explains the effect of policy interest rates on bank retail interest rates. 
Moreover, a higher degree of interest rate pass-through will show the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in controlling the economy and achieving national policy targeting. 
Therefore, the study of interest rate pass-through also raises the important issue of policy 
implications.   
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The important issue of interest rate pass-through has become an interesting subject for many 
researchers in both developed (Hansen and Welz, 2011; Bredin et al., 2001; Singh et al., 
2008; Lowe and Rohling, 1992; Kazaziova, 2010; De Bondt, 2002, 2005, De Bondt et al., 
2005; Liu, et al., 2005; Mojon, 2000) and developing countries (Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 
2011; Chirlesan and Aposstoaie, 2012; Bonga-Bonga, 2009; Charoenseang and Manakit, 
2007; Amarasekara, 2005). 
 
There are several factors which affect interest rate pass-through: credit rationing behaviour, 
asymmetric information, the risk sharing behaviour of banks, the costs faced by banks and 
investors (switching costs and adjustment costs) and the different national economic 
conditions. Moreover, financial sector development is also one of the important factors 
affecting interest rate pass-through. As financial development can be divided into different 
categories - financial liberalization, banking sector development, capital market development, 
financial competition and financial innovation - these developments can affect the financial 
market and banking sectors through the effect of the demand elasticity of the retail interest 
rates and the way banks adjust rates. Therefore, this results in a change in the degree of the 
interest rate pass-through. To account for this, many papers have introduced the effect of 
financial development into their studies of this area (Singh et al., 2008; Vel Leuvensteijn et 
al., 2006; Mojon, 2000; Sander and Kleimeier, 2005; 2006; Chionis and Leon, 2005; 
Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010; Cottarelli et al., 1995). However, the studies of the effect of 
financial development on interest rate pass-through focus mainly on developed European 
countries (Vel Leuvensteijin et al., 2006; SØrensen and Werner, 2006; Mojon, 2000; Cottarelli 
and Kourelis, 1994), with a lack of studies of developing countries (Aziakpono and Wilson, 
2010; Aziakpono et al., 2010). In addition, many past studies have primarily focused on the 
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effect of financial competition on interest rate pass-through (Sander and Kleimeier, 2005, 
2006; Vel Leuvensteijn et al., 2006; SØrensen and Werner, 2006), leaving some gaps for the 
study of the effect of other aspects of financial development (financial liberalization, financial 
innovation and banking and capital sector development) on the pass-through.  
 
The contribution of this chapter concerning the gaps in past papers is as follows. First, we will 
apply other aspects of financial development, including banking sector development, capital 
market development, financial competition, financial innovation and financial liberalization to 
our study of interest rate pass-through in order to fill the gaps of other studies, which only 
focus on the effect of financial competition on the pass-through. Second, we will fill the gaps 
of many studies of interest rate pass-through and the effect of financial development on it 
which only focus on developed countries; therefore, Thailand is used as a case study of 
interest pass-through in a developing country. Third, this paper will compensate for the lack 
of studies of the effect of financial development on interest rate pass-through in Thailand; 
none of the few which exist have introduced the financial development aspect into their work 
(Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007; Rehman, 2004; Tai et al., 2012). 
 
This paper has two main objectives: (1) to investigate interest rate pass-through in Thailand 
and (2) to examine the effect of financial development on interest rate pass-through in the 
country. The study of these two aspects will be conducted by using the VECM technique and 
the quarterly data on interest rates in Thailand from 1978 to 2008. The baseline result of 
interest rate pass-through in Thailand confirms the interest rate pass-through theory, as the 
policy interest rate has a positive effect on retail interest rates in Thailand. The results indicate 
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an incomplete degree of pass-through in the long- and short-run, with a relatively higher 
degree of pass-through in the long-run. The higher the maturity of the interest rates (different 
maturity of time deposit interest rates)30, the higher the degree of pass-through in the long-run 
and the lower the degree in the short-run. The speed of adjustment in every short-run pass-
through model indicates a significant negative coefficient of the speed of adjustment variable, 
confirming the equilibrium adjustment concept. For the effect of financial sector 
development, we conclude that capital market development, financial liberalization, financial 
competition, and financial innovation will cause a greater degree of interest rate pass-through, 
while banking sector development causes a lower degree of pass-through. This effect of the 
financial development indicator on interest rate pass-through is greater in the long-run pass-
through model than the short-run one.  
 
The following section in this chapter consists of five parts. The first will discuss the literature 
review relating to interest rate pass-through and the empirical literature (section 6.2). The 
second part will show the data, model specification and methodology used in the study 
(section 6.3). This section is followed by the empirical results (section 6.4) and the conclusion 
(section 6.5). 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The different maturity of time deposit interest rates considered in this paper are 3, 6, and 12 month time 
deposit interest rates, and the 2 year time deposit interest rate.  
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6.2 Literature review  
 
This section will review the literature relating to interest rate pass-through and comprises the 
theoretical aspects (section 6.2.1), the determinants of pass-through (section 6.2.2) and the 
empirical literature on the subject (section 6.2.3). 
6.2.1 Interest rate pass-through 
 
Interest rate pass-through explains the pass-through process of the effect of the monetary 
policy interest rate on the money market and retail interest rates (Lapinskas, 2011; 
Amarasekara, 2005). In other words, the degree of the effect of the policy interest rate on 
retail interest rates can be considered as the interest rate pass-through (Bangura, 2011).  
 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2006), Chirlesan and Appostoaie (2012), Fomum (2011) and Tai et 
al. (2012) point out that interest rate pass-through can be divided into two stages. The first 
stage is the pass-through effect of the policy interest rate on the money market interest rates 
(the inter-bank lending rate and the money market interest rates). If we consider the different 
maturity of interest rates, the pass-through of the policy interest rate can pass from the short 
term money market interest rates to the long term ones (Samba and Yan, 2010; Crespo-
Cuaresma et al., 2006).  The second stage is the pass-through effect of the money market rates 
on the retail interest rate (bank lending rates and bank deposit rates). This stage is known as 
the cost of funds approach. This is because bank lending and deposits need to be funded by 
money market sources of funds (equities, bonds and government securities) and therefore 
bank lending and deposit rates depend significantly on the money market interest rates 
(Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2006; Tai et al., 2012; De Bondt, 2005; Bogoev and Petrevski, 
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2012). To sum up, interest rate pass-through is a part of the transmission process of the 
interest rate channel. This is because the process of the interest rate channel transmission can 
be summarised in two stages: (1) the effect of monetary policy instruments (policy interest 
rates) on the short and long term money markets and on retail interest rates, and (2) the effect 
of the retail interest rates on investment spending, consumption expenditure and aggregate 
output in the economy (Kazaziova, 2010; Lapinskas, 2011). Therefore, the concept of interest 
rate pass-through is considered as the first stage and is explained by the interest rate channel. 
The effect of the policy interest rate on retail interest rates is called the monetary policy 
approach of interest rate pass-through (Chirlesan and Appostoaie, 2012; Samba and Yan, 
2010; Sellon, 2002). The explanation of interest rate pass-through is summarised in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Interest rate pass-through diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2006). 
The interest rate pass-through model can be explained by the marginal cost pricing model 
below (Bogoev and Petrevski, 2012; Tai et al., 2012; Lapinskas, 2011; De Bondt (2005): 
    mrbr 10        (6.1) 
where br is the retail interest rate of banks 
First stage Long term money  
market rate 
Short term 
money market 
rate 
Policy interest rate 
Second stage 
Cost of fund 
approach  
Short term retail 
interest rate 
 
Cost of fund 
approach  Monetary policy 
approach  
Long term retail 
interest rate 
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 0 is the constant markup  
 1 is the size of interest rate pass-through 
 mr is the money market interest rate or the policy interest rate (marginal cost price) 
 If 1  is equal to one, this means that there is a complete pass-through of the interest rate 
(when there is perfect competition in the market) (Tai et al., 2011). An incomplete pass-
through of the interest rate is when 0 < 1 < 1, and there is an overshooting of the interest rate 
when 1 ˃1 (Tai et al., 2011; Lapinskas, 2011; Bredin et al., 2001). Therefore, the higher 
degree of pass-through can indicate a stronger and more effective interest rate channel as the 
interest rate pass-through is the first stage of the interest rate channel (Singh et al., 2008).  
 
De Bondt (2002) states that deposit and loan demand elasticity with respect to the deposit and 
loan interest rates also affects interest rate pass-through (  in equation 5.1). Interest rate 
stickiness and an incomplete pass-through will take place (  is below 1) when there is not 
full elasticity of deposit and loan demand (De Bondt, 2002, 2005; Bogoev and Petrevski, 
2012). 
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6.2.2 Determinants of interest rate pass-through 
 
After describing the interest rate pass-through concept in the previous section, it is now 
necessary to discuss the factors influencing the pass-through effect. The determinants of 
interest rate pass-through can be divided into two factors: (1) interest rate stickiness, and (2) 
financial development. 
6.2.2.1 Interest rate stickiness  
 
When the policy interest rate and money market interest rates change and when this is followed 
by a lower rate of change in the retail bank interest rates, this situation is considered as interest 
rate stickiness (Amarasekara, 2005; Cottarelli and Kourellis, 1994; Sellon, 2002). Interest rate 
stickiness depends significantly on the following four factors: (1) credit rationing and 
asymmetric information, (2) switching cost, (3) adjustment cost, and (4) risk sharing.  
(1) Credit rationing and asymmetric information  
Banks will have less information about borrowers’ financial status, and firms’ business and 
investment projects compared with the information known by borrowers and firms due to the 
asymmetric information in the financial market (Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 2011). This 
situation leads to the adverse selection and moral hazard problem in the financial market and 
leads to credit rationing by banks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Lowe and Rohling, 1992; Liu et 
al, 2005). Thus, when there is a rise in the policy interest rate, this will cause stickiness in the 
lending interest rates. This is because a rise in the bank loan rates will lead to a greater 
number of risky borrowers in the market (the adverse selection problem) (Fomom, 2011). 
This increases future default risk (the moral hazard problem) and causes a reduction in the 
banks’ expected returns (Fomum, 2011; Samba and Yan, 2010; Bangura, 2011; Khawaja and 
Khan, 2008). Banks will tend to change their retail interest rates to a smaller degree than 
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changes in the money market rate (the bank lending rate will be set below the market clearing 
rate) and decide to ration credit (De Bondt, 2002; Fomum, 2011). Therefore, the problem of 
asymmetric information in the financial market, as well as credit rationing by banks, will 
cause stickiness in interest rate pass-through.  
 
(2) Switching cost  
de Bondt (2002), Fomum (2011) and Lowe and Rohling (1992) state that the cost bank 
customers face when transferring their banking activities from one bank to another is known 
as the switching cost. Generally, banks will charge fees to customers due to the costs they 
face when obtaining customer information (borrowers’ risk profile and customers’ behaviour), 
and this fee is also known as the switching cost (Fomom, 2011). Because of this cost, bank 
customers prefer not to move their banking activities to other banks and continue to accept the 
retail interest rates set by their own (Bangura, 2011). This therefore causes a reduction in 
deposits and loan demand elasticity in the market, causing interest rate rigidity with a 
downward rigidity of loan rates and an upward rigidity of deposit rates (Liu et al, 2005).  
 
(3) Adjustment cost    
When the policy interest rate and market interest rate change, the decision of banks to adjust 
retail interest rates will depend on the difference between the interest rate adjustment cost and 
the cost of keeping the interest rate unchanged (Toolsema et al., 2002; Weth, 2002; 
Karagiannis et al., 2010; Kazaziova, 2010). The adjustment cost relates to the administrative, 
menu, agency and communicating costs of banks (Bangura. 2011). If the adjustment cost is 
high compared to the cost of keeping the interest rate unchanged, this causes an incomplete 
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pass-through of interest rates, as banks do not want to face the cost of adjusting their retail 
interest rate when the policy rate changes (Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 2011; De Bondt, 2005). 
Therefore, a permanent change in the policy interest rate will cause a greater change in the 
bank retail interest rate than a temporary change in the policy interest rate (Liu et al., 2005). 
This situation affects the stickiness of the retail interest rate and thus causes an incomplete 
interest rate pass-through. 
 
(4) Risk sharing 
Fried and Howitt (1980) point out that the risks banks face will be shared between them and 
their borrowers, causing the stickiness of the bank retail interest rates. In this case, when the 
policy interest rate changes, a stable lending rate will be charged by the banks and additional 
fees have to be paid by risk adverse borrowers to compensate for the bank risk (Bangura, 
2011; Fried and Howitt, 1980). This factor can be clearly explained by the case of an 
insurance contract, where there is higher risk adverse behaviour amongst the borrowers than 
the banks (Fomum, 2011). When the policy interest rate increases, banks will tend not to 
increase their retail interest rate to their risk adverse customers; however, this is compensated 
for by increasing the insurance premium for borrowers (Lowe and Rohling, 1992; Bangura, 
2011; Toolsema et al, 2004). 
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6.2.2.2 Financial development 
 
Financial sector development is an important factor affecting the size of interest rate pass-
through. We already discussed in the literature review in chapter 2 (section 2.5.1) that 
financial development will lead to greater interest rate pass-through and hence lead to the 
strengthening of the effect of the policy rate via the interest rate channel. The interest rate 
ceiling abolition (deposit and loan interest rate ceiling abolition) which happened during the 
financial liberalization period in Thailand has led to to greater interest rate pass-through. This 
is because when the interest rate ceiling is abolished, banks will have the possibility to adjust 
the rates which are not now fixed at the ceiling and hence the pass-through process will 
become greater (Singh et al., 2008; Sellon, 2002; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010). Other 
deregulation policies, such as the deregulation of capital control, foreign exchange control 
relaxation, and the relaxation of foreign transaction control, also lead to greater pass-through. 
These policies result in an increase in capital inflows, a higher volume of foreign exchange 
transaction, and a rise in international lending, increasing the alternative sources of 
investment for bank customers. This leads to a higher demand elasticity of loans and deposits 
and more competitive retail interest rates, thus increasing the degree of interest rate pass-
through (Fomum, 2011).  
 
Financial competition also results in a greater degree of interest pass-through. The more 
competitive environment will lead to a higher demand elasticity of retail interest rates and 
thus banks will tend to adjust their retail interest rates in a more competitive way (Cottarelli 
and Kourelis, 1994; Fomum, 2011; Borio and Fritz, 1995). This is because in a more 
competitive environment, profit-maximizing banks will tend to reduce interest margins, as 
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they do not want to pass on bank costs to customers, which will lead to a fall in profits and 
number of customers (Bredin et al., 2001; Horva th et al, 2004) This situation results in a 
reduction in the interest rate stickiness and an increase in the size of pass-through. According 
to de Bondt (2002) and Horváth et al. (2004), the size of interest rate pass-through (
1 in 
equation 6.1) depends on the market power. Horv ath et al. (2004) explain that 
1 will be equal 
to one in a perfect competitive market as the marginal cost is equal to the price. Therefore, the 
lower the competitive environment, the lower the elasticity of price with respect to marginal 
cost and 
1 will decrease (below one), and thus the lower the size of the pass-through.  
 
The higher degree of financial depth shown by the development in the capital market also 
leads to a higher degree of interest pass-through. This is due to the greater number of 
alternative sources of funding and investment for savers and investors caused by the 
development of trading and investment in other financial markets (equity and bond markets) 
(Sellon, 2002; Singh et al., 2008). Therefore, when the policy interest rate changes, banks will 
tend to adjust their deposit and loan rates to a greater extent as they will face higher 
competition from other financial markets (Sellon, 2002; Singh et al., 2008). This condition 
also leads to a rise in the demand elasticity of deposits and loans, causing a higher degree of 
pass-through when the policy interest rate changes (Sellon, 2002; Singh et al., 2008).  
 
Financial innovation can also lead to wider sources of finance for investors and savers due to 
new financial market instruments. This increases alternative funding and investment sources 
for bank customers as well as increasing the demand elasticity of deposits and loans when the 
policy interest rate changes, thus causing a higher degree of interest rate pass-through (Singh 
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et al., 2008; Gropp et al., 2007). Financial innovation also leads to a reduction in bank costs 
due to the development of financial technologies, hence reducing interest rate stickiness 
(Gropp et al., 2007).  
 
However, the development of the banking sector will cause an increase in the financial 
intermediation activities and functions, such as an extension of the scope of banking business 
and a rise in the degree of financial intermediation. This leads to a greater influence of banks 
on borrowers and firms, causing a lower elasticity of demand for loans and deposits, and thus 
causing a lower degree of pass-through (Horváth et al., 2004).  
 
6.2.3 Empirical literature on interest rate pass-through 
 
This section will be divided into two sub-sections: (1) the literature on interest rate pass-
through and (2) the literature on the effect of financial sector development on interest rate 
pass-through.   
6.2.3.1 Literature on interest rate pass-through 
 
The majority of interest rate pass-through studies have been conducted in developed 
countries. Bredin et al. (2001) examine interest rate pass-through in Ireland by studying the 
effect of the wholesale money market rate on the bank lending rates. Their Johansen VECM 
results show an incomplete pass-through with quite a high degree of short- and long-run pass-
through, at around 0.73. A similar finding is also reported by Hansen and Welz (2011) in their 
study of the interest rate pass-through of the interbank market rate to lending rates in Sweden 
(around 0.5 in short-run and 0.9 in long-run pass-through), and by Becker et al. (2010) for the 
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pass-through effect of the Bank of England base rate on the LIBOR rate in the UK (around 
0.8 in short-run and 0.8 in long-run pass-through). Kwapil and Scharler (2007) introduce the 
pass-through effect on deposit rates and their ARDL results show an incomplete pass-through 
of the money market rate on lending rates and deposit rate in the US (an average lending rate 
pass-through of 0.57 and 0.32 for the deposit rate) and Euro area (an average lending rate 
pass-through of 0.48 and 0.22 for the deposit rate). A similar conclusion can be seen in the 
pass-through study in New Zealand by Liu et al. (2005), in the EMU countries by Bolt and 
Labondance (2011), Belke et al. (2012), Borio and Fritz (1995), Toolsema et al. (2002), 
Marrotaa (2007), Karagiannis et al. (2011), Mojon (2000), and Donnay and Degrase (2001), 
and in Belgium by Baugnet et al. (2007), who all find incomplete of pass-through of the 
money market rate on retail interest rates and also obtain a greater long-run pass-through than 
short-run one.  
 
However, some studies of this issue not only find an incomplete pass-through, but also the 
overshooting of interest rate pass-through. Kazaziova (2010) analyses interest rate pass-
through in the Czech Republic. Her OLS results show an incomplete effect of money market 
interest rates on retail lending and deposit interest rates. An overshooting of interest rates is 
also found and she explains that this is due to the introduction of the EMU, which supports 
financial disintermediation, capital market development, and financial competition in the EU 
financial market. Similarly, Frisancho-Mariscal and Howells (2010) examine interest rate 
pass-through in the UK by using the VECM method to study the effect of the policy interest 
rate on loan and deposit rates. They obtain a relatively high pass-through and also the 
overshooting of retail interest rates, especially in the long-run pass-through (around 0.50-
1.10) compared to the short-run (around 0.20-0.90). The overshoot finding can be seen in de 
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Bondt (2002) and he explains that this overshooting result is possibly due to the introduction 
of the EMU. This increases the competitive environment in the banking system as well as 
reducing the cost of information asymmetry, hence increasing the degree of pass-through. The 
overshooting in the interest rate pass-through can be found in Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci 
(2004), Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2006) and Jobst and Kwapil (2008) for the pass-through 
effect of the money market rate on the retail interest rates in EMU and developed countries. 
 
In developing country studies, Fomum (2011) examines the effect of policy interest rate on 
deposit and lending rates in Cameroon and Nigeria and his VECM outputs show an 
incomplete degree of interest rate pass-through in both short-run and long-run pass-through, 
(around 0.7 in lending rates and 0.5 in deposit rates). Hanif and Khan (2012) employ the 
ARDL approach for their pass-through studies of Pakistan and find an incomplete pass-
through of the effect of the interbank market interest rate on bank retail rates, especially in the 
short-run pass-through (a range of around 0.40-0.60) compared to the long-run (a range of 
around 0.70-0.90). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the VAR and ECM model studies 
by Kusmiarso et al. (2002), Chirlesan and Aposstoaie (2012), Rehman (2004) and Bonga-
Bonga (2009) in Indonesia, Romania, ASEAN countries, and South Africa respectively. 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2004) show incomplete pass-through in Chile (an average of 
0.50 pass-through in the short-run and long-run). They also report that the size of interest rate 
pass-through of the money market rate to the bank retail rates, especially in the short-run 
pass-through, will be lower when there is an increase in the maturity of deposit interest rates. 
Bangura (2011) use the cointegration technique and found an incomplete pass-through of the 
money market interest rate on retail bank interest rates, with a greater pass-through in the 
long-run than short-run in both lending rates (around 0.5-0.8 and 0.3-0.6 in long-run and 
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short-run pass-through) and deposit rates (around 0.4-0.7 and 0.1-0.5 respectively) in West 
African countries. He also explains that the reason for this sluggish pass-through is because of 
the low degree of development in the financial markets of West African countries (lack of 
competition and limited alternative sources of finance) (Bangura, 2011). The low degree of 
pass-through in developing countries can be seen in the VECM and ARDL models by 
Amarasekara (2005), Acheampong (2005) and Bogoev and Petrevski (2012) in Sri Lanka, 
Ghana and South East European countries (Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia) respectively. 
They find a low degree of the effect of money market interest rates on retail interest rates, at 
around 0.40-0.70 in lending rates and around 0.03-0.10 in deposit rates. These sluggish results 
are caused by the low degree of competition (oligopolistic competition) and poor risk 
management behaviour, which lead to high bank management costs and an adverse selection 
problem (Amarasekara, 2005; Bogoev and Petrevski, 2012). Likewise, a low degree of 
interest rate pass-through is also found in the studies by Betancourt et al. (2005) in Columbia, 
Horváth et al. (2004) in Hungary, Aydin (2010) in Turkey, and Aziakpono et al. (2010) in 
South African Development Community countries (SADC). The overshooting of interest rates 
is also shown by Maskay and Pandit (2010). They use the OLS method study and obtain a 
pass-through range of around 0.7-1.05 for the saving deposit and lending rates in Nepal. They 
explain that the overshooting result is due to the financial development during the study 
period, which can increase alternative investment sources and the loan demand elasticity. The 
overshooting result of interest rate pass-through is also reported in Isakova (2008) for Central 
Asian countries (Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan) and Lapinskas (2011) in 
Lithuania.  
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Amongst studies of Thailand, Rehman (2004) examines interest rate pass-through in the 
ASEAN countries (including Thailand). He uses the VECM technique and found an 
incomplete degree of pass-through for the effect of the interbank market interest rate on the 
bank lending and deposit rates in Thailand, with a relatively higher pass-through in the long-
run (around 0.76 in lending rates and 0.7 in deposit rates) than the short-run (around 0.3 in 
lending rate and 0.4 in deposit rates). A similar result can be seen in Charoenseang and 
Manakit (2007), who also found that the higher the maturity of deposit interest rates, the 
higher the degree of pass-through, especially in the long-run.  
 
Overall, the studies of both developed and developing countries mostly find incomplete 
interest rate pass-through from policy rate and market rate to bank retail interest rates. This 
finding is in line with the theoretical review explained in section 6.2.2.  
 
6.2.3.2 Literature on the effect of financial sector development on interest rate pass-
through.  
 
Many researches point out the important effect of financial competition on interest rate pass-
through. SØrensen and Werner (2006) study the effect of market concentration (three largest 
bank assets to total bank assets) on the speed of adjustment of the interest rate pass-through in 
European countries and their cointegration results show that the higher the banking 
concentration, the lower the speed of adjustment of the retail bank interest rates. This result 
shows the significant effect of financial competition on pass-through, as low market 
competition (high concentration) can lead to a reduction in the degree of interest rate pass-
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through. Cottarelli et al. (1995) applied the DOLS method in Italy and found that the higher 
the banking concentration ratio (less competitive condition), the lower the degree of pass-
through of money market rates to bank loan rates. Vel Leuvensteijn et al. (2006) conclude 
from their panel cointegration results that financial competition can lead to a relatively faster 
pass-through of interest rates in both the long- and short-run in the Euro area. This result 
shows that competition will lead to a higher interest rate pass-through and thus a stronger 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Other studies of European countries 
also confirm that financial competition can result in a greater degree of interest rate pass-
through (Tieman, 2004; de Graeve et al., 2007; Sander and Kleimeier, 2005; 2006).  
  
Further studies of the effect of financial development can be seen in Singh et al. (2008) as 
they introduce the capital and bond market development indicator (bond and equity securities 
to GDP ratio) into their study of interest rate pass-through in Asian and European countries. 
The results from the Engle-Granger 2-step method indicate an incomplete pass-through from 
money market rate to lending and deposit rates in most countries, with a relatively higher 
degree in developed countries. There is also a positive correlation between the financial 
development indicators and the short- and long-run pass-through of interest rates. This study 
also shows that the higher the degree of financial development in countries, the greater the 
degree of interest rate pass-through and thus the stronger the interest rate channel. Mojon 
(2000) employs the panel data cointegration technique for his pass-through study of EMU 
countries and finds that the introduction of the EMU, which contributes to a higher degree of 
competition, financial integration and capital market development among the EMU countries, 
will lead to a higher degree of interest rate pass-through. Other papers in developed countries 
also conclude that financial sector development (more competition and development in the 
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capital market) will result in greater interest rate pass-through in the economy (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994; Gropp et al., 2007; Lowe and Rohling, 1992). 
 
Many studies also consider the effect of financial liberalization and deregulation on interest 
rate pass-through. De Bondt (2005) and De Bondt et al. (2005) investigate the effect of the 
money market interest rate on bank retail interest rates in the Euro area and their VECM 
results show that the introduction of the EMU, followed by the establishment of the Euro 
currency, a higher degree of competitiveness in the financial market and also the development 
of banks’ alternative funding sources (money market mutual funds and capital market), will 
result in a higher pass-through in Euro area countries. The same conclusion is drawn by 
Chionis and Leon (2005) and Kleimeier and Sander (2007) in their studies of interest rate 
pass-through after the introduction of the EMU. Similarly, Chong (2010), using the Engle-
Granger 2-step method, indicates that interest rate deregulation in Hong Kong can lead to a 
greater effect of the market interest rate on bank deposit rates, particularly in long-run pass-
through. He also obtains the result that the higher maturity of deposit interest rates will cause 
a higher degree of pass-through, especially in the long-run. Among studies of developing 
countries, Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) employ the Engle-Granger 2-step technique to 
investigate the effect of financial reform on interest rate pass-through in South Africa. Their 
results show incomplete long- and short-run pass-through. The size of pass-through also 
becomes higher when considering the period of financial liberalization in the country. A 
similar result is also reported by Brouwer (1995). His correlation and ECM results show a 
stronger relationship between the money market rate and retail interest rate, as well as greater 
speed of adjustment after the financial deregulation in Western Pacific countries (including 
Thailand). 
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To sum up, the results from past studies mainly show that financial sector development, 
including capital market development, financial competition, financial innovation and 
financial liberalization, will significantly lead to higher interest rate pass-through. The greater 
the financial development, the higher the interest rate pass-through and thus the stronger the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. This is also confirmed by the 
theoretical literature review discussed in section 6.2.2. The empirical literature review 
discussed previously shows that the study of interest rate pass-through and the effect of 
financial development on the pass-through have been mainly conducted in developed and 
European countries. For the effect of financial sector development, many studies of this aspect 
have mostly focused on the effect of financial competition on interest rate pass-through, with 
few papers introducing all aspects of financial sector development into their models (capital 
market development). In studies of Thailand, past empirical studies only focus on the interest 
rate pass-through (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007; Rehman, 2004) and the effect of 
financial liberalization on the pass-through (Brouwer, 1995). However, no papers discuss the 
effect of other financial development perspectives, such as the banking and capital market 
development, financial competition, and financial innovation, on interest rate pass-through in 
the country.  Therefore, this chapter will fill this gap by examining interest rate pass-through 
in a case study of Thailand as an example of an Asian developing country. Moreover, it will 
examine the effect of several aspects of financial sector development (banking sector 
development, financial competition, capital market development, financial innovation and 
financial liberalization) on interest rate pass-through in Thailand.   
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6.3 Data and Methodology  
 
This section will be divided into three sub-sections: (1) model specification, (2) data 
description and (3) methodology. 
 
6.3.1 Model specification 
 
The model specification in this study will be divided into two models: (1) the interest rate 
pass-through model and (2) the model of the effect of financial development on interest rate 
pass-through. 
(1)  Interest rate pass-through model 
 
The model used to examine interest rate pass-through is divided into two types: (1.1) the long-
run pass-through model and (1.2) the short-run pass-through model (short-run dynamic model 
or the equilibrium error correction model). 
(1.1) Long-run pass-through model31 
ttt MPR   10                  (6.2) 
Where tR  is the retail interest rate  
 tMP  is the policy interest rate 
 t  is the error term 
                                                          
31
 This long-run pass-through model has been used by other papers (Rehman, 2004; Cottarelli et al., 1995; 
Amarasekara, 2005; Chionis and Leon, 2005; Maskay and Pandit, 2010; Belke et al., 2012; Bogoev and 
Petreuski, 2012; SØrensen and Werner, 2006).  
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We described in section 6.2.1 that there are two stages of interest rate pass-through: (1) the 
effect of the policy rate on the money market rate (monetary policy approach) and (2) the 
effect of the money market rate on the retail interest rate (cost of fund approach). This chapter 
aims to focus on the overall process of interest rate pass-through, therefore it will consider it 
on the basis of the monetary policy approach. The retail interest rates used in this chapter ( tR ) 
comprise: (1) bank lending rates (minimum lending rate and minimum retail rate) and (2) 
bank deposit interest rates (saving deposit rate, 3 month deposit rate, 6 month deposit rate, 12 
month deposit interest rate and 2 year deposit rate). The 14 day repurchase market rate is used 
as the policy interest rate in Thailand ( tMP )
32
.   
 
In equation 6.2, 0  is the intercept and 1 is the degree of the long-run pass-through of the 
effect of policy interest rate on the bank retail rates. According to the theoretical literature in 
section 6.2.1, the 1  coefficient is expected to have a positive sign because the change in the 
policy interest rate will pass through to the money market interest rates and then affect the 
retail interest rate in the same direction. The meaning of the 1  coefficient is as follows: if 1
is equal to one, there is a complete long-run pass-through; if 1 is below one, there is an 
incomplete long-run pass-through; and if 1  is bigger than one, there is an overshooting of 
the pass-through. 
 
                                                          
32 If there is no data for the repurchase rate available, we use interbank overnight interest rate instead.  
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For the long-run pass-through model, a different model will be estimated based on each of the 
retail interest rates used in equation 6.2. Thus, a total of seven models need to be estimated.  
(1.2) Short-run pass-through model33 
tt
n
k
n
k
ktktt ECMMPRR   
 
  13
1 1
210          (6.3) 
where ECM 1t  is the error correction term which is calculated from   11  ttt MPR   The 
coefficients 1 and 2  are the long-run coefficients obtained from the estimation of the long-
run pass-through model (model (5.2)).  
k is the number of lag lengths (k = 1,2,3,...,n).  
Other variables are also defined in the same way as in the long-run pass-through model 
described above. 
 
In equation 6.3, 0  is the intercept and 1  is the coefficient of the effect of the pass -through 
value of retail interest rates on the retail interest rates at time t. 2 is the degree of short-run 
pass-through. According to the theoretical and empirical literature discussed in section 6.2, 
the 2  coefficient is expected to have a positive sign. The meaning of 2  is the same as 
already explained in the long-run pass-through model. 3 is the coefficient representing the 
speed of adjustment of the interest rate to the new equilibrium and this is expected to have a 
negative sign as it describes the equilibrium adjustment of the short-run model (Bangura, 
2011; Rehman, 2004).  
                                                          
33
 This short-run pass-through model can be seen in many papers (Fomum, 2011; Mojon, 2000; Marotta, 2007; 
de Bondt, 2005a, 2005b, Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010; Liu et al., 2005; Kusmiarso et al., 2002).  
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(2) Model of the effect of financial sector development on interest rate pass-through 
This model will be divided into two types: (2.1) the long-run pass-through model and (2.2) 
the short-run pass-through model. 
     (2.1) Long-run pass-through model34 
  ttttt FDMPMPR   210       (6.4) 
where FD t  are the financial sector development indicators, which are as follows: 
FD1 t  is the depository banks’ assets to total financial assets. We described in chapters 4 and 
5 that this indicator presents the size measure of banking sector development and also shows 
the degree of financial depth and financial intermediation. An increase in this indicator will 
show greater bank size and a rise in the degree of financial intermediation, as discussed in 
section 6.2.2. This shows a greater influence of banks on borrowers and depositors, hence 
reducing the demand elasticity of loans and deposits. Consequently, an increase in the 
development of the size of the banking sector will cause a lower degree of interest rate pass-
through. Therefore, the coefficient of the interaction term between this indicator and the 
policy interest rate will have a negative effect on the bank retail interest rate 2( < 0). 
 
FD2 t  is the private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio, which represents the activity 
of banking sector development. We discussed in chapters 4 and 5 that this indicator is used to 
represent the financial intermediary activities provided to customers. An increase in this 
indicator will show a rise in the banking services provided to customers, such as the issue of 
                                                          
34
 This long-run pass-through model has been used by Vel Leuvensteijn et al. (2006), Liu et al. (2005), and 
Mojon (2000).  
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loans and provision of saving facilities to customers, increasing the influence of banks on 
borrowers and depositors and thus lowering the demand elasticity of loans and deposits. This 
results in a lower degree of interest rate pass-through. For the above reasons, the coefficient of 
the interaction term of this indicator with the policy rate is expected to have a negative effect 
on bank retail interest rates 2( < 0). 
 
FD3 t is the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total bank assets. We explained in 
chapters 4 and 5 that this indicator is the financial concentration measure and an increase in it 
shows a decrease in financial competition. This indicator has been used in many studies to 
study the effect of financial competition on interest rate pass-through (Singh et al., 2008; 
SØrensen and Werner, 2006; Gropp et al., 2007; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). We 
previously discussed in section 6.2.2 that there is a higher demand elasticity of retail interest 
rates and a lowering of the bank spread (banks’ interest margin) in a more competitive 
environment, causing a faster adjustment of retail interest rates when there is a change in 
policy interest rate. As financial concentration has a negative relationship with financial 
competition, an increase in the financial concentration indicator will therefore lead to a lower 
interest rate pass-through and thus the interaction term between the coefficient of this 
indicator and the policy interest rate will be expected to have a negative effect on retail bank 
interest rates 2( < 0).  
 
FD4 t is the stock market value traded to GDP ratio. This indicator is used to show the size 
development of the capital market as well as the financial depth. Several papers on interest 
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rate pass-through also employ this indicator in their models to investigate the effect of capital 
market development on interest rate pass-through (Singh et al., 2008; Fomum, 2011; Gropp et 
al., 2007). We explained in section 6.2.2 that an increase in this indicator will show a higher 
degree of financial disintermediation and the development of trading and investment in other 
financial markets. A greater degree of capital market development leads to wider alternative 
sources of funding and investment for savers and investors, so banks tend to adjust their retail 
interest rates more significantly and quickly due to the higher demand elasticity of deposits 
and loans (Sellon, 2002; Singh et al., 2008). As a result, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between this indicator and policy interest rate will be expected to have a positive effect on the 
bank retail interest rates 2( > 0). 
 
FD5 t  is the stock market total valued traded to GDP ratio, which is used to represent the 
activity measure of capital market development. We explained in chapters 4 and 5 that a 
rise in this indicator shows an increase in the activities and liquidity in the capital market. 
Similar to FD4, this development gives greater opportunities to banks to obtain other 
funding sources and leads to an increase in bank capital and liquidity. Therefore, banks 
tend to adjust their retail interest rates more significantly and quickly due to the higher 
demand elasticity of deposits and loans. Therefore, this causes a higher degree of pass-
through and the coefficient of the interaction term between this indicator and policy interest 
rate will be expected to have a positive effect on the bank retail interest rates 2( > 0). 
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FD6 t  is the ratio of private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and 
corporations to GDP. This indicator shows bond market development, financial depth and 
financial innovation in the economy, as described in chapters 4 and 5. This indicator has been 
used in the studies by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995) and Gropp et al. 
(2007) to represent the effect of bond market development on interest rate pass-through. We 
stated in section 6.2.2 that an increase in this indicator will reduce interest rate pass-through 
stickiness due to the development of new financial market instruments, and trading and 
payment system technologies. This leads to an increase in the alternative sources of finance 
for borrowers and investors and a reduction in bank costs and therefore results in an increase 
in the demand elasticity of deposits and loans when the policy interest rate changes and causes 
a higher degree of interest rate pass-through. Consequently, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between this indicator and the policy interest rate will be expected to have a positive 
effect on bank retail interest rates 2( > 0). 
 
FD7 t  is the dummy variable representing the period of financial liberalization in Thailand, 
where the value of 1 represents the years from 1990Q1 to 1995Q4 and 0 otherwise. We 
explained previously in section 6.2.2 that financial liberalization will lead to greater interest 
rate pass-through. This is because the financial liberalization policies will give banks more 
possibilities to adjust interest rates (the interest rate ceiling abolition policy), as well as 
leading to an increase in capital inflows, a higher volume of foreign exchange transactions, 
and financial openness in the country. This results in an increase in the alternative sources of 
investment for bank customers, leading to more competitive retail interest rates and thus 
increasing the extent of pass-through. Hence, the coefficient of the interaction term between 
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this indicator and policy interest rate will be expected to have a positive effect on bank retail 
interest rates 2( > 0). 
 
Other variables shown in model 6.4 will be described as in model 6.2.  0  is the intercept and 
1 is the degree of long-run pass-through. The 1  coefficient is expected to have a positive 
sign. The meaning of the 1  coefficient was described in the long-run pass-through model 
6.2. 
 
For the long-run pass-through model, different models will be estimated based on each of the 
retail interest rates used in this equation and each of the financial development indicators.  
 
(2.2) Short-run pass-through model 
   tt
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10 (6.5) 
where ECM 1t  is the error correction term which is calculated from 
 
121
)(


ttttt
FDMPMPR  . The coefficients 1 and 2  are the long-run coefficients 
obtained from the estimation of the long-run pass-through model (model 6.4).  
k is the number of lag lengths (k = 1,2,3,...,n).  
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Other variables are also defined as in the long-run pass-through model (model 6.4), described 
previously. 0  is the intercept and 1  is the coefficient of the effect of the pass-through on 
retail interest rates at time t. 2 is the degree of short-run pass-through. We discussed 
previously in the short-run model (model 6.3) that the 2  coefficient is expected to have a 
positive sign and the meaning of 2  is the same as explained in model 6.3. 3  is the 
coefficient representing the effect of financial sector development on interest rate pass-
through. The meaning and the expected sign of this interaction term have already been 
presented in the long-run pass-through model above (model 6.4). 4  is the speed of 
adjustment of the interest rate to the new equilibrium and this is expected to have a negative 
sign.  
 
The expected sign of the variables for the interest rate pass-through model and the model of 
the effect of financial sector development on the interest rate pass-through are summarised in 
tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of the expected signs for the long-run and short-run interest rate pass-through 
model estimation where the (+) sign indicates the positive effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, while the (-) sign shows the negative effect 
 
Long run pass-through model   
Dependent variables/ independent 
variables 
mp 
mlr + 
mrr + 
3tdep + 
6tdep + 
12tdep + 
2ytdep + 
sav + 
  
Short-run pass-through model   
Dependent variables/ independent 
variables 
mp 
mlr + 
mrr + 
3tdep + 
6tdep + 
12tdep + 
2ytdep + 
sav + 
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Table6.2: Summary of the expected signs for the long-run and short-run model of the effect of 
financial sector development on the interest rate pass-through where the (+) sign indicates the 
positive effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, while the (-) sign shows the 
negative effect 
 
Long run pass-through 
model  
        
Dependent variables/ 
independent variables 
mp mpfd1 mpfd2 mpfd3 mpfd4 mpfd5 mpfd6 mpfd7 
mlr + - - - + + + + 
mrr + - - - + + + + 
3tdep + - - - + + + + 
6tdep + - - - + + + + 
12tdep + - - - + + + + 
2ytdep + - - - + + + + 
sav + - - - + + + + 
         
Short-run pass-through 
model  
        
Dependent variables/ 
independent variables 
mp mpfd1 mpfd2 mpfd3 mpfd4 mpfd5 mpfd6 mpfd7 
mlr + - - - + + + + 
mrr + - - - + + + + 
3tdep + - - - + + + + 
6tdep + - - - + + + + 
12tdep + - - - + + + + 
2ytdep + - - - + + + + 
sav + - - - + + + + 
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6.3.2 Data description  
The sample data in this study are the quarterly interest rate data in Thailand from 
1978Q1 to 2008Q4 obtained from the Bank of Thailand database. These interest rate 
data comprise the policy interest (14 day repurchase market interest rate) and retail 
interest rates, which include bank lending rates (minimum lending rate and minimum 
retail rate) and bank deposit rates (saving deposit rate, 3 month deposit rate, 6 month 
deposit rate, 12 month deposit rate and 2 year deposit rate). This chapter will still use 
the financial development indicators as stated in chapters 4 and 5. In addition, we use 
quarterly data; the database from Beck et al. (1999) cannot be applied in this case, as it 
only comprises yearly data. Therefore, the financial development indicators in this 
chapter have had to be obtained from the following alternative sources: FD1, FD2, and 
FD6 from the Bank of Thailand website; FD335, FD4, and FD5 from the SET database; 
and FD7 obtained from the author’s own calculations. 
 
A summary of all the variables in this study is shown in table 6.3.  
 
The summary statistics of the observations are also presented in table 6.4, which shows 
the statistical value of the interest rate variables and the interaction term between the 
financial development indicators and policy interest rate during the period 1978Q1 to 
2008Q4.
                                                          
35
 We use the quadratic frequency conversion technique performed by Eviews 7 to convert the data of this 
indicator from the period that not have the quarterly data available.   
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Table6.3: List of all variables used in this study illustrated by type of variable, name of variable, variables’ symbol, variable’s definition and soure 
Type of  variable Variable Symbol Definition Source 
Monetary policy 
instrument 
policy interest rate 
mp t  
14 day repurchase market interest rate BOT website  
Retail interest rates Minimum lending rate 
mlr t  
The interest rate of commercial banks charged on pre-specified repayment schedule’s loans BOT website 
 Minimum retail rate 
mrr t  
The interest rate of commercial banks charged to overdraft loans BOT website 
 Saving deposit interest rate 
sav t  
Saving deposit interest rate of all commercial banks in the market BOT website 
 3 months deposit interest rate 
3tdep t  
Deposit interest rate of all commercial banks in every 3 months times BOT website 
 6 month deposit interest rate 
6tdep  
Deposit interest rate of all commercial banks in every 6 months times BOT website 
 12  months  deposit interest rate 
1tdep  
Deposit interest rate of all commercial banks in every 12 months times BOT website 
 2 years  deposit interest rate 
2ytdep t  
Deposit interest rate of all commercial banks in every 2 years times BOT website 
Financial development 
indicators 
Banking sector development 
(size measure) 
FD1 Depository bank assets to total financial asset 
 
BOT website 
 Banking sector development 
(activity measure) 
FD2 Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio BOT website 
     
 Banking concentration FD3 Three largest bank assets to total assets ratio SET bank balance sheet  
 
 Capital market development 
(size measure) 
FD4 Stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio SET database 
 Capital market development 
(activity measure) 
FD5 Stock market value trade to GDP ratio SET database 
 Bond market 
development/financial 
innovation 
FD6 The private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and corporations to GDP ratio BOT website 
 Financial liberalization FD7 Liberalisation dummy which equal 1 from 1990Q1 to 2005Q4 and 0 otherwise Author owned calculation 
t
t
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Table6.4: Summary statistics of all variables used in the model from 1978Q1 to 2008Q4 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
policy interest rate ( mp ) 
124 8.3589 5.2035 1.0100 20.640 
 
Minimum lending rate ( mlr ) 
124 11.588 3.6844 5.5000 18.167 
 
Minimum retail rate ( mrr ) 
124 11.769 3.5782 5.7122 17.496 
 
Saving deposit interest rate ( sav ) 
124 5.0410 2.8900 0.7500 9.6667 
 
3 months deposit interest rate (3tdep ) 
124 6.8480 3.5429 1.0000 13.667 
 
6 months deposit interest rate (6tdep ) 
124 7.0907 3.6285 1.0000 13.333 
 
12 months deposit interest rate (12tdep ) 
124 7.4946 3.7219 0.9283 13.250 
 
2 years deposit interest rate (2ydep ) 
 124 8.0320 3.9213 0.9218 13.829 
 
The interaction term between Depository 
bank assets to total financial asset and 
policy interest rate (mpfd1) 
 124 5.5528 3.5020 21.4836 1.1043 
The interaction term between private credit 
by deposit money bank and policy interest 
rate (mpfd2) 
 124 6.4762 5.8509 34.4459 0.9122 
The interaction term between three largest 
bank asset to total financial asset and policy 
interest rate (mpfd3) 
 124 5.0199 12.7605 0.5117 3.3982 
The interaction term between stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio and policy 
interest rate (mpfd4) 
 124 2.1985 10.3316 0.3702 2.2421 
The interaction term between stock market 
total value trade to GDP ratio and policy 
interest rate (mpfd5) 
 124 1.5022 5.8121 0.0449 1.4476 
The interaction term between private 
domestic debt securities to GDP ratio and 
policy interest rate (mpfd6) 
 124 1.0635 4.3221 0.2872 0.7825 
The interaction term between Financial 
liberalization dummy  and policy interest 
rate (mpfd7) 124 1.7526 14.2500 0 3.7814 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
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Figure 6.2 is a graph of all the variables listed in table 6.2. There was a considerable increase 
in the bank lending interest rates (minimum lending rate and minimum retail rate) and deposit 
rates (time deposit interest rates and saving interest rate) during the periods from 1983 to 1984 
and from 1990 to 1991. This was probably due to the adjustment of the short-term time 
deposit interest structure. In this case, the 3 and 6 month deposit interest rate ceiling of 
commercial banks was adjusted upward in order to achieve the comparative interest rate level 
with the 12 month deposit interest rate (BOT, 1984). This adjustment can lead to an increase 
in deposit rates, especially time deposit ones. The policy interest rate, as well as the deposit 
and lending rates, show a downward trend, especially from 1992 to 1995. This is due to the 
effect of financial liberalization and other deregulation polices, which caused an increase in 
liquidity in the financial market (details of this are discussed in chapter 3). The financial crisis 
in Thailand was also an important factor resulting in a significant increase in lending and 
deposit rates, the repurchase market interest rate, as well as the interaction term between 
policy interest rate and financial development indicator in Thailand from 1997 to 1998. As a 
result of the IMF bailout during this period, a tightened monetary policy needed to be issued 
to stabilise the economic condition. Additionally, the lack of market confidence and the 
relatively high proportion of non-performing loans and default risk also led to a rise in the 
bank lending rates to cover the risk cost of banks (BOT, 1997). The deposit interest rates 
showed a steady increase in this period because banks were trying to attract more funding 
from investors and depositors in the sluggish financial market conditions during this period. 
After the crisis period, the policy interest rate and retail interest rates in Thailand showed a 
downward trend as a result of the Thai economic recovery plans (the IMF and BOT financial 
recovery measures as already explained in chapter 3) which aim to improve the liquidity 
condition in the financial market and economy.  
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Figure6.2: The graphs of variables use in the model estimation (interest rate variables and the interaction 
term between policy interest rate and financial sector development) 
 
Note: The variable mpfd1, mpfd2, mpfd3, mpfd4, mpfd5, and mpfd6 are the interaction term of the policy interest rate with 
the financial sector development including the banking sector development, financial competition, capital market 
development, capital market concentration, financial innovation, and financial liberalization respectively.  
 
6.3.3 Methodology  
 
Several techniques have been applied to examine this issue in the empirical literature on 
interest rate pass-through. Some studies employ the OLS method to analyse the effect of the 
policy interest rate or money market interest rate on bank retail interest rates (Kazaziova, 
2010; Lapinskas, 2011). However, the financial variables (interest rates) usually have a non-
stationary property and the estimation of the non-stationary data by using the general OLS 
technique can lead to spurious regression (Mousa, 2010; Brooks, 2008; SØrensen and Werner, 
2006). This means that the regression of the non-stationary variables will cause a relatively 
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high 2R even if the variables in the equation are not related to each other (Enders, 2004; 
Brooks, 2008; Granger and Newbold, 1974). Enders (2004), Granger and Newbold (1974) 
and Brooks (2008) have proved this issue by constructing the OLS estimation with the non-
stationary variables. Their results show a substantially high 2R as well as a t-ratio and            
F-statistic which are not in line with the standard distribution.  
 
Due to the problem with the OLS estimation, other papers tend to use other methods to deal 
with the problem of non-stationary series. The Dynamic OLS technique is used in some 
papers on interest rate pass-through to solve the non-stationarity problem (Crespo-Cuaresma 
et al., 2006). Mousa (2010) and Banerjee et al. (1993) state that the non-stationarity property 
of the data can be solved by first differencing the data and estimating the equation by the 
dynamic OLS method (DOLS). However, Mousa (2010) argues that the short-run relationship 
will be only considered when estimating the first differencing equation as in the DOLS 
method and this ignores the study of the long-run relationship of the variables. Other 
researchers tend to use the Engle-Granger 2-step method due to various drawbacks of the 
DOLS method (Singh et al., 2008; Fomum, 2011; Amarasekara, 2005; Chirlesan and 
Apostoaie, 2012) and the ARDL approach  (Aydin, 2010; Hanif and Khan, 2012; Espinosa-
Vega and Rebucci, 2004; Samba and Yan, 2010; De Grave et al., 2004; Sander and Kleimeier, 
2005) to measure the effect of interest rate pass-through in both the long- and short-run 
relationship, as well as the cointegrating relationship between variables. Nevertheless, in 
order to conduct the cointegration test in the Engle-Granger 2-steps method, the unit root test 
(ADF test) is used to test the stationary property of the residual obtained from the OLS 
equation (Engle and Granger, 1987; Brooks, 2008). If there is a stationary property in the 
residual, there is cointegration of the variables (Brooks, 2008). This process will cause an 
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over-rejection of the unit root hypothesis of the residual due to the result of the OLS 
estimation, which usually has the smallest variance of the residual (Mousa, 2010). Another 
problem of the ARDL and Engle-Granger 2-step methods is that these techniques only focus 
on one cointegrating relationship between variables and ignore the fact that there may 
possibly be more than one cointegration relationship between the series (Brooks, 2008; 
Mousa, 2010; Harris and Sollis, 2003).  
 
Many studies of interest rate pass-through have employed the VECM method introduced by 
Johansen (1988) in their models concerning the drawbacks of the other methods (SØrensen 
and Werner, 2006; Belke et al., 2012; Rehman, 2004; Mojon, 2000; Bredin et al., 2001; 
Scholnick, 1996; Fomum, 2011). This is because this technique will consider both the long- 
and short-run relationship in the model (Mousa, 2010; Juselius, 2006). Moreover, the multiple 
cointegration in the model is focused on this technique and it also has its own test statistic for 
the cointegration test (this will be discussed in the following section), thus solving the 
problem of bias in the cointegration test, as in the Engle-Granger 2-step method (Mousa, 
2010; Brooks, 2008). Therefore, this chapter will employ the Johansen technique (VECM 
technique) to study interest rate pass-through in Thailand.  
 
After discussing the technique suitable for the estimation of the interest rate pass-through 
model, we now explain the detail and process of this technique. This section will be divided 
into two parts: (1) the unit root test and (2) the cointegration test.  
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6.3.3.1 The unit root test 
 
Before we construct the model estimation, a unit root test needs to be performed to check for 
the property of the series (stationary or non-stationary).  The unit root test36 in this chapter 
comprises: (1) the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (ADF test) and (2) the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS test). 
(1) Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (ADF test)  
This test will have the following equation (Brooks, 2008): 
tjt
p
j
jtt uyyy  

 
1
1           (6.6) 
where ty  is the series used to perform the unit root test and 
 j is the number of lags (j=1,2,3,...,p) 
Kirchgässner and Wolters (2008) and Mousa (2010) state that equation 6.6 comes from the 
autoregressive regression (AR process) as follows: 
   tjtjttt yyyy    ...2211        (6.7) 
where t ~ ),0(
2 . After reparameterising equation 6.7, we obtain 
   t
p
i
ititt yyy   


2
11           (6.8) 
                                                          
36
 For the study of the cointegration relationship, there is a problem when using the test for the structural change 
in different individual variables. This is due to the non-coincidence of the break date in different variables and 
thus the unit root test with structural breaks is inappropriate for use in this case (Maddala and Kim, 1998).  
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where 


p
i
i
1
 , and when equation 6.8 is subtracted from both sides by 1ty  , we can write the 
new equation 6.8 in a similar way to equation 6.6, where  is equal to  -1 (Mousa, 2010). The 
null hypothesis of this test is 0:0 H ( =1) and the alternative hypothesis is 0: aH  
(Brooks, 2008). If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, it means that the series have a non-
stationary property and a further unit root test needs to be employed in order to obtain the order 
of integration (Maddala, 2001; Brooks, 2008). Mousa (2010) and Brooks (2008) point out that 
the k times differentiation of the series that causes the stationary property is called the 
integration of order k (I(k)). Therefore, if we reject the above hypothesis, it means our series 
have an I(0) or stationary property. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we have to conduct 
the higher orders of the integration test to examine the number of the unit root by first 
differencing the series and performing the unit root test again (Kirchgässner and Wolters, 2008). 
The null hypothesis of this test is tyH :0 ~I(2) and the alternative hypothesis is tyH :1 ~ I(1) , 
and if we reject the null hypothesis of the two unit roots, we can conclude that our series have 
only one unit root ((I(1) process) and thus the cointegration technique can therefore now be 
performed (Brooks, 2008). 
 
If we have an intercept in the series, equation 6.6 will take the following form (Mousa , 2010; 
Kirchgässner and Wolters, 2008),: 
   tjt
p
j
jtt uyyy  

 
1
1           (6.9) 
where  is the intercept term. If our series have deterministic time trends, equation 6.6 can be 
rewritten as: 
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tjt
p
j
jtt uyyty  

 
1
1            (6.10) 
where t represents the time trends. 
 
(2) The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS test) 
The KPSS test is also employed in this chapter to check for the robustness of the results from 
the ADF test. This is because the unit root test has difficulty in deciding when the series have 
a stationary property with the relatively high   coefficient, causing an over non-rejection of 
the null hypothesis of the unit root (Brooks, 2008). Kwiatkowski et al. (1991) introduced the 
KPSS test as a stationary test in order to check for the reverse hypothesis of the ADF test. The 
model is as follows: 
    ttt rty        (6.11) 
where ttt urr  1 ,  2,0 ut iidu  , t = 1,2, ...T 
 tr  is the random walk process, t is the deterministic trends, and t is the stationary 
error term. 
The KPSS test has the null hypothesis that the series have the stationary property ( )0
2
u  
and the alternative hypothesis is that the series have a unit root ( )0
2
u (Kwiatkowski et al., 
1991). If we test the level stationary,  is assumed to equal zero.  
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6.3.3.2 The cointegration test  
 
After we ensure that our series have the I(1) property, the cointegration test will be applied. 
According to Hamilton (1994) and Bredin et al. (2001), when there is a stationary property in 
the linear combination of the I(1) series, the series will be cointegrated. In other words, if 
there is a d order of integration in the tX  series in the (n×1) vector and also the (d-b) order of 
integration in the linear combination of the series in this vector (b>0), there is cointegration in 
the vector tX  component with the d, b order ( tX ~ CI(d,b)) (Enders, 2004; Engle and 
Granger, 1991; Juselius, 2006; Banerjee et al., 1993).  
The model of cointegration is represented by the Vector Error Correction model (VECM) 
shown below (Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Lütkepohl, 2004): 
   tktktktt XXXX   1111 ...          (6.12) 
where    ii AAI  ...1   
  kAAI  ...1  
 i = 1,2,3,...k-1 
tX  is the vector of the I(1) series in which tktktt uXAXAX   ...11  
  is the vector of the long-run coefficient matrix 
   is the vector of the short-run coefficient matrix 
t  is the error term ( t ~IID(0,
2 )) 
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If the rank of matrix   (r) is greater than zero and r < p, we can therefore show that 
  (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). tX   has an I(0) process, there is cointegration in 
the series      ( tX ) which have   as the vector of cointegration (long-run coefficients matrix), 
 is the matrix of the adjustment parameter indicating the variable adjustment from the long-
run equilibrium, and r is the cointegrating vector number (Mousa, 2010; Johansen, 1988; 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Belke et al., 2012; Harris and Sollis, 2003).  
 
In order to test the cointegration of the series, Johansen introduced two types of tests: (1) the 
likelihood ratio trace statistic ( trace) and (2) the maximum eigenvalue statistic ( max),   
described below (Johansen, 1988; 1992; Mousa, 2010; Brooks, 2008): 
    


g
ri
iTtrace
1
1ln   
   )1ln(max 1 rT   
where   r is the cointegrating vector number and r = 0,1,2,3,...,n-2,n-1 
  is the eigenvalues of order i and r+1 
T is the observation number 
 
Brooks (2008), Lütkepohl (2004) and Enders (2004) state that the null hypothesis of the 
trace statistic is that an r or less than r cointegrating vector and the alternative hypothesis is 
there is a more than an r cointegrating vector number. On the other hand, there is an r 
cointegrating vector in the null hypothesis of the  max statistic and there is an r+1 
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cointegrating vector in its alternative hypothesis (Brooks, 2008). After using the test statistics 
above and indicating the number of cointegrating vectors, we can then estimate the long-run 
relationship of the variables from the   matrix.  
 
Furthermore, a restriction needs to be imposed in the cointegration model in order to test for 
weak exogeneity. This test is performed in order to ensure that no cointegration relationship is 
entered into the equation of each of the determinants in the vector, thus confirming that the 
right hand side of the short-run ECM equation can be modeled with each of the I(1) series in 
the vector (Harris and Sollis, 2003). Johansen (1992), Enders (2004), Brooks (2008) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1992) point out that this can be done by applying the restriction that    
 =0 as is the null hypothesis against the alternative that  ≠0 and employing the likelihood 
ratio test statistic (LR) as follows: 
    LR = T     


r
i
ii
1
* ˆ1/ˆ1ln   
where 
*ˆ  is the unrestricted characteristic root  
 ˆ  is the restricted characteristic root  
 r is the unrestricted characteristic root number 
 T is the number of observations 
If the chi-square statistic of this test indicates non-rejection of the null hypothesis, it means 
that the long-run coefficient is not affected by other cointegration relations or past 
tX
tX
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disequilibrium feedback (Bredin et al., 2001; Johansen, 1992; Kirchgässner and Wolters, 
2008). 
 
After we obtain the long-run relationship by using the VECM model explained previously, the 
short-run relationship of the model is now estimated by using the Error Correction Model 
(ECM model). The short-run relationship equation can be shown by the dynamic short-run 
model as follows (Brooks, 2008; Enders, 2004; Banerjee et al., 1993): 
   

 
k
i
ttktkt ECMxy
1
12,10     (6.13) 
where ECM is the error correction term equal to 


k
i
ktkt xy
1
,1  
   is the long-run coefficient from the cointegrating vector   
 1 is the short-run coefficient for this model 
 2 is the error correction term coefficient explaining the speed of equilibrium 
adjustment. 
This short-run dynamic model is estimated by the standard OLS technique in order to obtain 
the short-run relationship of the model (Rehman, 2004). This dynamic model is employed by 
many studies of interest rate pass-through to examine the short-run effect of the policy interest 
rate on retail interest rates (Fomum, 2011; Rehman, 2004; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010; 
Mojon, 2000; Kusmiarso et al., 2002). The model estimation in this chapter is performed by 
Pcgive 13.10. 
 295 
 
6.4 Empirical results 
 
This section presents the results obtained from the model estimation and is divided into four 
sub-sections: (1) unit root test, (2) cointegration test, (3) interest rate pass-through model, and 
(4) the effect of financial sector development on interest rate pass-through.  
6.4.1 Unit root test 
 
The results for the unit root tests of each series as listed in table 6.2 are presented in table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 clearly shows that the series used in the model estimation have an I(1) process. The 
ADF tests show a non-rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit root at the level form, while 
there is rejection of the null hypothesis at the first different form of the series.  The KPSS also 
confirms the I(1) process of the series. The LM statistic shows rejection of the null hypothesis 
of the stationary series at the level form, while showing non-rejection of the null hypothesis in 
the first difference form.   
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Table6.5: The result of unit root test for the series in the model 
 
Variable ADF KPSS 
 level First difference level First difference 
mlr -1.3874 -6.5880*** 0.4840** 0.1273 
mrr -1.5705 -3.7191*** 0.6851** 0.1324 
3tdep -1.4005 -8.0221*** 0.6044** 0.1144 
6tdep -0.9747 -9.4319*** 0.5125** 0.1075 
12tdep -2.1776 -5.5214*** 0.7078** 0.0889 
2ytdep -1.5407 -6.8954*** 0.5330** 0.1120 
sav -0.7361 -7.3962*** 0.3704* 0.1686 
mp -2.4983 -9.0832*** 0.4423* 0.0355 
mpfd1 -2.4741 -9.2035*** 0.4273* 0.0367 
mpfd2 -1.8125 -9.1660*** 0.4355* 0.0358 
mpfd3 -2.1121 -10.1313*** 0.4224* 0.0386 
mpfd4 -2.4301 -9.0477*** 0.4264* 0.0938 
mpfd5 -1.3453 -10.4383*** 0.3650* 0.0363 
mpfd6 -2.3201 -10.9860*** 0.3485* 0.0538 
Note: *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively. 
This unit root test is performed in the intercept only as the graph presents in figure 6.2 shows that the series have the intercept 
in their property.  
 
6.4.2 Cointegration test 
 
To ensure that the series used in the model estimation have an I(1) process, the cointegration 
test can be performed. In this case, the groups of the series in each model have to be tested 
separately in order to check for the cointegration relationship and the number of cointegrating 
vectors in each model. Table 6.6 presents the results of this test.  
 
The results from the  trace statistic show that the series used in each model have a 
cointegration relationship with one cointegrating vector. This is because there is a rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration vector (the number of cointegrating vectors is equal to 
zero), while there is non-rejection of the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector. These 
results thus confirm that the model of interest rate pass-through, as well as the model of the 
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effect of financial development on the pass-through, can be estimated by the VECM model to 
obtain the long-run relationship of the variables. 
 
Table6.6: The result of the cointegration test for the series in the model 
Set of the variables 
including in the model 
estimation 
rank Trace statistic rank Trace 
statistic 
Interest rate pass-through 
model  
    
mlr, mp 0 79.511*** 
[0.000] 
1 2.8793 
[0.090] 
mrr, mp 0 75.571*** 
[0.000] 
1 1.8488 
[0.174] 
3tdep, mp 0 29.762*** 
[0.000] 
1 2.0057 
[0.157] 
6tdep, mp 0 33.403*** 
[0.000] 
1 1.8162 
[0.178]8 
12tdep, mp 0 37.071*** 
[0.000] 
1 1.7196 
[0.190] 
2ytdep, mp 0 30.546*** 
[0.000] 
1 1.0584 
[0.304] 
sav, mp 0 30.035*** 
[0.000] 
1 0.9249 
[0.336] 
     
Set of the variables 
including in the model 
estimation 
rank Trace statistic rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statistic 
The model of the effect 
of financial sector 
development  on the 
interest rate pass-through 
      
mlr, mp, mpfd1 0 99.030*** 
[0.000] 
1 13.937 
[0.084] 
2 1.8836 
[0.170] 
mlr, mp, mpfd2 0 82.892*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.4742 
[0.757] 
2 1.6067 
[0.205] 
mlr, mp, mpfd3 0 77.611*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.9046 
[0.709] 
2 2.4642 
[0.116] 
mlr, mp, mpfd4 0 87.758*** 
[0.000] 
1 8.6204 
[0.409] 
2 2.4073 
[0.121] 
mlr, mp, mpfd5 0 93.140*** 
[0.000] 
1 9.9490 
[0.290] 
2 1.4057 
[0.236] 
mlr, mp, mpfd6 0 99.028*** 
[0.000] 
1 7.8817 
[0.485] 
2 2.7477 
[0.097] 
mlr, mp, mpfd7 0 99.030*** 
[0.000] 
1 13.937 
[0.084] 
2 1.8836 
[0.170] 
       
Note: *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the series at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent respectively. [-] represents the probability of the rejection of the null hypothesis. Before performing the Johansen 
cointegration test, the VAR model up to lag 4th is performed and the VAR model with intercept and 2 lag is chosen based on 
the lowest of the AIC information criteria. This lag length selection in VAR is performed in Eviews 7.0.  
 
 
 298 
 
Table 6.6 (cont’d):The result of the cointegration test for the series in the model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the series at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent respectively. [-] represents the probability of the rejection of the null hypothesis. Before performing the Johansen 
cointegration test, the VAR model up to lag 4th is performed and the VAR model with intercept and 2 lag is chosen based on 
the lowest of the AIC information criteria. This lag length selection in VAR is performed in Eviews 7.0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Set of the variables 
including in the model 
estimation 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statistic 
The model of the effect 
of financial sector 
development  on the 
interest rate pass-
through 
      
mrr, mp, mpfd1 0 95.248*** 
[0.000] 
1 11.875 
[0.165] 
2 1.3387 
[0.247] 
mrr, mp, mpfd2 0 79.298*** 
[0.000] 
1 4.9757 
[0.809] 
2 1.1274 
[0.288] 
mrr, mp, mpfd3 0 78.793*** 
[0.000] 
1 4.6641 
[0.840] 
2 1.8282 
[0.176] 
mrr, mp, mpfd4 0 82.363*** 
[0.000] 
1 7.9657 
[0.476] 
2 1.9715 
[0.160] 
mrr, mp, mpfd5 0 80.598*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.7267 
[0.729] 
2 2.1465 
[0.143] 
mrr, mp, mpfd6 0 87.776*** 
[0.000] 
1 6.9700 
[0.587] 
2 1.7618 
[0.184] 
       
3tdep, mp, mpfd1 0 41.092*** 
[0.001] 
1 13.279 
[0.105] 
2 2.6870 
[0.101] 
3tdep , mp, mpfd2 0 43.101*** 
[0.001] 
1 4.7495 
[0.832] 
2 1.4339 
[0.231] 
3tdep , mp, mpfd3 0 40.916*** 
[0.001] 
1 4.4428 
[0.860] 
2 2.1176 
[0.146] 
3tdep , mp, mpfd4 0 39.559*** 
[0.002] 
1 5.9410 
[0.705] 
2 2.0947 
[0.148] 
3tdep , mp, mpfd5 0 36.636*** 
[0.006] 
1 8.6013 
[0.411] 
2 1.9089 
[0.167] 
3tdep , mp, mpfd6 0 55.842*** 
[0.000] 
1 6.6175 
[0.628] 
2 2.0195 
[0.155] 
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Table 6.6 (cont’d):The result of the cointegration test for the series in the model 
Note: *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the series at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent respectively. [-] represents the probability of the rejection of the null hypothesis. Before performing the Johansen 
cointegration test, the VAR model up to lag 4th is performed and the VAR model with intercept and 2 lag is chosen based on 
the lowest of the AIC information criteria. This lag length selection in VAR is performed in Eviews 7.0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model of the effect of 
financial sector 
development  on the 
interest rate pass-through 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statisti
c 
rank Trace 
statistic 
  
6tdep, mp, mpfd1 0 43.031*** 
[0.001] 
1 11.287 
[0.197] 
2 1.9938 
[0.158] 
  
6tdep , mp, mpfd2 0 52.543*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.3479 
[0.771] 
2 2.1796 
[0.140] 
  
6tdep , mp, mpfd3 0 43.248*** 
[0.001] 
1 4.1800 
[0.883] 
2 2.0206 
[0.155] 
  
6tdep , mp, mpfd4 0 42.168*** 
[0.001] 
1 6.3629 
[0.657] 
2 1.8736 
[0.171] 
  
6tdep , mp, mpfd5 0 40.001*** 
[0.002] 
1 8.1954 
.[0.452
] 
2 1.5832 
[0.208] 
  
6tdep , mp, mpfd6 0 58.821*** 
[0.000] 
1 6.4669 
[0.645] 
2 1.8239 
[0.177] 
  
         
The model of the effect of 
financial sector 
development  on the 
interest rate pass-through 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statisti
c 
rank Trace 
statistic 
  
12tdep, mp, mpfd1 0 42.535*** 
[0.001] 
1 6.8421 
[0.602] 
2 2.3619 
[0.124] 
12tdep, mp, mpfd2 0 57.129*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.0541 
[0.801] 
2 1.2769 
[0.258] 
  
12tdep, mp, mpfd3 0 64.316*** 
[0.000] 
1 4.1523 
[0.885] 
2 1.6369 
.[0.201] 
  
12tdep, mp, mpfd4 0 46.549*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.3209 
[0.774] 
2 1.9192 
[0.166] 
  
12tdep, mp, mpfd5 0 43.298*** 
[0.001] 
1 6.6621 
[0.623] 
2 1.3111 
[0.252] 
  
12tdep, mp, mpfd6 0 65.338*** 
[0.000] 
1 6.6880 
[0.620] 
2 1.7124 
[0.191] 
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Table 6.6 (cont’d):The result of the cointegration test for the series in the model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration among the series at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent respectively. [-] represents the probability of the rejection of the null hypothesis. Before performing the Johansen 
cointegration test, the VAR model up to lag 4th is performed and the VAR model with intercept and 2 lag is chosen based on 
the lowest of the AIC information criteria. This lag length selection in VAR is performed in Eviews 7.0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model of the 
effect of financial 
sector development  
on the interest rate 
pass-through 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statisti
c 
rank Trace 
statistic 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd1 0 43.031*** 
[0.001] 
1 11.287 
[0.197] 
2 1.9938 
[0.158] 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd2 0 37.482*** 
[0.005] 
1 3.6275 
[0.924] 
2 0.8629 
[0.353] 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd3 0 45.635*** 
[0.000] 
1 3.6286 
[0.924] 
2 1.0847 
[0.298] 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd4 0 37.086*** 
[0.005] 
1 5.4364 
[0.761] 
2 1.1609 
[0.281] 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd5 0 36.000*** 
[0.008] 
1 6.8427 
[0.602] 
2 1.1962 
[0.274] 
  
2ytdep, mp, mpfd6 0 46.771*** 
[0.000] 
1 5.9151 
[0.708] 
2 1.0290 
[0.310] 
  
         
The model of the 
effect of financial 
sector development  
on the interest rate 
pass-through 
rank Trace 
statistic 
rank Trace 
statisti
c 
rank Trace 
statistic 
  
sav, mp, mpfd1 0 37.196*** 
[0.005] 
1 5.5501 
[0.749] 
2 1.5979 
[0.206] 
sav , mp, mpfd2 0 45.396*** 
[0.000] 
1 8.1927 
[0.452] 
2 1.9890 
[0.158] 
  
sav , mp, mpfd3 0 36.497*** 
[0.007] 
1 6.4231 
[0.650] 
2 2.1005 
[0.147] 
  
sav , mp, mpfd4 0 36.955*** 
[0.006] 
1 6.7134 
[0.617] 
2 1.0444 
[0.307] 
  
sav , mp, mpfd5 0 45.916*** 
[0.000] 
1 9.9370 
[0.291] 
2 2.2654 
[0.132] 
  
sav, mp, mpfd6 0 39.099*** 
[0.003] 
1 6.9365 
[0.591] 
2 1.0165 
[0.313] 
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 6.4.3 Interest rate pass-through model 
 
After ensuring that we have a cointegrating relationship in the model, we start by estimating 
the long-run pass-through model described previously in section 6.3.1 (model 6.2). The seven 
long-run pass-through models are estimated in terms of the different retail interest rates used 
in each model. 
 
In order to test for weak exogeneity, each long-run pass-through model is imposed with the 
restriction that the coefficients of the policy rate variable (mp) in the  matrix are equal to 
zero to ensure that our models are not affected by other cointegration relations.  
 
The restriction that the coefficient of each of the retail interest rates in the  matrix is equal to 
one needs to be imposed to ensure that this variable is the dependence variable in the model 
(normalisation)37. The result of the restriction test is shown in table 6.7 and the chi-square 
statistic of the LR restriction test shows non-rejection of the null hypothesis of the restriction 
imposed, ensuring that our long-run coefficient is not affected by past disequilibrium 
feedback, and the short-run pass-through model can be estimated.  
 
                                                          
37
 The VECM model in this interest rate pass-through model, as shown in section 6.3.1 subsection 1.1, is as 
follows: 
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+ t  
 
The following restrictions are imposed: 
21 =0 and 11 =1.  
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Table6.7: The result of the long-run pass-through model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 
 
 
 
Inependent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.  
mp 0.7985 
(0.0346) 
0.7831 
(0.0371) 
0.7749 
(0.0887) 
0.7789 
(0.0613) 
0.8016 
(0.0870) 
0.8136 
(0.0754) 
0.7167 
(0.0819) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: 
21 =0 
and 
11 =1) 
0.8121 
[0.3675] 
2.1841 
[0.1394] 
2.0750 
[0.1497] 
2.2719 
[0.1521] 
1.7086 
[0.1912] 
2.0595 
[0.1513] 
2.6907 
[0.1009] 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0 
and =1,
12  = -1 ) 
14.361*** 
[0.0008] 
15.302*** 
[0.0005] 
6.5621** 
[0.0376] 
8.8561** 
[0.0119] 
5.0159** 
[0.0251] 
4.7829* 
[0.0915] 
5.8247* 
[0.0543] 
21
11
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The results from table 6.7 show an incomplete degree of long-run interest rate pass-through in 
Thailand, with a considerably high degree of pass-through in the retail interest rates (around 
0.71-0.81). This result is in line with the theoretical explanation in section 6.2.2, as interest 
rate pass-through can be incomplete due to several important factors which cause stickiness in 
the interest rate (credit rationing and the risk sharing behaviour of banks, the asymmetric 
information problem and the costs faced by banks and investors, namely switching cost and 
adjustment cost). The results of an incomplete long-run pass-through with a relatively high 
degree of pass-through is supported by many empirical papers, both in developed countries 
(Bredin et al., 2001; Hansen and Welz, 2011; Kwapil and Scharler, 2007; Liu et al., 2005; 
Egert et al., 2006; De Bondt, 2005; Cottarelli et al., 1995) and in developing countries 
(Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 2011; Amarasekara, 2005; Bonga-Bonga, 2009; Horváth et al., 
2004; Hanif and Khan, 2012; Chirlesan and Aposstoaie, 2012). Furthermore, as our results 
show a considerably high degree of pass-through, it is possible that the degree of this can be 
equal to one or a full degree of pass-through. Therefore, another joint restriction is performed 
to check for the full degree of long-run pass-through. This is done by adding another 
restriction, that the coefficient of the policy interest rate in the cointegrating vector is equal to 
one ( 112  )
38
. We find from table 6.7 that the null hypothesis of this restriction is rejected, 
thus confirming that the degree of interest rate pass-through in the long-run is still at the 
considerably high level described previously.  
 
 
                                                          
38
 The joint restrictions that we impose are as follows:
21 =0 , 11 =1, and 112  . 
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Our results show a similar high degree of long-run pass-through in Thailand compared with 
other studies of the country (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007; Rehman, 2004). We discussed 
previously in section 6.2.2 that financial development is also an important factor which causes 
a higher degree of pass-through. Therefore, the significantly high long-run degree of pass-
through in our study was probably caused by the financial sector development which took 
place in Thailand during our study period (1978-2008), as explained in chapter 3.  
 
Our study of different maturities of deposit interest rates shows that the higher maturities 
show a higher degree of long-run pass-through. This finding is similar to the studies by 
Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2004). Larrain (2005) and Cokayne (2009) state that when the 
interest rate series have the mean reversion property (stationary series), the effect of the policy 
interest rate on the short-term interest rate will be higher than the long-term ones. The interest 
rate series in the long-run pass-through model are considered to be an I(1) (no mean 
reversion), thus the effect of the policy interest rate will become higher in the long-run retail 
interest rate than the short-run.  
 
Furthermore, recursive estimation is also performed to examine for the effect of structural 
changes on the cointegrating vector. The recursive graph of every model in table 6.7 is shown 
in figure 6.3.  
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Figure 6.3: The recursive estimation of the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector (the baseline interest 
rate pass-through model) 
 
 
 
Note: the eigenvalue of each long-run pass-through model is performed in each different retail interest rate equations. Eval 
mlr, Eval mrr, Eval 3tdep, Eval 6tdep, Eval 12tdep, Eval 2ytdep, and Eval sav represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating 
vector of the long-run interest rate pass-through equations of minimum lending rate, minimum retail rate, 3 month deposit 
interest rate, 6 month deposit interest rate, 12 month deposit interest rate, 2 year deposit interest rate, and saving interest rate 
respectively.  
 
The results for all the eigenvalues in each equation show their stability throughout the study 
period, with slight changes taking place, especially during 1997Q4. This was possibly due to 
the effect of the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997, which had a profound effect on the 
financial market and institutions. Although there is a change in the eigenvalues during 1997, 
this change has little effect on the eigenvalues as we do not see the sharp break of the 
recursive graph of the eigenvalues during this period and the recursive graph still remains 
stable until 2008.  
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We also perform recursive estimations of the  coefficient (the coefficient of the degree of 
pass-through) in order to obtain the result of the change in the degree of pass-through during 
the study period, as the change in the eigenvalues also resulted from the change in the  
coefficient. The recursive graph is shown in figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: The recursive estimation of the   coefficient (the baseline interest rate pass-through model) 
 
 Note: the coefficient of each long-run pass-through model is performed in each different retail interest rate equations. 
Beta mlr, beta mrr, beta 3tdep, beta 6tdep, beta 12tdep, beta 2ytdep, and beta sav represent the coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the long-run interest rate pass-through equations of minimum lending rate, minimum retail rate, 3 
month deposit interest rate, 6 month deposit interest rate, 12 month deposit interest rate, 2 year deposit interest rate, and 
saving interest rate respectively.  
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The  coefficients in all the lending and deposit interest rate equations show a positive sign 
and lie within the +/-2standard error band. All the  coefficients also present stability, with 
some changes occurring in specific periods. The long-run pass-through degree of both lending 
and deposit interest rates tends to adjust upwards during the periods 1984Q1 and 1991Q1. 
The increase in pass-through during 1984Q1 was possibly due to the adjustment by 
commercial banks of the short-term deposit interest structure. In this case, the 3 and 6 month 
deposit interest rate ceilings were adjusted upwards to achieve an interest rate level 
comparable to the 12 month-deposit rate (BOT, 1984). This adjustment may have caused the 
increase in the interest rate pass-through, especially with regard to the 3 and 6 month deposit 
interest rates. Moreover, transferable deposit certificates were introduced in this period for 
short-term deposit interest rate mobilization. We discussed in section 6.2.2 that the 
introduction of a new financial instrument can lead to a higher degree of pass-through as a 
result of the higher demand elasticity of deposits and loans. Therefore, this can cause an 
upward adjustment of the  coefficients. The upward movement of the  coefficients also 
comes from the effect of the financial liberalization which began in 1990. The effect of the 
relaxation of the retail interest rate ceiling in Thailand, and other deregulation policies, 
resulted in a higher degree of pass-through, mostly shown in the increase of the  
coefficients during 1991Q1. The  coefficients also show negative adjustment during the 
period 1997Q4, possibly due to the effect of financial crisis. Horváth et al. (2004), Frisancho-
Mariscal and Howells (2010) and Karagiannis et al. (2010) state that financial crisis in a 
country can lead to the problem of financial market volatility and market uncertainty. This 
leads to a relatively low level of interest rate pass-through, as banks will face higher credit 
risk, adjustment costs and the asymmetric information problem. 
 


 


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After discussing the results of the long-run pass-through model, it is now important to analyse 
short-run pass-through. This model is estimated by the error correction model explained 
previously in section 6.3.1 (model 6.3). The results of this are shown in table 6.8 below.  
Table6.8: The result of the short-run pass-through model 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction 
where *,**, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the restriction at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Table 6.8 shows that there is an incomplete degree of short-run interest rate pass-through in 
Thailand, with a relatively lower degree of pass-through compared with the long-run (around 
0.05 to 0.16 degrees of pass-through compared with 0.71 to 0.82 in the long-run). This result 
is confirmed by our theoretical explanations. Our result is supported by other studies, which 
also find incomplete short-run pass-through, with a noticeably lower degree of pass-through 
Independent 
variable  
/dependent 
variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Lag of 
dependent 
variable(-1) 
-0.0136 
(0.1212) 
0.2098** 
(0.1056) 
0.1168 
(0.0833) 
0.0729 
(0.0857) 
0.2196** 
(0.1048) 
0.3212*** 
(0.0817) 
0.2699** 
(0.1177) 
Lag of 
dependent 
variable(-2) 
0.1111* 
(0.0586) 
0.1352*** 
(0.0513) 
0.0796 
(0.0602) 
0.1078** 
(0.0516) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0452) 
0.0591 
(0.0386) 
-0.0477 
(0.1029) 
constant 0.4486** 
(0.2188) 
0.2963* 
(0.1696) 
0.0081 
(0.0559) 
-0.0113 
(0.0531) 
0.0472 
(0.0469) 
0.1137 
(0.0901) 
-0.0561* 
(0.0328) 
mp (-1) 0.1641*** 
(0.0475) 
0.0371* 
(0.0190) 
0.1430*** 
(0.0333) 
0.1531*** 
(0.0350) 
0.0767*** 
(0.0258) 
0.0147 
(0.0269) 
0.0529** 
(0.0224) 
mp (-2) 0.0635* 
(0.0348) 
0.0887*** 
(0.0303) 
0.0410 
(0.0254) 
0.0333 
(0.0247) 
0.1145*** 
(0.0288) 
0.1012*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.0008 
(0.0208) 
Ecm(-1) -0.0841** 
(0.0391) 
-0.0605** 
(0.0302) 
-0.0400* 
(0.0240) 
-0.0539* 
(0.0292) 
-0.0371* 
(0.0202) 
-0.0621* 
(0.0324) 
-0.0608* 
(0.0311) 
        
AR 1-5 test 1.5554 
[0.1787] 
1.7374 
[0.1806] 
0.1333 
[0.9844] 
0.4889 
[0.7839] 
0.2733 
[0.9268] 
0.6871 
[0.5048] 
0.3645 
[0.8718] 
ARCH 1-4 
test 
3.1216** 
[0.0178] 
0.2869 
[0.7511] 
0.2015 
[0.9370] 
0.2112 
[0.9317] 
0.1463 
[0.9643] 
1.5670 
[0.2130] 
0.4092 
[0.8016] 
Normality 
test 
5.8953 
[0.0525] 
7.9213** 
[0.0191] 
27.7420*** 
[0.0000] 
24.9370*** 
[0.0000] 
25.510*** 
[0.0000] 
18.407*** 
[0.0001] 
39.980*** 
[0.0000] 
Hetero test 1.0943 
[0.3729] 
0.9298 
[0.4950] 
1.7106 
[0.0742] 
1.8142 
[0.0662] 
1.6402 
[0.0910] 
1.2654 
[0.2687] 
1.8481 
[0.0851] 
Hetero-X test 1.1071 
[0.3547] 
0.7519 
[0.7175] 
1.2930 
[0.1832] 
1.3096 
[0.1909] 
1.2539 
[0.2119] 
1.7610 
[0.0543] 
1.6302 
[0.1156] 
RESET23 test 3.8719** 
[0.0236] 
0.8335 
[0.4372] 
3.1484** 
[0.0467] 
2.6144 
[0.0777] 
2.3362 
[0.1013] 
1.4008 
[0.2506] 
0.1277 
[0.8802] 
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compared with the long-run (Samba and Yan, 2010; Bredin et al., 2001; Kwapil and Scharler, 
2007; Kazaziová, 2010; Aydin, 2010; Liu et al., 2005; Egert et al., 2006; Singh et al., 2008; 
Belke et al., 2012; Fomum, 2011; Bangura, 2011; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010; 
Marotta,2007). Compared with research on Thailand (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007; 
Rehman, 2004; Tai et al., 2012), the results from these studies also confirm that the degree of 
long-run pass-through is considerably higher than that of the short-run. 
 
The short-run degree of pass-through in lending interest rates is comparably higher than the 
deposit rates. The outcomes from the different maturity studies also indicate a relatively 
higher degree of pass-through in lower maturity interest rates (short-term deposit rates) than 
higher ones. This finding is also supported by Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci (2004) and 
Kazaziová (2010). The effect of the policy rate on the short-term interest rates will be higher 
than the long-term ones as the interest rate series in the short-run model have a mean 
reversion property (all series are in first difference with the I(0) property). For the speed of 
adjustment of pass-through, every short-run pass-through model in table 6.8 shows a 
significant negative sign of the coefficient of the ECM term.  This finding is also supported 
by our theoretical expectation.  
 
Moreover, the results from almost all the diagnostic tests in each short-run model show 
significant non-rejection of the null hypothesis of the following tests: Normality test, AR test, 
ARCH test, Hetero test and RESET test. This ensures that our results have a normal 
distribution, no autocorrelation, no heteroscedasticity, and have a linearity of the series 
respectively. However, the short-run models still show non-normality detection. This is 
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because the outlier resulted from some structural changes which took place in the study period 
(as explained in the data description in section 6.3.2). Although this occurred during our study 
period, it has been argued that the inclusion of dummy variables as an exogenous variable or 
an unrestricted variable in the VECM model to control for these structural changes will have 
an effect on the underlying distribution of the Johansen cointegration test statistics (Harris and 
Sollis, 2003; Doornik et al., 1998; Juselius, 2006). In addition, it is difficult to include the 
same set of dummy variables in different equations as the structural change in different 
equations will not coincide due to the fact that our study considers pass-through in different 
types of retail interest rates.  
 
The recursive graph of the  coefficients in each of the short-run pass-through models can 
be seen in figure 6.5. The  coefficients of the mp variable in each of the short-run pass-
through models present a similar pattern to the long-run pass-through model, with the 
movement of the  coefficient within the +/-2 standard error band. There is also an upward 
adjustment of the degree of pass-through during the 1984Q1 and 1991Q1 periods due to the 
effect of the time deposit interest rate structural change and financial liberalization 
respectively. The negative adjustment of the degree of pass-through can be seen during 
1997Q4 due to the effect of the financial crisis in the country. The result from the break point 
Chow test and forecast Chow test show that the F-statistic is below the critical value of 5 per 
cent and confirms that our result is stable. However, the 1 step Chow test and the 1 step 
residual still show a value which lies outside the critical value during 1984Q1, 1991Q1 and 
1997Q4, representing the structural changes in the country discussed earlier. 



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Figure 6.5: The recursive estimation of the short-run interest rate pass-through model 
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Figure 6.5 (cont’d): The recursive estimation of the short-run interest rate pass-through model 
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Overall, there is a high degree of interest rate pass-through in Thailand, with a relatively 
higher degree in the long-run than the short-run. This is due to the financial development in 
the country which took place during our study period and thus caused a high degree of interest 
rate pass-through. Our result shows that high maturity interest rates (long-term deposit 
interest rates) will have a higher degree of pass-through in the long-run, while low maturity 
interest rates (short-term deposit interest rates) will have a high degree of pass-through in the 
short-run. This is because the interest rate pass-through in the short-run has a mean reversion 
property, and thus the effect of the policy interest rate on the short-term interest rate will be 
higher than the long-term ones.  
 
6.4.4 The effect of financial sector development on interest rate pass-through 
 
We start by estimating the long-run pass-through models described previously in section 6.3.1 
(model 6.4). These models are estimated in terms of the different retail interest rates and the 
financial sector development indicators used in each model. Each model is already imposed 
with the restriction that the  matrix of the coefficient of policy rate variable (mp) and the 
interaction term between the policy interest rate and each of the financial sector development 
indicators (mpfd) are equal to zero39. Additionally, there is the restriction that the coefficient 
of each of the retail interest rates (Rt) in the  matrix is normalised to one.  The chi-square 
statistic of the restriction test in the long-run pass-through model shows non-rejection of the 
                                                          
39
 The VECM model in this interest rate pass-through model, as shown in section 6.3.2, subsection 2.1, is:  
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The restrictions are imposed as follows: 
21 =0, 031   and 11 =1. 
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null hypothesis, ensuring that our long-run coefficient is not affected by other past 
disequilibrium feedback and the short-run pass-through model can be estimated. We now 
explain the results of each of the effects of financial development on the long- and short-run 
pass-through models below.  
 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present the long- and short-run pass-through results of the effect of 
banking sector development (size measure: fd1) on the pass-through of each retail interest 
rate. For the pass-through result (coefficient of mp), we find a relatively high degree of pass-
through, with the long-run pass-through (0.71-0.86) more than the short-run (0.10-0.25). A 
higher maturity of the deposit interest rates results in a higher degree of pass-through, 
especially in the long-run, while lower maturity shows a higher degree of pass-through in the 
short-run. This result is also in line with the pass-through results explained previously. The 
ECM term shows a significant negative effect, supporting our theoretical expectation. We 
reject another joint restriction, that the coefficient of the policy interest rate in the 
cointegrating vector is equal to one ( )40, thus ensuring that our pass-through result is 
not equal to one.  
 
The results mainly show a significant negative effect of the interaction term between this 
indicator and the policy interest rate on the lending rates both in the long-run (-0.18 and -0.25 
in mlr and mrr) and short-run (-0.15 and -0.05 in mrr and mlr) models of pass-through. On the 
other hand, the results show an insignificant effect on all the deposit rates in the long-run and 
a significant effect in the short-run only in the short-term deposit rates (3 and 6 month deposit 
                                                          
40
 The joint restrictions that we impose are as follows:
21 =0 , 11 =1, and 112  . 
112 
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rates) and saving interest rate (around -0.08 to -0.20). Although this indicator has an 
insignificant effect on all the deposit rates in the long-run, it shows that the inclusion of this 
interaction term still leads to a lower degree of pass-through of deposit rates, compared with 
the degree of pass-through before its inclusion (the lower coefficient of mp variable in deposit 
rates equations shown in table 6.9, compared with the mp coefficient of deposit rates 
equations shown in table 6.7). Hence, this result confirms that the effect of the size measure of 
banking sector development still leads to a lower pass-through of lending and deposit rates in 
Thailand, especially in the lending rates and short-term deposit rate. This is in line with our 
theoretical expectation, as a greater bank size will show a greater degree of financial 
intermediation and a greater influence of banks on borrowers and depositors. Hence, this 
reduces the demand elasticity of loans and deposits and leads to a lower degree of pass-
through and the weakening of the interest rate channel.  
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Table6.9: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (size measure of banking sector development: FD1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *,**, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at  10%, 5% , and 1% respectively.
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD1 mp 0.8483 
(0.0487) 
0.8678 
(0.0750) 
0.7942 
(0.1279) 
0.7801 
(0.2138) 
0.8039 
(0.1227) 
0.8121 
(0.0879) 
0.7189 
(0.1336) 
mpfd1 -0.1801 
(0.0718) 
-0.2515 
(0.0487) 
-0.1194 
(0.1905) 
-0.1143 
(0.1435) 
-0.1958 
(0.1828) 
-0.1124 
(0.0783) 
-0.3985 
(0.2072) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: 
21 =0, 31 =0, 
11 =1) 
2.0140 
[0.3653] 
3.2314 
[0.1987] 
2.5137 
[0.2845] 
2.5449 
[0.2801] 
2.4781 
[0.2897] 
2.5082 
[0.2853] 
1.2245 
[0.5421] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: 
21 =0, 31 =0,
11 =1, 12 = -1) 
8.9438** 
[0.0300] 
16.041*** 
[0.0011] 
15.521*** 
[0.0014] 
12.886*** 
[0.0049] 
11.743*** 
[0.0083] 
10.133** 
[0.0175] 
15.158*** 
[0.0017] 
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Table6.10: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (size measure of banking sector development: FD1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1% respectively.  
The effect of FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependence 
variable (-1) 
0.0935 
(0.0674) 
0.1804** 
(0.0792) 
0.1644** 
(0.0759) 
0.1690** 
(0.0765) 
0.3664*** 
(0.0897) 
0.2890*** 
(0.0853) 
0.1920** 
(0.0884) 
 Lag of dependence 
variable (-2) 
0.1451** 
(0.0727)
 
0.1235* 
(0.0721) 
0.0931 
(0.0901) 
0.1039 
(0.0781) 
0.0472 
(0.0855) 
0.0326 
(0.0796) 
-0.0342 
(0.0841) 
 constant 0.4707*** 
(0.1673) 
0.4954*** 
(0.1675) 
0.4796** 
(0.2331) 
0.0385 
(0.0518) 
-0.0064 
(0.0368) 
0.0099 
(0.0460) 
0.0280 
(0.0340) 
FD1 mp (-1) 0.1415** 
(0.0560) 
0.1171*** 
(0.0399) 
0.1175 
(0.1085) 
0.1844*** 
(0.0685) 
0.1012* 
(0.0413) 
0.1339*** 
(0.0476) 
0.1445*** 
(0.0452) 
      mp (-2) 0.1182** 
(0.0469) 
0.1022** 
(0.0421) 
0.2536** 
(0.1057) 
0.1651** 
(0.0696) 
0.1274* 
(0.0405) 
0.0189 
(0.0479) 
0.0755 
(0.0474) 
 mpfd1 (-1) -0.1549*** 
(0.0384) 
-0.0123 
(0.0324) 
0.0275 
(0.1368) 
-0.0447 
(0.0557) 
-0.1273 
(0.0784) 
0.0420 
(0.0915) 
-0.0823** 
(0.0371) 
       mpfd1 (-2) 0.0131 
(0.0400) 
-0.0587* 
(0.0325) 
-0.2058** 
(0.1275) 
-0.1018* 
(0.0536) 
0.0117 
(0.0761) 
-0.0276 
(0.0866) 
-0.0329 
(0.0382) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.0902*** 
(0.0319) 
-0.0843*** 
(0.0279) 
-0.0929** 
(0.0443) 
-0.0586** 
(0.0268) 
-0.0706** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0886*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.0694*** 
(0.0210) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.3067 
[0.2667] 
0.9059 
[0.4072] 
0.6029 
[0.6978] 
0.6449 
[0.6660] 
4.8018*** 
[0.0005] 
7.3512*** 
[0.0000] 
1.7331 
[0.1333] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.6484 
[0.1670] 
1.9554 
[0.1063] 
0.1229 
[0.9740] 
0.1631 
[0.9566] 
1.1456 
[0.3388] 
3.5982** 
[0.0085] 
0.5389 
[0.7074] 
 Normality test 8.3305** 
[0.0155] 
7.9808** 
[0.0185] 
20.177*** 
[0.0000] 
19.482*** 
[0.0001] 
18.057*** 
[0.0001] 
24.152*** 
[0.0000] 
35.300*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 0.5344 
[0.9352] 
1.3354 
[0.2097] 
1.5198 
[0.1065] 
1.3901 
[0.1526] 
1.0092 
[0.4457] 
1.0634 
[0.3984] 
1.6405 
[0.0914] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.2740 
[0.1734] 
1.1945 
[0.3068] 
1.2836 
[0.1907] 
1.7168 
[0.1845] 
1.3885 
[0.1123] 
2.3176 
[0.1033] 
1.2028 
[0.2361] 
0.2895 
[0.7492] 
1.2880 
[0.1629] 
2.6521 
[0.0749] 
1.3390 
[0.1549] 
0.8535 
[0.4287] 
2.5978*** 
[0.0004] 
1.2733 
[0.2839] 
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For the effect of the activity measure of banking sector development (fd2), tables 6.11 and 
6.12 show the long- and short-run pass-through results respectively. The pass-through results 
(coefficient of mp) still show a relatively high degree of pass-through, with long-run pass-
through (0.74-0.81) higher than short-run (0.09-0.17). The higher maturity of deposit interest 
rates still shows a higher degree of pass-through in the long-run compared with the short-run, 
in line with our expectation. The ECM term continues to show a significant negative effect. 
We still reject another joint restriction, that , thus ensuring that our pass-through 
result is not equal to one.  
 
The results of the coefficient of mpfd2 in the long-run model mainly show a significant 
negative effect on the lending rates both in the long-run (-0.09 and -0.10 in mlr and mrr) and 
short-run (-0.14 and -0.06 in mlr and mrr). For the effect on the deposit interest rate, an 
insignificant effect is shown in the long-run, while this interaction term has an effect only in 
the short-run on the short-term deposit rates (3 and 6 month rates) and saving interest rate 
(around -0.01 to -0.09). Despite the insignificant effect on deposit rates in the long-run, the 
inclusion of this interaction term still leads to a lower degree of pass-through of the deposit 
rates (the coefficient of mp in table 6.11 is relatively higher than in table 6.7). Hence, this 
result confirms that the effect of the activity measure of banking sector development still 
leads to a lower interest rate pass-through of in Thailand, especially in the lending rates and 
short-term deposit rate. This is in line with our theoretical expectation, as a higher level of 
banking activities will show a greater degree of financial intermediation. Therefore, this 
reduces the demand elasticity of loans and deposits and leads to a lower degree of pass-
through and the weakening of the interest rate channel.  
112 
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Table6.11:  The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (activity measure of banking sector development: FD2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD2 mp 0.8144 
(0.0383) 
0.8185 
(0.0439) 
0.7716 
(0.1123) 
0.7752 
(0.0821) 
0.8051 
(0.0901) 
0.8181 
(0.0786) 
0.7490 
(0.0922) 
mpfd2 -0.0947 
(0.0344) 
-0.1090 
(0.0391) 
-0.0690 
(0.1011) 
-0.0414 
(0.0739) 
-0.1193 
(0.0820) 
-0.1077 
(0.0708) 
-0.2422 
(0.1830) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1) 
0.2077 
[0.9013] 
1.7435 
[0.4182] 
1.0586 
[0.5890] 
2.1815 
[0.3360] 
0.9824 
[0.6119] 
2.7269 
[0.2558] 
0.3887 
[0.8234] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1, = -1) 
6.7036* 
[0.0820] 
9.0265** 
[0.0289] 
7.3958* 
[0.0603] 
10.767*** 
[0.0046] 
24.470*** 
[0.0000] 
8.7975** 
[0.0321] 
8.4128*** 
[0.0382] 
21
31 11
21
31 11 12
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Table6.12: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (activity measure of banking sector development: FD2) 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1% respectively. 
 
The effect of FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable 0.1461** 
(0.0707) 
0.1887** 
(0.0792) 
0.1052 
(0.0896) 
0.0723 
(0.0888) 
0.2516*** 
(0.0809) 
0.3098*** 
(0.0844) 
0.1707* 
(0.0879) 
 Lag of dependent variable 0.0800 
(0.0689) 
0.1195** 
(0.0721) 
0.0888 
(0.0792) 
0.1039 
(0.0778) 
0.1165 
(0.0748) 
0.0523 
(0.0799) 
-0.0567 
(0.0838) 
 constant 0.4633*** 
(0.1539) 
0.4009*** 
(0.1496) 
0.0182 
(0.0522) 
0.0556 
(0.0543) 
0.0543 
(0.0483) 
0.1147* 
(0.0683) 
-0.0420 
(0.0339) 
FD2 mp (-1) 0.1525*** 
(0.0573) 
0.1218*** 
(0.0401) 
0.1770** 
(0.0728) 
0.1786** 
(0.0688) 
0.1312** 
(0.0516) 
0.1305** 
(0.0626) 
0.0706 
(0.0468) 
      mp (-2) 0.1133** 
(0.0505) 
0.1083** 
(0.0421) 
0.1809** 
(0.0748) 
0.1592** 
(0.0698) 
0.0737 
(0.0521) 
0.0261 
(0.0637) 
0.0937** 
(0.0468) 
 mpfd2 (-1) -0.1422*** 
(0.0411) 
-0.0142 
(0.0326) 
-0.0382 
(0.0601) 
-0.0399 
(0.0557) 
-0.0224 
(0.0426) 
-0.0023 
(0.0514) 
-0.0304 
(0.0377) 
       mpfd2 (-2) -0.0193 
(0.0391) 
-0.0609** 
(0.0327) 
-0.0110* 
(0.0578) 
-0.0959* 
(0.0537) 
0.0485 
(0.0405) 
-0.0139 
(0.0487) 
-0.0652* 
(0.0355) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.0880*** 
(0.0290) 
-0.0751*** 
(0.0273) 
-0.0561** 
(0.0249) 
-0.0632** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0375* 
(0.0209) 
-0.0594** 
(0.0266) 
-0.0722*** 
(0.0191) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.5763 
[0.1729] 
5.9155*** 
[0.0001] 
0.9906 
[0.4271] 
0.0855 
[0.5138] 
5.6525*** 
[0.0001] 
9.6993*** 
[0.0000] 
0.8792 
[0.4977] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.8209 
[0.1297] 
1.0537 
[0.3829] 
0.2469 
[0.9110] 
0.1962 
[0.9399] 
0.5101 
[0.7283] 
7.1850*** 
[0.0000] 
0.6269 
[0.6442] 
 Normality test 4.8834* 
[0.0870] 
16.227*** 
[0.0003] 
27.010*** 
[0.0000] 
20.498*** 
[0.0000] 
24.802*** 
[0.0000] 
13.645*** 
[0.0011] 
20.742*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 1.2730 
[0.2453] 
0.4020 
[0.9601] 
1.6876* 
[0.0535] 
1.9301* 
[0.0511] 
2.3168*** 
[0.0044] 
1.0568 
[0.4061] 
1.0698 
[0.3930] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.2679 
[0.2021] 
2.1628 
[0.1199] 
0.8000 
[0.7407] 
0.5073 
[0.6035] 
 
1.3883 
[0.1071] 
1.7188 
[0.1841] 
1.5231 
[0.1517] 
0.7423 
[0.4784] 
1.6458** 
[0.0270] 
0.4401 
[0.6451] 
1.1634 
[0.2773] 
0.0159 
[0.9841] 
1.8723** 
[0.0077] 
2.9672 
[0.1556] 
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For the effect of financial concentration (fd3) on interest rate pass-through, the results in 
tables 6.13 and 6.14 show that this pass-through (coefficient of mp) is still at a relatively high 
level, with long-run pass-through (0.77-0.83) greater than short-run (0.11-0.19). The higher 
maturity deposit interest rates still show a higher degree of pass-through in the long-run 
compared with the short-run. The ECM term still has a significant negative effect. We 
continue to reject another joint restriction, that . The results of the coefficient of 
mpfd3 in the long-run model mainly show a significant negative effect on lending rates (-0.15 
and -0.13 in the long- and short-run respectively). The impact of this indicator has no effect 
on the deposit rate in the long-run, while showing a significant negative effect only in the 
short-run in the short-term deposit rates (3 and 6 month deposit rates) and saving interest rate 
(around -0.08 to -0.12). Despite the insignificant effect on deposit rates in the long-run, the 
inclusion of this interaction term still leads to a lower degree of pass-through of the deposit 
rates (the coefficient of mp in table 6.13 is relatively higher than in table 6.7). This result 
confirms that the effect of banking concentration will lead to a lower interest rate pass-
through, especially in the lending rates and short-term deposit rate. This is in line with our 
theoretical expectation, as financial concentration will lead to low market power in the 
banking sector. This decreases financial competition. We previously stated in equation 6.1 
(section 6.2) that the weaker the competitive environment, the lower the elasticity of price 
with respect to marginal cost ( 1  decrease), thus reducing the demand elasticity of retail 
interest rates. Also, a weaker competitive environment can lead to an increase in the bank 
spread. This causes a lower adjustment of retail interest rates when there is a change in policy 
interest rate. Several empirical studies support our findin (Vel Leuvensteijn et al., 2006; 
Sander and Kleimeier, 2005, 2006; SØrensen and Werner, 2006; Singh et al., 2008).
112 
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Table6.13: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (financial concentration:FD3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD3 mp 0.8278 
(0.0416) 
0.8331 
(0.0460) 
0.7765 
(0.1212) 
0.7790 
(0.0892) 
0.8022 
(0.0978) 
0.8181 
(0.0786) 
0.7812 
(0.1026) 
mpfd3 -0.1287 
(0.0362) 
-0.1447 
(0.0400) 
-0.0820 
(0.1022) 
-0.0479 
(0.0776) 
-0.0253 
(0.0851) 
-0.1077 
(0.0708) 
-0.2473 
(0.1993) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1) 
0.2205 
[0.8956] 
1.9638 
[0.3746] 
0.6684 
[0.7159] 
2.7153 
[0.2573] 
0.9428 
[0.6241] 
2.2344 
[0.3272] 
3.1608 
[0.2059] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1, = -1) 
13.790*** 
[0.0032] 
10.078** 
[0.0179] 
10.322** 
[0.0159] 
13.352*** 
[0.0039] 
9.8529** 
[0.0199] 
8.3634** 
[0.0391] 
8.1472** 
[0.0431] 
21
31 11
21
31 11 12
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Table6.14: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (financial concentration:FD3) 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1%respectively.  
The effect of FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable (-1) 0.0888 
(0.0686) 
0.1891** 
(0.0813) 
0.1007 
(0.0901) 
0.1480*** 
(0.0493) 
0.2476*** 
(0.0818) 
0.3228*** 
(0.0846) 
0.1827** 
(0.0873) 
 Lag of dependent variable (-2)  0.1616** 
(0.0711) 
0.1303* 
(0.0741) 
0.0966** 
(0.0459) 
0.1252 
(0.0845) 
0.1006 
(0.0750) 
0.0561 
(0.0807) 
-0.0510 
(0.0834) 
 constant 0.4817*** 
(0.1693) 
0.3073** 
(0.1473) 
0.4706** 
(0.2351) 
0.0124 
(0.0546) 
0.0388 
(0.0438) 
0.0848 
(0.0639) 
0.0249 
(0.0330) 
 mp (-1) 0.1453** 
(0.0647) 
0.1542*** 
(0.0435) 
0.1697** 
(0.0820) 
0.1692** 
(0.0821) 
0.0537 
(0.0386) 
0.0512 
(0.0461) 
0.1603*** 
(0.0496) 
FD3      mp (-2) 0.1146** 
(0.0558) 
0.0863* 
(0.0444) 
0.1982** 
(0.0834) 
0.1745** 
(0.0809) 
0.1108** 
(0.0369) 
0.1358*** 
(0.0457) 
0.0651 
(0.0526) 
 mpfd3 (-1) -0.1351*** 
(0.0438) 
-0.0301 
(0.0357) 
-0.0457 
(0.0640) 
-0.0017 
(0.0613) 
-0.0324 
(0.0727) 
-0.0947 
(0.0921) 
-0.0886** 
(0.0386) 
       mpfd3 (-2) -0.0225 
(0.0414) 
0.0213 
(0.0342) 
-0.1251** 
(0.0612) 
-0.1038* 
(0.0607) 
0.0673 
(0.0698) 
-0.0786 
(0.0906) 
-0.0244 
(0.0402) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.0922*** 
(0.0323) 
-0.0588** 
(0.0274) 
-0.0916** 
(0.0448) 
-0.0431 
(0.0283) 
-0.0452* 
(0.0242) 
-0.0539** 
(0.0271) 
-0.0851*** 
(0.0221) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.0274 
[0.4054] 
6.9597*** 
[0.0000] 
1.1805 
[0.3237] 
0.7547 
[0.5845] 
2.8878*** 
[0.0001] 
9.4684*** 
[0.0000] 
0.41661 
[0.8363] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.5469 
[0.1935] 
1.6945 
[0.1561] 
0.1869 
[0.9448] 
0.1371 
[0.9683] 
0.7614 
[0.5526] 
3.0589* 
[0.0197] 
0.3897 
[0.8156] 
 Normality test 10.032*** 
[0.0066] 
11.634*** 
[0.0030] 
31.663*** 
[0.0000] 
27.814*** 
[0.0000] 
43.701*** 
[0.0000] 
30.512*** 
[0.0000] 
43.316*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 0.4246 
[0.9796] 
0.31021 
[0.9863] 
1.1328 
[0.3327] 
1.0565 
[0.4065] 
1.7146 
[0.0732] 
0.9253 
[0.5504] 
1.1114 
[0.3589] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
0.6971 
[0.9137] 
1.8006 
[0.1701] 
0.4886 
[0.9817] 
0.6088 
[0.5458] 
0.9359 
[0.5967] 
2.2260 
[0.1128] 
0.9223 
[0.6183] 
2.1564 
[0.1207] 
1.6825** 
[0.0351] 
1.1036 
[0.3352] 
0.8681 
[0.7028] 
1.9162 
[0.1521] 
3.1601*** 
[0.0000] 
2.5824* 
[0.0803] 
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The effect of capital market development (size measure: fd4) on interest rate pass-through is 
shown in tables 6.15 and 6.1. The results from both the long- and short-run pass-through 
models (tables 6.15 and 6.16 respectively) indicate a relatively high degree of pass-through 
(coefficient of mp), with long-run pass-through (0.73-0.83) greater than short-run (0.05-0.11). 
The short-term deposit rate still shows a lower degree of pass-through than the long-term ones 
in the long-run pass-through model, while showing a higher degree in the short-run model. 
This result supports our previous explanation. The ECM term still shows a significant 
negative effect and we continue to reject another joint restriction, that . 
 
The interaction term between this indicator and the policy interest rate shows an significant 
positive effect on lending rates only in the short-run (0.06 in mlr and 0.08 in mrr) and 
showing a significant positive effect on time deposit rates in the long-run (0.46-0.53) and 
short-run (0.07-0.13). Despite the insignificant result in the long-run pass-through of lending 
rates, the inclusion of this interaction term still leads to a higher degree of pass-through 
compared with table 6.8 (the coefficient of mp in table 6.15 is relatively higher than in table 
6.7). Thus, our finding still confirms our theoretical expectation, as an increase in this 
indicator will show a higher degree of financial disintermediation and the development of 
trading and investment in other financial markets. This causes wider alternative sources of 
funding and investment for savers and investors, increasing the demand elasticity of loans and 
deposits and therefore increasing the degree of interest rate pass-through and strengthening 
the interest rate channel. This result is supported by other empirical papers (Mojon, 2000; 
Singh et al., 2008; Gropp et al., 2007; Sander and Kleimeier, 2003).  
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Table 6.15: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (size measure of capital market development: FD4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD4 mp 0.8062 
(0.0372) 
0.7837 
(0.0393) 
0.7361 
(0.0747) 
0.7564 
(0.0572) 
0.7805 
(0.0591) 
0.8329 
(0.0769) 
0.7962 
(0.0372) 
mpfd4 0.0613 
(0.0866) 
0.0921 
(0.0915) 
0.4606 
(0.1761) 
0.5437 
(0.1397) 
0.5308 
(0.1374) 
0.2922 
(0.1789) 
0.0613 
(0.0866) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0, 
=1) 
2.1454 
[0.3421] 
2.4333 
[0.3090] 
2.3872 
[0.2115] 
3.4448 
[0.2242] 
3.7358 
[0.2985] 
3.6715 
[0.2587] 
2.1454 
[0.3421] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0,
=1, = -1) 
13.505*** 
[0.0037] 
16.366*** 
[0.0010] 
14.421*** 
[0.0024] 
16.334*** 
[0.0000] 
14.290*** 
[0.0008] 
13.817*** 
[0.0032] 
13.505*** 
[0.0037] 
21 31
11
21 31
11 12
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Table 6.16: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (size measure of capital market development: FD4 ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10 percent, 5 percent , and 1 percent respectively.  
 The effect of FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable (-1) 0.1526** 
(0.0708) 
0.2160*** 
(0.0821) 
0.1942** 
(0.0783) 
0.0813 
(0.0892) 
0.2445*** 
(0.0803) 
0.3204*** 
(0.0850) 
0.2672*** 
(0.0909) 
 Lag of dependent variable (-2) 0.0588 
(0.0745) 
0.1268* 
(0.0749) 
0.0515 
(0.0770) 
0.0754 
(0.0775) 
0.1217 
(0.0736) 
0.0430 
(0.0805) 
-0.0575 
(0.0884) 
 constant 0.3938*** 
(0.1403) 
0.2081 
(0.1293) 
-0.0487 
(0.0522) 
-0.0413 
(0.0493) 
-0.0269 
(0.0379) 
0.0168 
(0.0471) 
-0.0795* 
(0.0404) 
 mp (-1) 0.1172*** 
(0.0348) 
0.0934*** 
(0.0258) 
0.0907* 
(0.0385) 
0.0956* 
(0.0422) 
0.0379 
(0.0312) 
0.0751** 
(0.0386) 
0.0565** 
(0.0285) 
FD4      mp (-2) 0.0256 
(0.0991) 
0.0551 
(0.0663) 
0.0698 
(0.0432) 
0.0254 
(0.0425) 
0.0743*** 
(0.0315) 
0.0002 
(0.0386) 
-0.0006 
(0.0321) 
 mpfd4 (-1) 0.0611* 
(0.0338) 
0.0828** 
(0.0305) 
0.1321* 
(0.0795) 
0.0899 
(0.0776) 
0.0705** 
(0.0281) 
0.0880** 
(0.0345) 
0.0718 
(0.0668) 
       mpfd4 (-2)  -0.0651 
(0.0990) 
0.0491 
(0.0302) 
0.0993 
(0.0827) 
0.1292* 
(0.0751) 
0.0396 
(0.0566) 
0.0660 
(0.0718) 
0.0372 
(0.0695) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.0887*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0444* 
(0.0261) 
-0.0974*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.0789*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0448* 
(0.0234) 
-0.0567** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0631*** 
(0.0193) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.2152 
[0.3070] 
4.5346*** 
[0.0009] 
0.5302 
[0.7529] 
0.1431 
[0.9817] 
4.2965*** 
[0.0013] 
8.3688*** 
[0.0000] 
0.7397 
[0.5954] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.8660 
[0.1212] 
1.7479 
[0.1445] 
0.1771 
[0.9498] 
0.1677 
[0.9544] 
0.7499 
[0.5600] 
6.0513*** 
[0.0002] 
0.1727 
[0.9519] 
 Normality test 8.5860** 
[0.0137] 
7.1596** 
[0.0279] 
30.167*** 
[0.0000] 
28.460*** 
[0.0000] 
28.5150*** 
[0.0000] 
21.3410*** 
[0.0000] 
48.509*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 1.1671 
[0.3158] 
0.6262 
[0.8158] 
0.8111 
[0.6834] 
0.9989 
[0.4674] 
2.0983 
[0.1108] 
0.7368 
[0.7659] 
0.6688 
[0.8341] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.1124 
.[0.3432] 
2.7180* 
[0.0703] 
0.6182 
[0.9220] 
1.2027 
[0.3043] 
1.0534 
[0.4175] 
1.0897 
[0.3399] 
1.5128 
[0.1545] 
1.9508 
[0.1471] 
1.2546 
[0.1891] 
0.5390 
[0.5849] 
0.8352 
[0.7516] 
0.6951 
[0.5012] 
2.0386*** 
[0.0030] 
3.5099 
[0.2333] 
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For the effect of the activity measure of capital market development (fd5), the results from 
both the long- and short-run pass-through models (tables 6.17 and 6.18 respectively) still 
present a relatively high degree of pass-through (coefficient of mp), with the long-run  (0.75-
0.84) greater than the short-run (0.05-0.15). The short-term deposit rate still shows a lower 
degree of pass-through than the long-term ones in the long-run pass-through model, while 
showing a higher degree in the short-run model. This result supports our previous 
explanation. The ECM term still shows a significant negative effect and we continue to reject 
another joint restriction, that . 
 
The interaction term between this indicator and the policy interest rate shows a significant 
positive effect on lending rates only in the short-run (0.06 and 0.10 in mlr and mrr), while 
showing a significant positive effect on time deposit rates in the long-run (0.40-0.76). Despite 
the insignificant effect of this interaction term, the mp coefficient of the long-run pass-
through of lending rates and short-run pass-through of deposit rates is still relatively high 
compared with that before inclusion of the interaction term (tables 6.7 and 6.8). Thus, our 
finding still confirms that the activity measure of capital market development causes a higher 
degree of pass-through and hence a strengthening of the interest rate channel. This is 
confirmed by our theoretical aspect, as the development in the activities in the capital market 
will lead to greater opportunities for banks to obtain other funding sources, increasing the 
demand elasticity of deposits and loans and therefore increasing the degree of pass-through 
and strengthening the interest rate channel.  
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Table 6.17: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (activity measure of capital market development: FD5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1%respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD5 mp 0.7992 
(0.0372) 
0.7886 
(0.0371) 
0.7574 
(0.0760) 
0.8196 
(0.1888) 
0.7876 
(0.0569) 
0.8499 
(0.0771) 
0.7992 
(0.0372) 
mpfd5 0.0802 
(0.1355) 
0.2052 
(0.1339) 
0.6241 
(0.2779) 
0.7764 
(0.0525) 
0.7655 
(0.1980) 
0.4010 
(0.2773) 
0.0802 
(0.1355) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0, 
=1) 
4.5189 
[0.1044] 
2.7939 
[0.2474] 
4.3225 
[0.1152] 
2.9891 
[0.2244] 
3.2482 
[0.2267] 
3.0922 
[0.2175] 
4.5189 
[0.1044] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0,
=1, = -1) 
9.5984** 
[0.0223] 
10.796** 
[0.0129] 
10.5450** 
[0.0145] 
9.7280*** 
[0.0077] 
14.7570*** 
[0.0006] 
15.365*** 
[0.0005] 
9.5984** 
[0.0223] 
21 31
11
21 31
11 12
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Table 6.18: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (activity measure of capital market development: FD5)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1%respectively.
The effect of FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable (-1) 0.1357* 
(0.0711) 
0.2072** 
(0.0822) 
0.1797** 
(0.0778) 
0.1828** 
(0.0771) 
0.3348*** 
(0.0896) 
0.3270*** 
(0.0851) 
0.2696*** 
(0.0940) 
 Lag of dependent variable (-2) 0.1225 
(0.0843) 
0.1043 
(0.0757) 
0.0915 
(0.0833) 
0.0999 
(0.0904) 
0.0633 
(0.0830) 
0.0497 
(0.0813) 
-0.0451 
(0.0911) 
 constant 0.3846 
(0.2321) 
0.2652* 
(0.1394) 
-0.0318 
(0.0578) 
-0.0353 
(0.0499) 
-0.0032 
(0.0434) 
0.0625 
(0.0584) 
-0.0311 
(0.0357) 
 mp (-1) 0.1437*** 
(0.0451) 
0.0527** 
(0.0263) 
0.1553*** 
(0.0425) 
0.1556*** 
(0.0359) 
0.0667** 
(0.0334) 
0.1363*** 
(0.0336) 
0.0765*** 
(0.0251) 
FD5 mp (-2) 0.0320 
(0.0412) 
0.1068*** 
(0.0261) 
0.0762* 
(0.0444) 
0.0831 
(0.0415) 
0.1374*** 
(0.0342) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0375) 
0.0071 
(0.0282) 
 mpfd5 (-1) 0.0647** 
(0.0326) 
-0.0408 
(0.0711) 
0.0903 
(0.1533) 
0.0452 
(0.0415) 
0.0227 
(0.1124) 
0.0874 
(0.1237) 
0.0930 
(0.0968) 
 mpfd5 (-2) -0.0380 
(0.0402) 
-0.0785 
(0.0741) 
-0.0877 
(0.1534) 
0.1908 
(0.1347) 
-0.1136 
(0.1126) 
-0.1147 
(0.1252) 
-0.0200 
(0.0993) 
 Ecm (-1) -0.0759* 
(0.0408) 
-0.0525** 
(0.0265) 
-0.0650** 
(0.0297) 
-0.0634** 
(0.0292) 
-0.0451* 
(0.0254) 
-0.0542* 
(0.0293) 
-0.0509*** 
(0.0185) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.6353 
[0.1569] 
3.9663*** 
[0.0024] 
0.4344 
[0.8237] 
0.2932 
[0.9157] 
1.4331 
[0.2180] 
8.4684*** 
[0.0000] 
0.3006 
[0.9114] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.6951 
[0.1560] 
0.0982 
[0.4204] 
0.1126 
[0.9779] 
0.1618 
[0.9572] 
1.3302 
[0.2630] 
5.1065*** 
[0.0008] 
0.7703 
[0.5468] 
 Normality test 8.4690** 
[0.0145] 
7.0993** 
[0.0287] 
31.341*** 
[0.0000] 
29.545*** 
[0.0000] 
40.484*** 
[0.0000] 
18.474*** 
[0.0001] 
38.631*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 0.8807 
[0.5686] 
1.3614 
[0.1961] 
1.4941 
[0.1373] 
1.0563 
[0.4067] 
1.3464 
[0.2033] 
0.9459 
[0.5268] 
1.0015 
[0.4598] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.0429 
[0.4240] 
1.9202 
[0.1515] 
0.8781 
[0.6391] 
1.0033 
[0.3700] 
1.1362 
[0.3183] 
4.9764*** 
[0.0085] 
1.1797 
[0.2598] 
2.8454* 
[0.0624] 
6.2321*** 
[0.0000] 
2.2273 
[0.1125] 
 
0.9483 
[0.5771] 
1.8824 
[0.1571] 
2.6461*** 
[0.0001] 
0.5267 
[0.5919] 
 330 
 
The effect of bond market development (financial innovation) (fd6) on interest rate pass-
through is shown in tables 6.19 and 6.20. The results show that there is still a higher degree of 
pass-through (coefficient of mp) in the long-run (0.79-0.88) than in the short-run (0.06-0.16). 
The short-term deposit rate still shows a lower degree of pass-through than the long-term rates 
in the long-run pass-through model, while showing a higher degree in the short-run model. 
The ECM term still shows a negative coefficient.  
 
The interaction term of this indicator with the policy interest rate shows that there is no effect 
of this term on either the lending interest rates or deposit interest rates in the long-run, while 
the effect only appears in the short-run model of lending rates (0.06 and 0.09 in mlr and mrr). 
Although this interaction term shows an insignificant result, its inclusion also improves the 
degree of long-run pass-through in both lending and deposit rates as well as short-run pass-
through in deposit rates, compared with the level before its addition (tables 6.7 and 6.8). In 
addition, the result in table 6.19 shows that we not reject the null hypothesis of the joint 
restriction that . This shows that the inclusion of this interaction term will lead to an 
increase in the degree of pass-through (in this case, a full degree of pass-through). This 
therefore shows that the effect of financial innovation still leads to a greater degree of long-
run pass-through in deposit interest rates and the strengthening of the interest rate channel. 
Our finding is confirmed by the theoretical expectation in section 6.2.3, as an increase in 
financial innovation will show the development of the trading system and payment system 
technologies, an increase in the sources of finance for investors, and a reduction in bank costs. 
This therefore increases the demand elasticity of deposits and loans, causing a higher degree 
of interest rate pass-through. This result is supported by other empirical papers on this issue 
(Singh et al., 2008; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Cottarelli et al., 1995).
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Table6.19:  The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (financial innovation:FD6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5% , and 1%respectively.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 In this case, the coefficient of mp is equal to one and the coefficient and standard error of the mpfd6 will be changed to equal to 0.9336 (0.6286). 
42
 In this case, the coefficient of mp is equal to one and the coefficient and standard error of the mpfd6 will be changed to equal to 0.6756 (0.6413). 
43
 In this case, the coefficient of mp is equal to one and the coefficient and standard error of the mpfd6 will be changed to equal to 0.1705 (0.6363). 
44
 In this case, the coefficient of mp is equal to one and the coefficient and standard error of the mpfd6 will be changed to equal to 0.6833 (0.6300). 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD6 mp 0.7957 
(0.0527) 
0.7835 
(0.0560) 
0.8242 
(0.1314) 
0.8275 
(0.0785) 
0.8525 
(0.0827) 
0.8809 
(0.0848) 
0.8416 
(0.0730) 
mpfd6 0.1223 
(0.3404) 
0.3340 
(0.3634) 
-0.2671 
(0.2671) 
-0.4369 
(0.5227) 
0.3129 
(0.5508) 
-0.5024 
(0.5643) 
-0.5744 
(0.4863) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0, 
=1) 
0.5318 
[0.7665] 
1.9306 
[0.3809] 
4.0355 
[0.1330] 
1.6130 
[0.4464] 
2.8918 
[0.2355] 
3.1361 
[0.2085] 
3.6846 
[0.1584] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0, =0,
=1, = -1) 
11.669*** 
[0.0086] 
12.489*** 
[0.0059] 
5.306441 
[0.1507] 
4.010542 
[0.2603] 
4.534843 
[0.2092] 
4.323744 
[0.2286] 
13.992*** 
[0.0029] 
21 31
11
21 31
11 12
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Table 6.20: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (financial innovation:FD6) 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of  rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10 percent, 5 percent , and 1 percent respectively. 
Retail interest rates Independent variable  /dependent 
variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable (-1) 0.1647** 
(0.0681) 
0.2127*** 
(0.0808) 
0.1847** 
(0.0766) 
0.1551** 
(0.0756) 
0.3232*** 
(0.0892) 
0.2822*** 
(0.0867) 
0.2472** 
(0.0963) 
 Lag of dependent variable (-2)  0.1070 
(0.0835) 
0.1122 
(0.0739) 
0.1029 
(0.0968) 
0.1061 
(0.0850) 
0.0685 
(0.0822) 
0.0387 
(0.0806) 
-0.0527 
(0.0915) 
 constant 0.2704 
(0.1823) 
0.3221** 
(0.1586) 
0.0069 
(0.0575) 
-0.0262 
(0.0559) 
0.0259 
(0.0537) 
0.0592 
(0.0583) 
-0.0864* 
(0.0490) 
 mp (-1) 0.1556*** 
(0.0333) 
0.0458 
(0.1705) 
0.1634*** 
(0.0544) 
0.1879*** 
(0.0510) 
0.0939** 
(0.0381) 
0.0983* 
(0.0571) 
0.0627* 
(0.0326) 
FD6      mp (-2) 0.0792** 
(0.0319) 
0.0923*** 
(0.0332) 
0.0301 
(0.0558) 
0.0421 
(0.0535) 
0.0941** 
(0.0366) 
0.1216** 
(0.0540) 
0.0392 
(0.0319) 
 mpfd6 (-1) 0.0609** 
(0.0298) 
-0.1372 
(0.1802) 
-0.2023 
(0.6083) 
-0.2185 
(0.5782) 
-0.1812 
(0.2077) 
-0.2791 
(0.1919) 
-0.1505 
(0.1854) 
       mpfd6 (-2) -0.0100 
(0.0302) 
0.0979* 
(0.0352) 
0.2068 
(0.6210) 
0.1878 
(0.5874) 
0.1665 
(0.2026) 
0.0341 
(0.1813) 
-0.2073 
(0.1802) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.1029*** 
(0.0312) 
-0.0562** 
(0.0272) 
-0.0477* 
(0.0271) 
-0.0403* 
(0.0240) 
-0.0354* 
(0.0199) 
-0.0513* 
(0.0295) 
-0.0305** 
(0.0141) 
 AR 1-5 test 1.6353 
[0.1569] 
2.4387** 
[0.0388] 
0.3101 
[0.9059] 
0.6338 
[0.6743] 
8.7682*** 
[0.0000] 
8.8961*** 
[0.0000] 
0.4931 
[0.7807] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 1.6029 
[0.1655] 
2.4043 
[0.0539] 
0.1879 
[0.9443] 
0.1769 
[0.9499] 
1.3796 
[0.2454] 
3.7576** 
[0.0066] 
0.8312 
[0.5081] 
 Normality test 2.0132* 
[0.0973] 
7.7987*** 
[0.0203] 
38.672*** 
[0.0000] 
26.487*** 
[0.0000] 
29.365*** 
[0.0000] 
14.1480*** 
[0.0008] 
45.102*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 1.2454 
[0.2544] 
1.3953 
[0.1790] 
0.9911 
[0.4622] 
0.9306 
[0.5290] 
0.9828 
[0.4699] 
1.1804 
[0.3067] 
1.7421 
[0.0681] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.2454 
[0.2544] 
1.9202 
[0.1515] 
0.9816 
[0.5009] 
0.9539 
[0.3883] 
1.2002 
[0.2563] 
1.3062 
[0.2749] 
1.3701 
[0.1219] 
6.8150*** 
[0.0016] 
0.7926 
[0.7503] 
0.0163 
[0.9838] 
1.0894 
[0.3698] 
0.1959 
[0.8223] 
7.1986*** 
[0.0000] 
0.7849 
[0.4587] 
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For the effect of financial liberalization (fd7), the results in tables 6.21 and 6.22 still show a 
higher degree of pass-through (coefficient of mp) in the long-run (0.74-0.79) than in the short-
run (0.05-0.12). The short-term deposit rate continues to show a lower degree of pass-through 
than the long-term rates in the long-run pass-through model, while showing a higher degree in 
the short-run model. This result supports our previous explanation. The ECM term still shows 
a significant negative effect. We continue to reject another joint restriction, that . 
 
The results from both the long- and short-run pass-through models indicate a significant 
positive effect of the interaction term between this indicator and the policy interest rate, in 
both the long-run (0.15 and 0.12 in mlr and mrr, and around 0.24-0.48 in deposit rates) and 
short-run (0.05 and 0.04 in mlr and mrr, and around 0.07-0.09 in deposit rates). The finding 
shows that financial liberalization leads to a greater effect of interest rate pass-through, thus 
causing a stronger effect of the interest rate channel. This result is confirmed by our 
expectation, as financial liberalization policies will give banks more possibilities to adjust 
retail interest rates and also lead to an increase in capital inflows, a higher volume of foreign 
exchange transactions, and financial openness in the country. This causes an increase in 
alternative sources of investment for bank customers, leading to a higher demand elasticity of 
loans and deposits, and thus increasing the extent of interest rate pass-through and 
strengthening the interest rate channel. Our finding is supported by other empirical papers 
(Fomum, 2011; Chong, 2009; De Bondt, 2005; De Bondt et al., 2005; Sander and Kleimeier, 
2006; Marotta, 2007; Chionis and Leon, 2005; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010; Brouwer, 1995).
112 
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Table 6.21: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the long-run pass-through model (financial liberalization:FD7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FD Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
FD7 mp 0.7731 
(0.0469) 
0.7221 
(0.0491) 
0.6499 
(0.0799) 
0.6971 
(0.0776) 
0.6745 
(0.0647) 
0.6999 
(0.0799) 
0.6549 
(0.1031) 
mpfd7 0.1521 
(0.0622) 
0.1238 
(0.0588) 
0.3612 
(0.1084) 
0.3222 
(0.1052) 
0.3409 
(0.0864) 
0.4861 
(0.1073) 
0.2489 
(0.1171) 
Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1) 
4.1119 
[0.1280] 
2.3873 
[0.3031] 
1.6383 
[0.4408] 
3.8858 
[0.2431] 
4.2220 
[0.1211] 
3.8115 
[0.1487] 
4.5595 
[0.1023] 
 Chi-square statistic 
(the restriction: =0,
=0, =1, = -1) 
13.259*** 
[0.0041] 
19.596*** 
[0.0002] 
9.1730** 
[0.0102] 
9.7677*** 
[0.0076] 
14.211*** 
[0.0008] 
14.978*** 
[0.0006] 
9.8894** 
[0.0195] 
21
31 11
21
31 11 12
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Table 6.22: The result of the effect of financial sector development on the short-run pass-through (financial liberalization: FD7) 
Note:  (-) represents the standard error and [-] represents the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of restriction where *, **, *** means the rejection of the null hypothesis of the 
restriction at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
Retail interest rates Independent variable  
/dependent variable 
 
mlr mrr 3tdep 6tdep 12tdep 2ytdep sav 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 Lag of dependent variable (-1) 0.0259 
(0.0834) 
0.1773** 
(0.0778) 
0.0741 
(0.0942) 
0.1551** 
(0.0756) 
0.2388*** 
(0.0810) 
0.3991*** 
(0.0955) 
0.2764*** 
(0.0931) 
 Lag of dependent variable (-2) 0.0492 
(0.0705) 
0.1409* 
(0.0747) 
0.0720 
(0.0805) 
0.0577 
(0.0885) 
0.1165 
(0.0731) 
0.0207 
(0.0905) 
-0.0485 
(0.0848) 
 constant 0.5335*** 
(0.1512) 
0.3093** 
(0.1422) 
0.0050 
(0.0554) 
0.0463 
(0.0527) 
0.0737 
(0.0495) 
0.0291 
(0.0821) 
-0.0391 
(0.0344) 
 mp 0.0932*** 
(0.0291) 
0.0513** 
(0.0221) 
0.1283*** 
(0.0344) 
0.0944*** 
(0.0324) 
0.0493** 
(0.0237) 
0.0489 
(0.0308) 
0.0538*** 
(0.0191) 
FD7      mp (-1) 0.0615** 
(0.0265) 
0.0887*** 
(0.0213) 
0.0577 
(0.0359) 
0.0462 
(0.0320) 
0.1106*** 
(0.0235) 
0.1132*** 
(0.0315) 
0.0115 
(0.0206) 
 mpfd7 0.0525** 
(0.0249) 
0.0467** 
(0.0205) 
0.0845** 
(0.0366) 
0.0728** 
(0.0324) 
0.0903*** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0223 
(0.0346) 
0.0853*** 
(0.0221) 
       mpfd7 (-1) 0.0073 
(0.0252) 
-0.0154 
(0.0207) 
0.0305 
(0.0364) 
0.0190 
(0.0324) 
-0.0228 
(0.0242) 
-0.0259 
(0.0338) 
-0.0101 
(0.0235) 
   Ecm (-1) -0.1172*** 
(0.0319) 
-0.0626** 
(0.0277) 
-0.0570** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0926** 
(0.0354) 
-0.0620** 
(0.0284) 
-0.0679** 
(0.0308) 
-0.0480*** 
(0.0181) 
 AR 1-5 test 0.7847 
[0.5629] 
2.4387** 
[0.0388] 
1.3731 
[0.2400] 
0.6073 
[0.6945] 
8.7682*** 
[0.0000] 
6.9077*** 
[0.0000] 
0.4931 
[0.7807] 
 ARCH 1-4 test 2.0132* 
[0.0973] 
1.3086 
[0.2711] 
0.0591 
[0.9934] 
0.1430 
[0.9657] 
1.3796 
[0.2454] 
3.5652*** 
[0.0089] 
0.8312 
[0.5081] 
 Normality test 4.4105 
[0.1102] 
7.7987*** 
[0.0203] 
16.3080*** 
[0.0003] 
30.350*** 
[0.0000] 
29.365*** 
[0.0000] 
17.992*** 
[0.0001] 
45.102*** 
[0.0000] 
 Hetero test 1.2131 
[0.2707] 
1.3953 
[0.1790] 
0.9911 
[0.4622] 
0.8694 
[0.6155] 
0.9828 
[0.4699] 
0.7632 
[0.7059] 
1.7421 
[0.0681] 
 Hetero X test 
 
RESET test 
1.0973 
[0.3556] 
1.8640 
[0.1600] 
0.9816 
[0.5009] 
0.9539 
[0.3883] 
1.2002 
[0.2563] 
1.3062 
[0.2749] 
0.9286 
[0.6059] 
0.7198 
[0.4891] 
0.7926 
[0.7503] 
0.0163 
[0.9838] 
0.8066 
[0.7586] 
0.7629 
[0.4687] 
7.1986*** 
[0.0000] 
0.7849 
[0.4587] 
         



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Furthermore, recursive estimation is also performed in order to check for the effect of 
structural change on the cointegrating vector. The recursive estimation of the eigenvalue of 
the cointegrating relationship in each equation of the effect of each financial development 
indicator (fd1-fd7) on the pass-through model is shown in appendix B (figures B6.1.1 to 
B6.1.7).  
 
Similar to the result in figure A6.1.1, the results for all the eigenvalues in each different 
equation show their stability throughout the study period, the change occurring during 
1998Q1 as a result of the effect of the financial crisis, as previously explained. Although there 
is a change in the eigenvalues during this period, this change has little effect on them as we do 
not see the sharp break of the recursive graph of the eigenvalues during this period and the 
recursive graph continues to be stable until 2008.  
 
We also perform recursive estimations of the  coefficient (the coefficient of the degree of 
pass-through) to obtain the result of the change in the degree of pass-through during the study 
period. The results of each of the  coefficients for the effects of different financial 
development indicators are shown in Appendix B (figures B6.2.1 to A6.2.7). 
 
The  coefficients of the mp and mpfd variables in all the lending interest rate and deposit 
interest rate equations show positive signs and lie within the standard error band. All the  
coefficients are almost stable throughout the period, with some changes occurring in specific 
periods. The long-run pass-through degree of both lending and deposit interest rates shows an 




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upward trend during the periods 1984Q1 and 1991Q1. This is because of the adjustment of 
the short-term time deposit interest structure and the introduction of transferable deposit 
certificates (in 1984Q1) and the effect of financial liberalization (in 1991Q1). The  
coefficients of both variables in each of the interest rate pass-through equations also show a 
decrease in the degree of pass-through during 1997Q4 as a result of the effect of the financial 
crisis.  
 
The recursive estimation of each of the short-run interest rate pass-through models can be 
seen in Appendix B (figures B6.3.1 to B6.3.7).   
 
The  coefficients of both the mp and mpfd variables in each of the short-run interest rate 
pass-through models show a similar pattern to the long-run pass-through model, with the 
movement of the  coefficient within the +/-2 standard error band. An upward adjustment of 
the degree of pass-through is seen during the periods 1984Q1 and 1991Q1 due to the effect of 
the time deposit interest rate structure change and financial liberalization respectively. The 
degree of pass-through is stable after 1991Q1 and changes negatively again in 1997Q4 due to 
the effect of the financial crisis in the country. The result from the break point Chow test and 
forecast Chow test show that the F-statistic is below the critical value of 5 per cent and 
confirms the stability property of our result. However, the 1 step Chow test and the 1 step 
residual still show a value which lies outside the critical value during 1984Q1, 1991Q1 and 
1997Q4, representing the structural changes in the country discussed earlier. Moreover, the 
results from almost all the diagnostic tests in each short-run model still show the detection of 



 338 
 
non-normality.  This is due to the outliner problem as a result of structural changes as 
previously described. 
 
To sum up, the results of the study of interest rate pass-through in Thailand show incomplete 
interest rate pass-through, with a relatively higher degree of pass-through in the long-run than 
in the short-run. High interest rate maturity will also show a higher degree of pass-through in 
the long-run model, while showing a lower degree in the short-run model. The finding is 
supported by our theoretical explanation and the empirical papers discussed previously. For 
the effect of financial development on interest rate pass-through, the results show that capital 
market development (size and activity measure), bond market development (financial 
innovation), banking competition, and financial liberalization will lead to a greater degree of 
pass-through, hence also showing the strengthening of the interest rate channel. On the other 
hand, banking sector development (size and activity measure) will cause a lower degree of 
pass-through, hence weakening the interest rate channel.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines interest rate pass-through in Thailand and also the effect of financial 
sector development (financial liberalization, financial competition, financial innovation, 
capital market development and banking sector development) on this pass-through. We 
investigate this pass-through effect by obtaining quarterly data on interest rates and also the 
financial sector development indicators in Thailand from 1978Q1 to 2008Q4 and by using the 
VECM technique to study long- and short-run interest rate pass-through. The baseline result 
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of the interest rate pass-through in Thailand indicates an incomplete degree of long- and 
short-run pass-through, with a considerably higher degree in the long-run compared with the 
short-run. This result is in line with our theoretical expectation, as interest rate pass-through in 
reality can show an incomplete degree of pass-through due to various important factors which 
cause stickiness in the interest rate (credit rationing and the risk sharing behaviour of banks, 
the asymmetric information problem, and the costs faced by banks and investors, namely 
switching cost and adjustment cost). Our results show a similar high degree of long-run pass-
through in Thailand to other studies in Thailand (Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007; Rehman, 
2004) and the high degree of pass-through, especially in the long-run, was probably caused by 
the financial sector development which took place in Thailand during our study period 
(1978Q1-2008Q4), as explained in chapter 3. The study of different maturities of the time 
deposit interest rates (3 month, 6 month, 12 month, and 2 year time deposit interest rates) 
show that the higher the maturity of the time deposit interest rate, the greater the pass-through 
in the long-run, but the lower in the short-run. This result is supported by our theoretical 
prediction, as the interest rate pass-through in the short-run has a mean reversion property, 
and thus the effect of the policy interest rate on the short-term interest rate will be higher than 
the long-term ones. The speed of adjustment in every short-run pass-through model indicates 
a significant negative coefficient of the speed of adjustment variable, confirming that the 
interest rate will have an equilibrium adjustment to the new equilibrium.  
 
For the study of the effect of financial sector development on the long- and short-run models 
of interest rate pass-through, it can be concluded that banking competition, capital market 
development, financial innovation, and financial liberalization will cause a greater degree of 
pass-through, thus resulting in a stronger effect of the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
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transmission. Financial competition (lower concentration) can lead to a reduction in banks’ 
interest rate margins and a higher demand elasticity of retail interest rates, so banks will tend 
to adjust their retail interest rates in a more competitive way. Also, if we look at the interest 
rate pass-through model as a marginal cost pricing model (see equation 6.1), the more 
competitive environment will raise elasticity of price with respect to marginal cost, hence 
increasing the degree of pass-through. Capital market development (both size and activities 
measures) causes a higher degree of pass-through as this development leads to a wider range 
of alternative sources of funding and investment for savers and investors. This increases the 
demand elasticity of loans and deposits and therefore increasing the degree of interest rate 
pass-through and strengthening the interest rate channel. Financial innovation also leads to a 
higher degree of pass-through, as this development involves the development of trading 
system and payment system technologies. Hence, it can increase the sources of finance for 
investors and reduce bank costs, raising the demand elasticity of deposits and loans, and 
causing a higher degree of interest rate pass-through. Moreover, the financial liberalization in 
Thailand, shown by many deregulation policies (interest rate ceiling abolition, capital control 
and foreign exchange control relaxation), gives banks more possibilities to adjust retail 
interest rates. Also, this leads to an increase in capital inflows and a higher volume of foreign 
exchange transactions in the country, causing an increase in alternative sources of investment 
for bank customers. This causes a higher demand elasticity of loans and deposits, thus 
increasing the extent of interest rate pass-through and strengthening the interest rate channel. 
Banking sector development will cause a lower degree of pass-through, resulting in a weaker 
effect of the interest rate channel. This is because greater banking sector development (both 
bank size and activities development) will show a greater degree of financial intermediation 
and a greater influence of banks on borrowers and depositors. Hence, this reduces the demand 
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elasticity of loans and deposits and leads to a lower degree of pass-through and the weakening 
of the interest rate channel. 
 
The results for all the recursive graphs of eigenvalues in each equation (both the baseline 
equation and the equation of the effect of financial development on the pass-through) show 
their stability throughout the study period, confirming that we do not have the effect of 
structural changes on the cointegrating vector. When we perform the recursive estimations of 
the  coefficient (the coefficient of the degree of pass-through) in order to obtain the result 
of the change in the degree of pass-through during the study period, we found that all of the 
 coefficients in both the lending and deposit rate equations present stability throughout the 
period, with some changes occurring in specific periods. The pass-through degree of both 
lending and deposit interest rates tends to adjust upwards during the periods 1984Q1 and 
1991Q1. The increase in pass-through during 1984Q1 was possibly due to the adjustment by 
commercial banks of the short-term deposit interest structure. In this case, the 3 and 6 month 
deposit interest rate ceiling was adjusted upwards to achieve an interest rate level comparable 
to the 12 month-deposit rate (BOT, 1984). This adjustment may have caused the increase in 
the interest rate pass-through, especially with regard to the 3 and 6 month deposit interest rate. 
The upward movement of the  coefficients also comes from the effect of the financial 
liberalization which began in 1990. The effect of the relaxation of the retail interest rate 
ceiling in Thailand, and other deregulation policies, resulted in a higher degree of pass-
through, mostly shown in the increase of the  coefficients during 1991Q1. The  
coefficients also show negative adjustment during the period 1997Q4, possibly due to the 
effects of the financial crisis which may have led to the problem of financial market volatility 



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and market uncertainty. This can lead to a relatively low interest rate pass-through, as banks 
will face higher credit risk, adjustment costs and the asymmetric information problem. 
 
This study raises some important issues for policy makers in Thailand, since we have 
obtained the result that an increase in financial development will lead to an increase in the 
degree of pass-through. Policy makers should therefore consider financial development as one 
of the factors which can increase the effectiveness of monetary policy through the interest rate 
channel. However, the effects of financial developments can also pass through to affect the 
economy via other channels of monetary policy transmission and the effect of these 
developments on the economy can depend on these other channels. Therefore, an adequate 
supervisory system and appropriate risk management techniques in the banking and financial 
sectors are also needed when carrying out financial development in the future in order to 
control the effect of financial development on the economy. Moreover, policy makers should 
examine financial and economic conditions before introducing financial development plans. 
In this case, a reasonably stable macroeconomic condition is required, with stable conditions 
in the financial market. 
 
There are several issues policy makers should be aware of when conducting financial sector 
development in the future. We obtained the result that the effect of financial sector 
development will have a greater effect in the long- run pass-through model than the short-run 
one. Thus, policy makers should be aware of this long-run effect. This is because their 
financial sector development policies will take time to affect the economy. Furthermore, 
financial development, especially capital market development, financial innovation, financial 
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competition, and financial liberalization, can have a greater effect on the degree of pass-
through. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the issue of new financial development 
policies, as this can create an overshooting of the pass-through. Therefore, policy makers and 
central banks should consider this problem when developing future financial development 
policies and before implementing monetary policy in the economy.  
 
There is a lack of data on interest rates in the different economic sectors (business loan rate, 
mortgage interest rate and consumer interest rate) and in different maturities (different 
maturities of bond interest rates) in our consideration period (1978Q1 to 2008Q4)45. 
Therefore, future studies of interest rate pass-through, as well as the effect of financial 
development on the pass-through, could be expanded by including examination of these 
different types of retail interest rates.  
                                                          
45
 We have a lack of data on the interest rates in different economic sector and the data of bond market interest 
rate available only from 1997 onward.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Among several channels of monetary policy transmission, the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector have been considered to be an important issue in 
many studies of monetary policy in recent decades. The significance of this study derives 
from the important role of financial intermediaries (the banking sector and financial 
institutions) in the financial market in terms of solving the asymmetric information problem 
by reducing agency, transaction and search costs between lenders (banks) and borrowers 
(firms and households), diversifying and reducing risks in financial market transactions 
through the risk diversification approach. Thus, this improves the saving allocation between 
economic agents, and supporting economic growth. 
 
Moreover, the idea of financial development is another important aspect of the study of 
monetary policy transmission. Financial development can lead to important effects on the 
banking sector, affecting the roles which the financial institutions and the banking sector play 
in the financial market, economic agents and the economy. Therefore, it is also interesting and 
important to study the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary policy 
transmission relating to the banking sector. This is due to the importance of financial 
development on the banking sector and thus this area of study raises the significant issue of 
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the way in which monetary policy passes through to the economy via the banking sector and 
its impact it has from financial development. In addition, this study can be used as a policy 
implication for policy makers to control the economy during periods of financial 
development.  
 
Therefore, this thesis will focuse on the channels of monetary policy transmission which 
relate to the banking sector, namely the lending, balance sheet and interest rate channels 
(interest rate pass-through), and also investigates the effect of financial development on the 
channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector.  
 
Recent studies of these channels of monetary policy transmission, as well as the effect of 
financial development on them, broadly focus on developed countries, such as the US and 
European ones. This leaves a gap for the study of developing countries, and therefore this 
thesis uses Thailand as a case study of a developing country. It also introduces the micro data 
based approach to both the bank lending channel and firm balance sheet channel, thus filling 
the gap in the past empirical studies, which mainly use time series data.  
 
This thesis also shed light on the effect of financial development on the channels of monetary 
policy transmission relating to the banking sector, which is an aspect which is rarely focused 
on in past empirical studies, especially of developing countries. It also introduces the effect of 
financial development on different areas (financial liberalization, financial competition, 
financial innovation, financial deepening, banking sector and capital market development) 
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and studies the effect of different aspects of financial development on the channels of 
monetary policy transmission relating to the banking sector. This fills the gap in past 
empirical papers, which only focus on a few aspects of financial development on monetary 
policy transmission.  
 
Moreover, this thesis is the first case study of Thailand to examine the effect of financial 
development on the micro data based aspect of the credit channel and on interest rate pass-
through. It is also the first case study of Thailand to introduce different aspects of financial 
development to examine the effect of financial development on these channels.  
 
The following section will summarise the main empirical findings of the thesis (section 7.2). 
Section 7.3 will discuss the implications and section 7.4 will state the limitations of the thesis 
and make suggestions for further research.  
 
7.2 Summary of results  
 
The main aims of this thesis were to examine the channels of monetary policy transmission 
relating to the banking sector, as well as to investigate the effect of financial development on 
these channels in Thailand. Therefore, our study was divided into three main empirical 
chapters investigating the three channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the 
banking sector as well as the effect of financial development on these channels (the bank 
lending channel, the bank balance sheet channel and the interest rate channel). 
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Chapter 4 examined the bank lending channel in Thailand from the micro data based 
perspective by using bank panel data from 1978 to 2008 and investigated the effect of 
financial sector development on the bank lending channel. We applied different panel data 
estimation techniques (fixed effect estimation, 2SLS, first difference GMM and system GMM 
estimation) and our results confirm the bank lending channel theory in Thailand as we found a 
significant negative effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans. We also found that the 
higher the size, capitalization and liquidity of banks, the weaker the effect of the policy 
interest rate on bank loans and thus the weakening of the bank lending channel. This is due to 
the relatively high ability to obtain external funding of the large, highly capitalized, and 
highly liquid banks in Thailand. However, we found that the size characteristic variables show 
an unexpected negative effect on bank loans due to the balance sheet structure of banks in 
Thailand, with small banks having higher capital to asset and securities to asset ratios. Also, 
the capital characteristic variable shows an unexpected negative effect on bank loans, as the 
poorly capitalized banks have considerably higher average loans than the highly capitalized 
ones. Despite these unexpected findings, this result will have little impact when the effect of 
the policy interest rate variable is included. This is because the balance sheet structure of large 
and high capitalized banks in Thailand which still have the relatively high ability to obtain 
external funding. In this case, the balance sheet of banks in Thailand shows that large banks 
still have a relatively high proportion of average bank securities, total equity, total liquid 
assets, and liquidity to total asset ratio compared with small ones. Better capitalized banks 
have better access to external funding sources due to the higher proportion of capitalization 
(capital to asset ratio) and liquidity (liquidity to asset ratio), compared to poorly capitalized 
banks. Moreover, the highly liquid banks in Thailand have a higher proportion of bank 
securities, capital and liquid assets compared with those with weak liquidity. Therefore, we 
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conclude that a greater bank size, capital and liquidity will weaken the effect of the policy 
interest rate on bank loans, and thus weaken the bank lending channel in Thailand.   
 
The results of the effect of financial sector development on the bank lending channel indicate 
that banking sector development (both in size and activity), banking competition, capital 
market development (both size and activity), bond market development (financial innovation), 
and financial liberalization show a similar conclusion, in that these developments will weaken 
the bank lending channel. Development in the size of the banking sector causes a rise in the 
degree of financial intermediation, an improvement in financial market liquidity, and an 
increase in the opportunities for external funding. Also, the development of the activities of 
the banking sector leads to an increase in banking loans and services provided to customers. 
Thus, banking sector development can weaken the effect of the policy interest rate on bank 
loans as banks have greater opportunities to obtain loans, increased external sources of 
funding and access to banking products and services. Financial competition (a lower 
concentration ratio) will lead to a more competitive environment in the banking sector and a 
lower cost for the banks in the market to access other sources of funds. This situation can 
therefore weaken the effect of the policy interest rate via the bank lending channel due to this 
greater opportunity to access alternative external funding sources. Furthermore, capital market 
development, bond market development, and financial innovation will result in a greater 
opportunity for banks to obtain other funding sources via securities and equity investment, the 
development of new financial instruments and risk diversification techniques. Thus, this will 
weaken the effect of the policy interest rate on bank loans and the bank lending channel. In 
addition, financial liberalization in Thailand can have a weakening effect on the bank lending 
channel due to the deregulation policies (capital account liberalization, and the relaxation of 
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financial institution and market restrictions). These results in more opportunities to obtain 
additional sources of funding, thus reducing the effect of the policy interest rate on bank 
loans. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the firm balance sheet channel and also investigated the effect of different 
aspects of financial sector development on this channel in Thailand from 1978 to 2008. The 
study was conducted by investigating the effect of firms’ financial condition (their cash flow 
and leverage) on their investment in order to prove the existence of the firm balance sheet 
channel. We investigated this by using firm panel data and GMM estimation (first difference-
GMM and system-GMM estimation) and the results from the baseline model confirm the firm 
balance sheet channel theory, as a stronger firm balance sheet condition (higher cash flow and 
lower firm leverage ratio) has a significant positive effect on firms’ investment. These results 
confirm the theoretical expectation, as higher cash flow leads to an increase in firms’ 
creditworthiness and investment spending. Also, higher firm leverage will raise the risky 
behaviour of firms (higher agency costs and default risk), raising the external finance premium 
and lowering investment. Our sub-sample result (small/large firms and high/low dividend 
payout firms) still shows the positive effect of firms’ cash flow on investment, with a 
relatively higher effect in small and low dividend payout firms than in larger and high 
dividend ones. This is because small and low dividend firms have more financial constraint (a 
lower reputation and net worth) than large and high dividend ones, thus lowering their external 
funding opportunities. Therefore, small and low dividend firms’ investment will depend more 
on their internal finance (cash flow). On the other hand, the leverage ratio shows a significant 
negative effect on the investment of these firms, while showing a lower insignificant effect on 
large and high dividend ones. This is in line with the theoretical expectation, since small and 
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low dividend firms have a lower reputation and net worth, and higher external funding costs. 
Thus, they will have a high possibility of default risk and more agency cost than large and 
high dividend firms. An insignificant result of the leverage ratio in large and high dividend 
firms can explain why they tend to face less impact from financial constraint (firm leverage) 
as not only is there a lower effect of leverage on their investment, but additionally this does 
not have a significant effect on investment. Our results can have an implication for the firm 
balance sheet channel, as monetary policy can cause a weaker effect via the firm balance sheet 
channel, especially in the less financially constrained firms (large and high dividend ones) 
than the more constrained ones. This is because the less financially constrained firms have a 
higher reputation and net worth, lower external funding costs, and more dependence on their 
external finance, so they will reduce the effect of monetary policy via the firm balance sheet 
channel compared with the more constrained ones.  
 
For the effect of financial sector development, our findings show similar results, in that 
financial development in Thailand (banking sector development, capital market development, 
financial competition, financial innovation, and financial liberalization) results in less 
dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance as they have more opportunity to 
obtain external funding sources. Banking sector development (both size and activities 
measure) leads to an increase in bank size, a higher degree of financial intermediation and a 
rise in the activities of financial intermediation provided to customers. This condition will 
increase the opportunity for firms to obtain bank loans and lower their external funding costs. 
This will reduce the dependence of their investment on internal funds (cash flow) and also 
lower the external funding cost and agency cost, thus raising their debt finance for investment 
(leverage). We find that financial competition (a lower the concentration ratio) leads to more 
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easier for other banks to access borrowers’ information and other sources of funding, thus 
leading to lower risk, lower external finance premiums faced by firms and less difficulty in 
accessing external sources of funds. Therefore, the investments of firms will depend less on 
their internal finance (cash flow) and reduce the effect of firms’ leverage on investment. Our 
results show that capital market development (both size and activities measure) will result in a 
weaker effect of internal finance (cash flow) on investment and increase debt finance 
(leverage) for investment. This is because this development can lead to greater possibilities for 
firms to access external funding sources and thus they will be less dependent on their internal 
finance (cash flow). Capital market development also leads to lower external funding cost and 
agency cost for firms, thus increasing the opportunity for them to increase debt for investment.  
The greater development of the equity and bond markets will result in less dependence of 
firms’ investment on their internal finance. Financial innovation (the development of new 
financial instruments and techniques) also reduces liquidity and credit risk and the external 
funding cost of firms, causing a rise in debt finance (leverage) for firms’ investment. Financial 
liberalization in Thailand (domestic interest rate liberalization and relaxation of many 
financial market controls) also lowers the financial constraint of firms and reduces the 
dependence of their investment on internal funds. This causes a reduction in the external 
funding cost of firms and an increase in their dependence on external finance.  
 
We found that the effect of financial development on our sub-sample estimation shows similar 
results to the total sample case, as banking sector development, capital market development, 
financial competition, financial innovation, and financial liberalization will result in less 
dependence of firms’ investment on their internal finance and more dependence on external 
funds. The effects of these aspects of financial development are significant and higher in the 
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small and low dividend firms, while showing a lower effect on the large and high dividend 
ones. This is because the more financially constrained firms (the small and low dividend 
payout ones) have a higher dependence on their internal funds, and higher agency and 
external financial costs. This leads to the greater dependence of investment on the balance 
sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) of the more constrained firms, and therefore 
financial development will also affect these firms more. Furthermore, we also found an 
insignificant effect of financial development on the sensitivity of investment to the balance 
sheet condition (cash flow and leverage) of firms, especially on the less financially 
constrained firms. This is because the large and high dividend firms already have greater 
opportunities to obtain external funding sources and relatively low external funding costs and 
agency costs than small and low dividend ones, which depend mostly on their internal funds. 
Therefore, financial development will possibly have no affect on these less constrained firms, 
which have relatively low agency costs, low external costs of funds and low default risk.   
 
We found that firms will be less dependent on their internal finance and more on their 
external funds when there is financial development and that this effect is higher in the more 
constrained firms. Thus, this result also has implications for the theory of the firm balance 
sheet channel. It shows that monetary policy shock will have a weaker effect through the firm 
balance sheet channel as firms can obtain external funding sources to offset the effect of 
monetary policy. Thus, financial development can weaken the firm balance sheet channel and 
this effect is considerably higher in the more financially constrained firms.  
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Chapter 6 examined interest rate pass-through in Thailand and also the effect of different 
aspects of financial sector development on this pass-through from 1978Q1 to 2008Q4. We 
apply the quarterly time series data of interest rates in Thailand and the VECM technique and 
found an incomplete degree of long- and short-run interest rate pass-through, with a 
considerably higher degree of pass-through in the long-run compared with the short-run. This 
result is in line with our theoretical expectation, as an incomplete degree of pass-through is 
caused by various important factors which cause stickiness in the interest rate (credit rationing 
and the risk sharing behaviour of banks, the asymmetric information problem, and the costs 
faced by banks and investors, namely switching cost and adjustment cost). Also, the high 
degree of pass-through is probably caused by the financial sector development in the country 
during our study period. The study of different maturities of the time deposit interest rates (3 
month, 6 month, 12 month, and 2 year time deposit interest rate) show that the higher the 
maturity of the time deposit interest rate, the greater the pass-through in the long-run, but the 
lower in the short-run. This result is supported by our theoretical prediction, as the interest 
rate pass-through in the short-run has a mean reversion property, and thus the effect of the 
policy interest rate on the short-term interest rate will be higher than the long-term ones. The 
speed of adjustment in every short-run pass-through model indicates a significant negative 
coefficient, thus confirming that we have disequilibrium adjustment in the short-run model.  
 
For the effect of financial sector development, we found that capital market development, 
financial liberalization, banking competition and financial innovation will cause a greater 
degree of pass-through, thus leading to a stronger effect of the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy transmission. The explanation is that financial competition (lower 
concentration) can lead to a reduction in the banks’ interest rate margins, as they do not want 
 354 
 
to pass on bank costs to customers, hence banks will tend to adjust their retail interest rates in 
a more competitive way. Also, when the interest rate pass-through model is considered as a 
marginal cost pricing model, the more competitive environment will cause a higher elasticity 
of price with respect to marginal cost, hence increasing the degree of pass-through. Capital 
market development (both size and activities measure) and financial innovation result in a 
higher degree of pass-through as this development creates wider alternative sources of 
funding and investment for savers and investors. This increases the demand elasticity of loans 
and deposits and therefore increasing the degree of interest rate pass-through and 
strengthening the interest rate channel. Moreover, the financial liberalization in Thailand, 
shown by many deregulation policies, such as interest rate ceiling abolition, capital control 
and foreign exchange control relaxation, gives banks additional opportunities to adjust retail 
interest rates and also leads to an increase in capital inflows, a higher volume of foreign 
exchange transactions, and financial openness. This results in an increase in alternative 
sources of investment for bank customers, leading to a higher demand elasticity of loans and 
deposits, thus increasing the extent of interest rate pass-through as well as strengthening of 
the interest rate channel. However, banking sector development will cause a lower degree of 
pass-through, resulting in a weaker effect of the interest rate channel.  This is because greater 
banking sector development (both bank size and activities development) will show a greater 
degree of financial intermediation and a greater influence of banks among borrowers and 
depositors. This reduces the demand elasticity of loans and deposits and therefore leads to a 
lower degree of pass-through and the weakening of the interest rate channel. 
 
When we performed the recursive estimations of the coefficient of the degree of pass-through    
(  coefficient), we found that all the  coefficients in both the lending and deposit rate  
 355 
 
equations present stability throughout the period, with some changes occurring in specific 
periods. The pass-through degree of both lending and deposit interest rates tends to adjust 
upwards during the periods 1984Q1 and 1991Q1 due to the adjustment by commercial banks 
of the short-term deposit interest structure (the 3 and 6 month deposit interest rate ceiling was 
adjusted upwards to achieve an interest rate level comparable to the 12 month deposit rate). 
The effect of the relaxation of the retail interest rate ceiling in Thailand, and other 
deregulation policies, resulted in a higher degree of pass-through, mostly shown in the 
increase of the  coefficients during 1991Q1. Moreover, the  coefficients also show 
negative adjustment during the period 1997Q4. This is due to the effect of financial crisis, 
which can lead to the problem of financial market volatility and market uncertainty, causing 
higher credit risk, adjustment costs and the asymmetric information problem and thus 
resulting in a lower degree of pass-through in this period. 
 
7.3 Policy implications  
Our empirical studies of the channels of monetary policy transmission related to the banking 
sector and the effect of financial development on these channels raises some important 
implications for policy in Thailand. The results in chapter 4 and 5 show that financial 
development can lead to an increase in the bank loan supply and the opportunity for firms to 
obtain bank loans and external financial sources of funds, thus lowering their external funding 
costs. The results in chapter 6 also show that financial development will lead to an increase in 
the degree of pass-through and thus will cause strengthen of the interest rate channel. 
Therefore, we found from our study that financial development can be used in order to 
stimulate economic growth in the country as it leads to an increase in loan supply and a rise in 
 
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the opportunity for banks and firms to obtain external funding sources, thus increasing 
investment and economic growth. Policy makers could also possibly consider financial 
development as one of the factors that can lead to the effectiveness of monetary policy 
through the interest rate channel, as we found that financial development in Thailand can 
result in a higher degree of interest rate pass-through, thus strengthen the interest rate channel. 
 
However, although we found that financial development can be used to stimulate the 
economy, our results also raise some important points for policy makers to consider before 
issuing new financial development plans in the future.  In this case, we found in chapters 4 and 
5 that financial development can lead to a rise in bank loan supply, thus policy makers should 
be aware that if they do not carefully control financial development in the country at a suitable 
level of development, this will probably result in a rise in the default risk of banks and firms 
and weaken the balance sheet condition. This possibly will increase the non-performing loan 
problem in the future and possibly lead to financial fragility. Moreover, we found that 
financial sector development can cause a weaker effect via the bank lending and firm balance 
sheet channels, as banks and firms can outweigh the effect of policy shock by obtaining 
alternative external sources of funds. Thus, policy makers should consider the effect of 
financial development when controlling and regulating monetary policy and before issuing 
new financial development policy, as these policies can cause a weaken effect via these 
channels and raise difficulties for them to control the economy through these channels. In 
addition, our results from chapter 6 show that financial development, especially capital market 
development, financial innovation, financial competition, and financial liberalization, can have 
a greater effect on the degree of pass-through. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the 
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introduction of new financial development policies, as this can create an overshooting of the 
pass-through.  
 
In addition, the effects of financial development can also pass through to the economy via 
other channels of monetary policy transmission apart from those in our study related to the 
banking sector. Hence, the effect of financial development on the economy also depend on 
other channels of monetary policy transmission and our discussion of the policy implication 
presented previously also depends on the other channels of monetary policy transmission, such 
as the asset price and exchange rate channels, as described in chapter 1. Therefore, an 
adequate supervisory system, appropriate risk management techniques in the banking and 
financial sectors, and stable conditions in the financial market and banking sector, are also 
needed when carrying out future financial development. In this case, it is important for policy 
makers to use macro-prudential policies as well as an appropriate supervisory system in order 
to control and regulate the economy when issuing financial development plan in the future as 
well as to reduce the risk of financial fragility possibly caused by the financial development. 
Some important policy implications including the macro-prudential policies and other 
supervisory measures are presented below. 
 
Risk management should be considered in order to achieve financial stability and reduce the 
risk of external shocks. Loan loss reserves should be built up by banks during good economic 
conditions to reduce the liquidity risk which may occur in economic downturns and prevent 
the over issuing of debt of banks (Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001; Siregar, 2011). Sufficient 
capital to cover the risk should be put in place and controlled in line with the minimum capital 
 358 
 
requirement following the Basel II Accord (Siregar, 2011). Policy makers should also consider 
the introduction of the capital requirement based on the new Basel III Accord in order to 
prevent the possibility of systematic risk in the future, largely caused by international financial 
risk (BOT, 2011a). In Basel III, there is stricter requirement of capital in terms of an increase 
in the minimum capital requirement, a stricter definiton of risk-weighted assets, and an 
increase in other measures to improve risk management supervision and prevent financial risk 
in the future46. Therefore, policy makers in Thailand should consider the possibility of 
introducing the capital requirement based on the new Basel III standards in the future.  
 
The loan-to-value ratio (LTV), debt-to-income ratio (DTI) and the credit ceilings should be 
used as macro-prudential policy tools to help prevent systematic risk, excessive expansion of 
credit and the liquidity problem of banks and firms, especially investment in the non-
productive sector (real estate and short-term securities investment) as well as credit cards 
loans and personal loans (Watanagase, 2012; Oh, 2013; Nijathaworn, 2010). Other liquidity 
management instruments, such as the liquid asset minimum holding, maximum cash outflow, 
maximum leverage ratio, and maximum reserve holding, should also be controlled and 
regulated to prevent the maturity mismatch problem and improve the balance sheet strength of 
banks and firms (Siregar, 2011). Furthermore, both financial and non financial institutions 
should be aware of offshore over-borrowing, as a relatively large foreign currency 
denominated debt in their portfolio leads to a high degree of currency and liquidity risk 
                                                          
46
  The important changes in the Basel III capital requirement are an increase in the Tier 1 capital requirement     
(from 4% in Basel II to 6% of risk-weighted assets in Basel III), a rise in the common equity Tier 1 (from 2% to 
4.5% of risk-weighted assets),  an increase in the capital defined as Tier 1 (additional Tier 1), and the inclusion 
of additional measures to control the risk of financial institutions (leverage ratio and capital buffer requirement) 
(BIS, 2010; BOT, 2011a; Siregar, 1999). The details of the Basel II approach can be seen in BIS(2010) and 
BOT(2011a). The BOT is in the process of gathering information and studying the effect of Basel III on financial 
institutions and the economic sector in order to prepare to apply this approach in the future (from 2013 onwards) 
(BOT, 2011a). 
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(Jacque, 1999). In this case, the hedging instruments in Thailand (future and forward contract, 
options and debt-equity swap) should be further developed and introduced by the institutions 
in order to prevent these risks in the financial market.  
 
Further supervisory measures should be introduced to prevent the possibility of financial 
market risk occurring in the market. Stress testing should be used by policy makers as policy 
tools for the investigation of financial institution risk profiles and financial stability and for 
improvement in the standard quantitative techniques for risk management (Siregar, 1999). 
Policy makers should improve the supervision of both financial and non-financial institutions 
as well as the credit rating agencies in terms of information disclosure and transparency 
(Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001). The strict control of the disclosure rules and the auditing 
process of banks and firms, particularly concerning bad and doubtful debts, are important for 
regulators in order to prevent the debt concealment (Dickinson and Mullineux, 2001). The 
liquidity disclosure of banks should be regularly controlled by policy makers to prevent the 
possibility of liquidity risk and the maturity mismatch problem (Siregar, 1999). Also, 
disclosure of banks’ and firms’ foreign borrowing and lending as well as a regularly provided 
corrected report are needed for the central banks to control the capital accounts and balance 
sheet status of banks and firms (Jacque, 1999). This can prevent the indebted problem and 
improve the accuracy of the information of central banks (Jacque, 1999). 
 
Not only are appropriate risk management techniques and adequate supervision in the banking 
and financial sectors needed when carrying out financial development in the future, but also a 
reasonably stable macroeconomic condition is required. Therefore, it is also important for 
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policy makers to enact suitable monetary policy to control the economy and maintain financial 
and economic stability in the country. In this case, the important macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities, including capital market conditions, financial and non-financial institution 
balance sheet strength, household and public debts, conditions in the real estate sector and 
risks of external shock (foreign exchange market conditions, trade partners and international 
economy), should be considered and controlled by the monetary policy committee in order to 
achieve economic and financial stability (Nakornthab, 2009). Policy makers should introduce 
an early warning system by using these vulnerability conditions or the economic indicators47 as 
a way of detecting the risk of economic instability at an early stage and to introduce suitable 
policy to mitigate this risk (Nakornthab, 2009; Kochhar et al., 1998). Tightened monetary 
policy should be used when there is the possible signal of excessive macroeconomic growth 
and high inflation pressure, and the reduction of contractionary pressure should be made when 
there are signs of a return to stability in the markets (Kochhar et al., 1998; Watanagase, 2012). 
Furthermore, the accountability and transparency of monetary policy should be controlled and 
achieved by the central bank when devising monetary policy. In this case, the announcement 
of the monetary policy implementation to the public (via its website and the central bank 
annual or quarterly report), the clear policy objectives and targets issued by the central banks, 
the coordination of the central banks and the external committee members when there is 
monetary policy decision making, and regular meetings of the monetary policy committees, 
should be achieved when implementing the monetary policy (Nakornthab, 2009). Moreover, 
an adequate economic and financial infrastructure, such as suitable accounting, legal and 
supervisory systems, an improvement in regulatory coordination, the provision of adequate 
information to institutions and economic agents, and the support of the mechanisms of 
                                                          
47
 Short term debt to total debt, the broad money to reserves ratio, equity price volatility, the real effective 
exchange rate, foreign direct investment as a proportion of capital inflow, and terms of trade are considered as 
examples of useful economic indicators used for signalling economic vulnerabilities (Kochhar et al., 1998). 
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consumer protection should be developed before implementing monetary policy and the new 
financial development plans in the future (Trairatvorakul, 2012; Lee, 2003; BOT, 2006b).  
 
In addition, policy makers should encourage international cooperation in the financial market 
and institutional sectors. In this case, they should support the improvement of adequate cross-
border financial institution supervisory cooperation and cross-country supervisory 
coordination in order to support the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy and to reduce a 
regulatory arbitrage, and the spillover of the financial market and institutional risks (BOT, 
2011b; Siregar, 2011). 
 
Therefore, the policy implications and suggestions discussed previously can be used as the 
policy implications for further development of the Thai financial sector (financial master plan 
phase II). Moreover, we described in chapter 3 that this master plan aims to support financial 
competition, financial access and financial infrastructure, as well as to improve the financial 
risk management system and reduce operating costs in the banking system. Thus, the main 
aims of improving the risk management system and supporting the financial infrastructure 
should be achieved in line with other developments in this plan in order to reduce the possible 
risk of financial fragility in the future. Policy makers should also use the monetary policy in 
order to maintain stable economic and financial conditions in the country. As a result, this can 
prevent systematic risk, financial market risk, and the risk from external shocks that can 
possibly affect the economy during the implementation of the financial development plan in 
the future.  
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7.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
There are some limitations in this thesis in relation to the three main empirical chapters, 
which raise suggestions for further study: 
 
(1) For the study of the bank lending channel in Thailand, the bank balance sheet data for 
bank lending to specific sectors, such as bank loans to the business sector or to households, 
are not available. As a result, we only use the data of total loans in different banks to represent 
bank loans. Accordingly, it would be interesting for further studies to investigate the effect of 
monetary policy and financial development on the bank lending channel in terms of the effect 
on bank loans in specific sectors, such as the corporate and household ones.  
 
(2) The study of the firm balance sheet channel in Thailand mainly focuses on the firm 
balance sheet and the effect of financial development on it in both the total sample cases and 
the sub-sample cases (firm size and firm dividend payout ratio). There remains the possibility 
of study by dividing the firms according to their industrial sectors, and thus further research 
could also extend investigations in this area by focusing on the firm balance sheet channel in 
different sectors of firms, as well as the effect of financial development on this channel. 
 
(3) There is a data limitation in the study of interest rate pass-through in Thailand in terms of 
the interest rates in different economic sectors (business loan rate, mortgage interest rate and 
consumer interest rate) as well as the loan interest rate in different maturities (short-term and 
long-term loan rates, and different maturities of bond interest rates); therefore, we cannot 
examine the pass-through on different types of retail interest rates. This leave a gap for further 
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studies of this issue to include analysis of interest rate pass-through for different types of 
retail interest rates as well as the effect of financial development on this pass-through.  
 
(4) Data is unavailable in our consideration period for the investigation of other channels of 
monetary policy transmission (asset price and exchange rate channels). Therefore, this thesis 
has mainly focused on the channels of monetary policy transmission relating to the banking 
sector, namely the interest rate channel, bank lending channel and firm balance sheet channel. 
Further study could be extended by examining the other channels of monetary policy 
transmission as well as the effect of financial development on them.  
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Appendix A 
TableA5.1: The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (total sample) 
Note: *,**,*** indicates the significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 This series is the interaction term between cash flow to capital ratio and the financial liberalization dummy. Due to W-t-bar test can be calculated when there is no more than 10 samples, thus we cannot 
obtain the W-t-bar in this case. We already obtained the result that CK series do not have unit root and also there is no unit root test require for the dummy variable. Thus, it is generally assumed that CKFD6 
series should not have unit root. The AIC information criteria is used to select the lag length of ADF test.  
Variable/test Im-Pesaran-Shin Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
 W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
I/K -19.8598*** 1702.3469*** -5.4873*** -16.0338*** 27.1583*** 2692.6967*** -25.1621*** -35.1210*** 53.7791*** 
     -39.0542*** 1202.7368*** -4.2282*** -9.0734*** 13.7287*** 1675.1794*** -47.0795*** -67.7109*** 107.0685*** 
C/K -23.1338*** 2397.1404*** -14.9886*** -29.8918*** 45.8345*** 1912.7858*** -29.3303*** -38.6787*** 59.6951*** 
B/K -23.4618*** 1224.9718*** -3.9791*** -8.9233*** 14.3264*** 1433.1653*** -11.5937*** -14.3876*** 19.9226*** 
(C/K)*FD1 -23.3763*** 1010.1669*** -4.6946*** -4.7194*** 8.5524*** 1903.1767*** -29.1497*** -38.4638*** 59.4368*** 
(D/K)*FD1 -28.8513*** 1210.5702*** -3.7081*** -8.6098*** 13.9393*** 1418.9319*** -11.7895*** -14.2839*** 19.5401*** 
(C/K)*FD2 -31.7234*** 1192.5025*** -2.6844*** -7.7151*** 13.4536*** 1144.5280*** -31.4302*** -42.7235*** 65.9244*** 
(D/K)*FD2 -46.2688*** 1066.2296*** -4.1281*** -7.6566*** 10.0594*** 1110.6548*** -8.0253*** -9.3799*** 11.2535*** 
(C/K)*FD3 -10.2161*** 1098.2526*** -1.3085* -6.1759*** 10.9201*** 2032.5623*** -30.7823*** -40.9572*** 62.9147*** 
(D/K)*FD3 -6.9023*** 1270.9130*** -5.4389*** -10.3680*** 15.5613*** 1483.6086*** -12.2559*** -15.6283*** 21.2786*** 
(C/K)*FD4 -4.2327*** 2229.5834*** -12.4715*** -26.5360*** 41.3305*** 1896.2142*** -18.0311*** -22.2726*** 32.3695*** 
(D/K)*FD4 -1.9238** 2250.3875*** -12.5878*** -29.3213*** 49.9538*** 1096.7508*** -6.2568*** -7.7801*** 10.8798*** 
(C/K)*FD5 -11.6482*** 1084.3513*** -3.5316*** -6.9562*** 10.5465*** 3227.9234*** -32.9619*** -45.3033*** 68.1660*** 
(D/K)*FD5 -17.7391*** 3207.7746*** -24.4058*** -44.1885*** 67.6244*** 2973.0824*** -28.2990*** -40.9074*** 61.3159*** 
(C/K)*FD6 -1.4487* 2275.7617*** -13.1499*** -27.1895*** 42.5718*** 2292.9912*** -22.5246*** -28.4325*** 43.0349*** 
(D/K)*FD6 -20.2887*** 2725.4121*** -15.0496*** -32.8436*** 54.6585*** 2820.5934*** -19.1448*** -34.8753*** 57.2169*** 
(C/K)*FD7 -
48
 854.0109*** -12.7292*** -18.1634*** 4.3549*** 3554.4710*** -31.0537*** -55.0586*** 76.9437*** 
(D/K)*FD7 - 1410.1080*** -18.6378*** -31.6920*** 149.3029*** 3271.6495*** -27.9234*** -50.2322*** 69.3141*** 
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TableA5.1 (cont’d): The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (total sample) (when controlling for cross sectional 
dependence of the series) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
 W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. Chi-
squared 
I/K -38.0188*** 856.5592*** -3.5268*** -4.7208*** 4.4234*** 2225.3092*** 51.7339*** -76.2118*** 121.8561*** 
     -31.3039*** 1072.4373*** -4.4656*** -8.0040*** 10.2262*** 2063.3897*** -49.5341*** -73.6667*** 117.5037*** 
C/K -28.6423*** 1039.3958*** -4.0500*** -6.8832*** 9.3381*** 2221.0842*** -23.4448*** -28.7466*** 41.1020*** 
B/K -8.2803*** 1439.1081*** -16.8702*** -18.5771*** 20.0824*** 891.4385*** -6.6009*** -7.1670*** 5.3609*** 
(C/K)*FD1 -27.4734*** 1037.1367*** -4.0633*** -6.8554*** 9.2773**** 2198.9173*** -23.1575*** -28.3596*** 40.5062*** 
(D/K)*FD1 -8.2093*** 1430.1795*** -16.6752*** -18.4241*** 19.8424*** 885.2391*** -6.4716*** -7.0186*** 5.1943*** 
(C/K)*FD2 -27.3250*** 982.6622*** -4.0188*** -6.1699*** 7.8130*** 1358.5007*** -25.7796*** -31.5919*** 44.7958*** 
(D/K)*FD2 -8.7350*** 802.9754*** -3.8989**** -5.4671*** 2.9830*** 921.9909*** -5.9387*** -6.8770*** 6.1822*** 
(C/K)*FD3 -64.3366*** 1127.0173*** -4.6832*** -8.2019*** 11.6933*** 1310.7522*** -24.5784*** -30.3557*** 43.5123*** 
(D/K)*FD3 -4.6434*** 1350.6042*** -15.6478*** -16.9895*** 17.7034*** 929.0218*** -7.2100*** -7.9342*** 6.3712*** 
(C/K)*FD4 -6.9653*** 1328.3701*** -6.5090*** -11.0889*** 17.1057*** 1696.6644*** -15.9599*** -19.2206*** 27.0055*** 
(D/K)*FD4 -12.8571*** 1019.1300*** -9.1577*** -10.1437*** 8.7933*** 1019.1300*** -9.1577*** -10.1437*** 8.7933*** 
(C/K)*FD5 -13.2853*** 979.2650*** -4.2598*** -6.7004*** 7.7217*** 2731.9814*** -28.3668*** -37.2296*** 54.8350*** 
(D/K)*FD5 -22.3203*** 849.5597*** -9.7396*** -8.9726*** 4.2352*** 1239.5284*** -10.9864*** -12.8736*** 14.7177*** 
(C/K)*FD6 -6.0275*** 807.8376*** -1.9673** -3.0360*** 3.1137*** 1813.7819*** -18.0418*** -21.6097*** 30.1537*** 
(D/K)*FD6 -13.2955*** 1670.2773*** -21.1152*** -22.5421*** 26.2963*** 1643.4039*** -18.8575*** -21.2717*** 25.5739*** 
(C/K)*FD7 - 1997.2898*** -23.7947*** -46.1503*** 35.0864*** 3591.3776*** -33.0256*** -56.2974*** 77.9358*** 
(D/K)*FD7 - 1400.2545*** -16.1655*** -30.3528*** 19.0380*** 1118.0058*** -40.3411*** -65.8403*** 92.0916*** 
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TableA5.2: The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF  Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
I/K Large  firms -11.7110*** 250.3694*** -4.7488*** -6.3297*** 7.8345*** 605.0837*** -10.9189*** -17.9176*** 29.8177*** 
 Small firms -20.2196*** 1391.0761*** -5.5590*** -14.8711*** 24.1152*** 2131.2070*** -22.6573*** -30.5492*** 45.8207*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-9.1349*** 689.0215*** -5.5491*** -12.8755*** 20.8520*** 764.0188*** -13.4330*** -16.7749*** 24.3040*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-34.1591*** 1012.6342*** -2.6145*** -10.2930*** 18.1145*** 1959.1028*** -21.4268*** -31.4283*** 49.2511*** 
     Large  firms -14.5113*** 277.8746*** -2.6443*** -5.8161*** 9.5672*** 798.1620*** -19.5304*** -26.7774*** 41.8851*** 
 Small firms -42.1382*** 925.8588*** -3.4469*** -7.3230*** 10.3848*** 1866.3340*** -42.1560*** -61.0915*** 96.9424*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-30.4445*** 417.5320*** -3.0198*** -5.4202*** 8.3557*** 1622.2883*** -28.5179*** -40.2276*** 63.8091*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-27.3365*** 783.3958*** -3.1296*** -7.4050*** 10.5731*** 3065.6795*** -37.2591*** -54.1332*** 85.6548*** 
C/K Large  firms -12.5977*** 223.3341*** -2.0072** -3.9016*** 6.1315*** 632.0709*** -15.8258*** -20.5710*** 31.5044*** 
 Small firms -26.6872*** 1834.4851*** -12.5186*** -24.8340*** 37.2020*** 2376.4835*** -25.5613*** -34.1989*** 53.0473*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-15.8071*** 897.2639*** -9.6058*** -18.6171*** 30.4371*** 978.5472*** -17.5700*** -23.2313*** 34.1785*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-25.0767*** 1499.3107*** -11.5049*** -23.3877*** 34.1250*** 1999.9562*** -23.8948*** -31.8953*** 50.5950*** 
D/K Large  firms -4.1624*** 286.9395*** -3.3374*** -7.1828*** 10.1382*** 239.6336*** -4.4240*** -5.1765*** 6.9771*** 
 Small firms -17.1182*** 1022.5474*** -3.7519*** -8.4333*** 13.2385*** 1247.2985*** -11.0526*** -14.0552*** 19.7783*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-16.1904*** 379.2951*** -2.3681*** -3.9565*** 6.5957*** 562.3813*** -8.4312*** -10.9548*** 15.0229*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-3.0491*** 844.7737*** -3.0888*** -8.1039*** 12.5923*** 919.8260*** -8.6027*** -10.5445*** 15.0614*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF  Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
(C/K)*FD1 Large  firms -12.5850*** 221.2854*** -2.0115** -3.8309*** 6.0024*** 629.3102*** -15.7464*** -20.4780*** 31.3319*** 
 Small firms -26.1198*** 785.8175*** -2.4099** -3.1825*** 6.2516*** 2370.5703*** -25.3941*** -34.0199*** 52.8730*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-22.3827*** 343.0518*** -2.2871** -2.4232*** 4.9275*** 974.0295*** -17.4494*** -23.1023*** 33.906*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-19.8250*** 667.6729*** -4.7206*** -4.1597*** 6.7661*** 1996.2172*** -23.7577*** -31.7474*** 50.4720*** 
(D/K)*FD1 Large  firms -4.1621*** 189.0113*** -2.5830** -2.2099** 3.9693*** 250.2165*** -4.8184*** -5.6460*** 7.6385*** 
 Small firms -4.2377*** 1017.4322*** -3.6908*** -8.3591*** 13.0875*** 1222.0173*** -11.1388*** -13.7310*** 19.0335*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-8.9414*** 372.0113*** -2.2770** -3.8075*** 6.2604*** 540.4952*** -8.4116*** -10.4879*** 14.0155*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-7.2582*** 837.6519*** -2.8195*** -7.8261*** 12.3580*** 923.6387*** -8.8691*** -10.7046*** 15.1868*** 
(C/K)*FD2 Large  firms -15.1265*** 311.8389*** -3.7558*** -7.3811*** 11.7067*** 768.8564*** -18.1908*** -25.6623*** 40.0535*** 
 Small firms -24.4639*** 1883.6869*** -12.7028*** -25.6513*** 38.6542*** 2436.4521*** -26.4919*** -35.5278*** 54.8141*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-21.4922*** 452.2973*** -4.7582*** -7.2332*** 9.9559*** 917.9806*** -16.8911*** -21.3993*** 31.3907*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-22.0971*** 647.4207*** -2.5854*** -4.1802*** 6.0999*** 2253.6021*** -26.5544*** -37.3005*** 58.9394*** 
(D/K)*FD2 Large  firms -1.5029* 724.5203*** -11.4904*** -23.8219*** 37.7032*** 181.4172*** -2.5056*** -2.8157*** 3.3386*** 
 Small firms -29.4993*** 2058.5302*** -13.0400*** -28.4281*** 43.8145*** 1015.8233*** -8.3934*** -10.3132*** 12.9584*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-5.7317*** 355.6520*** -3.3943*** -4.5154*** 5.5074*** 412.1909*** -7.3355*** -7.7767*** 8.1098*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-3.3561*** 706.0844*** -4.1589*** -6.4893*** 8.0298*** 731.8908*** -4.9736*** -6.4861*** 8.8788*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample).  
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
(C/K)*FD3 Large  firms -13.7654*** 585.9232*** -8.9916*** -18.4459*** 28.9724*** 695.7320*** -16.9556*** -22.9408*** 35.4833*** 
 Small firms -10.5592*** 1881.4118*** -12.9322*** -25.6499*** 38.5870*** 2436.3651*** -26.7179*** -35.6610*** 54.8115*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-19.8210*** 422.9994*** -3.8667*** -6.1184*** 8.6073*** 1020.4969*** -18.4936*** -24.5121*** 36.1232*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-21.0728*** 1554.4991*** -12.1427*** -24.5505*** 35.9406*** 2072.8609*** -25.0258*** -33.6951*** 52.9934*** 
(D/K)*FD3 Large  firms -3.6110*** 681.0758*** -11.2038*** -22.1758*** 34.9665*** 336.2043*** -6.5922*** -9.0418*** 13.0128*** 
 Small firms -3.6483*** 2078.4101*** -13.4443*** -28.6661*** 44.4013*** 814.33179*** -7.0050*** -7.9733*** 7.0219*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-3.8630*** 881.3716*** -6.6292*** -15.8773*** 29.7056*** 777.1735*** -15.4736*** -18.0365*** 24.9095*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-6.8618*** 1785.2341*** -13.7282*** -28.6215*** 43.5312*** 584.3222*** -3.9930*** -4.3556*** 4.0241*** 
(C/K)*FD4 Large  firms -8.4944*** 450.5801*** -6.5266*** -13.6677*** 20.4466*** 364.3028*** -8.7418*** -10.4776*** 14.7689*** 
 Small firms -14.2088*** 1775.3872*** -10.4999*** -22.6835*** 35.4578*** 1617.4471*** -16.0970*** -20.6410*** 30.6839*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-15.0840*** 388.0743*** -3.8465*** -5.0329*** 6.9998*** 602.5020*** 8.9825*** -11.7800*** 16.8696*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-14.2938*** 1367.4384*** -9.6863*** -20.4772*** 29.7867*** 1347.4027*** -15.9367*** -19.7579*** 29.1276*** 
(D/K)*FD4 Large  firms -3.2119*** 646.9943*** -10.5374*** -20.6017*** 32.8196*** 190.1486*** -9.9447*** -13.0163*** 19.7686*** 
 Small firms -2.1811** 1890.9639*** -8.6708*** -22.4902*** 38.8690*** 1643.0839*** -23.0214*** -24.7423*** 31.4393*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-2.0834** 396.5080*** -2.3682*** -4.0699*** 7.3880999 429.2257*** -3.7401*** -5.5323*** 8.8939*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-1.6654** 1743.8752*** -12.0149*** -26.3324*** 42.1706*** 2266.1256*** -17.8061*** -35.1046*** 59.3514*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample).  
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
(C/K)*FD5 Large  firms -15.0444*** 526.4014*** -9.6250*** -16.8650*** 25.2229*** 364.3028*** -8.7418*** -10.4776*** 14.7689*** 
 Small firms -14.2088*** 870.1423*** -4.3778*** -6.8409*** 8.7404*** 1617.4471*** -16.0970*** -20.6410*** 30.6839*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-10.0699*** 464.4787*** -6.3666*** -8.1492*** 10.5166*** 1251.5921*** -20.8926*** -30.5773*** 46.7464*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-23.3829*** 1470.4214*** -10.1692*** -21.8462*** 33.1746*** 1921.2891*** -25.0737*** -32.5124*** 48.0071*** 
(D/K)*FD5 Large  firms -18.1052*** 637.9577*** -11.4154*** -21.1662*** 32.2503*** 1127.3706*** -18.6131*** -37.3944*** 62.4607*** 
 Small firms 26.8564*** 2554.3341*** -21.2599*** -38.5885*** 58.4477*** 2120.4856*** -15.0885*** -27.6863*** 45.5048*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-3.0597*** 328.3695*** -1.7463** -2.7690*** 4.2516*** 1054.0431*** -17.9616*** -25.2693*** 37.6535*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-20.4544*** 2081.0379*** -18.8148*** -35.8922*** 53.2624*** 2956.1821*** -27.1869*** -50.1653*** 82.0526*** 
(C/K)*FD6 Large  firms -9.6269*** 471.1801*** -7.5658*** -14.4806*** 21.7443*** 499.4031*** -12.1588*** -15.6144*** 23.2127*** 
 Small firms -15.2446*** 1800.7005*** -10.8518*** -23.1414*** 36.2049*** 2193.0033*** -16.1217*** -29.0519*** 47.6414*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-2.5359*** 358.8455*** -1.7151** -2.6068*** 5.6544*** 771.4205*** -12.1331*** -15.9471*** 24.6447*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-14.6134*** 723.6644*** -3.8159*** -6.7431*** 8.6081*** 1115.3859*** -13.4533*** -15.3302*** 21.4948*** 
(D/K)*FD6 Large  firms -1.3997* 725.0636*** -10.3845*** -22.6537*** 37.7375*** 1266.9487*** -20.3369*** -42.0059 71.1843*** 
 Small firms -15.0208*** 1990.7909*** -11.3600*** -25.2848*** 41.8153*** 1868.5294*** -19.5152*** -24.8427*** 38.0815*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-3.8441*** 881.3716*** -6.6292*** -15.8773*** 29.7056*** 661.7207*** -7.5885*** -12.4948*** 19.5954*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-22.1851*** 2081.0379*** -18.8148*** -35.8922*** 53.2624*** 2255.8190*** -18.6897*** -35.4295*** 59.0123*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): The result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-
Pesaran
-Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
(C/K)*FD7 Large  firms - 175.2035*** -6.1508*** -12.6972*** 3.0995*** 797.8423*** -16.2061*** -29.4715*** 41.8651*** 
 Small firms - 756.4103*** -12.2493*** -16.8896*** 5.3837*** 2762.1188*** -26.5731*** -46.7817*** 64.4091*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
- 356.9561*** -8.1236*** -10.4838*** 5.5675*** 1207.0174*** -17.0534*** -30.5465*** 44.6947*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
- 569.1784*** -10.8386*** -17.6494*** 3.5259*** 2332.2504*** -25.8320*** -45.3375*** 61.5267*** 
(D/K)*FD7 Large  firms - 230.4083*** -9.1173*** -17.3450 6.5771*** 857.9267*** -16.9937*** -31.6309*** 45.6204*** 
 Small firms - 1111.7863*** -16.0748*** -26.0947*** 15.8722*** 2448.8607*** -23.3711*** -41.2204*** 55.1797*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
- 311.9803*** -6.6661*** -8.7566*** 3.4973*** 1483.3751*** -20.7991*** -38.3504*** 57.4151*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
- 657.7510*** -12.1733*** -20.6162*** 6.4397*** 1790.4546*** -19.2041*** -33.7171*** 43.7029*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) (when controlling for the cross 
sectional dependence in the panel).  
 
 
  Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
ADF PP 
Variable  Sub-sample W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
I/K Large  firms -25.3429*** 250.3694*** -4.7488*** -6.3297*** 7.8345*** 1509.5085*** -30.0088*** -51.7275*** 86.3443*** 
 Small firms -32.9915*** 827.8427*** -4.9049*** -6.7450*** 7.41919*** 1167.2137*** -45.7297*** -66.4437*** 105.8071*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-24.8159*** 380.8698*** -5.3808*** -5.9151*** 6.6682*** 1949.8837*** -32.7234*** -49.1263*** 78.8879*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-21.7337*** 529.2373** -2.1915** -3.0984*** 2.2119** 1372.4551*** -41.1443*** -59.9714*** 95.7469*** 
     Large  firms -15.6864*** 277.8746*** -2.6443*** -5.8161*** 9.5672*** 809.4524*** -19.0517*** -26.9952*** 42.5908*** 
 Small firms -42.2855*** 850.7209*** -3.9699*** -6.9762*** 8.1672*** 2411.0808*** -46.2677*** -70.1828*** 112.9922*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-28.0545*** 304.1747*** -1.4830* -2.0022** 3.1380*** 2219.7820*** -35.1782*** -55.8201*** 91.3110*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-31.4251*** 627.2395*** -1.8636** -4.5088*** 5.4360*** 1550.5403*** -32.7613*** -44.6554*** 68.7079*** 
C/K Large  firms -13.8276*** 382.2853*** -7.0163*** -11.4567*** 16.1445*** 527.2293*** -14.6184*** -17.2633*** 24.9518*** 
 Small firms -17.9284*** 842.9353*** -3.9006*** -6.0840*** 7.9374*** 1821.4058*** -20.2527*** -25.1364*** 36.6931*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-16.3227*** 603.4288*** -8.6559*** -11.8207*** 16.9123*** 1098.3808*** -19.1684*** -26.2763*** 39.6943*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-19.2597*** 642.1971*** -2.4614*** -4.9811*** 5.9281*** 1250.8929*** -15.5673*** -18.4535*** 25.9527*** 
D/K Large  firms -6.0358*** 773.2033*** -14.1200*** -26.4374*** 40.7700*** 328.9465*** -6.4269*** -8.7061*** 12.5592*** 
 Small firms -5.7887*** 1212.3687*** -16.8683*** -17.5366*** 18.8409*** 791.3054*** -6.4863*** -7.4099*** 6.3435*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-12.4742*** 534.4927*** -5.8903*** -8.6658*** 13.7392*** 714.2536*** -14.2341*** -16.2661*** 22.0134*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-7.7781*** 1057.8653*** -16.9053*** -18.4723*** 19.6025*** 571.8673*** -3.5001*** -3.8598*** 3.6144*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) (when controlling for the cross 
sectional dependence in the panel). 
 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
(C/K)*FD1 Large  firms -13.8337*** 386.3776*** -7.1676*** -11.6284*** 16.4022*** 525.6158*** -14.5970*** -17.2096*** 24.8510*** 
 Small firms -17.3740*** 826.7272*** -3.8259*** -5.8317*** -5.8317*** 1794.0154*** -19.8834*** -24.6213*** 35.8861*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-15.6868*** 602.0595*** -8.6675*** -11.8041*** 16.8493*** 1077.9513*** -18.9213*** -25.7563*** 38.7539*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-16.2096*** 645.2927*** -2.5265*** -5.0577*** 6.0299*** 1248.8523*** -15.5088*** -18.3834*** 25.8855*** 
(D/K)*FD1 Large  firms -5.9839*** 254.5863*** -3.0361*** -5.9645*** 8.1002*** 328.8225*** -6.4465*** -8.7287*** 12.5514*** 
 Small firms -5.8544*** 1720.5073*** -24.1927*** -26.3846*** 33.7204*** 788.8628*** -6.3738*** -7.3198*** 6.2715*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-12.0662*** 510.2001*** -5.6161*** -8.0710**** 12.6211*** 710.3907*** -14.2267*** -16.1971*** 21.8356*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-3.1613*** 1049.8691*** -16.8287*** -18.3272*** 19.3395*** 571.4795*** -3.3790*** -3.7702*** 3.6016*** 
(C/K)*FD2 Large  firms -13.6554*** 510.6549*** -10.8550*** -17.3508*** 24.2310*** 1110.7144*** -24.6273*** -37.7507*** 61.4196*** 
 Small firms -18.9762*** 1061.8667*** -5.1296*** -9.6158*** 14.3989*** 1916.6068*** -22.0399*** -27.5084*** 39.4980*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-16.3499*** 328.2314*** -3.0227*** -3.8114*** 4.2453*** 920.5197*** -17.5188*** -22.0259*** 31.5076*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-16.4941*** 569.1686*** -4.1735*** -4.5165*** 3.5256*** 1398.3343*** -18.1998*** -21.9704*** 30.8031*** 
(D/K)*FD2 Large  firms -5.0914*** 778.8708*** -14.2045*** -26.5833*** 41.1270*** 1065.6661*** -18.6152*** -35.3263*** 58.6041*** 
 Small firms -8.3844*** 1088.5880*** -14.1855*** -14.8209*** 15.1876*** 841.5564*** -5.6554*** -7.1790*** 7.8240*** 
 High dividend 
firms  
-5.6532*** 584.3759*** -7.4344*** -10.9611*** 16.0353*** 616.6655*** -12.4413*** -13.7501*** 17.5215*** 
 Low dividend 
firms  
-4.0190*** 706.0844*** -4.1589*** -6.4893*** 8.0298*** 607.8329*** -3.6649*** -4.7062*** 4.7976*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) (when controlling for the cross 
sectional dependence in the panel). 
 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
(C/K)*FD3 Large  firms -13.8782*** 419.2016*** -7.1085*** -12.3452*** 18.4700*** 398.6476*** -3.4776*** -5.1045*** 7.4865*** 
 Small firms -18.1557*** 881.4172*** -4.2754*** -6.8890*** 9.0731*** 1924.8140*** -21.6584*** -27.2363*** 39.7398*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-17.0904*** 398.6476*** -3.4776*** -5.1045*** 7.4865*** 1127.4351*** -19.7563*** -27.1439*** 41.0316*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-13.0212*** 537.5731*** -3.4363*** -3.9224*** 2.4862*** 1288.6756*** -16.2263*** -19.3678*** 27.1956*** 
(D/K)*FD3 Large  firms -6.1014*** 800.9445*** -14.5935*** -27.4321*** 42.5175*** 336.2043*** -6.5922*** -9.0418*** 13.0128*** 
 Small firms -8.8404*** 1156.5086*** -16.2957*** -16.5548*** 17.1922*** 814.3317*** -7.0050*** -7.9733*** 7.0219*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-4.5608*** 673.7728*** -8.0509*** -12.8406*** 20.1501*** 673.7728*** -8.0509*** -12.8406*** 20.1501*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-5.0867*** 1014.4767*** -16.1719*** -17.5308*** 18.1751*** 584.3222*** -3.9930*** -4.3556*** 4.0241*** 
(C/K)*FD4 Large  firms -13.5575*** 476.4023*** -7.7069*** -13.7426*** 22.0733*** 471.3408*** -12.5461*** -15.2026*** 21.4588*** 
 Small firms -13.7495*** 1026.1932*** -4.7433*** -8.4751*** 13.3461*** 1310.2141*** -13.0242*** -15.4437*** 21.6320*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-8.4809*** 467.5627*** -5.4621*** -7.5861*** 10.6585*** 726.6971*** -11.2747*** -15.0508*** 22.5862*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-13.2385*** 949.2073*** -5.3261*** -10.3343*** 16.0279*** 1008.6011*** -11.2515*** -13.1797*** 17.9819*** 
(D/K)*FD4 Large  firms -5.1721*** 965.9149*** -17.0559*** -34.2486*** 52.9097*** 304.1228*** -4.8842*** -7.0639*** 11.0077*** 
 Small firms -3.0981*** 1323.4608*** -18.9096*** -19.8399*** 22.1196*** 1643.0839*** -23.0214*** -24.7423*** 31.4393*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-3.0597*** 344.4489*** -1.4962* -3.3631*** 4.9918*** 815.8952*** -14.6673*** -18.2480*** 26.6918*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-7.1825*** 574.1583*** -1.3918* -2.7916*** 3.6897*** 1642.8194*** -23.4558*** -28.1821*** 38.8461*** 
 419 
 
TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) (when controlling for the cross 
sectional dependence in the panel).  
 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-Pesaran-
Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified inv. 
Chi-squared 
(C/K)*FD5 Large  firms -15.2170*** 249.1106*** -1.6187* -5.0819*** 7.7552*** 684.6629*** -17.1623*** -23.0339*** 34.7914*** 
 Small firms -27.4181*** 870.1423*** -4.3778*** -6.8409*** 8.7404*** 2270.3446*** -25.5411*** -33.8006*** 49.9201*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-10.2340*** 1049.9436*** -15.3545*** -24.2436*** 37.4648*** 1486.3453*** -24.0437*** -36.3808*** 57.5518*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-19.3429*** 643.1889*** -4.0198*** -6.1153*** 5.9607*** 1491.6034*** -18.6010*** -23.7806*** 33.8715*** 
(D/K)*FD5 Large  firms -13.8340*** 555.6334*** -7.6348*** -16.9460*** 27.01644*** 556.6627*** -12.8085*** -18.1222*** 26.7914*** 
 Small firms -9.7829*** 781.3469*** -9.6020*** -9.2591*** 6.1197*** 2698.8309*** -36.1532*** -43.2849*** 62.5445*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-16.3185*** 562.6230*** -6.7882*** -10.1567*** 15.0340*** 2066.9206*** -32.0478*** -51.8372*** 84.2749*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-5.4698*** 539.1561*** -2.1751** -3.7533*** 2.5382*** 2004.8169*** -27.3965*** -35.2282*** 50.7549*** 
(C/K)*FD6 Large  firms -13.4476*** 203.0110*** -2.3151** -3.7569*** 4.8512*** 533.7700*** -15.1835*** -17.7654*** 25.3606*** 
 Small firms -12.2681*** 832.9939*** -4.5469* -4.5692*** 7.6440*** 1399.8203*** -13.9016*** -16.8691*** 24.2720*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-10.2340*** 500.4782*** -6.2451*** -8.3653*** 12.1736*** 938.3997*** -18.9032*** -22.4555*** 32.3306*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-20.4210*** 707.2136*** -4.5871*** -5.5082*** 8.0669*** 1491.6034*** -18.6010*** -23.7806*** 333.8715*** 
(D/K)*FD6 Large  firms -5.4440*** 332.4972*** -6.1978*** -8.5940*** 12.7811*** 332.4972*** -6.1978*** -8.5940*** 12.7811*** 
 Small firms -9.7829*** 1143.5217*** -15.4322*** -15.7574*** 16.8089*** 1370.6549*** -18.9597*** -19.8229*** 23.4127*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
-10.0699*** 402.6638*** -4.2269*** -6.3084*** 7.6713*** 938.3997*** -18.9032*** -22.4555*** 32.3306*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
-4.3328*** 933.6008*** -14.3148*** -15.2934*** 15.5145*** 1544.9293*** -22.4727*** -26.3950*** 35.6258*** 
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TableA5.2 (cont’d): the result of panel unit root test for the series in the model (sub-sample) (when controlling for the cross 
sectional dependence in the panel).  
 
 
 
Variable  Sub-sample Im-
Pesaran
-Shin 
Fisher ADF Fisher PP 
  W-t-bar Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
Inverse chi-
square 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit Modified 
inv. Chi-
squared 
(C/K)*FD7 Large  firms - 358.4429*** -12.6009*** -27.1781*** 14.6425*** 1242.7253*** -24.6561*** -47.0099*** 69.6703*** 
 Small firms - 1551.0715*** -20.0896*** -37.2121*** 28.8374*** 2627.0010*** -26.8136*** -44.8463*** 60.4282*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
- 710.8976*** -12.4659*** -22.3049*** 21.8589*** 1418.1736*** -21.0658*** -36.8214*** 54.4140*** 
 Low dividend 
firms 
- 1176.8116*** -19.1571*** -38.8478*** 23.5156*** 2389.9801*** -27.7730*** -47.1081*** 63.4259*** 
(D/K)*FD7 Large  firms - 313.14181*** -10.0757*** -23.3529*** 11.7873*** 1215.4054*** -23.5365*** -45.9556*** 67.9628*** 
 Small firms - 1316.8605*** -15.1383*** -29.9698*** 21.9248*** 3008.5498*** -34.5091*** -52.8683*** 71.6697*** 
 High dividend 
firms 
- 1512.6989*** -23.7565*** -20.3678*** 58.7648*** 2488.0106*** -39.1739*** -66.7578*** 103.6572**
* 
 Low dividend 
firms 
- 842.7921*** -12.9118*** -26.2859*** 12.5271*** 1987.0697*** -24.1349 -38.7027*** 50.1711*** 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Figure B6.1: The recursive estimation of the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector 
Figure B6.1.1 The effect of banking sector development (size measure) on the Interest 
rate pass-through model (fd1) 
 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd1, Eval mrr-fd1, Eval 3tdep-fd1, Eval 6tdep-fd1, Eval 12tdep-fd1, Eval 2ytdep-fd1, and Eval sav-fd1 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.2 The effect of banking sector development (activity measure) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd2) 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd2, Eval mrr-fd2, Eval 3tdep-fd2, Eval 6tdep-fd2, Eval 12tdep-fd2, Eval 2ytdep-fd2, and Eval sav-fd2 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.3 The effect of banking competition on the Interest rate pass-through model 
(fd3) 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd3, Eval mrr-fd3, Eval 3tdep-fd3, Eval 6tdep-fd3, Eval 12tdep-fd3, Eval 2ytdep-fd3, and Eval sav-fd3 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.4 The effect of capital market development (size measure) on the Interest 
rate pass-through model (fd4) 
 
 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd4, Eval mrr-fd4, Eval 3tdep-fd4, Eval 6tdep-fd4, Eval 12tdep-fd4, Eval 2ytdep-fd4, and Eval sav-fd4 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.5 The effect of capital market development (activity measure) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd5) 
 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd5, Eval mrr-fd5, Eval 3tdep-fd5, Eval 6tdep-fd5, Eval 12tdep-fd5, Eval 2ytdep-fd5, and Eval sav-fd5 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.6 The effect of  bond market development (financial innovation) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd6) 
 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd6, Eval mrr-fd6, Eval 3tdep-fd6, Eval 6tdep-fd6, Eval 12tdep-fd6, Eval 2ytdep-fd6, and Eval sav-fd6 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.1.7 The effect of  financial liberalization on the Interest rate pass-through 
model (fd7) 
 
 
 
Note: Eval mlr-fd7, Eval mrr-fd7, Eval 3tdep-fd7, Eval 6tdep-fd7, Eval 12tdep-fd7, Eval 2ytdep-fd7, and Eval sav-fd7 
represent the eigenvalue of the cointegrating vector for the model of the effect of banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1) on minimum lending rate (mlr), minimum retail rate (mrr), 3 month deposit interest rate (3tdep), 6 month 
deposit interest rate (6tdep), 12 month deposit interest rate (12tdep), 2 year deposit interest rate (2ytdep), and saving interest 
rate (sav) respectively. 
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Figure B6.2: The recursive estimation of  coefficient 
Figure B6.2.1 The effect of banking sector development (size measure) on the Interest 
rate pass-through model (fd1) 
 
 Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd1, beta  mrr-mpfd1, beta 3tdep-
mpfd1, beta 6tdep-mpfd1, beta 12tdep-mpfd1, beta 2ytdep-mpfd1, and beta sav-mpfd1 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking sector development (size 
measure:fd1). Each beta coefficient if estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, 
minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest 
rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.2 The effect of banking sector development (activity measure) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd2) 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd2, beta  mrr-mpfd2, beta 3tdep-
mpfd2, beta 6tdep-mpfd2, beta 12tdep-mpfd2, beta 2ytdep-mpfd2, and beta sav-mpfd2 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking sector development (activity 
measure:fd2). Each beta coefficient if estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, 
minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest 
rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.3 The effect of banking competition on the Interest rate pass-through model 
(fd3) 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd3, beta  mrr-mpfd3, beta 3tdep-
mpfd3, beta 6tdep-mpfd3, beta 12tdep-mpfd3, beta 2ytdep-mpfd3, and beta sav-mpfd3 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking competition. Each beta coefficient if 
estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month 
deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest 
rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.4 The effect of capital market development (size measure) on the Interest 
rate pass-through model (fd4) 
 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd4, beta  mrr-mpfd4, beta 3tdep-
mpfd4, beta 6tdep-mpfd4, beta 12tdep-mpfd4, beta 2ytdep-mpfd4, and beta sav-mpfd4 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking competition. Each beta coefficient if 
estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month 
deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest 
rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.5 The effect of capital market development (activity measure) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd5) 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd5, beta  mrr-mpfd5, beta 3tdep-
mpfd5, beta 6tdep-mpfd5, beta 12tdep-mpfd5, beta 2ytdep-mpfd5, and beta sav-mpfd5 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking competition. Each beta coefficient if 
estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month 
deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest 
rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.6 The effect of  bond market development (financial innovation) on the 
Interest rate pass-through model (fd6) 
 
 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd6, beta  mrr-mpfd6, beta 3tdep-
mpfd6, beta 6tdep-mpfd6, beta 12tdep-mpfd6, beta 2ytdep-mpfd6, and beta sav-mpfd6 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking competition. Each beta coefficient if 
estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month 
deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest 
rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.2.7 The effect of financial liberalization on the Interest rate pass-through 
model (fd7) 
 
 
Note: beta mlr-mp, beta  mrr-mp, beta 3tdep-mp, beta 6tdep-mp, beta 12tdep-mp, beta 2ytdep-mp, and beta sav-mp represent 
the beta coefficient of  policy interest rate variable in the cointegrating vector. beta mlr-mpfd7, beta  mrr-mpfd7, beta 3tdep-
mpfd7, beta 6tdep-mpfd7, beta 12tdep-mpfd7, beta 2ytdep-mpfd7, and beta sav-mpfd7 represent the beta coefficient of the 
cointegrating vector of the interaction term variable (policy interest rate and the banking competition. Each beta coefficient if 
estimated based on different retail interest rates equations (minimum lending rate, mlr, minimum retail rate, mrr, 3 month 
deposit interest rate, 3tdep, 6 month deposit interest rate, 6tdep, 12 month deposit interest rate, 12tdep, 2 year deposit interest 
rate, 2ytdep, and saving interest rate, sav respectively). 
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Figure B6.3: the recursive estimation of the short-run pass-through model 
Figure B6.3.1: the effect of banking sector development (size measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd1) 
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Figure B6.3.1 (cont’d): the effect of banking sector development (size measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd1) 
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Figure B6.3.2: the effect of banking sector development (activity measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd2) 
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Figure B6.3.2 (cont’d): the effect of banking sector development (activity measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd2) 
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Figure B6.3.3: the effect of banking competition on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd3) 
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Figure B6.3.3(cont’d): the effect of banking competition on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd3) 
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Figure B6.3.4: the effect of capital market development (size measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd4) 
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Figure B6.3.4 (cont’d): the effect of capital market development (size measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd4) 
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Figure B6.3.5: the effect of capital market development (activity measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd5) 
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Figure B6.3.5 (cont’d): the effect of capital market development (activity measure) on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd5) 
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Figure B6.3.6: the effect of bond market development on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd6) 
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Figure B6.3.6 (cont’d): the effect of bond market development on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd6) 
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Figure B6.3.7: the effect of financial liberalization on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd7) 
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Figure B6.3.7 (cont’d): the effect of financial liberalization on the Interest rate pass-through model (fd7) 
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